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Introduction
Peter Fonagy has been described as ‘one of the most acclaimed child psychologists of his gen-
eration’, and as leading a ‘revolution’ in the theory and delivery of therapeutic services.1 He 
has published over 500 scientific papers and 260 chapters, and has authored or co- authored 
19 books. Since 2003, he has served as Chief Executive of the Anna Freud National Centre for 
Children and Families in London and, since 2008, as Head of the Division of Psychology and 
Language Sciences at University College London. He has also had a major role in UK health 
policy, including as Chair of the Outcomes Measurement Reference Group at the Department 
of Health, Chair of two National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) Guideline 
Development Groups, Chair of the Strategy Group for National Occupational Standards for 
Psychological Therapies, and co- chair of the Department of Health’s Expert Reference Group 
on Vulnerable Children. In 2015, he was the first UK recipient of the Wiley Prize of the British 
Academy for Outstanding Achievements in Psychology by an international scholar.
Fonagy’s research has been highly interdisciplinary, moving from psychoanalysis to at-
tachment theory, and from attachment theory to a wider agenda in developmental psycho-
pathology. He has attracted collaborators from among the most talented researchers and 
clinicians from various disciplines. These collaborations have combined with Fonagy’s re-
markable receptivity and desire to learn to contribute to sustained theoretical change and 
elaboration over the decades. Yet, this continually evolving theory poses difficulties for 
readers in understanding and applying the approach. Fonagy has joked that readers of a psy-
chological theory can ‘imprint’ on the work of one era, failing to see changes in a theorist’s 
stance or in the meaning given to terminology.2 On the one hand, there may be an undertow 
from early impressions, which lead later developments to be ignored or downplayed. Equally, 
someone familiar with the later work of Fonagy and colleagues may miss out on many in-
sights from earlier periods that have not subsequently seen sustained attention. They may 
also miss the underpinning architecture of the ideas, which comes into focus most clearly 
when the diverse writings of Fonagy and colleagues are considered together and over time.
The volume and spread of these writings have also, to date, contributed to the lack of an 
integrative overview and evaluation.3 This will be our central goal here, continuing work 
in an earlier book— Cornerstones of Attachment Research— offering an integrative appraisal 
 1 Doward, J. and Hall, S. (2019). ‘Therapy Saved a Refugee Child. Fifty Years on, He’s Leading a Mental 
Health Revolution’. Guardian, 27 April. Accessed at: https:// www.theguardian.com/ society/ 2019/ apr/ 27/ 
peter- fonagy- refugee- child- psychologist- anna- freud- centre.
 2 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Mutual Regulation, Mentalization, and Therapeutic Action: A Reflection on the 
Contributions of Ed Tronick to Developmental and Psychotherapeutic Thinking’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 
35(4): 355– 369: ‘As with Freud, Bowlby’s critics were often apparently imprinted with the initial model; their atti-
tude of hostility did not permit noting the change in Bowlby’s view’ (p. 357). Perhaps the most widespread case in 
the reception of the work of Fonagy and colleagues has been that the majority of readers seem to have imprinted on 
the idea of ‘pre- mentalizing’ states, as a kind of regression to childhood thinking, failing to notice that this has been 
replaced by the idea of ‘non- mentalizing states’ (see Chapter 5).
 3 Liljenfors, R., and Lundh, L. G. (2015). ‘Mentalization and Intersubjectivity towards a Theoretical Integration’. 
Psychoanalytic Psychology, 32(1): 36– 60. ‘This theoretical framework, which we will refer to as the theory of 
mentalization, is probably not yet to be seen as a full- fledged theory. Rather it is as a framework which is still 
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of the ideas of major psychological theorists who have engaged with ideas of attachment.4 
Cornerstones of Attachment Research presents a comprehensive analysis of the ideas of 
Bowlby, Ainsworth, Main and Hesse, Sroufe and Egeland, and Shaver and Mikulincer. The 
present book can certainly be read independently, but— in Chapters 3 and 7 especially— is 
also a continuation of the ongoing story of attachment research, and its attendant strengths 
and weaknesses.
The need for an integrative overview and evaluation additionally stems from the segmen-
tation of the audience of the works of Fonagy and colleagues. In a sense, each audience has 
had direct access to only a ‘part object’, obstructing both their evaluation and their use of the 
contributions of Fonagy and colleagues. Readers who know the work of Fonagy and col-
leagues on randomized trials may not know their work on the details of clinical technique, 
hindering their sense of how the clinical modality actually should work in practice. Readers 
who know the work of Fonagy and colleagues in attachment theory may have only a general 
sense of the model of modes of non- mentalizing, not only obscuring the fundamentals of the 
account of pathology but also of factors that undermine attachment security. Readers who 
have trained in delivering mentalization- based therapy may nonetheless not know the re-
cent thinking of Fonagy and colleagues about the primary unconscious and, as a result, may 
push at closed doors with patients, or even deliver therapy in ways that make their patients’ 
symptoms worse.
We acknowledge that there are limitations to a review of written texts as a methodology 
for understanding a living psychological theory. Not least, the textual record offers an opaque 
window on the process by which, and the context within which, scientific and theoretical 
work was actually completed. Because this process and context shapes the very meaning 
of the work, this is a significant deficiency. One partial solution is to read the penumbra of 
wider texts in order to understand the interventions that were intended by a particular work; 
another partial solution is to supplement the published record with unpublished sources in 
the public domain, when these are available.5 A further strategy is to receive and integrate 
feedback from the psychological theorists themselves, in this case Fonagy and colleagues. 
All these solutions have been pursued, but they offer only an incomplete fix. In particular, it 
should be highlighted that we are not mentalization- based therapists: we have no doubt that 
this would be a different book, and have different strengths, if we had been trained and were 
practitioners in this modality.
The reader should also note that the phrase ‘Fonagy and colleagues’, often used in this 
book, refers to a complex assemblage of people, discourses, institutional structures and pri-
orities, research funding, scientific tools, clinical settings— and their interaction. It is both 
a collective endeavour of thought and effort, and a product of the achievements and trajec-
tory of individual scholars within this group, with different areas of expertise.6 The theory is 
developing’ (p. 37). In our view, there is no contradiction between the status of full- fledged theory and ongoing 
development.
 4 Duschinsky, R. (2020). Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 5 Skinner, Q. (2002). Visions of Politics: Regarding Method, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 6 Griffin, R. J. (2019). ‘The Profession of Authorship’, in Simon Eliot and Jonathan Rose (eds), A Companion to 
the History of the Book, New York: Wiley, pp. 773– 785. In a sense, ‘Fonagy’, like the Crown in medieval legal and 
constitutional theory, has both individual and corporate identities.
‘Fonagy’ refers to an individual person, Peter Fonagy, who holds certain attitudes and has pursued certain ac-
tions. Yet, ‘Fonagy’ also refers to the embodiment of the assemblage of theoretical work occurring under his aegis. 
In this book, the phrase ‘Fonagy and colleagues’ is an attempt to signal the corporate identity, and ‘Peter Fonagy’ 
is invoked to refer to the individual person. However, there is inevitable instability: this division does not always 
hold. Maitland, F. W. (2003). State, Trust and Corporation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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the result of what Hutchins calls ‘distributed cognition’, a network of processes that together 
create effects greater than the sum of their parts (see Chapter 7).7 This collective contribution 
has been frequently highlighted by Fonagy: ‘The work summarized in this paper is the result 
of a collaborative effort of a group of wonderfully talented individuals who have honoured 
the author with their friendship over the past years.’8 He joked in a paper from 2000: ‘This 
paper is a preliminary report of an ongoing collaboration with friends and colleagues Mary 
Target, George Gergely, and Efrain Bleiberg. Many of the ideas presented are theirs, but if 
they should be well received the author will have no hesitation in taking credit for them.’9 The 
differences between the multifaceted labour of clinical and research work and its frontstage, 
published description is just one of the many limitations of any historical review dependent 
on texts. However, one opportunity stemming from a comprehensive review of written texts 
over time is the chance for perspective taking.
Clarification of terms and concepts
Joseph Sandler, Fonagy’s friend and predecessor as Freud Professor at University College 
London, was very concerned to give theoretical terms due scrutiny and consideration. 
Sandler emphasized that, just as humans need to engage in reality testing in order to benefit 
from both fantasy and perception, so psychological theory itself needs to treated with due 
seriousness and be subject to ‘concept testing’. Because concepts help guide perception and 
thought, they will benefit from discussion, appraisal and, at times, ‘adaptive reorganization’ 
in order to remain in good working condition.10 He acknowledged that concepts need some 
elasticity in order to ‘take up the strain of theoretical change, absorbing it while more or-
ganized newer theories or part- theories can develop’; yet he also worried ‘concepts become 
stretched to encompass new insights and new ideas. Often such an expansion of the meaning 
of a conceptual term is not explicit’, and this can cause confusion and hinder scientific and 
clinical developments.11 Sandler observed that there can be resistance to efforts to appraise 
concepts that seem to work well enough for pragmatic purposes, even when it is known that 
their use nonetheless has resulted in significant disadvantages:
 7 Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. On psychoanalytic theory as an ‘inter-
active’ product of individual thinkers and of the collective capacities of communities, see Winnicott, D. W. ([un-
dated] 2016). ‘Outline for a Study in the Sociology of Knowledge’, in Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson 
(eds), The Collected Works of D.W. Winnicott, Volume 9, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 391– 394.
 8 For example, Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach to Self Pathology’. 
Journal of Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576: George Moran, George Gergely, Miriam and Howard Steele, Helen 
Stein, John Allen, Efrain Bleiberg, Anthony Bateman, and Liz Allison are listed (p. 544).
 9 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Attachment and Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 48(4): 1129– 1146, p. 1129.
 10 Sandler, J. (1962). ‘Research in Psycho- Analysis— The Hampstead Index as an Instrument of Psycho- Analytic 
Research’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43: 287– 291, p. 289. For varying examples of this scrutiny 
of psychoanalytic concepts, see e.g. Sandler, J. (1960). ‘On the Concept of Superego’. The Psychoanalytic Study of 
the Child, 15(1): 128– 162; Sandler, J. and Rosenblatt, B. (1962). ‘The Concept of the Representational World’. The 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 17(1): 128– 145; Sandler, J., Dreher, A. U., and Drews, S. (1991). ‘An Approach 
to Conceptual Research in Psychoanalysis Illustrated by a Consideration of Psychic Trauma’. International Review 
of Psycho- Analysis, 18(2): 133– 141. Sandler’s critical examination of the concept of the ‘preconscious’ can be re-
garded, in retrospect, as important groundwork for Fonagy’s work. See Sandler, J. and Sandler, A. M. (1994). 
‘The Past Unconscious and the Present Unconscious: A Contribution to a Technical Frame of Reference’. The 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 49(1): 278– 292, p. 280.
 11 Sandler, J. (1983). ‘Reflections on Some Relations between Psychoanalytic Concepts and Psychoanalytic 
Practice’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 64: 35– 45, pp. 35– 36.
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The fact that they work well may in turn lead to an undue resistance to the progressive in-
tegration and modification of our concepts, so necessary for scientific development. This 
resistance can partly be overcome by the cultivation of a critical attitude towards our ideas, 
by discussion with colleagues, and by honest reading of the literature, but unless we are 
directly confronted with contradictions in our thinking, resistance to change due to sec-
ondary gains may prove too great.12
Sandler discussed various forms of ‘secondary gain’: use of imprecise or contradictory con-
cepts can help avoid battles with authorities with stakes in the use of these concepts;13 it 
can help build apparent consensus; it allows a variety of people to project their own precon-
scious part- theories and fantasies on to the concept and feel satisfied with it. There may also 
be ways in which general concepts have their own acuity: after all, to see a blurred picture 
clearly is to see a blurred picture.14 Many of these forms of secondary gain, both positive and 
negative, can be seen in the case of Melanie Klein’s concept of ‘projective identification’ (see 
Chapter 6).15 However, Sandler felt that these forms of secondary gain should not distract 
from the harm unscrutinized concepts make to the effectiveness of causal claims, or the ef-
fectiveness of communication between groups.16
Fonagy has been a strong advocate of such attempts to confront contradictions and 
achieve integration in psychological theory: ‘while the clarification of terms and concepts is 
laborious, it is possible. It is also essential if we are to find out where theoretical differences 
are real, and to test these against each other, and where they may only be imagined.’17 Though 
these were certainly not rigid steps, in Fonagy’s view, the essence of Sandler’s approach was 
‘to explore the history of a term or concept in psychoanalysis, then to elaborate on the mul-
tiple and frequently mutually incompatible meanings attached to the term. Having analysed 
the historical changes in terminology, he explains how misconceptions emerged or discus-
sions at different levels of abstraction were conflated. Then, with a minimal number of as-
sumptions, he proposes a highly economical model that encompasses the multiple uses of 
the varying meanings of the construct under scrutiny.’18 The function of such work is similar 
to a conceptual meta- analysis, as a concept’s aggregate relationships with other concepts are 
described and moderators identified that can account for variation between uses. Fonagy 
 12 Sandler, J. (1962). ‘Research in Psycho- Analysis— The Hampstead Index as an Instrument of Psycho- Analytic 
Research’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43: 287– 291, p. 290.
 13 For further reflections on gerontocracy and the ensuing problems for conceptual development, see Fonagy, 
P. (2009). ‘When Analysts Need to Retire: The Taboo of Ageing in Psychoanalysis’, in B. Willock, R. Curtis, and 
L. Bohm (eds), Taboo or not Taboo? Forbidden Thoughts, Forbidden Acts in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, 
London: Karnac Books, pp. 209– 227.
 14 Sandler, J. (1960). ‘On the Concept of Superego’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 15(1): 128– 162: ‘the 
Index has functioned rather like a microscope, and as in the examination of physical tissues, increasing magnifi-
cation may cause grosser structures to disappear from sight— but this by no means implies that they cease to exist’ 
(pp. 144– 145). See also Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell.
 15 Sandler, J. (1987). ‘The Concept of Projective Identification’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 10(1): 33– 49. 
See also Sandler, J. (1993). ‘On Communication from Patient to Analyst: Not Everything is Projective Identification’. 
The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74: 1097– 1107.
 16 Sandler, J. (1987). From Safety to Superego, London: Karnac Books.
 17 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘On the Relationship of Experimental Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Commentary by 
Peter Fonagy (London)’. Neuropsychoanalysis, 2(2): 222– 232, p. 226.
 18 Fonagy, P. (2005). ‘An overview of Joseph Sandler’s Key Contributions to Theoretical and Clinical 
Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 25(2): 120– 147, p. 139. See also Bohleber, W., Fonagy, P., Jiménez, J. P., 
Scarfone, D., Varvin, S., and Zysman, S. (2013). ‘Towards a Better Use of Psychoanalytic Concepts: A Model 
Illustrated Using the Concept of Enactment’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 94(3): 501– 530. While the 
criteria proposed by Bohleber, Fonagy, and colleagues have not been followed strictly in examining the concepts of 
mentalization theory, they have been held in mind: relevance, falsifiability, operational definition, internal consist-
ency, contextual consistency, parsimony, and (optional) extra- psychoanalytic convergence.
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appreciated that Sandler’s methodology encompassed both attention to the wider context 
and developments over time, and an attempt to proactively and constructively synthesize 
these developments to draw relevant distinctions in how a concept has been used. In this 
way, it allowed theory to ‘stop and rewind’ to identify the points at which different perspec-
tives in use of a concept came to diverge and contribute to misunderstanding. In their 2003 
book Psychoanalytic Theories, clearly influenced by Sandler, Fonagy and Target presented a 
historical and conceptual review of psychoanalysis attentive to the role of varying meaning 
of psychoanalytic concepts, and attempting to clarify and integrate difficulties these had 
caused.19 This included, impressively, a frank appraisal of limitations with their own theory 
and terminology at the time, and especially with the term ‘mentalizing’ (see Chapter 4).
With Sandler’s studies in mind, as well as approaches from the sociology of science,20 this 
book will explore 18 concepts that integrally organize the contributions of Fonagy and col-
leagues: adaptation, aggression, the alien self, culture, disorganized attachment, epistemic 
trust, hypermentalizing, reflective function, the p- factor, pretend mode, the primary uncon-
scious, psychic equivalence, mentalizing, mentalization- based therapy, non- mentalizing, the 
self, sexuality, and teleological mode. As with Sandler’s work, the analysis of key concepts is 
appreciative as well as critical, and intended to facilitate the success of the overall enterprise. 
We are mindful that matters such as terminological precision and the articulation of cat-
egories are not the priority of individual pragmatic researchers or clinicians. Furthermore, 
the work of Fonagy and colleagues offers an unprecedented integration of ideas from across 
different disciplines; it is inevitable that there remain some loose threads. Nonetheless, prob-
lems with the articulation of concepts and loose threads, which may be only minor irritants 
on a particular occasion, may cause wide- ranging issues for a field, played out incrementally 
over decades, with costs mounting.21 For instance, while the underspecification of concepts 
may contribute at times to their appeal by offering a screen for diverse projections, this pre-
dicament can also contribute to miscommunication, self- doubt, and reduced acuity when 
the concepts need to be used for practical work.22
We have attempted to identify areas for theoretical refinement and loose threads, and, 
where possible, suggest a potential resolution or propose what future research needs to be 
done. For instance, in Chapter 4, we scope the diversity of ways the concept of ‘mentalization’ 
has been used— not as a criticism on the grounds of incoherence— but precisely as a means 
of attempting to synthesize a new definition. It is hoped that our overview and analysis 
will help those using the ideas of Fonagy and colleagues understand their underlying co-
herence and architecture, as well as a number of current limitations, and help researchers 
on mentalization and epistemic trust identify priorities for future research and theoretical 
development.
Our aim has been to offer reflections that are friendly and constructive, and actionable 
whenever possible. Exploration of tensions in the use of these concepts by Fonagy and col-
leagues is by no means a rejection of them, but rather an attempt to understand what problem 
 19 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications.
 20 For further reflections on method in our studies of psychological theory, see Duschinsky, R. (2019). 
‘Attachment and the Archive: Barriers and Facilitators to the Use of Historical Sociology as Complementary 
Developmental Science’. Science in Context, 32(3): 309– 326.
 21 This is a major theme of Duschinsky, R. (2020). Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
 22 See e.g. Hutsebaut, J., Bales, D. L., Busschbach, J. J., and Verheul, R. (2012). ‘The Implementation of 
Mentalization- Based Treatment for Adolescents: A Case Study from an Organizational, Team and Therapist 
Perspective’. International Journal of Mental Health Systems, 6(1): 10.
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or problems they aim to solve, how, and with what consequences for the theory as a whole. 
As Brecht observed in one of his dialogues, understanding a system of thought has analo-
gies to understanding the dynamics of a family.23 Much like any family, concepts in such a 
system can sometimes be seen supporting one another, sometimes changing and improving 
themselves to offer better support in the future; sometimes they can be seen squabbling, 
sometimes sharpening their knives for the next squabble. Like members of a family, each has 
to compromise their own integrity at times for the sake of the group: they may be forced to 
be more pragmatic, more complicated, more confused, or isolated from others outside the 
family, or even compromise links with reality for the sake of the family. At the same time, 
each member may also be sustained, in a deeper sense, by the family’s collective capacities. 
The mode of life of concepts can be missed, however, if their self- presentation is taken at 
face value. It is not hard for concepts to sit down for dinner, or pose for a family photo, as if 
nothing had happened. But this may be far from the whole story.
The analysis of concepts entails careful thought about the language used to hold them. The 
language of psychological research and theory is a deceptively complex, multi- level system; 
this system has various entries and exits and opportunities for getting lost.24 The complexity 
is further compounded by the interdisciplinarity of the work of Fonagy and colleagues, as 
terms from various discourses are taken up, often adapted, and worked into new configur-
ations, retaining some of their previous connotations even as they become invested with a 
degree of technical or context- specific meaning. Fonagy and colleagues have attempted to 
avoid unnecessary abstraction, and remain close to ordinary language whenever possible. 
Their concepts have been developed not solely for academics or as a ‘common language’ 
for clinicians.25 Another intended function has been for use in psychoeducation with pa-
tients. However, this then raises the ongoing challenge, in making sense of their work, of 
distinguishing between technical and ordinary uses of familiar words such as ‘self ’, ‘mental’, 
‘adaption’, and ‘disorganization’. Careful scrutiny is therefore needed of the use of concepts 
across texts and over time to understand their meanings. For the book, definitions and uses 
of terms were identified from a complete examination of published works co- authored or 
authored by Peter Fonagy, Liz Allison, Anthony Bateman, Chloe Campbell, Marco Chiesa, 
György Gergely, Patrick Luyten, Howard Steele, Miriam Steele, and Mary Target. This was 
supplemented by study of relevant grey literature by these researchers. The writings of 
other researchers in the wider collaborative network— dubbed wryly by Fonagy and others 
as the ‘mentalization mafia’26— were also extensively consulted. These included Jon Allen, 
Eia Asen, Dickon Bevington, Efrain Bleiberg, Jessie Borelli, Martin Debbané, Karin Ensink, 
Jeremy Holmes, Elliot Jurist, Sigmund Karterud, Alessandra Lemma, Linda Mayes, Nick 
Midgley, Tobias Nolte, Carla Sharp, Finn Skårderud, Arietta Slade, and Lane Strathearn.
 23 Brecht, B. ([1961] 2019). Refugee Dialogues, trans. Tom Kuhn, London: Bloomsbury, p. 63.
 24 Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘Interview’, in L. E. Rubinstein (ed.), Talking about Supervision: 10 Questions, 10 
Analysts = 100 Answers, London: International Psychoanalytic Association, pp. 39– 49: ‘Language carries its own 
intelligence. It’s important to bear in mind that people’s thinking is organized by their language. Knowing that 
helps you. Sometimes you make terrible mistakes: the language drives particular parts of content and you cannot 
drive it away from that’ (pp. 43– 44). See also Cavell, S. (1994). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 
Romanticism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 25 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380, p. 375.
 26 E.g. Fonagy, P. (2013). ‘Mentalization Based Interventions and a Mechanism of Change in Psychological 
Therapy’. Improving Access to Psychological Therapies. Accessed at: http:// www.uco.es/ informacion/ webs/ 
fundacioncastilla/ documentos/ archivos/ simposium/ 2013- simposio/ presentaciones/ fonagy- pres.pdf.
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Central collaborators
Fonagy has described opportunities for collaborative work as the greatest pleasure in his profes-
sional life.27 Over time, he has co- authored works with countless colleagues. However, five sets 
of central collaborators can be picked out as playing a special role in pooling ideas and efforts.
A first set characterizes Fonagy’s early work, during the 1980s. These are George Moran and 
Anna Higgitt.
George Moran served as Director of the Anna Freud Centre from October 1987 until his 
death at the age of 40 in January 1992. During these years, Fonagy was a trainee child ana-
lyst receiving supervision at the Centre. In turn, Moran was pursuing a PhD under Fonagy’s 
supervision, exploring the relationship between blood sugar regulation and regulation of 
emotional state in diabetic children. Moran’s doctoral research with Fonagy ‘became the 
playing- working field on which a deep and mutually affectionate friendship and working 
relationship was established and flourished. It was a relationship in which mutual respect 
was enhanced by hours of discussion, debate and disagreement to force into view the best 
approximation of truth that friends and collaborators could muster.’28
Anna Higgitt is a consultant psychiatrist and clinical leader in a community mental health 
team. From 1997, she has also held a role as senior policy adviser to the Department of 
Health.29 Higgitt and Fonagy married in 1990.
A second set characterizes Fonagy’s work in the early and mid- 1990s. As well as Anna 
Higgitt, the two other key collaborators were Howard and Miriam Steele.
Howard and Miriam Steele arrived in London in 1986 to undertake doctoral research at 
University College London and clinical training at the Anna Freud Centre. Between 1987 
and 1989, the Steeles conducted the Adult Attachment Interview with 100 expectant mothers 
and fathers in the third trimester. They also collected 96 infant– mother Strange Situation ob-
servations when the children were 12 months old, and 90 infant– father Strange Situation ob-
servations at 18 months. This was the basis for the University College London Parent– Child 
Project. Together with Fonagy, Howard and Miriam Steele, and Anna Higgitt developed 
the Reflecting Functioning Scale for the Adult Attachment Interview. Howard and Miriam 
Steele left London for the New School of Social Research in New York in 2001. They now hold 
Chairs in the Clinical Psychology Faculty and co- direct the Center for Attachment Research.
A third set are researchers with whom Fonagy elaborated the theory of mentalization in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Though diverse researchers were part of a wider community developing 
and thinking about these themes, Fonagy was especially influenced by his collaboration with 
Mary Target and György Gergely.
Mary Target pursued doctoral study with Fonagy, using a retrospective study of patient 
records at the Anna Freud Centre to evaluate the effectiveness of the service. Target had 
come from a background of a decade of work as a clinical psychologist in acute adult psy-
chiatric services and child and adolescent mental health. She also trained as a psychoanalyst 
while completing her doctorate. Together with Fonagy, she published the influential series 
 27 Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘E- interview with Dominic Fannon’. Psychiatric Bulletin, 31(9): 360: ‘What part of your 
work gives you the most satisfaction? Collaborating with colleagues in creating innovative treatment approaches, 
designing joint projects and writing as a team’ (p. 360).
 28 Solnit, A. J. (1992). ‘George Stritch Moran: A Personal Appreciation’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 
15(4): 267– 268, p. 268.
 29 Baruch, G., Fonagy, P., and Robins, D. (eds) (2007). Reaching the Hard to Reach: Evidence- Based Funding 
Priorities for Intervention and Research, John Wiley & Sons, p. x.
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of papers on ‘Playing with Reality’ in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis, and a co- 
authored book, Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
in 2003. She is now Professor of Psychoanalysis at University College London, and a psycho-
analyst in private practice. (In her clinical work, she practises under her maiden name, Mary 
Hepworth.)
György Gergely is a Hungarian clinical psychologist and experimental researcher as-
sociated with the Central European University in Budapest. Between 1996 and 1999, he 
was Visiting Senior Lecturer at University College London.30 During this time, his con-
cept of ‘teleological mode’ as a form of non- mentalizing was integrated into Fonagy’s work. 
Together with Fonagy, Target, and Elliot Jurist, he was one of the authors of the 2002 book, 
Affect Regulation, Mentalization and the Development of the Self. He is also one of the ori-
ginators of natural pedagogy theory, which helped prompt Fonagy’s turn to concern with 
epistemic trust.
A fourth set of key collaborators are two researchers central to the development and 
validation of mentalization- based therapy (MBT), Anthony Bateman and Marco Chiesa. 
Increased funding was available in England for research on mental health services from 
2006, thanks to the creation of the National Institute of Health Research. The growing repu-
tation of the Anna Freud Centre also helped attract philanthropic donations to support 
research to develop and validate MBT, such as from the Borderline Personality Disorder 
Research Foundation and the Laurence Misener Charitable Trust.
Anthony Bateman is a consultant psychiatrist, Director of Psychotherapy Services and 
Research Lead at the St Ann’s Hospital, London. He is also a practising psychoanalyst. 
Bateman and Fonagy developed MBT as a manualized treatment modality. Bateman’s most 
recent publication is the second edition of the Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health 
Practice, co- edited with Fonagy.
Marco Chiesa was a consultant psychiatrist at the Cassel Hospital in Richmond from 
1991 to 2015, where he served as Director of the outpatient Adult Personality Disorder 
Service. He also pursued a private practice as a psychoanalyst.31 Together with Fonagy, he 
was principal investigator of the Cassel Personality Disorder Study, a trial of a mentalization- 
based approach to therapeutic intervention with patients with personality disorders. These 
patients were also followed up over subsequent decades to examine the long- term implica-
tions of treatment. Subsequently, Chiesa led a study of patient characteristics and treatment 
pathways using data from 14 psychotherapy services. He has also collaborated with Fonagy 
in studying associations between personality disorder and reflective function.
A fifth set of significant collaborators have had an especially influential role in Fonagy’s 
most recent work, and are co- authors on the landmark 2017 papers entitled ‘What we have 
changed our minds about’.32
Patrick Luyten is a clinical psychologist and psychodynamic psychotherapist, with fac-
ulty positions at University College London and KU Leuven. After qualifying as a clin-
ician, Luyten had conducted empirical work on depression and chronic fatigue syndrome 
 30 Details accessed at: https:// people.ceu.edu/ sites/ people.ceu.hu/ files/ profile/ attachment/ 1600/ gergelycv 
2012mayincl- natural- pedagogy- incl- richard- epiggle.pdf.
 31 Details accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ psychoanalysis/ people/ marco- chiesa.
 32 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What we have Changed our Minds 
about: Part 1. Borderline Personality Disorder as a Limitation of Resilience’. Borderline Personality Disorder 
and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 11; Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What we have 
Changed our Minds about: Part 2. Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental 
Significance of Social Communication’. Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9.
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at the University of Leuven and had previously collaborated with Sidney Blatt at Yale. It was 
through Blatt that Luyten was introduced to Fonagy. Luyten is now Director of the PhD in 
Psychoanalysis programme and Course Director of the PhD programme in Evidence- Based 
Child and Adolescent Mental Health at University College London. He also leads a treat-
ment service for patients with depression and functional somatic disorders at KU Leuven.33 
His recent research has included work on the effectiveness of clinical interventions, and the 
development of self- report measures of mentalization.
Elizabeth Allison is Director of the Psychoanalysis Unit at University College London, 
and a practising psychoanalyst. She has a doctorate in English literature from Oxford 
University.34 In writings with Fonagy, Allison has elaborated the idea of the primary uncon-
scious, and the implications of epistemic trust for clinical practice.
Chloe Campbell is Deputy Director of the Psychoanalysis Unit at University College 
London. Her doctoral study addressed themes of race and empire in the history of Kenya.35 
Together with Fonagy, she is one of the authors of the article ‘Bad Blood: 15 years on’, ad-
dressing the relationship between attachment theory and mentalization approaches.36 She 
has also contributed to current thinking about epistemic trust, especially drawing on inter-
disciplinary perspectives.
Overview of the book
After some biographical and contextual background in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 will 
detail Fonagy and Target’s development of the idea of ‘mentalizing’ in thinking about the 
meaning of borderline personality disorder (BPD). BPD is a psychiatric diagnosis identified 
on the basis of problems with ‘emotion dysregulation, impulsivity and social dysfunction’.37 
Chapter 3 will also consider the role of Howard and Miriam Steele and of attachment theory 
in shaping Fonagy’s thinking about mentalizing and child development. Chapter 4 will close 
by outlining Fonagy’s current position on mentalizing and identify transitions that have oc-
curred over time. Chapter 5 will address the three modes of ‘non- mentalizing’ identified 
by Fonagy and Target. These will each be explained in turn. The chapter will also inspect 
suggestions in the work of Fonagy and colleagues regarding reasons why, when mentalizing 
breaks down, it falls into these three forms.
Having situated the ideas of mentalizing and non- mentalizing, we will then consider what 
these mean for understanding human psychology. Chapter 6 will critically examine a key 
term in Fonagy’s vocabulary— ’the self ’— and consider the role of unconscious processes 
in the formation of thoughts and feelings. The chapter will also give attention to Fonagy’s 
discussions of the ‘alien self ’, and the role this psychological agency plays in sexuality and 
 33 Details accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ psychoanalysis/ people/ patrick- luyten.
 34 Details accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ psychoanalysis/ people/ liz- allison.
 35 Campbell, C. (2010). ‘Eugenics in Colonial Kenya’, in A. Bashford and P. Levine (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of Eugenics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 289– 300.
 36 Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2015). ‘Bad Blood Revisited: Attachment and Psychoanalysis, 2015’. British 
Journal of Psychotherapy, 31(2): 229– 250.
 37 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM- 5) lists nine criteria for BPD, of which five or 
more need to be met for a patient to receive a diagnosis. These are: unstable, intense relationships; inappropriate 
anger; frantic attempts to avoid abandonment; affective instability; impulsive and potentially self- damaging ac-
tions; recurrent self- injury or suicidality; chronic feelings of emptiness; paranoid thoughts or dissociative symp-
toms; and identity disturbances. See Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality 
Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds) Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 323– 334, p. 324.
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in aggressive behaviour. Chapter 7 will explore the conceptualization of mental illness 
proposed by Fonagy and colleagues. The chapter will begin by considering the interest in 
adaptation among Fonagy and colleagues, as part of a broader trend within developmental 
psychology. The importance placed on learning from experiences with others in the origins 
of mental health and illness will be described. The chapter will also consider the critique of 
diagnostic categories offered by Fonagy and colleagues, and their account of the nature and 
structure of mental illness.
Chapter 8 will draw out the implications of the previous five chapters for how Fonagy 
and colleagues have approached the task of therapeutic intervention. The chapter will de-
scribe “Mentalisation- based Therapy,” and the evidence so far regarding its effectiveness. 
Chapter 9 will also attempt to synthesize the diverse reflections of Fonagy and colleagues 
on mentalization and non- mentalization in social systems, which they have stated will be 
‘at the core of mentalizing endeavours in the future’.38 The chapter will give attention to the 
work of Fonagy and colleagues on the school as an institution, and the potential for schools 
to contribute to the psychological well- being of their pupils. The chapter will also consider 
the researchers’ reflections on preventative interventions and public health infrastructures. 
Finally, the chapter will consider Fonagy’s reflections on the contribution of wider culture 
to the capacity of individuals and institutions to sustain mentalization and promote mental 
health and well- being. The Conclusion will draw together the claims from across the pre-
vious chapters. It will highlight the particular strengths of the work of Fonagy and colleagues, 
and identify a number of outstanding questions that face their paradigm.
 38 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Introduction’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds) Handbook of 




On one level, this book has been designed to present an analysis of certain key concepts 
in the work of Fonagy and colleagues. However, simultaneously, we have also sought a 
structure that proceeds relatively chronologically, showing how later concepts built from 
earlier developments. One important such early development is the biographical context of 
Fonagy’s concerns as a researcher. Even if collective processes such as conceptual discourses 
have a certain autonomy (see Chapter 9), they are always closely related to individual minds, 
and this shapes their meaning. Fonagy has himself urged awareness that ‘behind the shifts 
in theories, techniques, and application are individuals whose sense of identity and ways of 
viewing the world have profoundly altered.’1 Especially over the past decade, he has repeat-
edly emphasized the importance of the biographical context within which his ideas and col-
laborations emerged. This chapter will offer three biographical snapshots, selected for their 
relevance for understanding the later trajectory of his thinking, as well as on the basis of the 
available textual record. The first will be Peter Fonagy’s experiences in the Fónagy household 
as a child in the 1950s. The second will be his psychoanalysis as a young man with Anne 
Hurry in the 1970s. Finally, close attention will be paid to Fonagy’s work with one of his early 
patients.
The Fónagy family
Peter was born to Judith and Ivan Fónagy in Hungary on 14 August 1952. Peter Fonagy has 
described his father, Ivan Fónagy, as the single person who has most inspired him.2 Ivan 
Fónagy was a Hungarian linguist, philosopher, and polymath. To develop his understanding 
of the development of language, he kept a diary of the early speech of his two children. This 
diary, excerpted in a book on Hungarian linguistics published in 1982, presents an initial 
view of the young Peter Fonagy.3 It also offers a sense of the intellectual preoccupations of the 
Fónagy home with both the developmental and interpersonal construction of meaning, and 
the developmental and interpersonal construal of difficult feelings. The chapter discussing 
the diary reflects Ivan Fónagy’s characteristic concern to weave together observed particu-
lars with general psychological phenomena. Psychoanalytic theory forms a general and 
 1 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Foreword’, in Peter Fonagy, Robert Michels, and Joseph Sandler (eds), Changing Ideas in a 
Changing World: The Revolution in Psychoanalysis. Essays in Honour of Arnold Cooper, London: Karnac Books, pp. 
xvii– xxiv, p. vii.
 2 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘I Would Like to Abolish Silo Working’. The Psychologist, 28: 948. Accessed at: https:// 
thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/ i- would- abolish- silo- working.
 3 Fónagy, I. (1982). ‘He is Only Joking (Joke, Metaphor and Language Development)’, in F. Kiefer (ed.), 
Hungarian Linguistics, Amsterdam: John Benjaminspp. 31– 108.
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subtly handled background to Ivan’s interpretations of material from the diary, but without 
the theory defining his answers in advance.
The first, and perhaps the most prominent, use of young Peter’s remarks in Ivan’s reflec-
tions on linguistics was in discussion of how the concrete and metaphoric meanings of terms 
may bleed into one another for children. For instance, the word ‘sweet’ can be used to refer to 
a concrete experience of taste, or to a general experience of something good. Ivan observed 
Peter, aged 2 years and 9 months, extending from the concrete meaning to the metaphoric 
meaning in asking about the fate of unpopular books in terms of their lack of ‘sweetness’ to 
children: ‘Books are printed again, says Peter’s mother, if children like them.— And if they 
are not sweet? asks Peter’.4 Ivan reflected that such closeness of concrete phenomena and 
their associated potential meanings for children can make internal experience and external 
perception uncomfortably close and difficult to distinguish: ‘There are no sharp borders be-
tween the personal, subjective and real universe which surrounds the child.’5
Second, Peter’s remarks are used to illustrate the role of jokes and pretending in negoti-
ating the terms under which an individual is inserted into meaning. Peter, aged 3, also told 
Ivan: ‘Daddy is not allowed to eat my pudding.’ When reproved by his grandfather, Peter 
retorted: ‘I was just kidding.’ Ivan was interested by the role that ‘pretend’ could play in such 
instances in turning an interaction into a ‘nonreal activity’.6 Pretend here had the social func-
tion of extracting, or attempting to extract, the real force of a person’s investment in and 
exposure to a social interaction. In Ivan’s analysis, to be just kidding disowns, in this case 
strategically, the intentionality of wanting all the pudding and depriving father of access to it.
Finally, Peter’s remarks are also used by Ivan to illustrate the role of caregivers in offering 
children access to the sense of what truth feels like. Ivan reported an interaction in which 
Peter, aged 3 years and 6 months, said to Judith: ‘Mummy, I can see in your eyes that I was 
lying again.’7 Peter’s statement was interpreted by Ivan as reflecting a condensation of the 
idea that the mother had ‘seen through’ Peter’s lie. However, it was also interpreted as repre-
senting Peter’s access to his own mind through the availability of the mother as a ‘mirror’, in 
which the lie could be reflected. For Ivan, the mother’s face served as a mirror, offering Peter 
access to the perceptions of the other and, through this, access to his own mind over time.
There is a 20- year gap between the composition of the diary and Ivan’s academic work in 
1982 reporting from and reflecting on the diary. As a result, Ivan could therefore add the per-
spective of Peter, now aged ‘26 years and 8 months’. He reported that his son disapproved of 
his tendency to characterize the differences between childish and adult meanings as an effect 
of a child’s shortcomings and confusion. This offered inadequate characterization of the psy-
chological processes entailed:
Although I refer to these shortcomings of the child using the word confusion, clearly, this 
term does not accurately portray the complexity of the processes which must be involved 
in these errors. This thorny problem which needs further elaboration emerged in a discus-
sion with Peter.8
 4 Ibid. 56: ‘The child will be even less willing to keep apart the shades of meaning of the same word. The semantic 
distance between original, primary “concrete” meaning and the derived, secondary “abstract” meaning is greatly 
reduced in the child’s mind if not totally obliterated. The child is generally unwilling to renounce the concrete sen-
sual interpretation of a word or idiom.’
 5 Ibid. 75.
 6 Ibid. 63.
 7 Ibid.
 8 Ibid. 70.
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In 1992, Ivan and Peter presented a paper together on these questions at the International 
Psychoanalytic Association Conference on Psychoanalysis and Literature, a work published 
in 1995 in Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought. There, Fónagy and Fonagy argued 
that adult language has two components. One is the symbolic– linguistic code of differenti-
ated adult meanings. The other is an ‘archaic accompaniment to language’, embedded in the 
manner in which something is said.9 The manner in which we do or say things easily escapes 
conscious control and is difficult to self- censor; it may therefore reflect aspects of childhood 
experience including embodied, associative thought. Fónagy and Fonagy proposed that cog-
nitive impressions and communications contain within them vestiges of sensations and pre-
dispositions, which— deliberately or inadvertently— shape their tone. To dismiss something 
as an adult, for instance, may retain the vestiges of physical experiences of turning away, 
and the occasions through development in which a child’s circumstances led them to turn 
away.10 In turn, the cultural meanings ascribed to turning away will partially and dynamic-
ally shape its associated secondary senses.11
Generally, the interplay between primary and secondary meanings is what enlivens 
speech, giving it depth. It permits a speaker to respond in their reply to the tone and manner 
in which something was said, both echoing aspects of the tone while also adding to or chan-
ging it to move the conversation forward.12 A host of familiar, well- worn, social responses de-
pend entirely on the concerted interplay of primary and secondary meanings, between what 
is said outright and what is implicated. For instance, in disinterested responses, the matter in 
hand is acknowledged but treated as without personal consequence.13 The concerted inter-
play of primary and secondary meanings permits discretion, good- humouredness, irony, 
gentle teasing, tentativeness, low- level threats, implicit requests, and many other kinds of 
reaction in which a meaning is at once offered and qualified.14 Consider the variety of ways 
in which routine phrases like ‘have a nice day’ can be inflected. Or again, note how sounds 
(e.g. ‘p’, ‘t’, ‘k’) associated with lightness and fastness may be used in brand names that seek 
to convey these properties to consumers, for instance medications for chemotherapy.15 
However, it is also possible for the two components of adult language to run contrary to one 
another, with one component of language closing down or tripping up the other:
 9 Fónagy, I. and Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Communication with Pretend Actions in Language, Literature and 
Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18(3): 363– 418, p. 366.
 10 The example comes from an exposition of the Fónagy and Fonagy paper in Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2007). 
‘The Rooting of the Mind in the Body: New Links between Attachment Theory and Psychoanalytic Thought’. 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 55(2): 411– 456, p. 433.
 11 This was discussed at more length some years later, in Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Does it Matter if There Is a Nonverbal 
Period of Development? On the Infant’s Understanding the Social World and its Implications for Psychoanalytic 
Therapy’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 60(2): 287– 296.
 12 This idea is already present in Ivan and Judith’s paper on the melodic patterns of speech: Fónagy, I. and Fónagy, 
J. (1987). ‘Analysis of Complex (Integrated) Melodic Patterns’, in R. Channon and L. Shockey (eds), In Honour of 
Ilse Lehiste, Dodrecht: The Netherlands: De Gruyter Mouton, pp. 75– 98: ‘Foris: “Enumerative information pat-
terns may appear in French sentences which do not contain enumeration conveying secondary messages such as 
‘for the one thing’, ‘there are many other reasons of course’ ” ’ (p. 75).
 13 See e.g. Maynard, D. W. and Hudak, P. L. (2008). ‘Small Talk, High Stakes: Interactional Disattentiveness in the 
Context of Prosocial Doctor- Patient Interaction’. Language in Society, 37(5): 661– 688.
 14 Fónagy, I. (1995). ‘Iconicity of Expressive Syntactic Transformations’, in M. E. Landsberg (ed.), Syntactic 
Iconicity and Linguistic Freezes: The human dimension, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 285– 304; Galgut, E. (2010). 
‘Reading Minds: Mentalization, Irony and Literary Engagement’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
91(4): 915– 935; Culpeper, J., Haugh, M., and Sinkevicute, V. (2017). ‘(Im)politeness and Mixed Messages’, in J. 
Culpeper, M. Haugh, and D. Z. Kádár (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness, London: Palgrave, 
pp. 323– 355.
 15 Abel, G. A. and Glinert, L. H. (2008). ‘Chemotherapy as language: Sound symbolism in cancer medication 
names’. Social Science & Medicine, 66(8): 1863– 1869.
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Some borderline individuals may appear to ‘ask’ questions whilst at the same time letting 
their analyst know that they are already aware of the answer. For example, one patient was 
in the habit of ‘asking’ relatively frequently: ‘Are you bored?’ As there was no inflection at 
the end of the sentence, the implication was that, whether through boredom or some other 
reason, the analyst was not doing his job properly.16
Peter was evidently proud of this paper written with his father.17 Whereas in the 1980s, his 
father had characterized children’s thought as confused, the collaboration with Peter had 
prompted a development in this position. Secondary meanings are present across human 
speech in both childhood and adulthood. Furthermore, they may be regarded as part of how 
sense and relevance are created and communicated. To claim to be just kidding after as-
serting exclusive rights over pudding may offer a way of defusing the aggressive aspects of 
the assertion. Removing inflection from the end of a question undercuts it as a question, 
forming it into an unstated and unanswerable accusation. The interplay of primary and sec-
ondary meanings, for children and for adults, signals an exposure to our history that may 
be qualified, stylized, or— at times— may ambush us. However, neither Ivan nor Peter at this 
point acknowledged, as would Peter many decades later, that exposure to history also means 
exposure to culture (see Chapter 9).18
In the 1990s, Fonagy and colleagues wrote versions of a paper published first in the 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre and then in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association. In this paper, the authors cited an anonymous ‘guilty 4- year- old who said to his 
mother “I can tell from your eyes that I am lying.” ’19 In the first version of the paper, Fonagy 
and colleagues commented that such a statement does not signify a child who has regressed:
to a stage of ‘fusion’ with his primary object. Rather, it was his grasp of the boundaries of his 
mental world which appeared to be insufficiently well established. The initial reliance on 
the object’s reflective self and the gradual recognition of its separateness are both necessary 
to the evolution of a securely established reflective self.
In the second version of the paper, after arguing against an explanation in terms of regres-
sion, the authors proposed that ‘it is more likely that his grasp of the boundaries of his mental 
world momentarily returned to an earlier state (in this instance, consequent on anxiety and 
self- reproach)’.20
 16 Fónagy, I. and Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Communication with Pretend Actions in Language, Literature and 
Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18(3): 363– 418, pp. 385– 386.
 17 Bach, S., Alvarez, A., Mayes, L., and Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Panel 3: Fantasy Life and the Self ’. Journal of Infant, 
Child & Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 51– 62: ‘It is the only paper I ever managed to write with my father, and 
Mary Target, who assisted the birth of this paper will, I think, vouch that it was a difficult and painful delivery. Dad, 
are you listening? I should tell you that my father is a linguist and a phonetician. He has, I believe, one of the most 
profound and psychoanalytically relevant theories of language development around’ (p. 58).
 18 In the 1980s, Derrida criticized Ivan Fónagy’s work for neglecting adequate acknowledgement of cultural 
signification in assuming too unmediated a relationship between preverbal childhood experience and adult 
sense- making. Derrida, J. (1986). Glas, trans. Richard Rand and John P. Leavey, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press.
 19 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Moran, G. S., Steele, H., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘Measuring the Ghost in the 
Nursery: A Summary of the Main Findings of the Anna Freud Centre/ University College London Parent- Child 
Study’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 14: 115– 131, p. 127.
 20 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Moran, G., Steele, H., and Higgitt, A. (1993). ‘Measuring the Ghost in the Nursery: An 
Empirical Study of the Relation between Parents’ Mental Representations of Childhood Experiences and Their 
Infants’ Security of Attachment’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 41(4): 957– 989, p. 983.
Fonagy’s psychoanalysis with Anne Hurry 15
In 1982, Ivan had emphasized the role of the mother as a ‘mirror’ offering little Peter access 
to his own mind and experience of truth. In the 1990s, Fonagy did not exactly disagree. The 
lie did offer a vehicle for exploring internal reality through the other’s response.21 At the same 
time, though, Fonagy’s sense was that this was not solely a positive exploration and reflected 
something insufficiently well established. He recalled himself as a child with ‘lots of anxieties 
and lots of difficulties’,22 offering a different slant on the incident. Looking back over the dec-
ades, Fonagy suggested that little Peter’s anxiety and self- reproach for his lie prompted a shift 
to a state in which he was unable to know the reason for his anxiety and self- reproach except 
through the concrete observable behaviour of his mother. The result of the lie is the mother’s 
concrete, observable response, and it is this that makes the deception apparent, not little 
Peter’s knowledge of his own mind. The papers from the 1990s show Fonagy’s reflection on, 
and renegotiation of, his father’s frame of reference. This included his father’s concern with 
experience– reality confusion, the use of pretend, and the interpretation of intentions from 
observable behaviour. The papers also show the way that Fonagy was building from these 
concerns to think about the limitations we may face in understanding our own minds, espe-
cially in the context of attachment relationships. Part of the context of these reflections was 
a preoccupation with self- understanding and recognition of feeling states among some clin-
icians at the Anna Freud Centre in the 1970s, including Fonagy’s own therapist, Anne Hurry.
Fonagy’s psychoanalysis with Anne Hurry
In 1970, Ivan Fónagy escaped communist Hungary, took up a professorship in linguistics 
in Paris, and began training as a psychoanalyst. However, Ivan felt that Peter should have an 
English education, so he sent his son, then aged 14, on his own to live in London.23 The young 
Peter knew no English and had no friends.24 He came to dread getting up each morning to go 
to school, where he was bullied by peers.25 He felt ‘sad, constantly worried and inadequate’,26 
and frequently had suicidal thoughts. He recalls that ‘as a young person, one of us (PF) used 
to phone home in states of distress and talk about his situation in catastrophic terms until his 
parents were palpably panicked, and then he would end the conversation feeling relieved’.27 
By age 17, Peter was depressed, suicidal, and failing academically. A neighbour worked at the 
Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic, and encouraged Fonagy to seek treatment.28 
 21 See also Lemma, A. (2005). ‘The Many Faces of Lying’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 86(3): 737– 
753: ‘Lying can be thought about as part of this process. Through the lie the child can transform something untrue/ 
unreal into something “real” by placing a lie about the self inside the object’s mind (Fonagy, personal communi-
cation). In other words, the lie provides a vehicle for exploring one’s own internal reality through the object’s re-
sponse to it, thereby making it “real” for the self ’ (p. 748).
 22 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’. Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899.
 23 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy on Psychoanalysis and IAPT’. The History of Emotions Blog, posted 
on 14 May by Jules Evans. Accessed at: https:// emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/ 2015/ 05/ peter- fonagy- on-  
psychoanalysis- and- iapt.
 24 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy on Psychoanalysis and IAPT’. The History of Emotions Blog, posted 
on 14 May by Jules Evans. Accessed at: https:// emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/ 2015/ 05/ peter- fonagy- on-  
psychoanalysis- and- iapt.
 25 BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific Podcast, 28 
January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2.
 26 Fonagy, P. (2020). Foreword to Leo Potion and Ana Strumpf, Perfectly Imperfect Stories, London: Magic Cat 
Publishing.
 27 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21.
 28 Kirby, T. (2019). ‘Peter Fonagy— Battling the Enemy of Loneliness’. The Lancet Psychiatry, 6(12): 987.
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The initial assessment meeting did not go well, and he felt so uncomfortable that he resolved 
never to go back.29 However, he reversed this decision six months later as his feelings of lone-
liness and depression became more entrenched.30 He went into analysis with Anne Hurry for 
what would be three years of treatment. The Hampstead Clinic was renamed the ‘Anna Freud 
Centre’ in 1982, following the death of Anna Freud. (For convenience, we will henceforth 
refer to the Anna Freud Centre even prior to 1982.)
Hurry’s therapeutic approach was an expression of important developments in clinical 
technique that had been germinating at the Anna Freud Centre over the previous decades. 
In the 1950s, Anna Freud circulated unpublished papers to her colleagues.31 There she sug-
gested that some individuals may not be suitable straightaway for the ‘classical technique’ 
of psychoanalytic interpretations punctuating long silences. The patients first needed to re-
ceive support in establishing relationships within which the silences and the interpretations 
could be meaningful and useful. She proposed that many of these patients had experienced 
traumatic events in their relationships with their caregivers.32 In the 1960s, Freud expanded 
her stance. She argued that, in general, many forms of therapeutic work could benefit from 
this additional approach, which she labelled as ‘developmental help’.33 Developmental help 
was taken to mean that a therapist should offer a patient undivided attention, help the pa-
tient recognize and verbalize feelings, develop an account of themselves and their needs, 
and clarify the reality of situations and of cause and effect. In this, Freud pitted her clinical 
approach against that of Melanie Klein, whom she felt ignored children’s maturational pro-
cesses and the importance of present- day experiences, including the child’s contemporary 
experiences of care by the parent.34
Despite her advocacy for alterations in clinical technique, Anna Freud was somewhat 
ambivalent about developmental help, and the prospect of departing from the approach es-
poused in her father’s writings.35 Anna Freud’s personal ambivalence no doubt contributed 
to a diversity of opinion at the Centre. Nonetheless, among many therapists associated with 
the Centre, the technique of developmental help was central to work with children and ado-
lescents. It was anticipated that these interventions would help unblock pathways towards 
 29 Fonagy, P. (2020). Foreword to Leo Potion and Ana Strumpf, Perfectly Imperfect Stories, London: Magic Cat 
Publishing.
 30 BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific Podcast, 28 
January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2.
 31 Freud, A. ([1956] 1969). ‘The Assessment of Borderline Cases’, in The Writings of Anna Freud, Volume 5. 
New York: International Universities Press, pp. 301– 314.
 32 Ibid. 310.
 33 Freud, A. (1965). Normality and Pathology in Childhood, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books. See also 
Freud, A. (1971). ‘The Infantile Neurosis: Genetic and Dynamic Considerations’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the 
Child, 26(1): 79– 90: ‘The analyst’s therapeutic ambition goes beyond the realm of conflict and the improvement 
of inadequate conflict solutions. It now embraces the basic faults, failures, defects and deprivations, i.e. the whole 
range of adverse external and internal factors, and it aims at the correction of their consequences’ (p. 89).
 34 The divergences between Freud and Klein on clinical technique are discussed by Fonagy and colleagues 
in Fonagy, P., Bleiberg, E., and Target, M. (1997). ‘Child Psychoanalysis: Critical Overview and a Proposed 
Reconsideration’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 6: 1– 38. See also Midgley, N. (2012). 
Reading Anna Freud, London: Routledge.
 35 Edgcumbe, R. (1995). ‘The History of Anna Freud’s Thinking on Developmental Disturbances’. Bulletin of 
the Anna Freud Centre, 18(1): 21– 34: ‘Over the years we have felt uncertainty about the use of “non- analytic tech-
niques” . . . Anna Freud made us feel that somehow it was not right. Yet she undoubtedly encouraged us to carry 
on experimenting’ (p. 22). This allegiance to psychoanalytic interpretation as a symbolic marker of ‘true’ psycho-
analysis, even while clinical practice has shifted in the direction of supportive counselling, has been discussed by 
Lecours, S. (2007). ‘Supportive Interventions and Nonsymbolic Mental Functioning’. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 88(4): 895– 915. The extent to which Sigmund Freud himself ever adopted ‘classical’ technique is 
unclear from the available evidence: Lohser, B. and Newton, P. M. (1996). Unorthodox Freud: The View from the 
Couch, New York: Guilford Press.
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healthy development, and facilitate the therapeutic relationship between patient and ther-
apist.36 While developmental help was increasingly treated as applicable to all therapeutic 
work, in the 1960s, The Group for the Study of Borderline Cases pursued the question of 
so- called borderline states, affirming that such patients are, especially, in ‘no condition to co-
operate or fully comprehend interpretations. It seems, however, that the therapist’s empathy 
comes across at such times.’37 The boundaries of what constituted a ‘borderline state’ were 
amorphous.38 Nonetheless, the Group identified that these patients were characterized 
especially by distress, difficulties in personal relationships, and an immediate and urgent 
translation of experiences into action, as a result of difficulties in holding on to thoughts.39 
Rosenfeld and Sprince also reported the impression of members of the Group that the inter-
pretation of psychological conflicts with these patients tended to backfire.40
By the 1970s, Hurry was aligned with this perspective, and had come to advocate the 
clinical use of empathy rather than interpretations alone.41 At the time that Fonagy entered 
into therapy with her, Hurry had recently joined a new study group focused on the role of 
patient self- understanding within clinical practice. Discussions led the group to conclude 
that patients would benefit not only from ‘insight’ into what had happened to them in the 
past, but also self- understanding regarding present- day experiences, and the role of these 
experiences in serving to impede or support their coping and development.42 To achieve 
 36 Cf. Szydlo, J. S. (1985). ‘Developmental Help: Intensive Treatment of a Nursery Child’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 8(1): 23– 38, p. 32; Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1996). ‘Predictors of Outcome in Child Psychoanalysis: A 
Retrospective Study of 763 Cases at the Anna Freud Centre’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 
44: 27– 77: ‘Developmental help includes those aspects of the analyst’s interaction with the child which address: (1) 
ego functions (mental processes) via self and object representations; (2) the verbalization of internal states and dif-
ferentiation of affects; (3) the breaking down of unmanageable affects (anxiety) into smaller manageable entities 
which the child can master; (4) the development of internal representations of affects so that the child can master 
his own feelings; (5) the facilitation of thinking by reducing anxiety and making links between different aspects of 
thought processes; (6) facilitation of thinking about cause and effect, particularly within relationships; (7) helping 
the child separate internal from external, real from unreal, fantasy from reality; (8) setting limits and offering ex-
planations for the limits provided; (9) facilitating the creation of internal representations of self and other; (10) 
establishing reciprocity (e.g. giving and taking); (11) developing the capacity to delay gratification; (12) helping the 
child to develop an “as if ” attitude, and the encouragement of fantasy; (13) gradually confronting the child with 
opposing ideas, for example, the possibility of hatred and dependence on the same person. While these elements 
enter into any analysis, especially with children, we suggest that they need to be much more intensively and repeat-
edly focused on with children whose primary disturbance is at the level of mental processes’ (p. 61).
 37 Rosenfeld, S. K. and Sprince, M. P. (1965). ‘Some Thoughts on the Technical Handling of Borderline Children’. 
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 20(1): 495– 517, p. 509. The specific case under discussion here was later 
considered again by Hepworth and Fonagy based on examination of the case record. Target, M. and Fonagy, P. 
(2003). ‘Attachment Theory and Long- Term Psychoanalytic Outcome: Are Insecure Attachment Narratives Less 
Accurate?’, in M. Leuzinger- Bohleber, A. U. Dreher, and J. Canestri (eds), Pluralism and Unity? Methods of Research 
in Psychoanalysis, London: International Psychoanalytical Association, pp. 149– 167.
 38 New, A. S. and Triebwasser, J. (2018). ‘A History of Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Barbara Stanley and 
Antonia New (eds), Borderline Personality Disorder, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1– 16. Fonagy, P. and 
Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, London: Whurr 
Publications: ‘With the benefit of a historical perspective, we may readily see the group of disorders she describes 
as ultimately analogous to disorders of personality . . . Her concept of non- conflictual disorders was revolutionary 
and the linking of these pathologies to development prescient. Her developmental perspective, however, was never 
properly reconciled with structural theory’ (p. 77).
 39 Rosenfeld, S. K. and Sprince, M. P. (1963). ‘An Attempt to Formulate the Meaning of the Concept “Borderline”’. 
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 18(1): 603– 635, p. 625. The initial members of the Group for the Study of 
Borderline Cases were Bene, Fahmy, Ini, Kawenoka, Kennedy, Rosenfeld, Schnurmann, Singer, and Sprince.
 40 Rosenfeld, S. K. and Sprince, M. P. (1965). ‘Some Thoughts on the Technical Handling of Borderline Children’. 
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 20(1): 495– 517.
 41 Hurry, A. (1977). ‘Living under the Threat of Death: Discussion’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 4(3): 22– 
24: ‘We all meet cases who need for periods to create their own worlds, and where interpretations are simply an 
impingement.’
 42 Kennedy, H. (1979). ‘The Role of Insight in Child Analysis: A Developmental Viewpoint’. Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytic Association, 27: 9– 28. Fonagy would later emphasize his intellectual debt to this paper, 
and the study group discussions that led to its composition. Fonagy, P. and Moran, G. S. (1991). ‘Understanding 
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this, Hurry felt it was important to ‘give the adolescent some experience of being under-
stood. This does not normally involve any “deep interpretation”, but simply a recognition of 
his feeling state’.43
Hurry’s approach in analysis with suicidal and depressed adolescents in the 1970s is sug-
gested by a 1977 paper in the Journal of Child Psychotherapy. There, she described her treat-
ment of an adolescent girl, Jessie. The overriding theme of the therapeutic work was the girl’s 
feeling of being unprotected by her mother. In this case, as in others, Hurry attempted to be 
kind and nurturing to her adolescent patient. However, she described her resoluteness in 
defending the distinction between reality and pretend, in the belief that reality is ultimately 
reassuring for all that it is also disappointing. Her impression was that a fantasy of omnipo-
tence was often active for suicidal adolescents as a reaction against feelings of helplessness or 
self- recrimination. Though a defence against feelings of fear and guilt, the sense of omnipo-
tence could also at times exacerbate these feelings and also predispose suicidal thoughts.44 In 
the case of Jessie:
For a long time she tested out how far I resembled her mother in willingness to let her be 
exposed to danger. Once she asked me to lie for her: to write a certificate saying she was 
eighteen so that she could go to a very unsuitable club. The next day she told me triumph-
antly that mother had helped her to forge a certificate so that she could get in. But in fact 
she was very relieved that I had not lied.45
Reflecting on his own therapy with Hurry, Fonagy recalled that her technique ‘wasn’t very 
classical’. One of Hurry’s major concerns was supporting her patients to gain cognitive in-
sight, using the therapeutic relationship as a focus. However, experiences outside the ana-
lytic situation were also acknowledged as having their own reality to deplete or support the 
patient, motiving kind and validating responses by the analyst:
One of the moments I remember from it is that, about a year into my analysis, I had my first 
car, which was an old banger— a Ford Anglia— and I went to lay down on the couch and 
said, Such a wonderful car, it’s great. She [Hurry] stopped, said hold on a second, went to 
the window and looked out, came back, sat down, and said: Peter, it’s a wonderful car. This 
I remember from my analysis. She gave space to reality. Exactly. She was a very, very human 
Psychic Change in Child Psychoanalysis’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 15– 22: ‘Kennedy high-
lights the child analyst’s focus on the patient’s present conflicts and concerns. In this context, the analyst aims to 
foster progressive development and improved adaptation by providing the patient with a framework which will 
allow him to understand himself better’ (p. 16). See also Target, M. (2010). ‘The Psychoanalytic Work of Hansi 
Kennedy: From War Nurseries to the Anna Freud Centre (1940– 1993)’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 36(3): 313– 
316, though other sources also pointed Fonagy in the same direction. See e.g. Fonagy’s 1989 review of Harold F. 
Searles, M.D. (1986). My Work with Borderline Patients, Northvale, NJ and London: Jason Aronson, in Bulletin of 
the Anna Freud Centre, 12(1): 77– 79.
 43 Hurry, A. (1986). ‘Walk- in Work with Adolescents’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 12(1): 33– 45, p. 41.
 44 Hurry was unpersuaded by the idea of a death drive. Hurry, A. (1978). ‘“My Ambition is to be 
Dead”: The Analysis of Motives and Reasons for Suicide Behaviour in an Adolescent Girl, with Particular Reference 
to the Relationship between the Adolescent Process and Suicide: Part II: Past and Current Findings on Suicide in 
Adolescence’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 4(4): 69– 79: ‘This latter theory has not been universally accepted, and 
I myself find it an impediment rather than an aid in the analysis of suicidal patients’ (p. 75).
 45 Hurry, A. (1977). ‘“My Ambition is to be Dead”: The Analysis of Motives and Reasons for Suicide Behaviour in 
an Adolescent Girl, with Particular Reference to the Relationship between the Adolescent Process and Suicide: Part 
I: Case Study’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 4(3): 66– 83, p. 71.
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person, and what adolescents need— what I needed then— was really someone who was 
going to relate to me and see me where I was.46
Fonagy has repeatedly stated that therapy with Hurry saved his life,47 helping him to find 
meaning in ‘the present day and the here- and- now’.48 He has described how ‘the power of 
personal recognition’, provided by Hurry, ‘gave me courage to internalize and organize my-
self and my life in very many respects in her image of me’.49
Fonagy has reflected that a lasting benefit of his work with Hurry was the refiguration of 
his depression into ‘an enduring commitment to confronting unpleasant truths and under-
standing’.50 Many of the concerns of his professional life can be regarded as, to a certain ex-
tent, reflecting questions he faced as an isolated adolescent émigré to Britain: attachment and 
separation (Chapter 4); challenges of social understanding and the opacity of other minds 
(Chapter 3); feelings of incoherence and meaninglessness, and of alienness (Chapter 6); the 
advantages and price of adaptation to the environment (Chapter 7); the need to learn from 
others (Chapter 7); and the complexities and potential cruelties of the school environment 
and of culture (Chapter 9). As a clinician, Fonagy has described that it has ‘helped me enor-
mously’ to be able to ‘reach back to that part of myself ’ and use reflection on the distress 
and hopelessness of his teenage years in considering the experience of his patient, though 
mindful also of the differences between his difficulties and those of the other.51
Despite its important successes, the therapeutic achievements with Hurry had limitations. 
As Fonagy and colleagues have subsequently argued, long- term therapy with a focus on sup-
porting cognitive insight may have limitations for reducing non- mentalizing (Chapter 8). 
Fonagy would be forced to re- enter analysis again as a young adult. And throughout his 
life he would report struggling with persistent depressive disorder and destructive work-
aholism. At times, depression and workaholism would assuage, and at times exacerbate, one 
another.52 Fonagy has been able to pursue the development of theory drawing on relevant 
experiences as a clinician, as a researcher, and also as a service user. At a conference for users 
of psychological services:
The house lights stay on throughout, because this is not an ‘expert’ talking at ‘service users’, 
but a man who appears to care deeply about his work and to want to share a little of his 
 46 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’. Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899.
 47 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in Practice: A 
Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98, p. 90.
 48 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy on Psychoanalysis and IAPT’. The History of Emotions Blog, posted on 14 May 
by Jules Evans. Accessed at: https:// emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/ 2015/ 05/ peter- fonagy- on- psychoanalysis- 
and- iapt/ .
 49 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2018). ‘The Origin of Human Life: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective’, 
European Psychoanalytical Federation, 31st Annual Conference, Warsaw, 24 March.
 50 Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘E- interview with Dominic Fannon’. Psychiatric Bulletin, 31(9): 360.
 51 BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific Podcast, 28 
January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2.
 52 Shragai, N. (2014). ‘Business Travel and Families: The Ultimate Guilt Trip’. Financial Times, 13 October. 
Accessed at: https:// www.ft.com/ content/ f7eea390- 4d66- 11e4- bf60- 00144feab7de; Ratner, R. H. (2014). 
‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in Borderline. Master of Fine Arts, The University of Texas at Austin. Accessed 
at: https:// repositories.lib.utexas.edu/ bitstream/ handle/ 2152/ 28667/ RATNER- MASTERSREPORT- 2014.
pdf, p. 123; Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Foreword’, in Cooper, A. and Redfern, S. (eds). Reflective Parenting: A Guide to 
Understanding What’s Going on in Your Child, London: Routledge, pp. ix– xii: ‘It doesn’t happen to me often that 
I feel worthwhile. Most days I do what I feel I have to do, and if I have done 50% of what I needed to, I feel good. The 
outcome I am for is just to have coped’ (p. ix). Approval of this discussion of his struggles around mental health was 
given explicitly by Peter Fonagy (personal communication, December 2019).
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knowledge with people who really need it. Any barriers between ‘them’ on the stage and 
‘us’ in the audience are further broken down when Professor Fonagy shared with us his 
personal experience of major depression and suicidal thoughts in the past.53
Fonagy holds as a personal value that mental health needs and use of mental health ser-
vices should be discussed openly rather than treated as a source of shame. Doing so can 
help acknowledge both the limitations and the achievements of psychological therapies, 
and this has been the context for his frequent discussions of his own history in his writings 
and interviews especially over the past decade.54 The achievements of Fonagy’s therapy with 
Hurry were clearly very extensive and helped sustain an unusual configuration: a deeply felt 
confidence in the capacity of psychoanalysis to help shed light on truths about the human 
mind and to help people who are suffering;55 and an empiricist impatience with anything, 
including psychoanalysis, that seemed unwilling or unable to confront reality in the final in-
stance. This configuration represented a transformation of depressive experiences, but also 
retained a continuity with them. Fonagy’s position on the ‘fault line’ between psychoanalysis 
and empirical psychology is one he has explicitly associated with a childhood fantasy of 
dread: ‘the gulf, gap, or chasm between psychoanalysis and psychology generated associ-
ations to dreams I used to have as a child where, standing on an elevated, unstable surface, 
I suddenly found myself falling and aware of the inevitability of a disastrous end’.56
One quality Fonagy appreciated in Hurry as an analyst was that, alongside helping him 
to ‘say truths that I didn’t like and yet retain a sense of myself as worthwhile’, Hurry was 
‘very funny to boot’.57 Hurry’s case reports describe making space for fun and humour.58 On 
the surface, this might seem opposed to her emphasis on reality. Having fun may function 
as a form of ‘just kidding’, in which an interpersonal or a personal reality is shrugged off. 
However, Fonagy appreciated Hurry’s humour and its contribution to their work together. 
Praising the importance of humour, he would later reflect that ‘rigid seriousness can exag-
gerate threats, amplify slights and close down our openness to different ways of responding 
to things. Humour can protect us; it gives us the ability to see a situation from another point 
of view, and gives perspective when we might feel overwhelmed’.59 Humour, even outright 
pretence, offers a renewed and different access to reality through a step outside our own 
habitual stance, precisely through the utilization of an interplay of primary and secondary 
meanings. Humour can counteract the risk of overstating the equivalence between internal 
perception and external states of affairs. And they can counteract the risk that external ac-
tion is overstated in its importance, at the expense of seeking perspective on it.
 53 See e.g. Walker, S. (2011). ‘It’s Good to Talk, 2: Where’s our Support Group?’ Accessed at: https:// 
purplepersuasion.wordpress.com/ 2011/ 09/ 14/ its- good- to- talk- 2- wheres- our- support- group/ .
 54 See e.g. BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific Podcast, 
28 January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2.
 55 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’. Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899: ‘Psychoanalysis has 
more truth to it about the mind than any other psychology I know. My own experiences on the couch— and I spent 
about 18 years there— helped me immeasurably with understanding people.’
 56 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘On the Relationship of Experimental Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Commentary by 
Peter Fonagy (London)’. Neuropsychoanalysis, 2(2): 222– 232, p. 222.
 57 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘I Would Like to Abolish Silo Working’. The Psychologist, 28: 948. Accessed at: https:// 
thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/ i- would- abolish- silo- working.
 58 E.g. Hurry, A. (1998). ‘“Paul”: The Struggle to Restore a Development Gone Awry’, in A. Hurry (ed.), 
Psychoanalysis and Developmental Therapy, London, Karnac Books, pp. 100– 123.
 59 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Laughter, Trauma and Building Resilience’. Huffington Post, 31 July. Accessed at: https:// 
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ peter- fonagy/ comedy- mental- health_ b_ 11262496.html.
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True, humour may be deployed to deflect thoughts and feelings. Nonetheless, in general, 
‘humour can be considered to be a coping strategy and a positive indication of mentalizing 
abilities; it attests a person’s ability to “play with ideas” ’,60 Fonagy and Bateman would expli-
citly incorporate humour into their guidebook for clinical interventions. They encouraged 
the use of ‘mischievous statements’, provocative and left- field, when a patient seems stuck 
in rigid seriousness. They likewise prescribed the use of ‘wacky statements’, puzzling and 
unexpected, when a dose of curiosity is needed.61 Fonagy and Bateman described the ‘in-
quisitive stance’ as a ‘style of interaction characterized by an expectation that an individual’s 
mind may be influenced, surprised, changed, and enlightened by learning about another’s 
mind’.62 From his descriptions of analysis with Hurry, Fonagy appears to have regarded her 
as a defining exemplar of this style of interaction.
Mr S
After a degree in psychology, Fonagy pursued graduate studies in neuropsychology at 
University College London (UCL). He then took up a post as Lecturer in Clinical Psychology 
at UCL and trained as a clinical psychologist, qualifying in 1980. After qualification, Fonagy 
saw private clients and worked sessions as a clinical psychologist at the Royal Free Hospital. 
He also began training as a psychoanalyst with the British Psychoanalytic Society, gradu-
ating in 1985. He recalls that he decided to train as an analyst partly as a result of his own 
positive experiences in therapy with Hurry, and partly because he saw ‘something within it 
that was a deeper explanation of how the mind functions’.63 There is little in print about this 
period of Fonagy’s life. However, a central part of psychoanalytic training with the British 
Psychoanalytic Society is that trainees must conduct the analysis of two patients— one for 
two years, one for a year— with supervision from a senior clinician. These are termed a 
psychoanalyst’s ‘membership cases’, on which an oral report is given to the Society. Often the 
report on one of the membership cases is published. This was the case for Fonagy, offering an 
account of a piece of his early clinical work.
Theories in psychology, especially clinical theories, are frequently developed from some 
prime examples. The identification of new patient groups, as Target has noted, contributes to 
the development of a distinct clinical theory, reflecting the kinds of clinical examples they pri-
marily have in mind: ‘each new area of clinical interest has tended to create a new theoretical 
approach: narcissism begat self psychology, severe personality disorder brought forth object 
 60 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 385– 
418, p. 393.
 61 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 266. Humour can offer a means of negotiating the dialectical 
interplay between the patient’s wishes and their needs in a therapeutic relationship, allowing features of the rela-
tionship to be both real and pretend to certain degrees: Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. 
The Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81: 853– 
873: ‘For the relationship to serve a function and to be tolerable, the analyst has to become what the patient wishes 
him to be. But at these moments, he is likely to be too terrifying for his help to be accepted. The analyst must be 
anything but what is projected on to him. Unless he is able to adopt an attitude analogous to that of the parent 
engaged in pretend play with a child, constantly juggling responses to these opposing pressures, the analysis is 
doomed’ (pp, 868– 869).
 62 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Introduction’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 3– 20, p. 3.
 63 BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific Podcast, 28 
January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2.
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relations theory, unmedicated psychotic patients spurred Kleinian thinking’.64 It is not-
able, then, that the first of Fonagy’s two ‘membership cases’ with the British Psychoanalytic 
Society was also a patient with significant features of BPD, a new diagnosis introduced in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd edition (DSM- III) in 1980. Yet, as 
well as helping direct Fonagy’s attention to the properties of BPD, the patient showed symp-
toms from across various diagnostic categories, suggesting the need for cross- cutting theory. 
Looking back on the 1980s at the early development of his thinking, for Fonagy the import-
ance of this case cannot be overstated. It was ‘this early experience [that] led to a focus on the 
thinking capacities of borderline patients’.65 Between 1989 and 2009, he offered a detailed 
description of the case on three different occasions. This provides an opportunity to see the 
way in which the case contributed to his emerging theory, and— reciprocally— the way that 
developments in his theory over the 20 years contributed to elaborations in his perception of 
the case.66
Mr S was 27 years old when he was referred to Fonagy. He had previously been in psycho-
therapy for several years, but had become physically threatening to his therapist, who felt it ne-
cessary to make a referral. Mr S reported severe physical abuse as a child. His back was scarred by 
the early beatings. He recalled especially that he would receive physical punishment for crying. 
His mother had attempted suicide when he was three. Some years into the analysis, he also ac-
knowledged that he had been sexually assaulted by his father, including on one occasion when 
he had gone to his father for comfort after a nightmare.67
The primary symptoms Mr S reported at the commencement of the analysis were inter-
personal problems, overwhelming anxiety, profound depression, and ‘transient psychotic- 
like episodes, marked by minor visual illusions’.68 He frequently used alcohol as an attempt 
to regulate his wildly fluctuating emotional state. Fonagy initially attempted to offer thera-
peutic treatment based on psychoanalytic interpretations. For instance, he presented the 
interpretation that Mr S’s reluctance to discuss sexual and aggressive fantasies was due 
to concern about provoking a negative reaction. Fonagy recalled that ‘his response still 
echoes in my ears: “Don’t you understand anything? It doesn’t matter a damn what you 
feel. As far as I am concerned you don’t exist.” ’69 On other occasions, interpretations would 
 64 Target, M. (2002). ‘Book Review’, Symbolization: Proposing a Developmental Paradigm for a New 
Psychoanalytic Theory of Mind by Anna Aragno. Madison, CT: International Universities Press, 1997, Journal 
of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 50(1): 348– 352, p. 349. See also Fonagy, P. and Leuzinger- Bohleber, 
M. (2012). ‘Foreword’, in P. Fonagy, M. Leuzinger- Bohleber, D. Taylor, and H. Kächele (eds), The Significance of 
Dreams: Bridging Clinical and Extraclinical Research in Psychoanalysis, London: Karnac Books, pp. 3– 8: ‘Some of 
the different psychoanalytic models of development may be rooted in these genetic differences between infants. 
They may all be accurate descriptions of genetically very different individuals’ (p. 151).
 65 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in M. Brownescombe Heller and S. Pollet (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts in 
the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176, p. 159.
 66 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the 
Anna Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115; Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical 
Considerations in the Treatment of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 
656; Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in M. Brownescombe Heller and S. Pollet (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts in 
the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176.
 67 Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment 
of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72:639– 656, p. 649.
 68 Ibid. 642.
 69 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 101.
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evoke no backlash, but seemed to be counterproductive and contribute to Mr S feeling 
suicidal.70
Over time, Fonagy came to the conclusion that the abuse experienced by the patient 
had undermined his capacity to understand the thoughts and feelings of others— as well as 
thoughts and feelings of his own: ‘his development of adequate social understanding was 
impaired by trauma’.71 In fact, interpretations were experienced as assaults. The importance 
of impaired social understanding had been highlighted by the London Kleinian group, es-
pecially Bion, Joseph, and Britton.72 Fonagy agreed on the importance of this theme. But 
within the British Psychoanalytic Society there was terrible animosity between the Anna 
Freudian and Kleinian traditions still in the 1980s and early 1990s. In reflecting on the role 
of trauma in impairing social understanding, he distanced himself from Britton and tended 
to avoid citing Bion and Joseph. Somewhat caricaturing their arguments, he declared him-
self unpersuaded by their claim that lack of capacity for social understanding, as in Mr S’s 
case, should be regarded as an attack on the fantasized image of parental intercourse or on 
the mother.73 Yet, though he criticized Britton’s interpretation, the mechanism for the im-
pairment of Mr S’s understanding of his own and other minds was far from evident. Fonagy 
attempted various speculations between 1989 and 1991. These included that it represented 
a rejection of his mother for her lack of love, or an identification with Mr S’s ‘thoughtless’ 
parents, or a wish for omnipotence, or an attempt to render the analyst helpless as Mr S 
had been helpless as a child.74 Even if he distanced himself from the London Kleinians re-
garding the origin of the problem, Fonagy found himself in agreement with Bion and Joseph 
that the effect of the impairment in social understanding was that Mr S was unable to make 
use of psychoanalytic interpretations, which lean on a patient’s capacity to recognize and 
think about a fundamental feature of therapy: the difference between the patient’s personal 
wishes and worries about their analyst, and the analyst’s here- and- now reality as an ally in 
reflection.75 In fact, Fonagy believed that Mr S had only a flickering sense of other people 
as capable of different thoughts, perceptions, and intentions from his own, a predicament 
that contributed to his anxiety, anger, and bafflement in social situations such as analysis. 
 70 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in M. Brownescombe Heller and S. Pollet (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts in 
the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, p. 158.
 71 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 100.
 72 Sandler, a major influence on Fonagy, had drawn attention to the vital importance of understanding as a 
mental process. However, he had not addressed difficulties with social understanding specifically, as did the 
London Kleinians: Sandler, J. (1976). ‘Dreams, Unconscious Fantasies and Identity of Perception’. International 
Review of Psycho- Analysis, 3: 33– 42.
 73 Bion, W. R. (1965). Transformations: Change from Learning to Growth, London: Tavistock; Joseph, B. ([1981] 
1989). ‘Defence Mechanisms and Phantasy in the Psychoanalytical Process’, in M. Feldman and E. B. Spillius 
(eds), Psychic Equilibrium and Psychic Change: Selected Papers of Betty Joseph, London: Routledge, pp. 116– 126; 
Joseph, B. (1983). ‘On Understanding and Not Understanding: Some Technical Issues’. The International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 64: 291– 298; Britton, R. (1989). ‘The Missing Link: Parental Sexuality in the Oedipus Complex’, 
in J. Steiner (ed.), The Oedipus Complex Today, London: Karnac Books, pp. 83– 102. For distancing from Britton, 
see e.g. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1995). ‘Understanding the Violent Patient: The Use of the Body and the Role of 
the Father’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 487– 501, p. 497. As Bion observed, Kleinian language 
is somewhat metaphorical, and should not be taken in over- concrete terms. Fonagy rather makes a straw man of 
Britton by an overliteral interpretation of his claims.
 74 Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment 
of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656, pp. 645– 646.
 75 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115: ‘He clearly had difficulty in learning to differentiate between an internal transference 
image of his analyst on the one hand and me as a person on the other. There was no “as if ” character to this transfer-
ence because at times at least he had no access to a sense “real yet not real” ’ (p. 103).
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Additionally, Fonagy suspected that such confused perceptions about self and others con-
tributed to the psychotic experiences of the patient.
As we have seen, Anne Hurry had already supplemented use of psychoanalytic interpret-
ations with empathetic ‘developmental help’ in her treatment of adolescents. And Fonagy 
would later recall that, seeing the ineffectiveness of psychoanalytic interpretations of Mr 
S’s symptoms, he thought about the clinical advice of members of the Group for the Study 
of Borderline Cases to avoid such interpretations when patients showed borderline symp-
toms.76 Fonagy found that helping Mr S consider the source and content of his affects was 
a more effective intervention than psychoanalytic interpretations, able to contribute to a 
working collaboration and some relief of symptoms. For example, Mr S’s symptoms of de-
pression were found to centre around feelings of emptiness. Fonagy identified that these feel-
ings seemed especially promoted by the patient’s lack of vivid experience of his own or other 
minds. Fonagy’s impression was that the most important aspect of discussions of feelings 
such as emptiness with the patient was not the patient’s insight, or feelings of being under-
stood, but ‘the opportunity within the analytic process to entertain the way in which my 
mind works’. The benefit of this opportunity stemmed from the fact that ‘imposing mental 
terms between experience and response provided him with the requisite distance to achieve 
control over some of his overwhelming affects’.77 This readmitted dynamism, vividness, and 
a degree of choice into Mr S’s sense of events and interactions, which had otherwise been 
dominated by certainties based on the equation of his personal impressions with reality.
Fonagy’s acknowledgement of the limitations of psychoanalytic interpretation as clinical 
intervention fed into his approach to other early clinical cases. For instance, Mr T was a 30- 
year- old composer with a physical disability who entered analysis complaining of feelings of 
worthlessness and out- of- control aggression following alcohol use. He was cruel to himself 
and to others, and found it difficult to engage in cooperative activities, including conversa-
tion in clinical sessions. Fonagy attributed Mr T’s difficulties in social understanding espe-
cially to his relationship with his mother, who had been cold and denigrating of him and his 
disability. Fonagy suspected that, despite the differences from the physical abuse experienced 
by Mr S, a similar outcome had occurred for Mr T in which his capacity for attending to the 
thoughts and feelings of himself and others had been inhibited. Specifically, in the case of Mr 
T, his mother’s treatment had led him to use his disabled body ‘as the theatre of his mental ex-
perience’, rather than having thoughts and feelings serve as this theatre.78 Usually, the body is 
 76 Rosenfeld, S. K. and Sprince, M. P. (1965). ‘Some Thoughts on the Technical Handling of Borderline Children’. 
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 20(1): 495– 517. Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of 
Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in M. Brownescombe Heller 
and S. Pollet (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts in the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176: ‘I 
began to dimly remember Rosenfeld’s caution about interpreting unconscious conflict with patients with bor-
derline personality disorder. My unease increased when he went on to remember a further segment of the dream 
when the image of castrating his father was quickly followed by seeing himself in the dream holding his father’s 
severed penis up as if it were a torch. He was reminded of the Statue of Liberty and conveyed to me that illumin-
ating the darkness represented by his unconscious mind freed him to be a person who could now genuinely engage 
with others. Needless to say, neither my interpretations nor his dream the following day signalled a dramatic im-
provement. On the contrary, he appeared to deteriorate to become even more suicidal’ (p. 158). In a late lecture, 
Winnicott had also reflected that ‘psychoanalysis is not just a matter of interpreting the repressed unconscious; it is 
rather the provision of a professional setting for trust, in which such work may take place.’ Winnicott, D. W. ([1970] 
1986). ‘Cure’, in Home Is Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst, New York: Norton, pp. 112– 122, p. 115. 
Though he does not anywhere cite this passage, Winnicott had a tremendous general influence on Fonagy’s early 
thinking.
 77 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 106.
 78 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55, p. 51.
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part of the archaic accompaniment to language, conveying tone but not asked to stand alone 
for meaning. However, ‘if objects cannot be properly represented as thinking and feeling, 
they may to some extent be controlled, distanced or brought into proximity through bodily 
experiences’.79 As for Mr S, the difficulties with social understanding necessitated changes in 
clinical technique:
As he clearly found it hard to stick to the normal constraints of the analytic encounter, I de-
cided also to permit myself occasional deviations from ‘classical’ technique and act simply 
as any human being might be expected to react to such provocations. For example, when 
he peered down on me, standing above my chair, I simply stood up from my chair and said 
‘You are trying to make me feel small, but you know I am actually taller than you are’ . . . My 
interventions served to restore contact with him at a human level, and on most occasions 
he would regain his composure, and some kind of analytic dialogue would resume.80
By the early 1990s, Fonagy’s experiences had oriented him towards a concern with 
perspective- taking and its clinical implications. His father’s interests and his own self- 
reflection had highlighted that social understanding in adulthood is grounded upon the base 
of childhood experiences, and that this contributed to the dynamic interplay of meanings 
in adult speech and social understanding. His father’s diary had documented interest in the 
child’s potential to confuse internal and external perception, confuse real and pretend, and 
lose the difference between concrete occurrences and their different potential meanings. 
However, Fonagy had contested his father’s sense that these represented a child’s confusion, 
instead proposing that children may process the world in a qualitatively different way, and 
that distinctions familiar to adults are developmental achievements. Such achievements may 
be interrupted briefly or blocked off in a more sustained way depending on the care a child 
has received, and especially depending on whether or how parents have offered acknow-
ledgement of the child’s experience.
These concerns shaped his early clinical work and contributed to his interest in his pa-
tients’ social understanding of thoughts and feelings. From technical innovations associated 
with the Group for the Study of Borderline Cases and from his own analysis as an adolescent 
with Anne Hurry, Fonagy was primed to accept the limitations and problems of traditional 
psychoanalytic interpretation as a form of clinical intervention. Instead, he had begun to 
experiment with clinical interventions focused around helping patients gain perspective on 
the sources and scope of their feelings and thoughts. These reflections would be further de-
veloped by his work as a clinician, researcher, and later manager at the Anna Freud Centre.
 79 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1995). ‘Understanding the Violent Patient: The Use of the Body and the Role of the 
Father’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 487– 501, p. 495.
 80 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55, pp. 40– 41.
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Work at the Anna Freud Centre
Introduction
Chapter 1 presented three biographical snapshots of some of Fonagy’s formative experi-
ences: as a child in the Fónagy household, as an adolescent in therapy with Hurry, and as 
a young analyst in the 1980s. This chapter will continue chronologically into the 1990s, but 
with a greater focus on institutional rather than biographical context. It will explore Fonagy’s 
work as research director for the Anna Freud Centre in the 1990s, and the research con-
ducted by Target and Fonagy examining the long- term outcomes of former patients at the 
Centre.
In considering the institutional context within which Fonagy and colleagues have devel-
oped their ideas, the focus on the Anna Freud Centre is in part an effect of the available 
textual record. Fonagy has stated in interview that, after the suicidal feelings and depres-
sion of his adolescence, ‘these two institutions saved me: both the Anna Freud Centre and 
University College London (UCL).’1 However, there is almost nothing in the public domain 
documenting Fonagy’s activity within UCL. This is despite the fact that he has spent his 
whole career at UCL: as undergraduate, graduate, lecturer, head of department for Clinical, 
Education, and Health Psychology since 2008, and as head of division for Psychology and 
Language Sciences since 2017.2 That said, Fonagy has expressed pride in the UCL tradition 
of ‘open- mindedness’, as the first English university to accept atheists and religious non- 
conformers, and then later the first to accept women.3 He has likewise signalled his sympathy 
for the utilitarian values of the founder of UCL, Jeremy Bentham, for whom the purpose of 
knowledge was its value in practical use.4
After describing Fonagy’s work at the Anna Freud Centre in the 1990s, this chapter will 
attempt to characterize some features of Fonagy’s leadership of the Centre since 2003. The 
Centre has seen an incredible transformation in this time. We will seek to situate this trans-
formation in relation to the challenges and opportunities of the wider social context. The 
chapter will close with an attempt to briefly situate a number of the major collaborations from 
different eras of Fonagy’s work, introducing the dramatis personae for the rest of the book.
Research director at the Anna Freud Centre
After graduating as a psychoanalyst accredited to practise with adults in 1985, Fonagy 
pursued a private practice while also working as a lecturer in psychology at UCL. In 1989, he 
 1 Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Peter Fonagy: Combating a Mental Health Crisis’. Accessed at: https:// www.goldmansachs.
com/ insights/ talks- at- gs/ peter- fonagy.html.
 2 Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘A Word from our New Head of Division Professor Peter Fonagy to all PALS Alumni’. 
Accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ pals/ sites/ pals/ files/ peter- fonagy- letter- to- alumni.pdf.
 3 Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Why UCL?’. Accessed at: https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=XbvKbHO57ZI.
 4 Ibid.
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began training as a child and adolescent psychoanalyst at the Anna Freud Centre. His clin-
ical supervisors were Rose Edgcumbe, Anne- Marie Sandler, and Marion Burgner. As we saw 
in Chapter 1, he had already come to identify limitations to interpretation as the primary 
form of clinical intervention, which characterized the ‘classical’ psychoanalytic technique. 
His critical appraisal of the inherited psychoanalytic tradition was not always encouraged:
You know, I nearly didn’t make it through my training. Halfway through I was pulled up 
by my progress advisor, who asked me if I was certain that analysis was the career for me. 
I asked why, and she said that it was because I had been critical in seminars. It’s not that my 
career is to criticize, I told her, I just wanted to test the ideas, and I tested them.5
Nonetheless, Fonagy was supported by his clinical supervisors to utilize the technique of ‘de-
velopmental help’ (see Chapter 1) in his work with child patients. Through the early 1990s, 
he reported cases in which it appeared to be this aspect of clinical technique that proved ef-
fective at reducing his child patients’ symptoms and helping them to understand themselves 
and others.6 For instance, Fonagy reported the case of William, a 7 year old who could not 
relate to or play with his peers. His mother wished that he had never been born and made 
him feel rejected. This was disguised by a barrage of talk to and about him, but which showed 
little recognition of his intentions, thoughts, or feelings. Neither she nor William’s father had 
played with him. Fonagy reported:
After three years of intensive ‘developmental help’, William was far more able to think 
about himself and others in terms of motives and feelings, and to explore the painful area 
of how different his thinking was from other people’s and how this had cut him off from 
them. Throughout the analysis, play, focused on uncovering the psychic reality behind the 
physical, and then on the different perspectives of different people, formed the backbone of 
all the therapeutic work.7
As well as pursuing training in child and adolescent analysis, from 1989, Fonagy was ap-
pointed research director at the Centre. One of his first projects was to put together a tech-
nique manual for child psychoanalysis at the Centre. This was undertaken in conjunction 
with Mary Target and Rose Edgcumbe, and as the doctoral project for Jill Miller. Initially, 
work on this manual was oriented by the principles of classical psychoanalytic technique 
for work with children and adolescents, with a focus on reticence and psychoanalytic inter-
pretation of both patients’ symptoms and the dynamics in the patient– therapist relationship. 
However, there was a growing consensus that developmental help was of special importance 
for the therapy provided by the Anna Freud Centre. So Fonagy and colleagues started again, 
 5 Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘Interview’, in L. E. Rubinstein (ed.), Talking about Supervision: 10 Questions, 10 
Analysts = 100 Answers, London: International Psychoanalytic Association, pp. 39– 49, pp. 45– 46.
 6 The ‘developmental help’ approach at the Anna Freud Centre found support also from Paulina Kernberg’s 
object relations approach, though it would not appear that Kernberg had significant direct influence on 
Fonagy. Kernberg, P. F. and Chazan, S. E. (1991). Children with Conduct Disorders: A Psychotherapy Manual, 
New York: Basic Books. Another, apparently independent voice from the period calling for a shift from inter-
pretation to supportive counselling was Killingmo, B. (1989). ‘Conflict and Deficit: Implications for Technique’. 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 70: 65−79. The Sandlers recall that, at least in the UK context, a focus on 
relational support among Anna Freudians was influenced by work in the independent tradition (e.g. Winnicott). 
Sandler, J. and Sandler, A. M. (1994). ‘The Past Unconscious and the Present Unconscious: A Contribution to a 
Technical Frame of Reference’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 49(1): 278– 292, p. 280.
 7 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Playing with Reality: The Development of Psychic Reality and its Malfunction in Borderline 
Personalities’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76(1): 39– 44, pp. 42– 43.
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this time with developmental help as the focus. Again, however, this attempt failed: there 
was too much dissensus for a manual to be developed that met with enough approval to pub-
licly represent the Centre.8 Part of the problem was that ‘the same words were being used in 
significantly different ways by different clinicians, who had always assumed that they were 
talking and writing about the same phenomena.9 Despite this, Fonagy was struck that amid 
the dissensus that blocked the publication of the manual ‘we found that we had use for very 
few terms. As for all the subtlety— you just don’t need it.’10
In the abandoned manual, Fonagy and colleagues attempted to characterize the core elem-
ents of developmental help. On the one hand, developmental help offers support to the child 
or young person’s ‘dare to change’, for instance— by drawing the patient’s attention to limita-
tions of their current strategies and the possibilities held out by alternatives. In doing so, the 
therapist is encouraged to act with due acknowledgement that this may be quite challenging 
for patients whose symptoms reflect adaptations to an ‘environment perceived as dangerous 
or destructive in which improvement in his functioning would not be welcome’.11 On the 
other hand, the techniques of development offer direct assistance to the patient to support 
successful psychological functioning, and thereby ‘increase the child’s sense of being compe-
tent’. This may include ‘support in learning to control his feelings and behaviour, suggestions 
or demonstrations of how to manage difficulties he encounters, and so on’, and should be 
accompanied by a good deal of ‘encouragement and praise’.12 The therapist acts as an ‘auxil-
iary’ source of help for the patient’s capacities for affect regulation and behavioural control, 
encouraging the young person as they learn to achieve these capabilities independently.
The ideas circulating at the Anna Freud Centre during Fonagy’s training had particular 
importance for his later thinking in four regards. A first was the growing interest at the 
Centre in self- understanding and the experience of being understood to clinical work in 
general, but especially to work with children and adolescents and in patients presenting 
with borderline states. A second was the perspective that the most crucial aspect of ‘border-
line’ phenomena was difficulties in relating to others, and that this may stem from trauma 
in the child– caregiver relationship. A third was the idea of developmental help, seeking to 
help young people find new forms of adaptation to their environment that would permit 
greater affect regulation and self- esteem. And a fourth important lesson, related to the work 
of Fonagy and colleagues on the manual, was that clinicians might have significant overlap in 
the core elements that contribute to successful therapy.
In these and other ways, the emerging stance of Fonagy and his immediate collaborators 
in the 1990s was indebted to the Anna Freudian tradition. However, Fonagy and colleagues 
appear to have experienced this tradition as ultimately no longer adequate for its contem-
porary tasks. Some aspects, alive and bright, were pulled out and preserved; others were 
 8 Edgcumbe, R. (1995). ‘The History of Anna Freud’s Thinking on Developmental Disturbances’. Bulletin of the 
Anna Freud Centre, 18(1): 21– 34: ‘As recently as five or six years ago, when Peter Fonagy, George Moran, Hansi 
Kennedy and I started trying to put together a Technique Manual, we began by trying to orientate it around clas-
sical technique with neurotic children. But we and the therapists whom we asked to comment on our formulations 
found this unsatisfactory and we were obliged start again, this time trying to formulate developmental help. But we 
failed to sort it out satisfactorily’ (p. 22).
 9 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 289.
 10 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in Practice: A 
Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98, p. 88.
 11 Fonagy, P., Edgcumbe, R., Target, M., and Miller, J. (1999). Contemporary Psychodynamic Child 
Therapy: Theory and Technique, London: The Anna Freud Centre and University College London, p. 111, unpub-
lished manuscript, Mary Target’s personal archive.
 12 Ibid.
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patched with grafts from elsewhere. Anna Freud was centrally interested in the role of child– 
caregiver relationships and in education for providing scaffolding for an individual’s skills 
at self- regulation, and as the locus for preventative interventions.13 Both concerns were re-
tained by Fonagy and colleagues. Anna Freud’s interest in both positive and negative fac-
tors in development, and a child’s adaptation to their circumstances, would be pivotal to the 
work of Fonagy and his collaborators. Anna Freud also tended to eschew psychiatric diag-
noses as superficial, in favour of a quasi- interval scale of total mental health needs. This can 
be regarded as a relevant backdrop to Fonagy and colleagues’ critique of diagnosis- focused 
mental health practice, and their conceptualization of mental illness as a latent dimension.14
Yet the position of Fonagy and colleagues also represented an important and valuable ad-
vance, leading to a substantially more plausible theory. Several rather weak and specula-
tive aspects of the Anna Freudian tradition were rejected, including Anna Freud’s use of 
drive theory and her appeal to the id, ego, and superego as if they were distinct agencies.15 
Freud’s analysis of development in terms of oral, anal, and genital stages was also, appropri-
ately, thrown out. Perhaps the most influential shift, however, was in the conceptualization of 
the psychological processes that generate positive and negative mental health. Anna Freud 
had emphatically argued for the therapeutic priority of psychological processes that serve as 
defence mechanisms against anxiety, unpleasant realities, and the conflict of incompatible 
drives. For Anna Freud, defences— for instance, fantasies of omnipotence, or workaholism 
as a sublimation— may contribute to pathology, or to positive adaptation, depending on the 
subtlety and sophistication of the defence, and its responsiveness to the demands of the en-
vironment.16 By contrast, Fonagy and colleagues advocated the therapeutic priority of psy-
chological processes that obstruct the capacity to conceive of or reconsider thoughts and 
feelings. They have also conceptualized resilience as the capacity to learn from experience. 
So, for instance, the concept of repression, foundational for Freud, was abandoned by Fonagy 
and colleagues in favour of a revised account of distortions in cognitive and affective pro-
cessing.17 Even when the accounts could in principle have been integrated— for instance, in 
considering what fantasies are helpful in facilitating the capacity to conceive of or reconsider 
 13 Freud, A. (1954). ‘Psychoanalysis and Education’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 9(1): 9– 15; Freud, A. 
(1965). Normality and Pathology in Childhood, New York: International University Press.
 14 Anna Freud also at times expressed scepticism of the role of single traumas in mental health symptoms, and 
argued— as Fonagy and colleagues would later— that accounts of trauma in therapeutic contexts may be important 
but in large part as narrative constructions through which a patient works to understand and recalibrate their ex-
perience of themselves. However, Freud was not consistent on this point. Freud, A. (1958). ‘Child Observation and 
Prediction of Development: A Memorial Lecture in Honor of Ernst Kris’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 
13(1): 92– 116. Another intellectual ancestor of Fonagy who may have provided a relevant backdrop was Winnicott, 
for whom mental ill health was arrayed quantitatively, with no sharp qualitative lines between diagnoses— ‘even 
between health and full- blown schizophrenia’. Winnicott, D. (1971). Playing and Reality, London: Routledge, p. 66.
 15 Midgley, N. (2012). Reading Anna Freud, London: Routledge.
 16 The 10 defences privileged by Anna Freud were repression, regression, reaction- formation, isolation, undoing, 
projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal into the opposite, and sublimation. Freud, A. (1946). The 
Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, New York: International Universities Press. Some of these processes may be fa-
cilitated or actually achieved through forms of non- mentalizing (see Chapter 5). Regression, reaction- formation, 
and reversal into the opposite may be prompted by pretend mode. Undoing, projection, and introjection may be 
prompted by psychic equivalence, in which what is felt is experienced as real (e.g. that one can really undo an ac-
tion through some symbolic reparation). Isolation may be achieved by teleological mode. However, the defence 
mechanisms and the forms of non- mentalizing operate on rather different levels of analysis, given that they are 
descriptions of the obstruction of mental processes that are conceived very differently. Exemplary in this regard is 
the causal centrality of anxiety for Freud, and its peripheral and epiphenomenal role for Fonagy and colleagues, in 
their conceptualization of the mind and of mental illness.
 17 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Response’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(2): 354– 356. See also Pedersen, 
S. H. (2013). ‘Fonagy and Freud. Psychological versus Psychic Reality’. The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, 
36(1): 18– 26.
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thoughts and feelings, or in conceptualizing and working clinically with anxiety— such 
questions have been left essentially untouched, because the concepts for asking them have 
been set aside.18
Fonagy and colleagues stitched together work at the Anna Freud Centre with ideas from 
other traditions. This included the treachery of claiming commonalities and opportunities 
for mutual learning between the Anna Freudians and their traditional arch- enemies, the 
Kleinian school of psychoanalysis. For instance, Fonagy felt that the Kleinians had made 
major advances in studying the patient’s awareness of the clinician’s mind, and the patient’s 
experience of reality in patient– analyst interaction.19 He adopted a version of the Kleinian 
concept of ‘projective identification’ in the idea of the externalization of the alien self (see 
Chapter 6).
Fonagy also asserted opportunities for mutual learning between psychoanalysis and non- 
psychoanalytic approaches to supportive and therapeutic work with children and adults. 
Fonagy went on record praising Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), a modality that was 
increasingly coming to dominate publicly funded mental health care, to an extent at the ex-
pense of psychoanalysis. Though he regarded CBT as offering less depth and richness than 
psychoanalysis, he felt that it had introduced new techniques and values that might be of 
general value to therapeutic work: ‘I think cognitive behavioural therapy is a fairly rigorous 
business and I have a lot of time for it. The therapists often know what they’re talking about 
and, if done well, CBT can be very good.’20 Fonagy knew he was courting controversy in 
making such assertions. In interview, he would describe his self- perception as follows:
I’m Peter Fonagy. I consider myself to be a Freudian. But in fact, it is the Freudians that 
I have somewhat greatest difficulty with. And many Freudians now consider me a Kleinian. 
And those who do not consider me a Kleinian consider me independent. And those who 
do not consider me independent consider me a renegade.21
My theoretical stance is really a distortion of Anna Freud’s thinking, although I know 
that, if she was alive, she wouldn’t think I was following her ideas. But I certainly feel that 
it’s really Anna Freud’s ideas that I’m trying to develop.22
 18 Another point of potential integration could have been around Part II of Anna Freud’s Ego and the Mechanisms 
of Defence, which is centrally concerned with strategies to avoid social understanding by blocking occasions for 
learning from experience. So, for instance, a new defence mechanism is proposed by Anna Freud— ‘restriction of 
the ego’— in which an individual structures their social environment to pre- emptively avoid unpleasure. However, 
Freud’s examples are largely of strategies to pre- emptively avoid certain thoughts and feelings about themselves 
or others. This suggests a role for the affordances of the environment in facilitating or hindering mentalizing that 
Fonagy and colleagues have themselves been concerned with, especially in recent years (see Chapter 9). However, 
the difference in metapsychology, and particularly Freud’s use of drive theory, has made her account of defences 
somewhat difficult for Fonagy and colleagues to play with and use, or to subsequently revisit. Freud, A. (1946) The 
Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, New York: International Universities Press.
 19 E.g. Joseph, B. (1985). ‘Transference: The Total Situation’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 66: 447– 
454; Feldman, M. (1993). ‘Aspects of Reality, and the Focus of Interpretation’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 13: 274– 
295; Steiner, J. (1993). Psychic Retreats, London: Routledge. Fonagy and colleagues express enthusiasm for these 
works in Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 448.
 20 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in Practice: A 
Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98, p. 93.
 21 Palmer, S. (2015). ‘Controversial Discussions for the XXIst Century: An Interview with: Jan Abram, Dana 
Birkstead- Breen, Catalina Bronstein, Peter Fonagy, Bob Hinshelwood, Isabel Hernandez- Halton, Rosine 
Perelberg, Ken Robinson, Anne- Marie Sandler, Allan Schore, Mark Solms, Riccardo Steiner, and David Tuckett’. 
PEP Video Grants, 1(1): 2.
 22 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in Practice: A 
Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98, p. 96.
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One quality that set Fonagy apart from most other Anna Freudians, and contributed to their 
perception of him as a potential threat, was his concern with the scientific evaluation of psycho-
analytic practice. This external standard was one in which most psychoanalytic practitioners 
had little skill or training. It also challenged established regimes of power and authority, espe-
cially the right to judge what counted as reality. Scientific evaluation was perceived by many of 
Fonagy’s colleagues as a profanation, with the result that ‘analytic therapists in particular have 
been defensive and suspicious in the face of the evidence culture as though the very idea of ob-
jective scrutiny represented a hostile intrusion into a quasi sacred private world.’23 Sigmund 
Freud had, at times, claimed that any element of psychoanalysis could be jettisoned if subse-
quent scientific developments suggested the need to update theory or practice.24 However, 
Freud had little interest in experimental studies as a means of evaluating and improving psycho-
analytic practice.25
With a few exceptions such as John Bowlby,26 by the time Fonagy was training as an analyst, 
psychoanalysts had little appetite for either experimental research or the incorporation of new 
developments from other scientific disciplines. Instead, Fonagy saw around him that develop-
ments in psychoanalytic theory tended to stem from reflection on individual cases or a handful 
of cases, with ideas incorporated into the canon on the basis of the appeal to other clinicians, and 
without established systems to prune or disconfirm theory:
The abundance of clinicians claiming, on the basis of case reports, that their theory and tech-
nique are indispensable, is the gravest indictment of the logic of case- study methodology. It 
leaves open the possibility that an unspecifiable, but possibly very substantial, portion of co-
herent psychoanalytic generalizations, which meet the hermeneutic criteria of consistency 
and meaningfulness, are incorrect.27
Allied with Joseph Sandler’s concern regarding the conflation of description and explan-
ation, and with work pursued by Ivan Fónagy on the nature of metaphor in science,28 Fonagy 
argued in the 1980s that ‘all the metaphoric language of psychoanalysis is a sign of inad-
equate information concerning underlying psychological processes. It indicates gaps in our 
knowledge which will only be filled by further experimental research.’29 No denigration of 
 23 Goldbeck- Wood, S. and Fonagy, P. (2004). ‘The Future of Psychotherapy in the NHS’. British Medical Journal, 
329: 245– 246, p. 245. See also Chiesa, M. and Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘Scientific Research, the Therapeutic Community 
and Psychodynamic Psychotherapy’. Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 7(6): 173– 181.
 24 Freud, S. ([1940] 2001). An Outline of Psycho- Analysis (standard edn), Volume 23, London: Vintage, pp. 144– 
207, p. 159.
 25 Shulman, D. G. (1990). ‘Psychoanalysis and the Quantitative Research Tradition’. Psychoanalytic Review, 
77(2): 245– 261.
 26 Bowlby, J. (1981). ‘Psychoanalysis as a Natural Science’. The International Review of Psychoanalysis, 8: 243– 256; 
Wallerstein, R. (1986). ‘Psychoanalysis as a Science: A Response to the New Challenges’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 
55(3): 414– 451.
 27 Fonagy, P. and Tallandini- Shallice, M. (1993). ‘On Some Problems of Psychoanalytic Research in Practice’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 16: 5– 22, p. 6. See also Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘On the Relationship of Experimental 
Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Commentary by Peter Fonagy (London)’. Neuropsychoanalysis, 2(2): 222– 
232: ‘Clinical data clearly offer a fertile ground for theory building, but not for distinguishing good theories from 
bad or better ones’ (p. 228).
 28 Fónagy, I. (1989). ‘The Metaphor: A Research Instrument’, in D. Meutsch and R. Viehoff (eds), Comprehension 
of Literary Discourse, Berlin and New York: W. De Gruyter, pp. 111– 130.
 29 Fonagy, P. (1982). ‘The Integration of Psychoanalysis and Experimental Science: A Review’. International 
Review of Psycho- Analysis, 9: 125– 145; Sandler, J. (1983). ‘Reflections on Some Relations between Psychoanalytic 
Concepts and Psychoanalytic Practice’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 64: 35– 45. This point would later 
be repeated and elaborated in Luyten, P. (2015). ‘Unholy Questions about Five Central Tenets of Psychoanalysis 
that Need to be Empirically Verified’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 35(1): 5– 23. For a sustained discussion of the value 
of metaphor, see Civitarese, G. and Ferro, A. (2013). ‘The Meaning and Use of Metaphor in Analytic Field Theory’. 
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metaphor was intended; Fonagy himself clearly appreciated the value of a good metaphor in 
developing theory and in scientific exposition. Rather, his point was that metaphor should 
not be mistaken for causal- deductive claims about mental processes.
Fonagy’s distinction between evocative metaphor and causal- deductive psychology was 
over- sharp; lack of attention to what is evoked by the language of psychological theory would 
contribute to confusion regarding the meaning of his own theoretical terms like ‘disorgan-
ization’ and ‘self ’ (see Chapters 3 and 6).30 However, in his discussion of metaphor, Fonagy 
is certainly persuasive in his critique of the language of psychoanalytic theory: this language 
may give a luminous feeling of comprehension, but Fonagy felt that its tendency towards 
encompassing metaphors masks imprecision, especially in conceptualizing and predicting 
causal processes. The audience nod along, and lose the sense that that the ideas are pro-
visional estimates.31 This is because a shortcut has been enacted in the process of under-
standing, because individuals take away quite different meanings from the theory based on 
their existing presuppositions, while believing they hold a common notion. With psycho-
analytic theory both superabundant and ultimately unreliable in the articulation of causal 
processes, Fonagy saw clinicians operating in practice on the basis of implicit assumptions 
and low- grade generalizations about what was felt to work with patients, assumptions that 
were not brought for public discussion or elaboration into testable hypotheses. The result 
was ‘a petrification of clinical practice’, a weak articulation of the underlying psychological 
processes acted upon in clinical interventions, and resistance to even thinking about the re-
form of how analysts are trained.32
Supported by a collaboration with George Moran, Director of the Anna Freud Centre 
until his early death in 1992, Fonagy sought to pursue and nurture research at the inter-
section of psychoanalysis and scientific practice.33 After completing his training as a child 
psychoanalyst in 1995, he co- convened yearly research training seminars in London, under 
the banner of the International Psychoanalytical Association, to support the development 
of empirical research projects by psychoanalysts and trainees, as a step towards a culture 
favourable to psychoanalytic research.34 As chairman of the International Psychoanalytic 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 33(3): 190– 209; Havsteen- Franklin, D. (2019). ‘Creative Arts Therapies’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds). Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 181– 195. See also Holmes, J. and Slade, A. (2017). Attachment in Therapeutic Practice, 
London: Sage: ‘Metaphor is inherently mentalising’ (p. 70).
 30 For criticism of the contrast between metaphor and propositional discourse on the grounds that the latter, 
too, is subject to implicatures, see Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (2008). ‘A Deflationary Account of Metaphor’, in 
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 84– 105; Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (2015). ‘Beyond Speaker’s Meaning’. Croatian Journal of 
Philosophy, 15(44): 117– 149.
 31 Bion had earlier raised an aligned concern, that psychoanalytic theory actually proves a systematic obstacle 
to learning from experience to the extent that the epistemic status of its language is misunderstood. However, 
whereas Fonagy contrasts metaphor and causal- deductive claims, Bion addresses a wider variety of ‘rows’ of kinds 
of claim, differentiating kinds of proto- thought and also kinds of abstract thought, again which he urges should 
not be mistaken for one another.
 32 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Some Complexities in the Relationship of Psychoanalytic Theory to Technique’. 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 72(1): 13– 47, p. 38. See also Fonagy, P. (2009). ‘When Analysts Need to Retire: The 
Taboo of Ageing in Psychoanalysis,’ in B. Willock, R. C. Curtis, and L. C. Bohm (eds), Taboo or not Taboo? 
London: Karnac Books, pp. 209– 227, p. 220; Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘On Caution and Courage in Psychoanalytic 
Epistemology’. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 19(3): 213– 215.
 33 Moran, G. S. and Fonagy, P. (1987). ‘Psychoanalysis and Diabetic Control: A Single‐Case Study’. Psychology 
and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 60(4): 357– 372.
 34 Emde, R. N. and Fonagy, P. (1997). ‘An Emerging Culture for Psychoanalytic Research?’ The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 78(4): 643– 651; Wallerstein, R. S. and Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Psychoanalytic Research and 
the IPA: History, Present Status and Future Potential’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80: 91– 109. See 
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Association Standing Committee for Research from 1993 to 2005, Fonagy was also involved 
in the funding of psychoanalytic research.35
It should not be thought that Fonagy’s position was that of the dour empiricist: for example, 
he would act as an advocate for speculative psychoanalytic theory in academic contexts, ar-
guing for recognition of its potential contribution.36 He valued the inherited tradition of 
hermeneutic thinking in psychoanalysis as having generated many unique and valuable pro-
posals about the human mind and about the treatment of mental suffering. He was certainly 
not above offering untestable speculations at times. For instance, Fonagy and Target specu-
lated, apparently seriously, that psychoanalysts’ aversion to new beliefs and knowledge from 
outside psychoanalysis was an ‘unconscious expression of infantile patterns’, which made 
them afraid to explore freely.37 As we will see in Chapter 5 on the modes of non- mentalizing, 
Fonagy and colleagues have not hesitated to give clinical guidance over decades without get-
ting round to operationalizing relevant constructs for testing. Fonagy’s concern has not been 
with speculation per se, but with speculation intrinsically cut off from empirical testing. He 
felt, following Karl Popper and others, that a distinction should be drawn between the work 
of proposing hypotheses (the ‘context of discovery’) and the work of testing them enough to 
be able to be sure of the evidence and its replicability (the ‘context of justification’).38 Some 
analysts might wish to focus their energies on proposing hypotheses and some on testing 
them, but psychoanalysis as a discipline needed both activities for the sake of its internal 
health and development, as well as for its external standing.
In the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, Fonagy wondered at times whether it was 
already too late for psychoanalysis to change fast enough to counteract its reputation as a sci-
entific backwater, and to gain the credibility to receive research funding and opportunities 
also Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘An Appreciation of Dr Wallerstein’s Contributions to Psychoanalytic Research’, in Wilma 
Bucci (ed.), From Impression to Inquiry, London: Routledge, pp. 18– 21.
 35 André Green would criticize Fonagy for using the financial resources of the International Psychoanalytical 
Association to incentivize trainee psychoanalysts to pursue research. In his view, Fonagy and colleagues were 
setting up a new ‘objectivist’ school of psychoanalysis. Green, A. (2000). ‘Science und Science- fiction in der 
Sauglingsforschung’. Zeitschrift fur psychoanalytische Theorie und Praxis, 15(4): 438– 466. Fonagy and Hepworth 
would retort that scientific measurement is not a ‘school’, but precisely a means of constraining the organization 
of psychoanalytic theory to avoid a proliferation of incommensurable schools. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1996). 
‘Should We Allow Psychotherapy Research to Determine Clinical Practice?’ Comments on Sol J. Garfield: ‘Some 
Problems Associated with “Validated” Forms of Psychotherapy.’ Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 3: 245– 
250, p. 248.
 36 Polatinsky, S. (2005). Psychoanalysis and the Non- Conceptual. Unpublished doctoral thesis, University College 
London. Accessed at: http:// discovery.ucl.ac.uk/ 1445792/ 1/ U593116.pdf: ‘My sincere thanks to Peter Fonagy for 
his distinctive contribution of much needed humour and irreverence, and most importantly for his unstinting 
interest in this research project particularly in light of (in the face of) the implacable empiricists and logical posi-
tivists holding court (and fort!) at UCL.’
 37 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2007). ‘The Rooting of the Mind in the Body: New Links between Attachment 
Theory and Psychoanalytic Thought’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 55(2): 411– 456, p. 446. 
This position was later updated with the more plausible proposal that the psychoanalytic community had adopted 
a stance of epistemic vigilance, making them quite capable of generating new ideas but within a context in which 
they were unable to learn from outside perspectives. Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is Truth Relevant?’ 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303.
 38 Emde, R. N. and Fonagy, P. (1997). ‘An Emerging Culture for Psychoanalytic Research?’ The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 78(4): 643– 651: ‘Exploratory methods, aimed at discovery, can be distinguished from 
hypothesis- testing methods, in the context of confirmation’ (p. 647). See also Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘On Caution 
and Courage in Psychoanalytic Epistemology’. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 19(3): 213– 215: ‘Nietzsche 
talks of unpretentious truths that have been discovered by means of rigorous method, and opposes them to the 
metaphysics that blinds us and make us happy. He is essentially distinguishing boring Millian fact from evocative 
narrative. Holding on to these unpretentious truths demonstrates courage of a different sort from that shown by 
psychoanalytic investigations of the unconscious. It is a turning away from what is appealing toward what is true’ 
(p. 215).
34 Work at the Anna Freud Centre
for collaboration with significant figures in other disciplines.39 When he and Mark Solms 
attempted to establish a new MSc in neuropsychoanalysis at UCL, the application was met 
with rejection on the basis that psychoanalysis had insufficient collaborations with neurosci-
ence to warrant a postgraduate degree at the intersection.40 Nonetheless, in general, Fonagy 
retained optimism and, in papers from 1997, urged major and immediate changes to psy-
choanalytic culture:
If we fail to meet the challenge confronting us, if child analysts offer their treatment for an 
overly extended range of disorders, while making little attempt to demonstrate its effects 
in a form accessible to others, the likely consequence is that child psychoanalysis will be 
discredited and disappear. This will be a great loss to psychoanalysts, but a still greater one 
to those children who specifically need this form of help but who will no longer have access 
to it.41
Fonagy, Bleiberg, and Target advised pursuit of cross- disciplinary collaborations and integra-
tions of psychoanalysis with new developments in science. And, to achieve this, they called 
for six changes to psychoanalytic practice to generate the basis for scientific credibility.42
First, Fonagy argued that psychoanalysis needed better characterization of its interven-
tions, to the point that these could be manualized. This would clarify the relationship be-
tween intervention, process, and outcome.43 A second was that better specification was 
needed regarding what interventions were appropriate for what symptoms (‘what works for 
whom?’). It should not be assumed that the same techniques, or even psychoanalytic ap-
proaches in general, would be equally effective for conditions as diverse as anxiety disorders, 
drug addiction, and postnatal depression. Third, clinical practices needed to develop inde-
pendent and quantitative evidence of their efficacy.44 It might be a complex task to quantify 
the benefit a patient receives from psychoanalysis, given that this is generally assumed to 
be much more than the reduction in their presenting symptoms. Fonagy felt that this com-
plexity was not an intrinsic obstacle to evaluation, though it required candid discussions 
about what benefits might be seen and how they might be authentically measured.
 39 E.g. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘The History and Current Status of Outcome Research at the Anna 
Freud Centre’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 57(1): 27– 60, p. 56. Fonagy would later reflect on the pre-
dicament of art therapy, which he is confident is clinically effective, but which has not generated an adequate re-
search base to now readily compete for a share of research funding. Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Art Therapy and Personality 
Disorder’. International Journal of Art Therapy, 17(3): 90. Fonagy described this as an especially sad predicament 
for him since ‘I believe that with its many subspecialties, art therapy has the key, or perhaps a key, to our under-
standing of the mechanisms underpinning change in all kinds of psychological treatments . . . art therapy is closest 
to what we now understand to be the embodied roots of human consciousness and cognition’ (p. 90). See also 
Havsteen- Franklin, D. (2019). ‘Creative Arts Therapies’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds) Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (pp.181– 195), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
 40 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Genetics, Developmental Psychopathology, and Psychoanalytic Theory: The Case for 
Ending our (not so) Splendid Isolation’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 23(2): 218– 247, p. 242.
 41 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1997). ‘The Problem of Outcome in Child Psychoanalysis: Contributions from the 
Anna Freud Centre’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 17(S1): 58– 73.
 42 Fonagy, P., Bleiberg, E., and Target, M. (1997). ‘Child Psychoanalysis: Critical Overview and a Proposed 
Reconsideration’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 6: 1– 38, p. 16.
 43 In recent years, Fonagy’s advocacy of manualized therapies has not diminished. However, he has allowed 
greater acknowledgement that, where manualization is not coupled with the potential to tailor treatment to the 
patient, this probably reduces efficacy because therapists prototype patients rather than recognize and respond to 
their specificity (see Chapter 7).
 44 Elsewhere Fonagy expressed worry that, if those sympathetic to psychoanalysis did not become engaged in 
trials, the modality would fail to have supporting evidence and lose reputation and access to public funding. And 
what trials were conducted would not be careful to pursue the complex work of identifying authentic indicators of 
success relevant to the modality. Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Psychoanalysis Today’. World Psychiatry, 2: 73– 80.
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Fourth, Fonagy argued that developments in theory needed to be tied more closely to 
developments in clinical technique, which could be evaluated to demonstrate or discon-
firm the practical value of the theory. If psychoanalysts approach anxiety disorders, drug 
addiction, and postnatal depression differently on the basis of ideas about their respective 
psychological mechanisms, then this should be specified, and the distinct components of 
the interventions articulated to facilitate their empirical evaluation and the optimization of 
treatment practice. Fifth, psychoanalytic treatments should be revised to be shorter, with 
better specified goals to facilitate transparency and evaluation. And sixth, clinical progress 
should receive ongoing evaluation using reliable procedures, which also feed in to clin-
ical supervision.45 Of the six recommended changes to psychoanalytic practice, only this 
last would spare the Anna Freudian tradition, which had generally had a better history of 
evaluating clinical progress than other schools of psychoanalysis. On the five other grounds, 
Fonagy was directly calling for major alterations to the approach to psychoanalysis in which 
he had recently qualified.
The Anna Freud Centre retrospective study
In becoming research director for the Anna Freud Centre, Fonagy gained access to the 
Centre’s case files for research purposes. It was expected that therapists associated with the 
Centre would write detailed weekly reports on each patient, and further reports every two 
months. These would belong to the Centre, for the purposes of research. Many of the case 
files had been indexed as part of a large project in the 1960s. The indexing work raised valu-
able questions about what should be the appropriate ‘unit of psycho- analytic observation’. 
These questions led to penetrating studies of basic psychoanalytic concepts by Sandler and 
colleagues (see the Introduction), studies that were a formative influence for Fonagy.46
By the time Fonagy took the role of research director, there were 763 cases available for 
research and, unusually, well characterized. Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham’s sense of 
scientific values had led them to demand an unusual level of documentation. This included 
identification of symptoms such as conduct problems, anxiety, and depression. Cases at the 
Centre were also reporting against a quasi- interval system for coding mental ill health (see 
Chapter 7): category 1 (essentially normal), 2 (transient symptomatology or developmental 
strain), 3 (neurotic, with ‘permanent regressions, fixations, and symptom formation’), 4 
(atypical, distorted personality development), and 5 (destructive processes disrupting 
mental growth).47 In the early 1990s, Mary Target began work on a PhD with Fonagy pur-
suing a retrospective study of patient records at the Anna Freud Centre to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of the service. Target’s characterization of Fonagy as a doctoral supervisor was as 
‘demanding’, ‘inspiring’, and ‘fun’, though ‘often infuriating’ because ‘much of the time I was 
left to get on with the work as best I could’.48
 45 Fonagy, P., Bleiberg, E., and Target, M. (1997). ‘Child Psychoanalysis: Critical Overview and a Proposed 
Reconsideration’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 6: 1– 38, p. 16.
 46 Sandler, J. (1962). ‘Research in Psycho- Analysis— The Hampstead Index as an Instrument of Psycho- Analytic 
Research’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43: 287– 291; Fonagy, P. (2005). ‘An Overview of Joseph 
Sandler’s Key Contributions to Theoretical and Clinical Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 25(2): 120– 147.
 47 Freud, A. (1962). ‘Assessment of Childhood Disturbances’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 17: 149– 158; 
Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Who is Helped by Child Psychoanalysis? A Sample Study of Disruptive Children, 
from the Anna Freud Centre Retrospective Investigation’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 291– 315, p. 294.
 48 Target, M. (2003). ‘The Anna Freud Centre: About the Directors’. Originally at http:// www.annafreudcentre.
org/ target.htm. Accessed at: http:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20060925220711/ http:// www.annafreudcentre.org/ 
36 Work at the Anna Freud Centre
Fonagy and Target published their first reports from the study in 1994. At first sight, it 
appeared that psychoanalysis had very different outcomes for groups of child patients. 
Forty- six per cent of child patients, who initially presented with aggressive and disruptive 
behavioural problems, showed improvement in these symptoms by the end of analysis, 
compared with 73% of child patients presenting with symptoms of anxiety or depression. 
However, Fonagy and Target found that, if only analyses lasting at least three years were con-
sidered, the magnitude of change was identical. They interpreted these results as suggesting 
that ‘it appears that psychoanalysis can bring about substantial improvements in children 
with disruptive disorders, but the challenge is to keep these children in analysis long enough 
for them to benefit’.49 The researchers assessed factors such as whether there was a change 
in the therapist and whether there were regular meetings with the parents. These factors ap-
peared to have no effect on the effectiveness of treatment of children showing aggressive and 
disruptive behaviour. Yet they predicted 20% of therapeutic outcome for children presenting 
with anxiety or depression.50 Examining patient- level factors that predicted improvement, 
Fonagy and Target found that the age of the child did not affect the likelihood of improve-
ment in their symptoms, but that older children were less likely to lose their diagnosis.51 
Later meta- analytic findings from trails data by Pilling, Fonagy and colleagues would report 
that, in general, younger children obtain greater benefit from psychotherapy than older chil-
dren by follow- up.52 However, a meta- analysis focused specifically on mentalization- based 
parenting interventions found the opposite, that interventions targeting parents of 6– 12 year 
olds had greater effectiveness than those targeting parents of younger children.53
Fonagy and Target acknowledged that there was considerable diversity of symptom pro-
files. So, for instance, within the ‘aggressive and disruptive’ group, there was actually much 
more improvement among children with oppositional defiant disorder (56%) than among 
those with a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (36%) or conduct disorder 
(23%).54 There was also heterogeneity in the anxiety and depression group, with poorer out-
comes for depression.55 Additionally, the distinction between ‘aggressive and disruptive’ be-
haviours and ‘anxiety and depression’ could be somewhat arbitrary. Many children displayed 
target.htm; Target, M. (2018). ‘20/ 20 Hindsight: A 25- Year Programme at the Anna Freud Centre of Efficacy and 
Effectiveness Research on Child Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’. Psychotherapy Research, 28(1): 30– 46.
 49 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Who is Helped by Child Psychoanalysis? A Sample Study of Disruptive 
Children, from the Anna Freud Centre Retrospective Investigation’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 291– 
315, p. 302.
 50 Ibid. Good psychological functioning of the mother, and poor psychosocial adaptation of the child patient, 
at commencement of therapy were also positive predictors of improvements for children with anxiety and depres-
sion, but less so for children with aggressive or disruptive behavioural problems. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1996). 
‘Predictors of Outcome in Child Psychoanalysis: A Retrospective Study of 763 Cases at the Anna Freud Centre’. 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44: 27– 77.
 51 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1994). ‘Efficacy of Psychoanalysis for Children with Emotional Disorders’, Journal 
of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 33: 361– 371, p. 367.
 52 Pilling, S., Fonagy, P., Allison, E., Barnett, P., Campbell, C., Constantinou, M., . . . and Kendall, T. (2020). 
‘Long- term outcomes of psychological interventions on children and young people’s mental health: A systematic 
review and meta- analysis’. PloS One, 15(11): e0236525.
 53 Lo, C. K. and Wong, S. Y. (2020). ‘The effectiveness of parenting programs in regard to improving parental re-
flective functioning: a meta- analysis.’ Attachment & Human Development, Early View.
 54 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘The Efficacy of Psychoanalysis for Children with Disruptive Disorders’. 
Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 33: 45– 55, p. 45.
 55 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1996). ‘Predictors of Outcome in Child Psychoanalysis: A Retrospective Study of 
763 Cases at the Anna Freud Centre’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44: 27– 77: ‘We would 
argue that childhood depression may in some instances reflect a dysfunction of mental processes associated 
with the creation of self representation, particularly those associated with self- monitoring and self- evaluation’ 
(pp. 54– 55).
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aspects of both profiles. An intriguing finding was that, among children presenting with ag-
gressive and disruptive behavioural problems who remained in analysis for at least a year, 
65% improved if there was an additional diagnosis of anxiety, whereas only 50% improved 
if there was no diagnosis of anxiety.56 This suggested that anxiety was generally a positive 
prognostic indicator, a finding that Fonagy and Target attributed to the role of anxiety as a 
signal of psychological conflict, at least in older children, which could then be resolved in the 
analysis through support in reconciling different perspectives on the problem: ‘the absence 
of anxiety may then be an indication of a pervasive distortion of representations, or more 
likely a substantial inhibition of mental processes, to a point where incompatibility is no 
longer experienced.’57 The finding that anxiety was a positive prognostic indicator has sub-
sequently been supported by findings of a negative association between internalizing symp-
toms and impairment once general mental health (the p- factor, see Chapter 7) is taken into 
account.58 Another related finding reported by Fonagy and Target was that children with 
mixed emotional and conduct disorder seemed particularly likely to benefit from four- or 
five- times weekly treatment, compared with once- a- week treatment. This was also the case 
for children with depression and those without a clear diagnostic profile. By contrast, chil-
dren with milder forms of anxiety or with separation anxiety problems were just as likely to 
show improvements from once- a- week treatment.59 A later meta- analytic study of child psy-
chotherapy would indicate that moderate treatment intensity was more effective than high 
intensity across all disorders.60
In a number of cases, the records showed that children had reported to their analyst 
abuse or neglect by their parents. Most clinicians took this seriously and approached the 
parents or worked with other professionals to try to resolve the problems. Nonetheless, a sad 
finding from the retrospective study was that some clinicians interpreted the children’s re-
ports as fantasy. In a later follow- up of a proportion of the child patients, Target and Fonagy 
found that ‘at the time of follow- up these individuals could be seen to be reliving and being 
 56 This proposal had already been suggested earlier by Conte, H. R., Plutchik, R., Picard, S. Karasu, T. B. and 
Vaccaro, E. (1988). ‘Self- Report Measures as Predictors of Psychotherapy Outcome’. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 
29: 355– 360.
 57 This was a complicated picture, however, and moderated by age. Fonagy and Target, ‘Predictors of 
Outcome’: “Variables specific to each age group emerged; for example, for children under 6 a history of mental 
illness in the mother predicted worse outcome, while sleep disorder, phobias, or significant medical history were 
associated with good outcome. Among latency children, in contrast, a history of maternal mental disorder was as-
sociated with better outcome. For adolescents, several variables related to parental mental health were significant 
predictors; for instance, an antisocial father or mother who had attempted suicide predicted worse outcome, but 
anxiety in the father was associated with improvement. Difficulties in peer relationships or disruptive behavior 
at school predicted poor outcome.’ (pp. 40– 41). For later reflections on the potentially adaptive contribution of 
anxiety, see St Clair, M. C., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Fonagy, P., Bullmore, E. T., Dolan, R. J., . . . and Goodyer, I. M. 
(2017). ‘Characterising the Latent Structure and Organisation of Self- Reported Thoughts, Feelings and Behaviours 
in Adolescents and Young Adults’. PloS One, 12(4): e0175381, pp. 19– 20.
 58 Caspi, A., Houts, R. M., Belsky, D. W., Goldman- Mellor, S. J., Harrington, H., Israel, S., . . . Moffitt, T. E. 
(2014). ‘The P Factor: One General Psychopathology Factor in the Structure of Psychiatric Disorders?’ Clinical 
Psychological Science, 2(2): 119– 137; Lahey, B. B., Rathouz, P. J., Keenan, K., Stepp, S. D., Loeber, R., and Hipwell, A. 
E. (2015). ‘Criterion Validity of the General Factor of Psychopathology in a Prospective Study of Girls’. Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines, 56(4): 415– 422.
 59 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1994). ‘Efficacy of Psychoanalysis for Children with Emotional Disorders’. Journal 
of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 33: 361– 371, p. 368; Schachter, A. (2004). The Adult 
Outcome of Child Psychoanalysis: A Long- Term Follow- Up Study. Unpublished doctoral thesis, London: University 
College London.
 60 Pilling, S., Fonagy, P., Allison, E., Barnett, P., Campbell, C., Constantinou, M., . . . and Kendall, T. (2020). 
‘Long- term outcomes of psychological interventions on children and young people’s mental health: A systematic 
review and meta- analysis’. PloS One, 15(11): e0236525.
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preoccupied by the traumata, for example of intrusive memories or flashbacks that corres-
ponded to actual experiences reported in the childhood file.61
The Anna Freud Centre retrospective study would be influential for the later thinking 
of Fonagy and colleagues in four regards in particular. First, Target and Fonagy identified 
pretend mode and psychic equivalence as forms of non- mentalizing through their work 
on the case files. This would form one of the most important bases for the development of 
their theory (see Chapter 5) and of Mentalization- Based Therapy by Fonagy and Bateman. 
Second, Anna Freud’s quasi- interval scale for assessing mental ill health as a latent variable 
beneath symptom clusters seems to have been relevant background to work by Fonagy and 
colleagues on the p- factor in the 2010s (see Chapter 7). Third, and most directly, the study 
showed that psychoanalytic therapy could contribute to robust improvement in patients’ 
symptoms over time, contrary to the claims of critics that suggested that psychoanalysis 
would either show no benefit or only had benefits that could not be documented. Fourth, 
children with anxiety problems improved just as well with once- a- week therapy as with four- 
or five- times- a- week therapy. This contributed to the interest of Fonagy and colleagues in 
lower- intensity therapies, and the delivery of mental health interventions for children and 
adolescents in primary care settings (see Chapter 8).
Transformations
The Anna Freud Centre retrospective study exemplified the willingness of Fonagy and col-
leagues to objectify and appraise the clinical efficacy of the Anna Freudian tradition of psy-
choanalytic intervention. Though Fonagy held the role of research director for the Centre, 
his stance was met by concern and scepticism by many of his fellow clinicians, who felt that 
his stance demonstrated insufficient appreciation for the richness of the Anna Freudian 
tradition in attempting to reduce its value to simplified outcome measures. Fonagy and his 
colleagues seemed to many at the Centre to be setting themselves up as independent of the 
community of Anna Freudians. He was also a controversial figure in the international psy-
choanalytic community, especially for his criticism of the concept of repression.62
The issue of Fonagy’s fidelity or infidelity to the Anna Freudian tradition would come to 
a head in 2002 with the retirement of Julia Fabricius as Director of the Centre. By this time, 
the Centre had a fourfold vision: conducting clinical training, analytic treatment, empirical 
research, and work on prevention. The Centre was comparatively rich, thanks to its estates 
in the heart of Hampstead. However, the institution was also financially overstretched in 
seeking to fulfil its different commitments.
Fonagy applied for the post of Director. In response, a petition was circulated to the board 
arguing against his appointment on the grounds that ‘Peter Fonagy clearly stated at the AGM 
 61 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Attachment Theory and Long- Term Psychoanalytic Outcome: Are Insecure 
Attachment Narratives Less Accurate?’ in M. Leuzinger- Bohleber, A. U. Dreher, and J. Canestri (eds), Pluralism 
and Unity? Methods of Research in Psychoanalysis, London: International Psychoanalytical Association, pp. 149– 
167, p. 163. See also Schachter, A. and Target, M. (2009). ‘The Adult Outcome of Child Psychoanalysis: The Anna 
Freud Centre Long Term Follow- Up Study’, in Midgley N, Anderson J, Grainger E, Nesic- Vuckovic T (eds), Child 
Psychotherapy and Research: New Approaches, Emerging Findings, London: Routledge, pp. 144– 156.
 62 See Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Response’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(2): 354– 356. Leo Rangell, 
twice president of the International Psychoanalytical Association and the American Psychoanalytic Association, 
would describe Fonagy as having ‘helped bring about’ the ‘current fragmentation’ of psychoanalysis. Rangell, L. 
(2008). ‘Reconciliation: The Continuing Role of Theory’. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis and 
Dynamic Psychiatry, 36(2): 217– 233, p. 219. See also, Rangell, L. (2004). My Life in Theory, New York: Other Press.
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that he does not think of himself as an Anna Freudian’, and that, while prioritizing research, 
he would pursue cost- cutting measures that would discontinue clinical training and scale 
back the provision of treatment by the Centre. As a result, it was argued that ‘we would go 
so far as to say that in his hands the identity and future of the Anna Freud Centre as an 
internationally renowned establishment dedicated to the Anna Freudian developmental 
perspective on child analysis would be destroyed.’63 Thirty therapists and former therapists 
associated with the Centre signed the petition.64 Fonagy withdrew his application. However, 
no other appropriate applicant could be found and Fonagy became Chief Executive the next 
year, with Mary Target and Linda Mayes as other members of the directorial team. Looking 
back on this moment of psychoanalytic history, Reeves has reflected that the petition:
now reads as a prescient though nostalgic letter, as the concerns raised in no way anticipated 
the sea- change the Centre would experience under Fonagy. It must also be said that no Anna 
Freudian child analyst or group of analysts came up with a clear vision to lead, protect, and 
fund the fourfold psychoanalytic clinic.65
Nearly 20 years later, the Anna Freud Centre certainly looks a different institution from the 
one inherited by Fonagy. It should be immediately acknowledged that it is difficult to discern 
how much of this change was the result of the decisions and priorities of Fonagy, how much 
the decisions of others, and how much circumstance. Nonetheless, the net effect has been 
that the Centre’s therapeutic, institutional, reputational, and financial resources have been 
almost wholly repurposed. While there are continuities in the strengths of all these elements, 
and some carry- overs such as parent– toddler groups,66 the mission and scale of the Anna 
Freud Centre have shifted.67 The Centre no longer offers long- term psychoanalytic therapy to 
children and adolescents. However, the Centre’s Early Years Parenting Unit offers 18 months 
of two- days- a- week mentalization- based treatment to parents with a personality disorder 
with a child under five referred by child protection services.68 Other clinical services are also 
 63 Nagera, H. et al. (2002). ‘Open Letter to the Chair of the Trustees’. The Anna Freud Centre. Accessed at: http:// 
www.thecjc.org/ pdf/ annafreud.PDF
 64 White, K. and Schwartz, J. (2007). ‘Attachment Here and Now: An Interview with Peter Fonagy’. Attachment, 
1(1): 57– 61.
 65 Reeves, J. K. (2017). ‘About Losing and Being Lost without Anna Freud’s ‘Revolutionary Overhaul’. Journal of 
the American Psychoanalytic Association, 65(6): 1077– 1101, p. 1079. The changes to the Anna Freud Centre under 
Fonagy’s leadership can be regarded as foreshadowed by an earlier episode. In 1990, Fonagy joined the Executive 
Council of the International Psychoanalytic Association, serving as treasurer until 1995. Reports from this time 
reveal Fonagy’s careful cost- effectiveness analysis of the Association’s activities, and repeated confrontation of un-
pleasant truths about the viability of expenditure. This generated some controversy at times. However, by the end 
of Fonagy’s tenure as treasurer, the Association was no longer on precarious footing, and in fact had started to 
build up reserves. Fonagy, P. (1990). ‘Treasurer’s column’. International Psychoanalytical Association Newsletter. 
Accessed at: http:// www.ipa.world/ ipa/ Images/ PDFDocuments/ IPA- News- Magazine/ ipa- newsmag- 1990- v22- 
i1.pdf: ‘We bear our own costs in mind . . . We aim to provide substance for the apocryphal remark “there is nothing 
quite as cost- effective as a good cost- effectiveness analysis.” ’ (p. 9). Andrade de Azevedo, A. M. (1995). ‘Secretary’s 
Column’. International Psychoanalytical Association Newsletter. Accessed at: http:// www.ipa.world/ ipa/ Images/ 
PDFDocuments/ IPA- News- Magazine/ ipa- newsmag- 1995- v4- i2.pdf ‘It was considered remarkable that there had 
been hardly any over spending and indeed very little increase in costs for four years. Prof. Fonagy’s report was re-
ceived with applause’ (p. 6).
 66 Zaphiriou Woods, M. and Pretorius, I. M. (2016). ‘Observing, Playing and Supporting Development: Anna 
Freud’s Toddler Groups Past and Present’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 42(2): 135– 151.
 67 The most integrated and up- to- date account of the current work of the Anna Freud Centre is Allison, E. and 
Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, London: Anna 
Freud Centre.
 68 McLean, D. and Daum, M. (2017). ‘The Use of Observation in Developing Parenting Capacity’, in Clare 
Parkinson, Lucille Allain, and Helen Hingley- Jones (eds), Observation in Health and Social Care: Applications 
for Learning, Research and Practice with Children and Adults, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 158– 176. 
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provided. For instance, the Parent– Infant Project offers a range of psychotherapeutic inter-
ventions focused on the parent– child relationship. The service is free for parents of infants 
living near the Centre who are struggling in the caregiving role. The Parent– Infant Project 
draws on elements of traditional parent– child psychotherapy, but also of mentalization- 
based therapy.69 It delivers group- based outreach in primary care baby clinics, in collabor-
ation with health visitors.70 The Centre also offers eight- week, manualized groups, both for 
parents and for foster- carers, focused on supporting caregiver mentalization.71 Many of the 
clinical services delivered by the Centre have been adapted to virtual delivery during the 
COVID- 19 pandemic, entailing both use of new technologies and adaptations of clinical 
technique.72
Additionally, the Centre delivers innovative non- clinical services anticipated to have sig-
nificant therapeutic benefit, and again these have been adapted for online delivery in the 
context of the pandemic.73 For instance, the ‘Contact and Residence Disputes’ service takes 
a mentalization- based approach to helping families locked in chronic legal disputes about 
custody and contact for their child or children.74 Such services signal the potential opening 
for a mentalization- based framework for professional practice across diverse contexts in 
which social understanding has difficulty forming or has broken down.
The training of child analysts has long gone. A clinical training in child psychotherapy 
remains, but the theoretical orientation of the course does not reflect an Anna Freudian per-
spective.75 Besides this, psychoanalysis is in the background rather than the foreground at 
the Centre, though there remain courses such as the MSc Psychoanalytic Developmental 
Psychology. The Hampstead estates have been sold as part of generating the funds for a 
£41 million new building near King’s Cross Station in London, supported in part through 
private philanthropy and the patronage of the British royal family. In 2019, the building 
won the Grand Prix Design Award and was described by the judges as ‘a homely, light- filled 
environment that supports children dealing with mental health problems and who are 
Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ what- we- do/ our- help- for- children- and- families/ our- clinical- work- 
and- projects/ our- work- with- under- fives/ early- years- parenting- unit- eypu/ .
 69 There are several differences in the Anna Freud Centre model of parent– infant psychotherapy from the ap-
proaches adopted elsewhere. See Baradon, T., Biseo, M., Broughton, C., James, J., and Joyce, A. (2016). The Practice 
of Psychoanalytic Parent- Infant Psychotherapy: Claiming the Baby (2nd edn), London: Routledge.
 70 James, J. and Rosan, C. (2019). ‘Remodelling Baby Clinics: Opportunities to Support Parent– Baby 
Relationships’. Journal of Health Visiting, 7(8): 400– 404.
 71 Redfern, S., Wood, S., Lassri, D., Cirasola, A., West, G., Austerberry, C., . . . Midgley, N. (2018). ‘The Reflective 
Fostering Programme: Background and Development of a New Approach’. Adoption & Fostering, 42(3): 234– 248. 
See also Dueger, S. K. (2015). An Attachment- and Mentalization- Focused Group: Experiences During One’s First 
Pregnancy. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Chicago: Chicago University.
 72 Ventura Wurman, T., Lee, T., Bateman, A., Fonagy, P., and Nolte, T. (2020). ‘Clinical management of common 
presentations of patients diagnosed with BPD during the COVID- 19 pandemic: the contribution of the MBT 
framework’. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Early View.
 73 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ mental- health- professionals/ our- help- for- children- and- 
 families/ our- clinical- work- and- projects/ parenting- and- multi- family- groups/ family- ties- online- 
therapy- for- parents- in- conflict/ 
 74 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ what- we- do/ our- help- for- children- and- families/ our- clinical- 
work- and- projects/ our- work- with- families- involved- in- legal- proceedings/ contact- and- residence- disputes/ 
.There is, as yet, no research evidence evaluating a mentalization- based approach compared with ‘mediation as 
usual’.
 75 Accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ pals/ study/ pals- phd- and- doctorate- programmes/ doctorate- psychotherapy-  
child- and- adolescent- psychoanalytic. ‘The theoretical orientation of the training represents the thinking of the 
Independent School within the British Psychoanalytic movement. A Jungian pathway has been developed for 
those in Jungian analysis.’
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excluded from the school system’.76 In terms of the Centre’s focus, prevention has gained far 
greater prominence than in earlier incarnations, through the production of resources for 
schools, children and families, and helping professionals.77 For instance, the Anna Freud 
Centre’s Service for Schools delivers training in a multi- family group approach, in which 
six to eight families receive mentalization- based support by a teacher at the school together 
with a psychological professional.78 In the context of the COVID- 19 pandemic, the Anna 
Freud Centre have issued a suite of prevention- focused resources and guidance for schools, 
children and families, and helping professionals.79 For instance, they have published guid-
ance on ‘Helping babies and young children under 5 through the coronavirus crisis’, which 
focuses on strategies parents and early years workers can use to help young children under-
stand the disruption to their lives, allow them to continue to feel well looked after, and to 
identify escalating problems with their mental health.80
On average, around 8,300 mental health professionals are trained a year at the Anna Freud 
Centre in mentalization- based approaches.81 As of 2018, over 5,000 mental health practi-
tioners are affiliated with the Centre’s Learning Network, and over 6,500 teachers with the 
Centre’s Schools in Mind Network.82 In 2020, the Centre launched a new online training 
portfolio, which will have the advantage of making their courses much more readily avail-
able to practitioners outside of London, including internationally.83
The Anna Freud Centre is also a major player in influencing national mental health policy, 
with a close relationship with the Department for Education. In 2014, the Centre became 
host to a new specialist school for children aged between 9 and 14 who had been excluded 
from mainstream education.84 The scope of research at the Centre has also grown beyond 
recognition compared with 2003. The Centre receives over £2 million each year in grants for 
pursuing empirical research. It directly employs 63 researchers (out of 250 direct staff) and 
hosts 330 postgraduate students.85
The Centre has a network of Young Champions— young people who have experience 
of using mental health services and contribute to research, governance, training and out-
reach.86 On the Anna Freud Centre website is ‘On My Mind’, a section co- produced with 
 76 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2019/ 11/ double- award- win- for- our- new- home- the- 
kantor- centre- of- excellence/ .
 77 E.g. the ‘You’re never too young to talk’ animation and teacher toolkit, aimed at years 5 and 6 pupils: https:// 
www.annafreud.org/ media/ 7228/ tmh- parent- leaflet- final- all- approved- laid- out- for- web.pdf/ .
 78 Asen, E., Dawson, N., and McHugh, B. (2003). Multiple Family Therapy: The Marlborough Model and its Wider 
Application. London: Karnac Books.
 79 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ coronavirus- support/ 
 80 Anna Freud National Centre for Children and Families (2020). Helping babies and young children under 5 
through the coronavirus crisis, https:// www.annafreud.org/ media/ 11732/ eyim_ covidsupport_ v1d2.pdf
 81 The Anna Freud Centre (2018). The Big Move: Annual Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 
August 2018. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ media/ 9623/ trustees- annual- report- ye310818.pdf.
 82 Ibid.
 83 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2020/ 07/ anna- freud- centre- launches- new- online-  
training- portfolio/ 
 84 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Why Do Families Matter?’, Huffington Post, 17 February. Accessed at: http:// www.
huffingtonpost.co.uk/ peter- fonagy/ childrens- mental- health- families_ b_ 9227210.html. In 2017, the school was 
rated as ‘outstanding’ by inspectors in every category. Accessed at: http:// www.thefamilyschoollondon.org/ up-
loads/ 2014/ 03/ The- Family- School- Ofsted- 2017.pdf.
 85 The Anna Freud Centre (2018). The Big Move: Annual Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 
31 August 2018. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ media/ 9623/ trustees- annual- report- ye310818.
pdf. The Anna Freud Centre (2019). ‘HRH The Duchess of Cambridge Launches Centre of Excellence to 
Drive Change for Child Mental Health’. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2019/ 05/ 
hrh- the- duchess- of- cambridge- launches- centre- of- excellence- to- drive- change- for- child- mental- health.
 86 The Anna Freud Centre (2020). ‘Young Champions’. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ on- my- mind/ 
get- involved/ young- champions.
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Young Champions, with information, signposting, and resources for children and young 
people to make sense of mental health and mental health services.87 For instance, the Youth 
Wellbeing Directory provides a list of free mental health support organizations for young 
people, searchable by postcode or town. The website also has guidance for young people 
who are in a role that entails providing support for a friend or family member experien-
cing mental health difficulties.88 Among the ‘On My Mind’ resources are self- care tools for 
young people, including support for activities such as creative writing, dance, conversations 
with friends, self- talk, time away from technology, and distraction techniques for when dif-
ficulties cannot otherwise be resolved.89 These have been popular and well- used resources. 
Furthermore, the Centre has reported a 567% increase in use of these resources between 
March and April 2020, as the first COVID- 19 lockdown commenced.90
Despite the multifaceted nature of the transformation of the Anna Freud Centre over 
time, a few societal changes may be identified as having played an especially significant role 
at a structural level. These changes were identified and responded to early by Fonagy and 
colleagues, shaping the direction of their research and institution- building. They were: 1) an 
epistemic shift: the rise of evidence- based medicine; 2) a sociological shift: the prioritization 
of individual self- management; 3) a policy shift: the deintensification of health and welfare 
interventions for individuals with mental health needs; and 4) an epidemiological shift: the 
increasing identification of depression, anxiety, and self- harm among young people.
A first shift was the growth of evidence- based health care within Britain and greater ap-
peal to the authority of outcome data in health policy decision- making and administra-
tion.91 From the late 1980s, pressure had begun to grow within the National Health Service 
for mental health treatments to supply evidence of their efficacy. On the one hand, data from 
randomized trials was important ammunition to justify or compete for public funding. On 
the other hand, collection of routine data regarding outcomes was called for in order to dem-
onstrate continued short- and long- term cost- effectiveness, as well as the improvement of 
services over time.92
Fonagy and Higgitt identified this trend in 1989, well ahead of the curve of their peers. 
They pleaded with the psychoanalytic community to respond to these oncoming pressures 
by the generation of evaluation research, and the development of robust and authentic quan-
titative measures for use in the collection of routine data.93 This was part of the context for 
the Anna Freud Centre retrospective study. The findings were timely for decisions in Britain 
and internationally regarding the continued funding of psychoanalytic treatments by the 
state and medical insurance companies.94 A further important development in the status 
 87 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ on- my- mind.
 88 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ on- my- mind/ helping- someone- else.
 89 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ on- my- mind/ self- care.
 90 https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2020/ 04/ the- duke- and- duchess- of- cambridge- support- every- 
mind- matters- and- chair- mental- health- roundtable- call.
 91 McLaughlin, K., Osborne, S. P., and Ferlie, E. (eds), (2002). New Public Management: Current Trends and 
Future Prospects, London: Routledge; Smith, R. and Rennie, D. (2014). ‘Evidence- Based Medicine— An Oral 
History’. JAMA, 311(4): 365– 367.
 92 The question of how to capture young people’s own perception of outcomes has remained a particular concern 
of the Anna Freud Centre over the years. See e.g. Deighton, J., Croudace, T., Fonagy, P., Brown, J., Patalay, P., and 
Wolpert, M. (2014). ‘Measuring Mental Health and Wellbeing Outcomes for Children and Adolescents to Inform 
Practice and Policy: A Review of Child Self- Report Measures’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health, 
8(1): 14.
 93 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (1989). ‘Evaluating the Performance of Departments of Psychotherapy’. 
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 4(2): 121– 153.
 94 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Who is Helped by Child Psychoanalysis? A Sample Study of Disruptive 
Children, from the Anna Freud Centre Retrospective Investigation’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 291– 315.
Transformations 43
of Fonagy and his group at the Anna Freud Centre as a credible and trusted source of scien-
tific knowledge on mental health in general, not just on psychoanalysis, was the completion 
of major systematic reviews of the evidence base of mental health interventions.95 The first 
edition of What Works for Whom? was published in 1996 and reviewed over 2,000 studies.96 
A companion volume, focused on interventions for children and adolescents, was published 
in 2002.97 In the wake of these publications, Fonagy and colleagues were commissioned 
in the early 2000s with large blocks of funding from the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence to develop clinical guidelines and outcome measures.98 Fonagy was also 
appointed in 2002 to the Department of Health’s Expert Group on Outcomes Measurement 
for mental health.
In Fonagy’s view, the demand for data- driven mental health treatments was quite valid, a 
perspective that has become increasingly mainstream in recent years among mental health 
practitioners.99 He felt that there would be benefits to patients of the movement towards 
evidence- based approaches to mental health treatment.100 Yet, additionally, Fonagy acknow-
ledged that in some respects ‘the movement appears to be driven largely by financial consid-
erations’, as well as ‘the motivation to impose social and political controls on the professional 
practitioner’.101 Rather than straightforwardly resist these pressures, Fonagy felt that the 
psychoanalytic community should respond to them through demonstrations of efficacy, 
cost- effectiveness, and manualization. This would then form the basis for arguments with 
policy- makers in terms that they would recognize. At a wider cultural level, he felt that in 
British society there was a growing expectation of demonstrable, short- term benefit from all 
activities and that psychoanalysis would have to adapt to this new reality.
A second societal shift, on which the work of Fonagy and colleagues has capitalized, has 
been sociological and cultural shifts towards a priority on individual self- management as the 
solution to social problems. Individuals are helped by their families, schools, workplaces, 
and other institutions to regulate and optimize their thoughts and feelings towards the end 
of coping with structural problems and economic precarity. This societal shift has sometimes 
 95 Target, M. (2018). ‘20/ 20 Hindsight: A 25- Year Programme at the Anna Freud Centre of Efficacy and 
Effectiveness Research on Child Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’. Psychotherapy Research, 28(1): 30– 46: ‘Probably 
the central plank of the bridge towards our getting support for a large- scale RCT [randomized control trial] 
including child psychotherapy was broader work on systematic reviewing of the evidence base of interventions 
for childhood mental health problems’ (p. 40). Fonagy states that ‘To be a trusted source of knowledge is our key 
aim’ at the Anna Freud Centre, inKirby, T. (2019). ‘Peter Fonagy— Battling the Enemy of Loneliness’. The Lancet 
Psychiatry, 6(12): 987.
 96 Roth, A. and Fonagy, P. (1996). What Works for Whom: A critical Review of Psychotherapy Research (1st edn). 
New York: Guilford Press.
 97 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Cottrell, D., Phillips, J., and Kurtz, Z. (2002). What Works for Whom? A Critical Review 
of Treatments for Children and Adolescents, New York: Guilford Press.
 98 Pilling, S. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Developing Clinical Guidelines for Children and Adolescents: Experience 
from the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence’, in P. Sturmey and M. Hersen (eds), Handbook of 
Evidence- based Practice in Clinical Psychology (Vol. 1. Child and Adolescent Disorders), pp. 73– 102. New York: Wiley.
 99 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy and the Undermining of Old Ideas on Personality Disorder’. Accessed at 
https:// www.escap.eu/ research/ peter- fonagy- and- the- undermining- of- old- ideas- on- personality- disorder/ : 
‘Clinicians used to be very sceptical and hostile, saying: “Hold on there, you are trying to undermine our status 
quo.” Now a new, popular movement presents itself: a wide range of practitioners— from psychoanalytic to behav-
ioural, to family and systemic oriented professionals— embrace the evidence- based way of working.’
 100 Murphy, M. and Fonagy, P. (2013). ‘Mental Health Problems in Children and Young People’, in Our Children 
Deserve Better, Prevention Pays: Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer (Chapter 10), London: Department of 
Health: ‘There is evidence that EBP [evidence- based practice] is statistically superior to usual care. Experimental 
work also demonstrates that the major benefit from EBP to child mental health services is in value, conceived of as 
the ratio of the outcome that matters to patients to the cost of delivering that outcome. Using EBP has been shown 
to reduce costs by up to 35% and duration of treatment by up to 43%’ (p. 6).
 101 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Process and Outcome in Mental Health Care Delivery: A Model Approach to Treatment 
Evaluation’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 63(3): 288– 304.
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been referred to by sociologists as ‘neoliberalism’, to characterize a culture focused on indi-
vidual responsibility and self- regulation, stoked by feelings of anxiety and emptiness should 
this self- regulation fail.102 The individual is encouraged to relate to their own life in an entre-
preneurial way. This includes attention to thoughts and feelings, indeed one’s whole ‘person-
ality’, as needing development and optimization.103 Desires and attempts to image change 
are directed away from collective or policy solutions, treated as beyond reach, and instead 
turned inwards.
Christopher Bollas, from whom Fonagy originally took the ‘reflective’ in ‘reflective func-
tion’ (see Chapter 3), has recently observed that the thought of Fonagy and colleagues— like 
some of his own work— has reflected and responded to the increasing emphasis on individual 
self- management of thoughts and feelings.104 Extrapolating on Bollas, it may be observed 
that, in a complex consumption- focused society, knowledge of the motivations and inten-
tions implicated in one’s own thoughts and feelings is important for distinguishing utility, 
sifting wants from needs, selecting among available goods, and judging what price is worth 
paying.105 Without this knowledge, we risk credulity, overextension, and flat- footedness. 
Furthermore, in a society in which the service sector accounts for the large majority of jobs, 
individuals have particular need of knowledge of the motivations and intentions implicated 
in the thoughts and feelings of others if they are to succeed in achieving sales, satisfying 
customers, receiving good ratings, and taking on debt in a strategic way. More generally, 
neoliberalism makes an individual’s ability to represent thoughts and feelings especially 
salient and important. Not only does this ability facilitate the optimal use of thoughts and 
feelings within an individual’s projects. It also facilitates a reduction in ways that thoughts 
and feelings may hinder these projects, or contribute more generally to social problems. 
Furthermore, the individual is held accountable for their thoughts and feelings, which re-
flects and responds to the wider perspective under neoliberalism in which individual re-
sponsibility or ‘ownership’ of their mental states and actions is emphasized, and in which the 
wider social, economic, and political context of mental states and actions is downplayed.106 
 102 Binkley, S. (2011). ‘Psychological Life as Enterprise: Social Practice and the Government of Neo- Liberal 
Interiority’. History of the Human Sciences, 24(3): 83– 102; Adams, G., Estrada‐Villalta, S., Sullivan, D., and Markus, 
H. R. (2019). ‘The Psychology of Neoliberalism and the Neoliberalism of Psychology’. Journal of Social Issues, 
75(1): 189– 216.
 103 Scharff, C. (2016). ‘The Psychic Life of Neoliberalism: Mapping the Contours of Entrepreneurial Subjectivity’. 
Theory, Culture & Society, 33(6): 107– 122; Teo, T. (2018). ‘Homo Neoliberalus: From Personality to Forms of 
Subjectivity’. Theory & Psychology, 28(5): 581– 599; Gill, R. and Orgad, S. (2018). ‘The amazing Bounce- Backable 
Woman: Resilience and the Psychological Turn in Neoliberalism’. Sociological Research Online, 23(2): 477– 495.
 104 Bollas, C. (2015). ‘Psychoanalysis in the Age of Bewilderment: On the Return of the Oppressed’. International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 96(3): 535– 551. Bollas’s breakthrough paper was centrally concerned with individual 
self- management, and one of the detailed clinical cases is specifically focused on self- management in the work-
place environment. Bollas, C. (1982). ‘On the Relation to the Self as an Object’. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 63: 347– 359: ‘We are constantly engaged in acts of self management, from our choice of vocation to 
our choice of clothing, from our perception and facilitation of our needs to our management of our own personal 
realities to partially gratify those needs, from our recognition of, and planning for, holidays to our differing abil-
ities to cognize and confront economic and familial realities.’ (p. 349).
 105 Cf. Polezzi, D., Daum, I., Rubaltelli, E., Lotto, L., Civai, C., Sartori, G., and Rumiati, R. (2008). ‘Mentalizing 
in Economic Decision- Making’. Behavioural Brain Research, 190(2): 218– 223; Weiland, S., Hewig, J., Hecht, H., 
Mussel, P., and Miltner, W. H. (2012). ‘Neural Correlates of Fair Behavior in Interpersonal Bargaining’. Social 
Neuroscience, 7(5): 537– 551.
 106 Sociologists have termed this societal shift ‘governmentality’, because the individual is asked to manage 
(govern) their own thoughts and feelings (mentality) in responding to social problems, rather than having recourse 
to collective or welfare responses to these problems. Schechter has adapted the term sociological ‘governmentality’ 
to refer to ‘governmentalization’, in characterizing the cultural alignment between a therapeutic focus on indi-
vidual thoughts and feelings, on the one hand, and a policy focus on individual responsibility for coping with 
social problems, on the other. Schechter, K. (2014). Illusions of a Future: Psychoanalysis and the Biopolitics of Desire, 
Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
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Individual skill at understanding social understanding and misunderstanding becomes all 
the more pertinent when institutions that might otherwise facilitate social understanding 
have been hollowed out and replaced with infrastructures generating competition, distrust, 
and feelings of alienation. Such skill is also all the more relevant in a multicultural society, in 
which common culture cannot be presumed upon. Over the years, Fonagy and colleagues 
have become increasingly critical of individual- centric modes of explanation, and acknow-
ledged that societal values may have influenced Fonagy’s own past thinking in this direction 
(see Chapter 9). They have also become increasingly concerned with alienation and culture, 
and the sociological conditions that undermine social understanding and trust.
A third trend over the past 30 years that has shaped the Anna Freud Centre has been the 
direction of public resources away from individualized and intensive health and welfare ser-
vices. This can be regarded as the effect of two interrelated shifts in British health and welfare 
policy:
 • Increasing moral weight put on egalitarianism, scalability, and population health.107
 • Increasing focus on cost- effectiveness, and indeed cheapness even in the absence of 
cost- effectiveness, with public services constructed as a potentially unfair burden on 
the taxpayer.108
Again, Fonagy and colleagues caught this trend early, arguing in the Emanuel Miller lec-
ture in 1992 for the need to ‘envisage a mental health service with the capacity to meet the 
demand for help (let alone the underlying need) at the same time as being equitable, ac-
cessible and acceptable to all those who need it’.109 Long- term psychoanalytic treatment of 
a few individuals seemed ‘dissonant’, he believed, both with crushing policy pressures to cut 
costs and with the democratic value of equitable access to mental health support for the huge 
numbers that could benefit from it.110 Fonagy argued that psychoanalysts should combat 
economic inequalities in access to mental health treatments: to do otherwise is to be morally 
complicit with the unequal distribution of wealth.111 Short- term psychoanalytically inspired 
 107 Mold, A., Clark, P., Millward, G., and Payling, D. (2019). Placing the Public in Public Health in Post- War Britain, 
1948– 2012, London: Palgrave. In Fonagy’s view, this was a shift across many countries, but was especially intense 
in Europe. Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘On the Relationship of Experimental Psychology and Psychoanalysis: Commentary 
by Peter Fonagy (London)’. Neuropsychoanalysis, 2(2): 222– 232, p. 227.
 108 Rao, A. S., Lemma, A., Fonagy, P., Sosnowska, M., Constantinou, M. P., Fijak- Koch, M., and Gelberg, G. 
(2019). ‘Development of Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy in Complex Care (DITCC): A Pilot Study’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy, 33(2): 77– 98: ‘The Tavistock Adult Depression Study (TADS) (Taylor et al., 2012) has demonstrated 
the effectiveness of a psychoanalytic approach and the importance of follow- up data to consider the sustainability 
of change. However, the demand and capacity imbalance are increasingly putting pressures on services to cut 
down the length of the individual treatment’ (p. 78).
 109 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Higgitt, A., and Target, M. (1994). ‘The Emanuel Miller Memorial Lecture 
1992: The Theory and Practice of Resilience’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 35(2): 231– 257, p. 231.
 110 Fonagy, P., Bleiberg, E., and Target, M. (1997). ‘Child Psychoanalysis: Critical Overview and a Proposed 
Reconsideration’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 6: 1– 38, p. 8; Fonagy, P. and Bateman, 
A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- based Treatment and its Roots in Psychoanalytic Theory and 
Practice’, in Brownescombe Heller, M., and Pollet, S. (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts in the Public Health Sector, 
London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176: ‘Preserving the key subtleties and respect for complexity of mind that psycho-
analysis offers in its unparalleled richness, while at the same time enabling more than the few to have the benefit 
of its long- term value. This is the goal which we set ourselves on this journey that began 20 years ago’ (p. 174). See 
also Kazdin, A. E. (2019). ‘Annual Research Review: Expanding Mental Health Services through Novel Models of 
Intervention Delivery’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 60(4): 455– 472.
 111 Jurist, E. L. (2010). ‘Elliot Jurist Interviews Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27(1): 2– 7: ‘I think the 
social inequalities in health should concern us majorly as psychoanalysts. It’s an embarrassment, because most 
psychoanalysts are in independent practice, and they are advantaged by the unequal distribution of wealth . . . We 
should be looking at how we can work toward a more equal distribution of wealth, and in some ways try to prevent 
the extant inequalities from affecting future generations’ (p. 5).
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therapies could also offer a ‘lifeboat’ for psychoanalytic clinicians in the context of the prefer-
ence among policy- makers for scalability and cost- effective interventions.112
Despite reservations from within the psychoanalytic community about the efficacy of em-
pirical evaluation, Fonagy, Target, and colleagues were committed to the question of whether 
the effectiveness of psychoanalytic approaches could be demonstrated empirically at scale. 
Through the 1990s and 2000s, they attempted to find funding for a randomized control trial 
of child psychoanalytic psychotherapy, comparing it with alternative treatments. However, 
the response from reviewers was that it was not worth funding the study because it could 
never be cost- effective.113 Ultimately, they were able to find funding for a trial of 28 weeks of 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy for adolescents with depression. The results were published in 
2017. The researchers found that psychoanalytic psychotherapy was no more effective than 
two other, briefer, treatments— as measured by patient self- report and clinical interview 
after 36 weeks, 52 weeks, and 84 weeks.114 All three treatments resulted in an average of 50% 
reduction in depression symptoms. The cost of delivering a Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
intervention was £904.57 per patient, compared with £1,396.72 for psychoanalytic psycho-
therapy. However, as we saw earlier in the section on the Anna Freud Centre retrospective 
study, psychoanalytic treatment is comparatively ineffective for depression in children. 
Psychoanalytic psychotherapy was therefore tested with a condition and client group where 
Fonagy and colleagues anticipated that it would be less effective than with other conditions 
and client groups— presumably because this was where funding for a trial happened to be 
available. There may also have been ‘sleeper effects’ of the psychoanalytic psychotherapy, 
or benefits not accessible to self- report, as argued by Target.115 Evidence from another trial 
by Fonagy and colleagues of long- term psychoanalytic psychotherapy (60 sessions), com-
pared with treatment as usual for adults with treatment- resistant depression, did find large 
differences at follow- up at 42 months (30.0% versus 4.4% partial remission of symptoms), 
suggesting that psychodynamic therapies can show their effectiveness in the longer term, 
though whether the findings from this latter trial were because of the longer follow- up, the 
specification of treatment- resistant depression, or the adult rather than adolescent patient 
group is unclear.116 According to the trial protocol, an economic evaluation was conducted 
 112 Target, M. (2018). ‘20/ 20 Hindsight: A 25- Year Programme at the Anna Freud Centre of Efficacy and 
Effectiveness Research on Child Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’. Psychotherapy Research, 28(1): 30– 46, p. 39. For a 
contrary position, arguing that the lifeboat offered by mentalization is too compromised to be worth reaching for, 
see House, R. (2012). ‘General Practice Counselling amidst the ‘Audit Culture’: History, Dynamics and Subversion 
of/ in the Hypermodern National Health Service’. Psychodynamic Practice, 18(1): 51– 70.
 113 Target, M. (2018). ‘20/ 20 Hindsight: A 25- Year Programme at the Anna Freud Centre of Efficacy and 
Effectiveness Research on Child Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’. Psychotherapy Research, 28(1): 30– 46.
 114 Goodyer, I. M., Reynolds, S., Barrett, B., Byford, S., Dubicka, B., Hill, J., . . . and Senior, R. (2017). ‘Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy and Short- Term Psychoanalytical Psychotherapy Versus a Brief Psychosocial Intervention 
in Adolescents with Unipolar Major Depressive Disorder (IMPACT): A Multicentre, Pragmatic, Observer- Blind, 
Randomised Controlled Superiority Trial’. The Lancet Psychiatry, 4(2): 109– 119; Goodyer, I. M., Reynolds, S., 
Barrett, B., Byford, S., Dubicka, B., Hill, J., . . . and Senior, R. (2017). ‘Cognitive- Behavioural Therapy and Short- 
Term Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy versus Brief Psychosocial Intervention in Adolescents with Unipolar 
Major Depression (IMPACT): A Multicentre, Pragmatic, Observer- Blind, Randomised Controlled Trial’. Health 
Technology Assessment, 21(12): 1.
 115 Target, M. (2018). ‘20/ 20 Hindsight: A 25- Year Programme at the Anna Freud Centre of Efficacy and 
Effectiveness Research on Child Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’. Psychotherapy Research, 28(1): 30– 46.
 116 Fonagy, P., Rost, F., Carlyle, J. A., McPherson, S., Thomas, R., Pasco Fearon, R. M., . . . and Taylor, D. (2015). 
‘Pragmatic Randomized Controlled Trial of Long‐Term Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy for Treatment‐Resistant 
Depression: The Tavistock Adult Depression Study (TADS)’. World Psychiatry, 14(3): 312– 321. Treatment- as- usual 
consisted of various interventions, as directed by the referring practitioner, and could include referral to other 
specialist provisions. On age as a moderator of the effectiveness of interventions for depression, see Cuijpers, P., 
Karyotaki, E. Eckshtain, D. et al. (2020). ‘Psychotherapy for Depression across Different Age Groups: A Systematic 
Review and Meta- Analysis’. JAMA Psychiatry, 77(7): 694– 702 .
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of the cost- effectiveness of long- term adult psychoanalytic psychotherapy compared with 
treatment as usual. However, findings from this evaluation were not published.
A fourth trend to which Fonagy and the Anna Freud Centre have been especially re-
sponsive has been the changing situation of young people. It is a complicated picture, be-
cause the past 30 years have brought many forms of freedom for young people, especially 
those from socially and economically less deprived families. However, rates of depression, 
anxiety, and self- harm among young people have, at a population level, generally risen 
over the period.117 On the one hand, as Fonagy has observed, this likely reflects that as a 
society ‘we have become better at expressing our thoughts, feelings, beliefs, wishes and 
desires and have passed this on to our children’.118 On the other hand, the epidemiology 
of adolescent mental illness likely partly reflects sociological changes.119 One contrib-
uting factor may have been increases in educational pressures in the context of frequent, 
high- stakes testing. Young people may have also experienced increasing worry about the 
consequences of failure in a social and economic context with fewer safety nets and the 
circulation of unrealizable images of what constitutes success.120 Furthermore, Fonagy 
has described the pervasiveness and image- focused qualities of new media as important 
aspects of contemporary life, contributing to their potential influence on individual self- 
representations (see Chapter 9).
Fonagy’s impression has been of a rise in despair among young people in the context 
of such changes, combined with a reduction in the availability and coherence of relevant 
community- based and third- sector supportive services:121
We see a growing mental health crisis across all groups. Trends highlight an increase in 
mental illness among some groups of children and young people, particularly emotional 
problems such as anxiety and depression. . . There can be little doubt that children and 
young people are experiencing new and multiple pressures in a demanding and fast- 
moving digitally enabled world.122
 117 Twenge, J. M., Joiner, T. E., Rogers, M. L., and Martin, G. N. (2018). ‘Increases in Depressive Symptoms, 
Suicide- Related Outcomes, and Suicide Rates among US Adolescents after 2010 and Links to Increased New Media 
Screen Time’. Clinical Psychological Science, 6(1): 3– 17; Patalay, P. and Gage, S. H. (2019). ‘Changes in Millennial 
Adolescent Mental Health and Health- Related Behaviours over 10 Years: A Population Cohort Comparison Study’. 
International Journal of Epidemiology, 48(5): 1650– 1664.
 118 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Mental Health is a Care We must Share’. Guardian, 13 October. Accessed at: https:// www.
theguardian.com/ society/ 2019/ oct/ 13/ isolation- not- social- media- cause- teenager- mental- ill- health
 119 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘We have Hard Choices to Make on Children’s Mental Health’. Huffington Post, 10 October. 
Accessed at: http:// www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ peter- fonagy/ world- mental- health- day_ b_ 12429138.html. See 
also, Fonagy, P. cited in Thomson, A. and Sylvester, R. (2020) ‘Panic and Anxiety after Education is Plunged into 
Limbo’. The Times, 31 March: ‘Between 20– 27 per cent of female students now have common mental health dis-
orders including depression, anxiety and phobias . . . There is greater pressure to achieve high grades and compete 
for jobs, from social media, financially and in what they think is expected of them as a woman, their goals and 
aspirations.’
 120 Cf. Blackman, S. and Rogers, R. (eds). (2017). Youth Marginality in Britain: Contemporary Studies of 
Austerity, Policy Press.
 121 Fonagy, P. (2004). ‘What Evidence for Evidence- based Prevention?’ Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent 
Psychotherapy, 3(4): 419– 443, p. 434; Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Evidence Submitted to the House of Commons Health 
Committee Children’s and Adolescents’ Mental Health and CAHMS’. Accessed at: http:// data.parliament.uk/ 
writtenevidence/ committeeevidence.svc/ evidencedocument/ health- committee/ childrens- and- adolescent- 
mental- health- and- camhs/ written/ 8009.html%23_ edn1; Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Commentary on 
Kernberg and Michels’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 64(3): 495– 500, p. 496.
 122 Fonagy, P., Lenehan, C., and O’Sullivan, A. (2017). ‘Foreword’, in Improving Mental Health Support for our 
Children and Young People, London: Social Care Institute for Excellence, p. 2.
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Payne and Fonagy have drawn attention to evidence that this mental health crisis is not 
evenly spread.123 Low socio- economic status is associated with twice the rates of anxiety 
and depression as the rest of the British population. Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and queer young 
people are over two and a half times as likely to experience mental ill health. And girls show 
rising rates of anxiety, depression, and body dysmorphia as they move through adolescence, 
suggesting particular challenges for young women.124
Fonagy as an individual, and the Anna Freud Centre as an institution, have been suc-
cessful at presenting themselves as credible voices in the policy conversation about the future 
of children’s mental health. On the one hand, these voices have been used to campaign for 
greater investment in the mental health needs of children and young people.125 In evidence 
presented to the House of Commons Youth Select Committee in 2015, Fonagy strongly criti-
cized a state of affairs in which children and young people received just over 6% of total 
national mental health expenditure. He regarded this as an injustice to the massive unmet 
need for mental health services for children and young people, and terrible foresight given 
the benefits of acting early in the life course to prevent or mitigate adverse developmental 
pathways.126
Fonagy and the Anna Freud Centre have also increasingly had a role in the development 
of policy. Fonagy has chaired two national clinical guideline development groups, as well as 
several expert reference groups for the Department of Health. For example, the 2017 Green 
Paper on Transforming Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision, which put for-
ward an increased role for schools in identifying and managing children’s mental health 
problems, was based on a review co- authored by Fonagy. The work of Fonagy and colleagues 
in policy engagement in public mental health and preventative work will be discussed fur-
ther in Chapter 9.127
 123 Payne, C. and Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘A Response to the Figures on the Mental Health of Children and Young 
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 124 Sadler K., Vizard T., Ford T., et al. (2018). Mental Health of Children and Young People in England, 2017. 
London: NHS Digital. Accessed at: https:// digital.nhs.uk/ data- and- information/ publications/ statistical/ mental- 
health- of- children- and- young- people- in- england/ 2017/ 2017.
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Having situated Fonagy in biographical and institutional context in Chapters 1 and 2, we can 
now turn more directly to the development of the theory of mentalizing. This theory has under-
gone very substantial changes over time, and with these changes have come alterations in and 
additions to the meaning of the term ‘mentalization’. In their 2003 book, Psychoanalytic Theories, 
Fonagy and Target observed critically that it is quite characteristic of psychological theories to 
have a primary concept or two with a host of meanings. This concept then serves in part as a 
symbol of collective endeavour: ‘Many concepts referred to theoretically have multiple refer-
ences, some pertaining to the developmental course, some to covert mental states and some 
to manifest presentation.’ Fonagy and Target highlighted that there are advantages to such a 
symbol, ‘particularly through enhancing a professional group identity by enabling members to 
believe that they share ideas, though ‘in the long term such fuzziness impedes progress, and sci-
entific debate is degraded’.1 The concept of ‘mentalization’ has also been subject to such a process, 
as Fonagy and colleagues have themselves increasingly acknowledged over the past decade.2
The term ‘mentalization’ is an umbrella term that has encompassed diverse meanings and 
investments. It offers the feeling of coherence that facilitates community building, while also 
serving as a switch and relay between research, health policy, and clinical practice, as well 
as between different clinical specialisms.3 At times, the term has been yoked to specific def-
initions or operationalization in psychological constructs, though these explicit definitions 
have seen very significant changes over time (see Chapter 4). At other times, ‘mentalization’ 
has functioned as a buzzword, used to mean little more than desirable psychological func-
tioning,4 or a process that is in some way psychological.5 The concept of mentalization 
 1 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 19.
 2 E.g. Fonagy. P. and Allison, E. (2012). ‘What is Mentalization? The Concept and its Foundations in 
Developmental Research’, in N. Midgley and I. Vrouva (eds), Minding the Child: Mentalization- Based Interventions 
with Children, Young People and their Families, pp. 11– 34, Hove: Routledge, p. 32. This criticism of the concept 
was first made in a sustained way by Choi- Kain, L. W. and Gunderson, J. G. (2008). ‘Mentalization: Ontogeny, 
Assessment, and Application in the Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
165(9): 1127– 1135: ‘Quickly adapted into psychiatric vernacular, the term mentalization has been used with 
variable meanings. The broad territory of the concept paradoxically contributes to its familiarity as well as to its 
ambiguity’ (pp. 1127– 1128). More recently, see Tipple, R. (2017). ‘Thinking versus Mentalization’. Art Therapy 
Online, 8(2).
 3 On the crafting of an idea and ideal of a knowable object of study as a guarantee to sustain coalitions of practice, 
identification, and research, see Wiegman, R. (2012). Object Lessons, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
 4 On buzzwords, see Bensaude Vincent, B. (2014). ‘The Politics of Buzzwords at the Interface of Technoscience, 
Market and Society: The Case of “Public Engagement in Science”’. Public Understanding of Science, 23(3): 238– 253.
 5 Slade, among others, has observed that the term ‘mentalization’ seems to operate with narrow and broader 
meanings: Slade, A. (2005). ‘Parental Reflective Functioning: An Introduction’. Attachment & Human 
Development, 7(3): 269– 281. To take one example: Fonagy and Adshead suggest that ‘classical behaviour therapy 
involves mentalisation. When patients are taught new responses to fear- inducing stimuli, changes occur in 
the ventral prefrontal cortex and amygdala, which are involved in fear reactions.’ The capaciousness of the 
term ‘mentalization’ is visible here, entailing only that mental states are identified and implicated. This makes 
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appears as an inspiring ideal, and one with multiple possible uses. However, this picture has 
been achieved in part by punching holes in the concept’s ability to hold determinate meaning 
and facilitate clear communication across domains. This predicament has made discrepant 
research findings difficult to interpret, because researchers may well be measuring different 
phenomena but nonetheless calling them ‘mentalization’.6 A few of Fonagy’s collaborators 
have even argued that the term ‘mentalization’ should not be used with patients, given its 
untamed panoply of semantic and theoretical investments.7 However, this is not the ma-
jority view.
To unpack the different meanings the concept has gained over time, it is necessary to take 
a developmental approach. The focus of the chapter will be work by Fonagy and colleagues 
addressed to the field of developmental psychology in the 1990s, though later theory and re-
search will be mentioned when there have been continuities. We will begin by considering 
the emergence of the concept of mentalization, the problems it was introduced to address, 
the theoretical perspective it encapsulated, and the clinical implications that stemmed from 
this perspective. We will then examine the development of the reflective functioning scale 
resulting from Fonagy’s work with Miriam and Howard Steele, a very important develop-
ment for work on mentalizing, as well as for the broader fields of developmental and clinical 
psychology. The chapter will close with an analysis of some ambiguities and problems in the 
use of the concept of disorganized attachment by Fonagy and colleagues.
Origins of the mentalization concept
As discussed in Chapter 1, the idea of a ‘borderline’ profile of mental illness had emerged in 
the twentieth century and gained prominence from entering the DSM- III in 1980 as one of 
the personality disorders. In the 1980s and 1990s, the wider clinical community regarded 
borderline personality disorder (BPD) as untreatable, even as a growing proportion of pa-
tients in NHS psychotherapy services were identified as having this profile.8 However, clin-
icians at the Anna Freud Centre regarded these cases as requiring an adjustment of clinical 
mentalization relevant to every psychological modality and specialism. Fonagy, P. and Adshead, G. (2012). ‘How 
Mentalisation Changes the Mind’. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 18(5): 353– 362, p. 35. But surely to claim 
that classical conditioning, effective with rats and artificial intelligences, implies mentalization is difficult to rec-
oncile with Bateman and Fonagy’s majestic claim that ‘mentalising is a uniquely human capacity— it can be seen 
as what defines humanity’:Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality 
Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 4. This statement might be interpreted 
as reflecting Fonagy’s earlier claim that ‘No animal, not even the most intelligent of non- human primates, can dis-
cern the difference between the act of a conspecific due to serendipity and one rooted in intention, wish, belief or 
desire.’ Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization and Attachment: The Implication for Community Based Therapies’. Paper 
presented at the Community of Communities 10th Annual Forum, March. London. Accessed at: https:// www.
slideshare.net/ raffaelebarone/ mentalization- and- attachment- the- implication- for- community- based- therapies.
 6 E.g. Ballespí, S., Vives, J., Debbané, M., Sharp, C., and Barrantes- Vidal, N. (2018). Beyond 
Diagnosis: Mentalization and Mental Health from a Transdiagnostic Point of View in Adolescents from Non- 
Clinical Population’. Psychiatry Research, 270: 755– 763.
 7 Reported in Keaveny, E., Midgley, N., Asen, E., Bevington, D., Fearon, P., Fonagy, P., . . . Wood, S. 2012). 
‘Minding the Family Mind: The Development and Evaluation of Mentalization Based Treatment for Families at 
the Anna Freud Centre in London’, in N. Midgley and I. Vrouva (eds), Minding the Child: Mentalization- Based 
Interventions with Children, Young People and their Families, London: Routledge, pp. 98– 112, p. 102.
 8 For later discussion of this attitude, see Chiesa, M., Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., and Mace, C. (2009). 
‘Psychiatric Morbidity and Treatment Pathway Outcomes of Patients Presenting to Specialist NHS Psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy Services: Results from a Multi‐Centre Study’. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and 
Practice, 82(1): 83– 98.
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technique to emphasize understanding and support. Looking back, Bateman and Fonagy 
observed in 2003 that the diagnostic category of BPD:
has evoked intense theorizing among psychoanalysts, behaviourists, psychiatrists, and 
others, and, perhaps because of its clinical difficulty and variability, that it represents a 
battlefield on which many of the controversies and schisms are played out.9
In the DSM- III, ‘borderline’ was considered to be a personality disorder because it signalled 
widespread difficulties an individual faced in understanding and regulating their ‘self ’ in 
relation to others. In the 1980s, it was assumed that pervasive psychosocial symptoms had 
to be located in the ‘personality’ of the patient.10 Running somewhat contrary to this focus 
on individual personality was growing concern in the period with the socially situated self 
in developmental psychology, with the solidification of research concerned with social cog-
nition. This represented important acknowledgement of social and developmental contribu-
tions to the mind of the individual (albeit with only somewhat greater acknowledgement of 
the role of culture).11 Within both British and American developmental psychology in the 
1980s, this shift was fed by several currents.
One was attachment theory: in the third book of his Attachment and Loss trilogy, Bowlby 
had reinterpreted individual differences in attachment as reflecting variation in the fil-
tering and processing of social information about the availability of attachment figures.12 
Research in American developmental science had also started to explore empirically how 
children develop an understanding of mental phenomena, conceptualized as the child’s 
‘theory of mind’.13 These perspectives helped scaffold empirical research by scholars such 
as Bretherton and Dunn on communication within families, which explored how children 
and parents spoke about feeling states and intentions.14 A further current was the growing 
maturity of empirical research on autism. Researchers such as Baron- Cohen had drawn on 
the idea of ‘theory of mind’ to suggest that autism reflected differences and/ or deficits in 
the capacity of an individual to understand the mental states of other people.15 Research 
on social cognition was diverse, but had in common that it questioned the assumption that 
human experience of self and others is prewired, universal, and equally accessible. Instead, 
it was proposed that such experience depends upon socio- emotional, communicative, and 
neurodevelopmental supports, which vary substantially between individuals.
 9 Bateman, A. W., and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Development of an Attachment- Based Treatment Program for 
Borderline Personality Disorder’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 187– 211, p. 188
 10 Cf. Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘Personality Disorder’. Journal of Mental Health, 16(1): 1– 4: ‘We suspect now that it is 
a considerable oversimplification to assume that a pre- existing characterological basis to psychopathology can 
provide a breeding ground for psychiatric disorder.’ (1) Pickersgill, M. (2013). ‘How Personality Became Treatable: 
The Mutual Constitution of Clinical Knowledge and Mental Health Law’. Social Studies of Science, 43(1): 30– 53.
 11 Jovanovic, G. Allolio- Näcke, L., and Ratner, C. (eds) (2018). The Challenges of Cultural Psychology: Historical 
Legacies and Future Responsibilities, London: Routledge.
 12 Bowlby, J. (1980). Loss, New York: Basic Books; Bretherton, I. (1987). ‘New Perspectives on Attachment 
Relations: Security, Communication and Internal Working Models’, in J. Osofsky (ed.), Handbook of Infant 
Development, New York: John Wiley, pp. 1016– 1100.
 13 Wellman, H. M. and Estes, D. (1986). ‘Early Understanding of Mental Entities: A Reexamination of Childhood 
Realism’. Child Development, 57: 910– 923. See also Flavell, J. H. (2004). ‘Theory- of- Mind Development: Retrospect 
and Prospect’. Merrill- Palmer Quarterly, 50(3): 274– 290.
 14 Bretherton, I., McNew, S., and Beeghley- Smith, M. (1981). ‘Early Person Knowledge as Expressed in Gestural 
and Verbal Communication: When do Infants Acquire a “Theory Of Mind”?’, in M. E. Lamb and L. R. Sherrod 
(eds), Infant Social Cognition, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; Dunn, J., Bretherton, I., and Munn, P. (1987). ‘Conversations 
about Feeling States between Mothers and their Young Children’. Developmental Psychology, 23(1): 132– 139.
 15 Baron- Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., and Frith, U. (1985). ‘Does the Autistic Child have a “Theory of Mind”?’ 
Cognition, 21(1): 37– 46.
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Reflecting on clinical cases such as Mr S (Chapter 1), in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
Fonagy found a ‘point of contact’ between the developmental theory of research in social 
cognition and the profile of symptoms characterized as BPD.16 His proposal was that the dif-
ficulties with identity, mood, empathy, and social relationships associated with BPD could be 
conceptualized as expressions of a single underlying problem: disruption in the capacity to 
process and reconsider information about mental states. In therapy, Fonagy’s patients with 
BPD described childhoods characterized by a lack of parental empathy, consistency, and/ or 
safety. Fonagy knew, of course, that the recollections of adults in therapy needed to be treated 
with caution. He also knew that children’s experiences of their parents may be inflected by 
their hopes and worries, as well as by the adult’s actual behaviour.17
Nonetheless, he extrapolated that experiences that would make it difficult for children 
to tolerate thinking about the mental states of their parents would hinder the development 
of social understanding more generally. The basic underpinning mechanism, Fonagy an-
ticipated, was the classic psychoanalytic premise of the ‘pleasure principle’. This principle 
supposes that children will avoid displeasure wherever possible. Fonagy hypothesized 
that children will turn away from thinking about mental states if these were sources of un-
pleasure or outright pain.18 Reflecting on the case of Mr S., Fonagy proposed that the most 
direct cause would be when parents were ‘unloving and cruel’, because this would make ‘the 
contemplation of the contents of the mind of the object unbearable’.19 His clinical work and 
review of existing retrospective research on BPD led him to conclude that sexual and phys-
ical abuse would make an especially potent contribution.20 However, he also suggested that 
lack of parental empathy, consistency, and the provision of safety might contribute through 
various means. For instance, he argued that a ‘totally vacuous relationship’ might be ex-
pected to have the same effect as an abusive or hostile one, in making mental states a source 
of unpleasure.21
 16 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in Practice: A 
Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98, p. 86. This point of contact was further facilitated by 
a symposium held to facilitate dialogue between developmental scientists and clinicians at the Anna Freud Centre. 
Moran, G. S. (1990). ‘Report on the One- Day Symposium between European Developmental Scientists and Anna 
Freud Centre Staff ’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 13(3): 167– 168.
 17 Cf. Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Discussion of Juan Pablo Jimenez’s Paper, “A Fundamental Dilemma of Psychoanalytic 
Technique. Reflections on the Analysis of a Perverse Paranoid Patient”’, in J. P. Jimenez and R. Moguillansky 
(eds), Clinical and Theoretical Aspects of Perversion, London: Karnac Books, pp. 63– 76: ‘Of course, the malevolent 
thoughts of the adult may not be real, but may be anticipated by the child, giving rise to a phantasy that may be the 
product of neurotic compromise, as when the Oedipal child imagined parental retribution’ (pp. 64– 65).
 18 Fonagy, P. (1991). Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment 
of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656: ‘In the case of borderline func-
tioning, I believe the deficit to be self- imposed and partial. It is brought about by a defensive disavowal of the 
mental existence (in terms of psychic functioning) of the object. Such disavowal is undertaken in the face of an 
anticipation of unbearable psychic pain’ (p. 651).
 19 Ibid. 650.
 20 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, pp. 107– 108. In fact, later research would show that physical abuse was less predictive of 
personality disorder than other forms of maltreatment. Cirasola, A., Hillman, S., Fonagy, P., and Chiesa, M. (2017). 
‘Mapping the Road from Childhood Adversity to Personality Disorder: The Role of Unresolved States of Mind’. 
Personality and Mental Health, 11(2): 77– 90, Table 2.
 21 Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘The Significance of the Development of Metacognitive Control over Mental 
Representations in Parenting and Infant Development’. Journal of Clinical Psychoanalysis, 5(1): 67– 86: ‘In cases of 
an abusive, hostile, or simply totally vacuous relationship with the caregiver, the infant may deliberately turn away 
from the mentalizing object because the contemplation of the object’s mind is overwhelming as it harbors frankly 
hostile intentions toward the infant’s self ’ (p. 84). For criticism of the necessity of such speculative attributions by 
the infant to the caregiver, see Fuchs, T. and De Jaegher, H. (2009). ‘Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense- 
Making and Mutual Incorporation’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4): 465– 486.
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During the 1990s, Fonagy was not sure whether trauma was the cause of the inhibition 
in social cognition, or a correlate; and whether the inhibition could occur in the absence of 
discrete trauma, as in the case of a ‘vacuous’ relationship. Poor specification of the concept 
of trauma also meant that he sometimes lost track of these questions altogether, especially 
when trauma was itself defined as the absence of mentalization.22 Nonetheless, in general, in 
this period he held that trauma in the early child- parent relationship would especially pre-
dispose a turning away from attention to mental states throughout development.23 However, 
he accepted that other aversive experiences of caregiving could have the same effect:
Inhibition of mental processes normally arises in the context of intense trauma, but this 
does not necessarily involve parental disturbance. Such inhibition does, however, require 
an internal experience that is sufficiently intense to make a permanent distortion of a basic 
mental capacity. This was the situation in the case which follows. Joan had had a bone dis-
ease from the age of 5 weeks which persisted throughout the first two years of her life. She 
suffered from pain which spoiled all the normal, pleasurable, physical interactions with 
her mother; being cuddled, washed, dressed, and fed all hurt. In addition her mother had 
to help in painful and frightening medical procedures. This resulted in a deeply ingrained 
view of mother as attacker and of herself as hurt, damaged, and deprived. The mother in 
turn felt helpless and inadequate and severe distortions of object representations were in-
evitable. Because the early mother child interactions were painful rather than pleasurable, 
they gave rise to severe inhibition and stunting of mental processes.24
Influenced by the tendency of psychoanalytic theories to speculatively assign the origin of 
particular mental health problems to a developmental stage of early life, Fonagy gave par-
ticular prominence to the second year of life. He argued that children of this age would have 
the cognitive maturity to be capable of inhibiting attention to mental states, while still lacking 
more mature and differentiated strategies for responding to abusive, hostile, or ‘vacuous’ 
other minds.25
On the basis of this developmental perspective, Fonagy proposed that an inhibition of 
the capacity to represent mental states, perhaps initiated in toddlerhood, could account for 
the symptoms of BPD: disruptions in an individual’s sense of their identity, their identifica-
tion and regulation of feelings, their capacity to empathize with others, and generally their 
capacity to engage in satisfying social relationships. To resolve these problems, Fonagy pro-
posed that the capacity to represent mental states needed to be reignited: ‘Only the gradual 
 22 E.g. Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Clinical Implications of Attachment and Mentalization: Efforts to Preserve the Mind 
in Contemporary Treatment. Epilogue’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 271– 280: ‘Trauma may be defined sub-
jectively as an experience that is intolerable to entertain: unmentalizable’ (p. 272).
 23 The status of trauma in Fonagy’s early thinking as probably one sufficient but not necessary condition for 
problems with the capacity to conceptualize mental states is already visible in Fonagy, ‘On Tolerating Mental 
States’. This position would later be qualified: Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., and Luyten, P. (2012). ‘Introduction 
and Overview’, in Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing, pp. 3– 42: ‘General characteristics of family function rather than maltreatment per se generate vul-
nerability to loss of mentalisation under stress’ (pp. 15– 16); ‘the mentalisation- based treatment model does not 
attribute a central role to trauma . . . In our view the effect of trauma is most likely to be felt as part of a more general 
failure to consider the child’s perspective’ (p. 16).
 24 Fonagy, P., Edgcumbe, R., Target, M., and Miller, J. (1999). Contemporary Psychodynamic Child Therapy: 
Theory and Technique, London: The Anna Freud Centre and University College London, pp. 46– 47.
 25 Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment 
of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656, p. 654.
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elaboration of mental representations of thoughts and feelings will free them from the 
crushing grip that the concrete experience of reality imposes upon the human mind.’26
Where the mental states of self and other can be drawn upon as a source of clear, spe-
cific, relevant, and transferable information, this permits an individual to make gradual and 
constant adjustments to their expectations about social interactions. The blockage of this 
process was likewise regarded by Fonagy as the basis for the extreme stances of patients with 
BPD, as well as contributing to a sense of grievance with a world that will not align with their 
expectations.27 Fonagy held that blocks on thinking about mental states could also account 
for other symptoms of BPD. For example, the feelings of disintegration reported by Fonagy’s 
patients could be understood in this perspective as reflecting difficulties in integrating self- 
relevant personal and social information, which would usually stabilize a sense of self. The 
feelings of emptiness reported by the patients could be understood as reflecting blocks in 
what would otherwise be the vivid sensations from experiences of self and other minds, and 
the shallowness with which relationships are therefore experienced: ‘The loss of the under-
lying experience of shared consciousness makes the whole world appear flat, meaningless 
and isolating.’28 Without shared consciousness, there is a poverty of sources of value, given 
that values are inherently social.
Fonagy cited his debt to research on social cognition, and especially the work of Baron- 
Cohen and Dunn. These researchers had demonstrated that the capacity for social under-
standing was a developmental achievement. However, Fonagy felt that Baron- Cohen tended 
to depict the child as an independent cognitive agent, alone in attempting to know the world. 
This neglected the centrality of child– caregiver interaction and emotional relationship, as 
an important environment within which children learn what it means to recognize a feeling, 
thought, or intention within themselves or in others. These early relationships also shape 
children’s feelings about such recognition, including whether it will likely offer benefits or 
whether punishments will ensue.29 In contrast to Baron- Cohen, the work of Dunn was closer 
 26 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Playing with Reality: The Development of Psychic Reality and its Malfunction in Borderline 
Personalities’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76(1): 39– 44, p. 43.
 27 Fonagy, P. (1993). ‘Psychoanalytic and Empirical Approaches to Developmental Psychopathology: An Object- 
Relations Perspective’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 41: 245– 260: the capacity to think about 
mental states ‘equips the individual with a sort of ballast, a self- righting capacity where working models may be-
come the object of review and change. Such gradual and constant adjustments give rise to an internal world where 
the behavior of objects can be experienced as predictable and stable, where the need for splitting of incoherent 
mental representations of the other is minimized and new experiences can be readily integrated with past internal 
representations’ (p. 256).
 28 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2007). ‘Playing with Reality: IV. A Theory of External Reality Rooted in 
Intersubjectivity’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 88: 917– 937, p. 921. See also Fonagy, P. (2000). 
‘Attachment and Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48(4): 1129– 
1146: ‘The emptiness is a direct consequence of the absence of secondary representations of self states, certainly at 
the conscious level, and of the shallowness with which other people and relationships are experienced . . . Emptiness 
(and in extreme cases a sense of dissociation) is the best description such individuals can give of the absence of 
meaning that the failure of mentalization creates’ (p. 1140). Fonagy and colleagues may now regard this emptiness 
as expressing aspects of the primary unconscious— see Chapter 6. This would seem to be the position of Grotstein, 
J. S. (1984). ‘A Proposed Revision of the Psychoanalytic Concept of Primitive Mental States, Part II: The Borderline 
Syndrome- Section 2: The Phenomenology of the Borderline Syndrome’. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 20(1): 77– 
119; Grotstein, J. S. (1990). ‘Nothingness, Meaninglessness, Chaos, and the “Black Hole” I— The Importance 
of Nothingness, Meaninglessness, and Chaos in Psychoanalysis’. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 26: 257– 290. 
However, unlike Fonagy and colleagues, Grotstein differentiates between emptiness as unintegration— the un-
committed potential for meaning- making— and emptiness as disintegration. The distinction is between a con-
tainer with nothing yet in it and a broken container in which meaning has drained away.
 29 Implicit in Fonagy’s early remarks on Baron- Cohen, this was brought out explicitly a few years later in 
Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality: II. The Development of Psychic Reality from a Theoretical 
Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479: ‘Our position is at odds with the majority of 
developmental psychologists (e.g. Leslie, 1987; Baron- Cohen, 1995). Current psychological theories stress mainly 
cognitive precursors of theory of mind. The child is seen as an isolated processor of information, engaged in the 
Origins of the mentalization concept 55
to Fonagy, because Dunn had suggested the importance of family interaction for scaffolding 
children’s understanding of the i) origin, ii) location, and iii) functioning of mental states. 
However, Dunn had also considered children’s iv) understanding of social and cultural con-
ventions under the rubric of social cognition, and this more sociological set of meanings was 
not of such interest to Fonagy, at least in the 1990s (see Chapter 9).30 He was much more con-
cerned with the individual’s capacity to attend specifically to their own mind and the mind 
of concrete others.
The term ‘mentalization’ was introduced to describe social cognition regarding the 
origin, location, and functioning of mental states. A desire on the part of Fonagy to cir-
cumscribe the object of concern was understandable— especially in retrospect, given that 
the concept of ‘mentalization’ has ballooned dramatically. However, the decision to cut 
understanding of social and cultural conventions from mentalizing would be incredibly 
important in circumscribing the scope of causal explanations and theorical concern, and 
for kicking into the long grass questions of context and culture that would haunt the para-
digm over decades, as Fonagy and colleagues have recently acknowledged (see Chapter 9). 
Above all, the role of social and cultural conventions and processes in structuring the origin, 
location, and functioning of mental states— and who is attributed mental states at all— was 
ejected from view. In Lacanian terms, Fonagy’s decision to exclude concern for under-
standing rules and conventions from mentalizing limited the theory to concern with the felt 
experience of self and others (what Lacan terms ‘the imaginary’), neglecting the complex 
and conflicted cultural context that structures our felt experience of self and others (‘the 
symbolic’).31 There was no intrinsic reason why a concern with individual perceptions of 
minds could not have been integrated with attention to social and cultural conventions. 
However, at the time, it was not, with the result that culture had to be rediscovered in the 
2010s (see Chapter 9).
construction of a theory of mind from first principles, accumulating representations of the world through observa-
tion. From a psychoanalytic viewpoint this is a barren picture that ignores the central role of the child’s emotional 
relationship with the parents or other caregivers in fostering the capacity to understand interactions in terms of 
mental states . . . We may assume, as do most cognitivists working in this area, that the development of a theory of 
mind is canalized (Waddington, 1966) or prepared, but the canal is dug not by biology, but by infant- parent inter-
action’ (p. 461).
 30 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115: ‘Dunn (1988) considers four aspects of this development: 1) understanding others’ 
feelings, 2) understanding others’ intentions, 3) understanding rules and conventions and 4) understanding that 
others have minds’ (p. 91).
Components of social cognition for Dunn (1988) Components of mentalizing for Fonagy (1989)
Understanding the origin of mental states Understanding the origin of mental states
Understanding the location of mental states Understanding the location of mental states
Understanding the functioning of mental states Understanding the functioning of mental states
Understanding of social and cultural rules and conventions
 31 Lacan, J. ([1953– 1954] 1988). Freud’s Papers on Technique, trans. John Forrester, NY: Norton. Among other 
consequences, Fonagy’s evacuation of the symbolic rather depoliticized the concept of mentalizing. So, for in-
stance, when Fonagy conceptualized conduct problems as caused by individual non- mentalizing (see Chapter 6), 
he did so without adequate attention to the role of inequalities in shaping conventions for the attribution of mental 
states and the role of institutionalized non- mentalizing. There was no intrinsic reason why a concern with in-
dividual perceptions of minds could not have been integrated with attention to social and cultural conventions. 
However, at the time, it was not, with the result that this concern has had to be rediscovered in the 2010s (see 
Chapter 9).
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On his first use of the word in 1989, Fonagy described it as a contraction of the phrase 
‘capacity to conceive of mental states’.32 The term presented itself in part because of an ex-
isting usage in Paris.33 Marty had been the president of the Parisian Psychoanalytic Society 
when Ivan Fónagy moved to the city and began training as a psychoanalyst. In 1972, Marty 
was co- founder of a clinic specializing in the treatment of ‘psychosomatic’ symptoms. The 
École Psychosomatique de Paris came to conceptualize these symptoms as expressing un-
processed mental states, which had been defensively blocked from achieving adequate and 
flexible representation.34 The capacity to form such representations was termed by Marty 
and colleagues as ‘mentalization’. Presumably conversations between Peter and his father 
contributed to an awareness of these developments even before they reached their full and 
widely known statement in Marty’s 1990 book, Mentalisation et Psychosomatique.35 (Perhaps 
influenced by Fonagy’s introduction of the concept, the term ‘mentalization’ would also 
enter the literature on social cognition in the 1990s to refer to the capacity to model the 
minds of others).36
Related ideas were also circulating in British psychoanalytic circles, associated especially 
with the work of Bion, who had described distortions of social and self- perception stemming 
from problems in the representation of thoughts and feelings.37 On Fonagy’s interpretation, 
Bion held that these distortions would be especially likely when an individual felt threatened, 
internally or externally. This helped Fonagy articulate the difference between mentalization 
and theory of mind, in a paper co- authored with the psychiatrist Anna Higgitt and published 
 32 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 97.
 33 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in Brownescombe Heller, M. and Pollet, S. (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts 
in the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176: ‘The first time we used the term “mentalization” was 
in 1989 (Fonagy 1989), influenced by the Ecole Psychosomatique de Paris, but we used the term as operational-
ized by developmental researchers investigating theory of mind (Leslie, 1987)’ (pp. 157– 158). In fact, the term 
‘mentalisation’ does not appear in Leslie: Leslie, A. M. (1987). ‘Pretense and Representation: The Origins of “theory 
of Mind”’. Psychological Review, 94(4): 412– 426.
 34 Luquet, P. (1981). ‘Le Changement dans la Mentalisation’. Revue Française de Psychoanalyse, 45: 1023– 1028.
 35 Marty, P. (1990). Mentalisation et Psychosomatique: Les Empecheurs de Penser en Rond, Paris. In recent years, 
Fonagy and colleagues have returned to the topic of somatic disorders, bringing to the topic their developed theory 
of mentalization— distinct from the École Psychosomatique de Paris. See e.g. Ballespí, S., Vives, J., Alonso, N., 
Sharp, C., Ramírez, M. S., Fonagy, P., and Barrantes- Vidal, N. (2019). ‘To Know or Not to Know? Mentalization 
as Protection from Somatic Complaints’. PloS One, 14(5): e0215308; Luyten, P., De Meulemeester, C., and Fonagy, 
P. (2019). ‘Psychodynamic Therapy in Patients with Somatic Symptom Disorder’, in David Kealy and John S. 
Ogrodniczuk (eds), Contemporary Psychodynamic Psychotherapy: Evolving Clinical Practice, New York: Academic 
Press, pp. 191– 206.
 36 Morton, J. and Frith, U. (1995). ‘Causal Modeling: A Structural Approach to Developmental Psychopathology’, 
in D. Cicchetti and D. J. Cohen (eds), Manual of Developmental Psychopathology, New York: Wiley, pp. 357– 
390: ‘The development of theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) or “mentalising”— our ability to predict 
and explain the behaviour of other humans in terms of their mental states. Our ability to mentalise is revealed in 
our use and understanding of such words as believe, know, wish, desire, intend and pretend . . . Mentalising is pri-
marily unconscious or implicit. It is a property of our cognitive apparatus that comes into action when triggered by 
particular stimuli, and it “makes sense” of other people’s and our own behaviour fully automatically’ (p. 363).
 37 The common element between Marty and Bion is likely Freud, S. ([1912] 2001). ‘Formulations on the Two 
Principles of Mental Functioning’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Volume 12 (1911– 1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other Works, pp. 213– 226, 
London: Vintage. To an extent, these concerns had been dealt with by Kleinian psychoanalysis under the rubric 
of ‘symbolization’. However, as Fonagy observed, the concept was insufficiently precise for fine work: Fonagy, P. 
(1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment of a Borderline 
Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656: ‘The achievement of a representation of mental 
events, whether conscious or unconscious, is frequently referred to in the psychoanalytic literature in the context 
of the capacity for symbolization (Segal, 1957); (McDougall, 1974); (Edgcumbe, 1984). The term symbolization is 
over- burdened with meanings, particularly in psychoanalysis. It is certainly not possible to restrict it to the notion 
of the secondary representation of mental states’ (p. 641).
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in 1990, the same year that Fonagy and Higgitt married. Baron- Cohen and colleagues 
studying autism had conceptualized this condition as a pervasive deficit in theory of mind. 
By contrast, Fonagy and Higgitt characterized mentalization as the capacity to continue gen-
erating models of mental states in the face of perceived internal or external challenges or 
conflict:
Failures of mentalisation tend to be limited and specific to situations characterised by in-
tense psychic conflict, particularly of an interpersonal kind. The large number of poets 
and writers (e.g. Baudelaire, Carroll, Nerval, Rimbaud and Verhaeren) whose biographies 
illustrate that their psychic functioning was close to or at the borderline level, yet whose 
capacity for abstract thinking in relation to the most subtle of human emotions could not 
be doubted, testify to this fact.38
Whereas Baron- Cohen had conceptualized autism as a pervasive deficit in theory of mind, 
Fonagy and Higgitt characterized mentalization as, specifically, a capacity. It might not fea-
ture much of the time when not needed. Furthermore, like other capacities, we may some-
times experience lapses in our ability or desire to use it, perhaps especially under conditions 
of stress or anxiety. Nonetheless, Fonagy and Higgitt described the major potential value of 
having access to the capacity to identify and consider mental states for both psychological 
health and social relationships.
In a series of articles in the 1990s, Fonagy and Target elaborated implications of this per-
spective for clinical technique. They agreed with the observation of the borderline group 
at the Anna Freud Centre that psychoanalytic interpretations had the potential to backfire. 
They felt that they could pinpoint the reason for this: interpretations can only be helpful to 
patients who can think about the difference between i) their personal wishes and worries 
about their analyst, and ii) the analyst’s here- and- now reality as an ally in reflection. Fonagy 
and Target also argued, however, against overreliance on pragmatic advice to patients about 
concrete actions. They instead encouraged the use of ‘brief, accurate and simple statements 
of the analyst’s perception of the patient’s current mental state’.39 There are resonances here of 
Fonagy’s retrospective descriptions of his analysis with Anne Hurry. And, in the early 1990s, 
Fonagy echoed Hurry’s advice that clinicians should adopt a tone of empathy with their pa-
tients. However, as the 1990s went on, Fonagy came to disagree on this point: ‘I hate the 
word empathy because it carries the implication that you have to be nice.’40 Fonagy felt that 
therapists could adopt a variety of tones in helping the patient gain perspective on mental 
states— these could be kind without being ‘nice’. Hurry’s own use of benevolent humour had 
suggested that what was important was the capacity of the therapist to spur the patient to 
mentalize, rather than empathy itself.
Fonagy and Target speculated that the active ingredient across most successful therapeutic 
modalities was actually support for improved mentalization. When patients in psychoana-
lytic psychotherapy could make use of interpretations, this would improve mentalization dir-
ectly by allowing the patient to reflect on and integrate different perspectives on potentially 
distressing mental states. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) was likewise anticipated to 
 38 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (1990). ‘A Developmental Perspective on Borderline Personality Disorder’. Revue 
Internationale de Psychopathologie, 1: 125– 159, p. 140.
 39 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1995). ‘Understanding the Violent Patient: The Use of the Body and the Role of the 
Father’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 487– 501, p. 498.
 40 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in Practice: A 
Life in the Mind (pp. 77– 98). Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, p. 91.
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contribute to mentalizing by helping patients elaborate and organize representations of their 
mental states, allowing them to be used appropriately even in the context of interpersonal or 
internal difficulties.41 For Fonagy and Target, enhanced mentalization would offer several 
benefits. It would support emotion regulation by interposing the capacity to reflect between 
the immediacy of felt experience and the chain of potential responses to these feelings. It 
would reduce anxiety by contributing to the orderliness of internal experience, and make 
this experience feel more manageable. And it would support the capacity of the patient to 
make use of social relationships to help them learn from experience, capitalize on potential 
opportunities for flourishing, and respond sensibly to adversities.
Reflective function
Interviewed in 2015, Fonagy was asked about the greatest regret of his career. He replied:
I spent the early years of my career a bit lost in the wilderness. It wasn’t until two PhD stu-
dents focused my attention on attachment and Bowlby that I found the topic in psychology 
that I was really genuinely interested in.42
These students were Miriam and Howard Steele. The Steeles had been introduced to attach-
ment theory by Larry Aber in New York.43 Attachment theory in the late 1980s was under-
going an exciting revolution. Main and colleagues in Berkeley had introduced the Adult 
Attachment Interview in 1985, as a measure of a speaker’s capacity to speak coherently about 
attachment- relevant memories. Main and colleagues found that some speakers were unable 
to maintain coherent discourse in the interview and would either close down the subject of 
attachment- relevant memories or become entangled in the memories and lose track of the 
interview questions. Another interruption of coherence could come from lapses in reasoning 
or discourse when speakers discussed experiences of bereavement or trauma, suggesting 
a disturbed state of mind regarding these events. The Adult Attachment Interview coding 
protocol is not concerned with assessing the speaker’s childhood. There are sub- scales for 
inferred experience, such as the extent to which the child was rejected or neglected by their 
parents. However, the coding system primarily focuses on examining individual differences 
in how childhood attachment relationships are discussed by the adult speaker.
 41 See Goodman, G., Midgley, N., and Schneider, C. (2016). ‘Expert Clinicians’ Prototypes of an Ideal Child 
Treatment in Psychodynamic and Cognitive- Behavioral Therapy: Is Mentalization seen as a Common Process 
Factor?’ Psychotherapy Research, 26(5): 590– 601. Recent work has found greater convergence in how CBT and 
psychoanalytic therapists respond to disengaged patients than how they respond to engaged patients. In terms 
of Fonagy and Hepworth’s hypothesis that mentalizing is the active ingredient in both cases, it might be sup-
posed that the modalities have different strategies for sustaining mentalizing— for instance, use of transference 
or homework— but both used similar approaches for bringing mentalizing online. e.g. ‘they actively structured 
the sessions, asked many questions and tried to bring up material from previous sessions in an attempt to invite 
the young person to talk’. The researchers note that this strategy for responding to disengagement is mentioned 
in the treatment manuals of neither approach. Calderon, A., Schneider, C., Target, M., and Midgley, N. (2019). 
‘“Interaction Structures” between Depressed Adolescents and their Therapists in Short- Term Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 24(3): 446– 461, 
p. 457.
 42 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘I Would Like to Abolish Silo Working.’ The Psychologist, 28: 948. Accessed at: https:// 
thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/ i- would- abolish- silo- working.
 43 Steele, H. and Steele, M. (2005). ‘Understanding and Resolving Emotional Conflict: The London Parent– 
Child Project’, in K. E. Grossmann, K. Grossmann, and E. Waters (eds), Attachment from Infancy to Adulthood: The 
Major Longitudinal Studies, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 137– 164.
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Main and colleagues found that speakers lower in coherence on the Adult Attachment 
Interview were more likely to have relationships with their child classified as insecure in the 
Ainsworth Strange Situation.44 The Strange Situation is an observational procedure in which 
repeated separations and reunions of an infant from their familiar caregiver are inferred to ac-
tivate the attachment system, prompting the infant to want to seek the availability of their care-
giver. Individual differences in response to the activation of the attachment system are observed. 
‘Secure attachment’ is coded when infants communicate their distress at the separation but can 
be comforted by reunion and able to then return to play. Ainsworth termed this pattern the use of 
the caregiver as a ‘secure base’ and ‘safe haven’, because it seemed to reflect trust in the caregiver’s 
availability. Some infants did not display their distress to the caregiver; Ainsworth found that 
these infants experienced rebuff of their proximity- seeking behaviours at home, and she termed 
the dyads ‘avoidantly attached’. Some infants showed frustration and were unable to accept com-
fort from the caregiver; Ainsworth found that these infants had caregivers who were not adept 
at responding accurately to their infants’ cues.45 Ainsworth labelled these dyads ‘ambivalent/ 
resistantly attached’. A further classification for infant behaviour in the Strange Situation, intro-
duced by Main and colleagues, was ‘disorganized’ attachment. Main and colleagues character-
ized disorganized attachment as representing the most concerning form of insecure behaviour.
It should be pointed out that the concept of disorganized attachment was introduced by 
Main and colleagues in quite a misleading way. The term ‘disorganization’ in ordinary lan-
guage means something thrown into chaos. By contrast, they used the term in a technical 
sense, but without explaining this to the reader.46 Disorganized attachment was coded on 
the basis of infant displays of i) conflicted, ii) confused, or iii) apprehensive behaviour to-
wards their caregiver, where these suggest conflict in expectations about the availability of 
the caregiver as a safe haven. When a child’s behaviour in the Strange Situation actually ap-
pears random, this is coded as ‘Cannot Classify’, rather than disorganization. The assignation 
of disorganized attachment actually requires the coder to observe determinate ‘patterning 
within the disturbance of coherence’, rather than unpredictability.47 Another source of con-
fusion was that Main and Hesse proposed that disorganized attachment is caused by fear 
in relation to the caregiver. This suggests a unitary process, triggered by hostile caregiving. 
Certainly disorganized attachment was, soon after its introduction, identified as having in-
creased prevalence in maltreatment samples.48 However, Main and Hesse found that the 
 44 Main, M., Kaplan, N., and Cassidy, J. (1985). ‘Security in Infancy, Childhood, and Adulthood: A Move to the 
Level of Representation’. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 50(1– 2): 66– 104.
 45 Ainsworth. M. D. S. (1983). ‘Patterns of Infant– Mother Attachment as Related to Maternal Care: Their Early 
History and their Contribution to Continuity’, in D. Magnusson and V. L. Allen (eds), Human Development: An 
Interactional Perspective, New York: Academic Press, pp. 35– 55.
 46 The challenge for psychological theory was evoked well by Bion in his Brazil lectures: ‘If we invent words, 
nobody will understand what those words mean. If we do not, their sensuous history is evoked. As with a “dead” 
metaphor carelessly used, its ghost begins to walk.’ Bion, W. R. ([1973] 1990). Brazilian Lectures, London: Karnac 
Books, p. 34. And, in any case, ‘attempts to contrive a term devoid of a distorting penumbra of associations is 
often defeated by the speed with which such a meaningless term collects a meaning’. Bion, W. R. (1962) Elements 
of Psychoanalysis, London: Karnac Books, p. 88. As a thought experiment, if Main and Solomon had set out their 
observations using a technical vocabulary rather than the evocative language of ‘disorganisation’ and ‘fear’, it seems 
likely that it would have had only a fraction of the take- up outside attachment research. At the same time, a price 
was paid in simplifying the concepts beyond all recognition. Duschinsky, R. (2018). ‘Disorganization, Fear and 
Attachment: Working towards Clarification’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 39(1): 17– 29.
 47 Reijman, S., Foster, S., and Duschinsky, R. (2018). ‘The Infant Disorganised Attachment Classification: 
“Patterning within the Disturbance of Coherence”’. Social Science & Medicine, 200: 52– 58.
 48 Carlson, V., Cicchetti, D., Barnett, D., and Braunwald, K. (1989). ‘Finding Order in Disorganization: Lessons 
from Research on Maltreated Infants’ Attachments to their Caregivers’, in D. Cicchetti and V. Carlson (eds), Child 
Maltreatment: Theory and Research on the Causes and Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 494– 528.
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caregivers from dyads classified as showing disorganized attachment were especially likely 
to be unresolved for bereavement or trauma on the Adult Attachment Interview, among 
other antecedents.49 Such findings suggested that the Adult Attachment Interview could be 
a powerful tool for exploring factors that disrupt the development of secure child– caregiver 
attachment.
Miriam and Howard Steele brought the first article on the Adult Attachment Interview 
with them when they moved to London and shared this with Fonagy. Fonagy was espe-
cially excited by the fact that ‘both attachment theory and modern psychoanalysis have as 
their fundamental epistemic aim the description of the internal mechanisms responsible 
for the discrepancy between actual and psychic reality.’50 The Steeles and Fonagy attended 
training in the Adult Attachment Interview held in 1987 at the Tavistock Clinic, taught by 
Mary Main and Erik Hesse at the invitation of John Bowlby.51 Between 1987 and 1989, the 
Steeles conducted the Adult Attachment Interview with 100 expectant mothers and fathers 
in the third trimester. They also collected 96 infant– mother Strange Situation observations 
when the children were 12 months old, and 90 infant– father Strange Situation observations 
at 18 months. This was the basis for the University College London Parent– Child Project, a 
fascinating longitudinal study that would eventually follow the sample over the subsequent 
17 years.
The first findings from the UCL Parent– Child Project were published by Fonagy, Steele, 
Moran, Steele, and Higgitt in 1991. The researchers reported powerful intergenerational 
continuities for mothers: around three- quarters of children whose mothers showed low co-
herence on the Adult Attachment Interview, conducted prenatally, displayed insecure pat-
terns of attachment in the Strange Situation procedure. The same was true for around half of 
fathers. Eighty per cent of children whose mothers or fathers had high coherence in the Adult 
Attachment Interview displayed a secure pattern of attachment in the Strange Situation. The 
Strange Situation classifications were not predicted by self- report of the quality of the marital 
relationship or by attitudes towards caregiving by either parent.52 The coding system for the 
Adult Attachment Interview had a sub- scale for ‘meta- cognitive monitoring’, the extent to 
which a speaker seemed able to reflect on their own thoughts, feelings, and discourse. However, 
the scale was (and, in fact, still is) unfinished. The Steeles and Fonagy, examining the tran-
scripts of coherent speakers with a clinical eye, ‘noticed that a defining feature of their narra-
tives was the way they relied on language as a tool for giving meaning to experience, including 
 49 Main, M. and Hesse, E. (1990). ‘Parents’ Unresolved Traumatic Experiences are Related to Infant 
Disorganized Attachment Status: Is Frightened and/ or Frightening Parental Behavior The Linking Mechanism?’, 
in M. T. Greenberg, D. Cicchetti, and E. M. Cummings (eds), Attachment in the 638 Child Development Preschool 
Years, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 161– 182. On the antecedents of disorganized attachment, see 
also Cyr, C., Euser, E. M., Bakermans- Kranenburg, M. J., and Van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2010). ‘Attachment 
Security and Disorganization in Maltreating and High- Risk Families: A Series of Meta- Analyses’. Development 
and Psychopathology, 22(1): 87– 108; Granqvist, P., Sroufe, L. A., Dozier, M., Hesse, E., Steele, M., van IJzendoorn, 
M., . . . and Duschinsky, R. (2017). ‘Disorganized Attachment in Infancy: A Review of the Phenomenon and its 
Implications for Clinicians and Policy- Makers’. Attachment & Human Development, 19(6): 534– 558.
 50 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Points of Contact and Divergence between Psychoanalytic and Attachment Theories: Is 
Psychoanalytic Theory Truly Different?’ Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19(4): 448– 480, p. 452.
 51 Steele, H. and Steele, M. (2005). ‘Understanding and Resolving Emotional Conflict: The London Parent– 
Child Project’, in K. E. Grossmann, K. Grossmann and E. Waters (eds), Attachment from Infancy to Adulthood: The 
Major Longitudinal Studies, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 137– 164.
 52 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Moran, G. S., Steele, H., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘Measuring the Ghost in the 
Nursery: A Summary of the Main Findings of the Anna Freud Centre/ University College London Parent– Child 
Study’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 14: 115– 131.
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the attribution of mental states (beliefs and desires).’53 These qualities seemed relevant across 
the Adult Attachment Interview, but especially in response to two questions that demanded 
examination of the motivations and influences guiding the behaviour of the speaker and their 
attachment figures: ‘When you think about your childhood experiences, do you think they 
have an influence on who you are today?’ and ‘When you think about your parents’ behaviour 
toward you when you were a child, why do you think they behaved the way they did?’54
The Steeles and Fonagy initially ‘referred to this phenomenon as evidence of the “internal 
observer” as we thought this term captured the sense in which adult speakers could observe 
how family life was when they were children, and distinguish this from the understanding 
they gained through later relationships across development.’55 However, the ‘internal ob-
server’ concept was amended to the ‘reflective self ’.56 This was a term from the psychoana-
lyst Christopher Bollas, used to encompass the fact that the attribution and reconsideration 
of mental states seemed to be more than perspective- taking on the past, and could include 
appraisal of different perspectives in the present or imagined future.57 The term was then ex-
tended again to ‘reflective function’, to encompass the capacity of the speaker to interpret the 
experiences of attachment figures with reference to mental states.
The Adult Attachment Interview had been modelled on a clinical interview, inte-
grating two components. The earlier component was a psychoanalytic approach to clinical 
interviewing from the 1970s, in which psychological defences or confusions were deciphered 
by the clinician. The later component, under the influence of the American Psychiatric 
Association’s DSM- III, was use of clinical interviews from the 1980s to identify specifiable 
markers for categories of mental pathology within the particularities of what and how an in-
dividual reports their experiences.58 Reflective function can likewise be seen as a further in-
tegration of the Adult Attachment Interview with developments within psychoanalysis that 
turned attention to obstacles to thinking and understanding (see Chapter 1). Indeed, though 
not situated as such by Fonagy and colleagues at the time, it is very likely that an influence on 
the concept of ‘reflective function’ was Bion’s earlier concept of ‘alpha function’, to mean the 
process by which determinate thoughts and feelings are made out of experiences.59
 53 Steele, H. and Steele, M. (2005). ‘Understanding and Resolving Emotional Conflict: The London Parent– 
Child Project’, in K. E. Grossmann, K. Grossmann, and E. Waters (eds), Attachment from Infancy to Adulthood: The 
Major Longitudinal Studies, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 137– 164, p. 157.
 54 Steele, H. and Steele, M. (2008). ‘On the Origins of Reflective Functioning’, in F. Busch (ed.), 
Mentalization: Theoretical Considerations, Re- Search Findings, and Clinical Implications, New York: Taylor and 
Francis, pp. 133– 158.
 55 Steele, H. and Steele, M. (2005). ‘Understanding and Resolving Emotional Conflict: The London Parent– 
Child Project’, in K. E. Grossmann, K. Grossmann, and E. Waters (eds), Attachment from Infancy to Adulthood: The 
Major Longitudinal Studies, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 137– 164, p. 157.
 56 As in the subtitle of Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G. S., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘The Capacity 
for Understanding Mental States: The Reflective Self in Parent and Child and its Significance for Security of 
Attachment’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 12(3): 201– 218.
 57 This usage was influenced by Bollas, C. (1990). ‘The Origins of the Therapeutic Alliance’. Paper presented at 
the English Speaking Conference of the British Psychoanalytical Society, October, London. Later published as 
Bollas, C. (1998). ‘Origins of the Therapeutic Alliance’. Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review, 21(1): 24– 36.
 58 Duschinsky, R. (2020). Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 59 Fonagy and Target would acknowledge alignment between the idea of reflective function and that of alpha 
function, though not any relation of influence e.g. Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., and Steele, M. (1998). 
Reflective- Functioning Manual, Version 5, London: University College London/ Anna Freud Centre, p. 4; Fonagy, 
P. and Target, M. (2003). ‘Evolution of the Interpersonal Interpretive Function: Clues for Effective Preventive 
Intervention in Early Childhood’, in S. W. Coates, J. L. Rosenthal, and D. S. Schechter (eds), September 11: Trauma 
and Human Bonds, Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 99– 113, p. 102. The developmental model of reflective func-
tioning likewise has marked similarities to the model proposed by Bion. Though since Fonagy and Target do not 
acknowledge influence, it is difficult to know whether this can inferred. See e.g. Bion, W.R. ([1973] 1990). Brazilian 
Lectures, London: Karnac Books: ‘If the baby has a mother who is able to tolerate being frightened that the child is 
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Frequently, reflective function and mentalization were treated as synonyms by Fonagy 
and colleagues in the 1990s and 2000s. However, a few distinctions can be identified. 
Whereas the term ‘mentalization’ was used by Fonagy and colleagues to refer to the cap-
acity of an individual to think about mental states, the term ‘reflective function’ appears to 
have been preferred, especially by the Steeles, to describe the capacity to think about mental 
states in the context of attachment relationships specifically.60 The Steeles and Fonagy devel-
oped a manual for coding reflective functioning and applied it to the transcripts. Though this 
was the development sample for the measure, and so strong findings might be expected, the 
results were still surprisingly clear. Reflective function in the Adult Attachment Interview 
not only predicted security in the Strange Situation better than coherence for mothers and 
fathers, but coherence had no association with security when reflective functioning was stat-
istically controlled.61 The Steeles and Fonagy also checked how the reflective functioning 
measure compared with the inferred experience scales: again, they found that reflective 
functioning was a better predictor than the inferred experience scales, which had no associ-
ation with the Strange Situation once reflective functioning was controlled. The researchers 
concluded:
The coherence of the parents’ perception of their past derives from their unhindered cap-
acity to observe their own mental functioning, to have a plausible view of themselves and 
their objects as human beings, thinking, feeling, wishing, believing, wanting, and desiring. 
We assume, then, that coherence may be a measure of reflectiveness, and it is the latter at-
tribute of the caregivers that has direct implications for their relationship to the infant . . . In 
our view, a child may be said to be secure in relation to a caregiver to the extent that, on the 
basis of his or her experience, he or she can make an assumption that his or her mental state 
will be appropriately reflected on and responded to accurately. The child’s confidence in 
this assumption will enable her or him to be more assured about the safety of the world of 
ideas and desires; she or he will feel secure in relation to her or his mental world.62
The unpublished manual conveys in more detail how the construct of reflective function 
was operationalized. It was by no means a quantitative count of occasions when mental state 
terms were used by speakers:
for a statement to be reflective, it has to imply an activity of reflection, rather than simply 
describing a mental state. Thus, the statement ‘I was angry’ would not be considered 
dying, or that it is mad, or stupid, then the baby seems to feel better for having such a mother. If she cannot tolerate 
it, neither can the baby who consequently seems unable to grow mentally. If it is going to grow it has to do so in a 
peculiar way; this, in turn, has the effect of making it grow a certain shape. Later, someone will say . . . “borderline 
case” ’ (p. 132).
 60 Sharp, C. and Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘The Parent’s Capacity to Treat the Child as a Psychological Agent: Constructs, 
Measures and Implications for Developmental Psychopathology’. Social Development, 17(3): 737– 754: ‘What 
exactly does mentalizing mean within this context? . . . When this capacity is operationalized within the context 
of attachment relationships, Fonagy refers to it as “reflective functioning” (RF) . . . The term is used to describe the 
parent’s capacity to reflect upon his/ her own or the child’s internal mental experience within the context of attach-
ment’ (p. 740).
 61 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G. S., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘The Capacity for Understanding 
Mental States: The Reflective Self in Parent and Child and its Significance for Security of Attachment.’ Infant 
Mental Health Journal, 12(3): 201– 218.
 62 Ibid. 215.
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reflective, whereas the statement ‘At the beginning I felt really angry and then it changed to 
sadness’ does suggest that the feelings have been considered.63
Compared with the general construct of mentalization, the operationalization of reflective 
function is notable for a few subtle differences, perhaps shaped by the priorities of the Adult 
Attachment Interview. The coding of reflective function appeared to give special weight to 
the capacity of the speaker to identify change in their perspective over time. And, more than 
the idea of mentalization, reflective function was concerned with understanding behaviour 
and mental states as having bidirectional lines of influence, not solely the interpretation of 
mental states as the cause of behaviour.64
The manual advised that individual statements should be given a score on a 1– 9 scale, as 
should the transcript as a whole. This required the coder to make a synthesis of the extent, in-
tensity, and quality of the varied forms of reflective functioning evident across the transcript. 
Fonagy and colleagues reported that ‘when reflective- functioning is absent or ineffectual, 
quite distinct, readily classifiable, patterns of responses tend to emerge.’65 One pattern was 
rejection of reflective functioning, with the prompts in the interview to think about child-
hood experiences and the intentions of attachment figures responded to in a hostile way by 
the speaker. Another pattern of particular note was ‘hyperactive reflective function’, in which 
there is extensive discussion of mental states, but these are poorly integrated and do not have 
much bearing on actually answering the questions posed by the interviewer: ‘Mentalization 
spins like a car wheel which has lost contact with ground. Because so many of the connec-
tions between what is thought about thoughts or feelings and the original thoughts or feelings 
themselves have been lost, metarepresentational capacity works overtime but without real 
impact.’66 This kind of response would later be termed ‘hypermentalizing’ (see Chapter 5).
A further pattern identified by Fonagy and colleagues was ‘disavowal of reflective func-
tion’, the most common form of which were explanations of caregivers’ behaviour in ‘socio-
logical’ rather than psychological terms, such as ‘people in their social class never expected 
to be affectionate with their children’. Fonagy had earlier excluded Dunn’s attention to social 
convention as part of mentalization. Taking this logic further, now the operationalization of 
reflective function actively treated sociological explanations as rather at the expense of re-
flection of the mental states of determinate figures. Mentalization in general, and reflective 
function in particular, were conceived of as ‘psychological processes underpinning the 
 63 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., and Steele, M. (1998). Reflective- Functioning Manual, Version 5, 
London: University College London/ Anna Freud Centre.
 64 This point seems to be explicitly affirmed in Murphy, A., Steele, M., and Steele, H. (2013). ‘From Out of Sight, 
Out of Mind to In Sight and In Mind: Enhancing Reflective Capacities in a Group Attachment- Based Intervention’, 
in Bettmann Joanna Ellen and Friedman Donna Demetri (eds), Attachment- Based Clinical Work with Children 
and Adolescents, NY: Springer, pp. 237– 257: ‘We define reflective functioning as (1) an awareness of the nature of 
mental states in the self and others; (2) the mutual influences at work between mental states and behaviour; (3) the 
necessity of a developmental perspective; and (4) the need to be sensitive to the current context’ (pp. 238– 239). 
Discrepancy between the characterizations of reflective function and mentalization, despite claims by Fonagy 
and colleagues that they relate to the same construct, have also been noted by Eagle, M. (2013). Attachment and 
Psychoanalysis, New York: Guilford Press, p. 184. For Eagle, mentalization requires treating thoughts and feel-
ings as intentions; reflective function addresses thoughts and feelings without the assumption of intentionality. 
Eagle also sees mentalization as implicit compared with reflective function as an explicit process. In our view, both 
contrasts are important, and there are some uses of the concepts that fit this contrast. However, at other times, 
reflective function is treated as implicit and assuming intentionality, and mentalization is treated as explicit and 
concerned with thoughts and feelings in general. Eagle’s characterization therefore does not hold, though he is cer-
tainly correct to identify these two axes of underlying ambiguity.
 65 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., and Steele, M. (1998). Reflective- Functioning Manual, Version 5, 
London: University College London/ Anna Freud Centre.
 66 Ibid.
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view of oneself and others as motivated by mental states’.67 Attention to processes above the 
level of mental states, such as sociological forces were therefore characterized as the absence 
of mentalizing (Chapter 9). Embodied processes below the level of mental states, such as 
endocrinology (e.g. appeal to the causal role of adrenalin or cortisol; consideration of post- 
partum hormone changes), are also ambiguous in this regard.68 The formulation offered 
by Fonagy and colleagues would seem to implicitly exclude them as legitimate objects of 
mentalization.69
The link between caregiver reflective function and infant attachment security in the UCL 
Parent– Child Project suggested to Fonagy and colleagues four revisions or amendments to 
important concepts in attachment theory in the late 1990s:
 • Sensitive care.
 • The cycle of abuse.
 • Internal working model.
 • Security.
First, Fonagy and colleagues proposed a new perspective on sensitive care. Ainsworth had 
proposed that the basis for secure infant attachment lay in caregiver ‘sensitivity’, a technical 
term she used for the capacity to ‘perceive and to interpret accurately the signals and com-
munications implicit in her infant’s behavior, and given this understanding, to respond to 
them appropriately and promptly’.70 Though incredibly perspicacious, there are nonetheless 
several problems with this account. It assumes that infants offer a single signal at a time or 
that signals are ultimately compatible; that it is in the parent’s capacity to solve the problem; 
that there are no needs without, prior to, or contrary to signals; that needs are not incom-
patible; and it neglects the importance of distraction.71 Perhaps most importantly, not all 
signals pertain to attachment needs. An infant may cry because they are bored or confused, 
for example. So even exquisite sensitivity will only ever be at best a moderate predictor of 
 67 Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘The Significance of the Development of Metacognitive Control over Mental Representations 
in Parenting and Infant Development’. Journal of Clinical Psychoanalysis, 5(1): 67– 86, p. 74.
 68 Cf. Cassidy, J., Jones, J. D., and Shaver, P. R. (2013). ‘Contributions of Attachment Theory and 
Research: A Framework for Future Research, Translation, and Policy’. Development and Psychopathology, 
25(4.2): 1415– 1434: ‘Consideration of linkages between representational and nonrepresentational processes 
must include the possibility that causality flows in both directions: physiological stress responses can presumably 
prompt a person to engage in higher level cognitive processes to understand, justify, or eliminate the stressor’ 
(p. 1419).
 69 The exception would be where conventions are established to infer mental states from physiology or endo-
crinology. E.g. McHugh, B., Dawson, N., Scrafton, A., and Asen, E. (2010). ‘Hearts on Their Sleeves’: The Use of 
Systemic Biofeedback in School Settings’. Journal of Family Therapy, 32(1): 58– 72; Fotopoulou, A. and Tsakiris, M. 
(2017). ‘Mentalizing Homeostasis: The Social Origins of Interoceptive Inference’. Neuropsychoanalysis, 19(1): 3– 
28. The distinction between the physical and the mental in the case of gender has been described by Fonagy as 
‘wrong’ and ‘inappropriate’. However, he has not yet been clear about whether attention to embodied processes 
below the level of mental states would constitute mentalizing. See Fonagy’s remarks in Steidinger, S. (2018) ‘Trans- 
Actions: An Exploration of Gender Dysphoria’. Accessed at: https:// vimeo.com/ 285555219.
 70 Ainsworth, M. (1969). ‘Scale 1: Sensitivity vs. Insensitivity to the Baby’s Signals’. Accessed at: http:// www.
psychology.sunysb.edu/ attachment/ measures/ content/ ainsworth_ scales.html. Some but not all aspects of the 
sensitivity scale and construct were described in Stayton, D. J., Hogan, R., and Ainsworth, M. (1971). ‘Infant 
Obedience and Maternal Behavior: The Origins of Socialization Reconsidered’. Child Development, 42(4): 1057– 
1069, pp. 1060– 1061.
 71 Some of these concerns are discussed variously in Kondo- Ikemura, K. (2001). ‘Insufficient Evidence’. 
American Psychologist, 56(10): 825; Keller, H. and Otto, H. (2009). ‘The Cultural Socialization of Emotion 
Regulation During Infancy’. Journal of Cross- Cultural Psychology, 40(6): 996– 1011; Shai, D. and Belsky, J. (2017). 
‘Parental Embodied Mentalizing: How the Nonverbal Dance between Parents and Infants Predicts Children’s 
Socio- Emotional Functioning’. Attachment & Human Development, 19(2): 191– 219.
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attachment security.72 For their part, Fonagy and colleagues argued that caregiver sensi-
tivity was largely a by- product of reflective function, and that it was the latter that was largely 
the basis for infant secure attachment. What was captured by Ainsworth’s sensitivity scale, 
Fonagy and colleagues proposed, was the extent to which the caregiver was attentive to 
the mental states of the child, could interpret these accurately, and could respond to them 
promptly and in an undistorted way.73 Later research has indeed supported the claim that 
some of the association between sensitivity and infant attachment can be accounted for in 
terms of parental reflective function.74 However, it would have been surprising if all of the 
association had been accounted for, because both sensitive care and attachment security can 
readily be seen in non- human animals with far less role for representation in parent– child 
interactions.75 There may be different paths to sensitivity through automatic and controlled 
forms of caregiver mentalizing (see Chapter 4)— but this was not a distinction Fonagy and 
colleagues had available in the late 1990s, nor one they have subsequently considered with 
respect to sensitivity.
A second alteration to attachment theory was regarding the ‘cycle of abuse’. This was a 
concept introduced by Egeland, Jacobvitz, and Sroufe in 1984, to describe findings from the 
Minnesota longitudinal study that about a third of caregivers who reported that they had 
been abused went on to abuse their own child: a much higher proportion than matched con-
trols, even if overall a minority of cases.76 Egeland and colleagues reported that the abused 
mothers who did not go on to abuse their child were distinguished by one or more of three 
experiences. First, some had emotional support from a non- abusive adult during their child-
hood. Second, some had participated in therapy. Third, some had a stable and emotionally 
supportive relationship with their adult partner. Fonagy and colleagues argued that what 
these experiences had in common was that they could be expected to increase a caregiver’s 
reflective functioning, offering possibilities for interrupting responses that might otherwise 
predispose abusive or neglecting behaviour towards their child.77
 72 Woodhouse, S. S., Scott, J. R., Hepworth, A. D., and Cassidy, J. (2020). ‘Secure Base Provision: A New Approach 
to Examining Links Between Maternal Caregiving and Infant Attachment’. Child Development, 91(1): e249– e265 .
 73 Fonagy, P., Steele, H., Steele, M. and Holder, J. (1997). ‘Attachment and Theory of Mind: Overlapping 
Constructs?’ Association for Child Psychology and Psychiatry Occasional Papers, 14: 31– 40: for Ainsworth, ‘the 
caregiver’s perception of the child as an intentional being lies at the root of sensitive caregiving’ (p. 36).
 74 Evaluating the criticisms of Ainsworth by Fonagy and colleagues, Zeegers and colleagues conducted a 
meta- analysis to investigate the relative contributions of sensitivity and mentalization/ reflective function to in-
fant attachment classifications. They found that together the two predictors accounted for 12% of variance in at-
tachment classifications. After controlling for sensitivity, the relationship between parental mentalization and 
infant– caregiver security was r = .24. And, after controlling for mentalization, the relationship between parental 
sensitivity and infant– caregiver security was r = .19. Sensitivity also partially mediated the association between 
mentalization and infant– caregiver security (r = .07). Such findings suggest that Fonagy and others were right 
to argue for the importance of mentalization/ reflective function, but that sensitivity is not reducible to reflective 
function. Zeegers, M. A., Colonnesi, C., Stams, G. J. J., and Meins, E. (2017). ‘Mind Matters: A Meta- Analysis 
on Parental Mentalization and Sensitivity as Predictors of Infant– Parent Attachment’. Psychological Bulletin, 
143(12): 1245– 1272.
 75 Bowlby, K. (1991). ‘Ethological Light on Psychoanalytical Problems’, in P. Bateson (ed.), The Development and 
Integration of Behaviour: Essays in Honour of Robert Hinde, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 301– 313; 
Stevenson- Hinde, J. (2005). ‘The Interplay between Attachment, Temperament and Maternal Style: A Madingly 
Perspective’, in K. E. Grossmann, K. Grossmann and E. Waters (eds.), Attachment from Infancy to Adulthood: The 
Major Longitudinal Studies, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 198– 222.
 76 Egeland, B., Jacobvitz, D., and Sroufe, L. (1988). ‘Breaking the Cycle of Abuse’. Child Development, 
59(4): 1080– 1088.
 77 Offering some support for this conclusion, researchers would find a large correlation between caregivers’ 
reflective functioning in the Adult Attachment Interview and the absence of frightening, dissociative, anom-
alous, withdrawing behaviours or severe disruptions to parent– child communication during filmed observation. 
Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2005). ‘Bridging the Transmission Gap: An End to an Important Mystery of Attachment 
Research?’ Attachment & Human Development, 7(3): 333– 343.
66 Mentalizing in development
A third change to attachment theory in the late 1990s was regarding the concept of ‘in-
ternal working model’. This concept had been introduced by Bowlby to characterize the 
expectations held by a child about the availability of their caregiver. Fonagy held that the 
concept of ‘internal working model’ was too vague, given that it encompassed memories of 
previous interactions with attachment figures, expectations about interactions with attach-
ment figures, ramifications of these memories and expectations for a child’s sense of self, and 
ramifications of these memories and expectations for the child’s sense of their caregiver.78 
When attachment researchers proposed that internal working models were the mechanism 
through which early childhood experiences contributed to later behaviour, Fonagy regarded 
this as a badly underspecified claim. He and his father had been discussing the ideas of the 
philosopher Hegel, who had emphasized the integral role of the other in the self ’s recogni-
tion of itself.79 And from György Gergely, Fonagy took the idea that self- recognition would 
be facilitated when the caregiver’s behaviour provided cues to the child that their mental 
states and intentions were being acknowledged. Gergely argued that an especially potent 
form of recognition a child could receive is ‘marked mirroring’. This is when a caregiver pro-
vides enough of a mirror to the child’s behaviour to show that the intention and/ or mental 
state implicated in the behaviour has been acknowledged, alongside some slight transform-
ation or elaboration to also communicate a sense of acknowledgement. So, for instance, a 
young child’s cry may be met initially with a sad mouth and tonal echo from the parent, sig-
nalling that the emotion has been received, but this response is then transformed by a half- 
smile and a rising- pitch intonation, as if to convey that the sadness is localized, resolvable, 
and will be okay soon.80 Marked mirroring utilizes the interplay of primary and secondary 
meanings highlighted by Ivan Fónagy as integral to human communication (see Chapter 1), 
offering the primary meaning of acceptance and the secondary meaning of containment.
 78 Fonagy, P. (2001). ‘The Human Genome and the Representational World: The Role of Early Mother– Infant 
Interaction in Creating an Interpersonal Interpretive Mechanism’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 65(3): 427– 448, 
p. 436.
 79 Fónagy, I. and Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Communication with Pretend Actions in Language, Literature and 
Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18(3): 363– 418. In the later formulation of Bateman, 
A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorders: Mentalization- Based Treatment, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘We have to assume a dialectic model of self- development (Hegel 1807) where 
the child’s capacity to create a coherent image of mind is critically dependent on an experience of being clearly per-
ceived as a mind by the attachment figure’ (p. 64).
 80 Gergely, G. and Watson, J. (1996). ‘The Social Biofeedback Model of Parental Affect Mirroring. The 
Development of Emotional Self- Awareness and Self- Control in Infancy’. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 77: 1– 31. A difference between Gergely and Fonagy in this regard is that the latter quite frequently 
translated the idea of marked mirroring into the Kleinian vocabulary of the caregiver offering ‘containment’ for the 
child’s affect. Kleinians, especially Bion, had certainly offered aligned ideas over the previous decades, though usu-
ally phrased in the language of projective identification. For instance, Bion wrote that ‘An understanding mother 
is able to experience the feeling of dread, that this baby was striving to deal with by projective identification, and 
yet retain a balanced outlook. This patient had had to deal with a mother who could not tolerate experiencing 
such feelings and reacted either by denying them ingress, or alternatively by becoming a prey to the anxiety which 
resulted from introjection of the infant’s feelings . . . a well- balanced mother can accept these and respond thera-
peutically: that is to say in a manner that makes the infant feel it is receiving its frightened personality back again 
but in a form that it can tolerate’,Bion, W. R. (1962). ‘The Psycho- Analytic Study of Thinking’. The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 43: 306– 310, p. 308. One subsequent criticism that Fonagy and colleagues have raised 
regarding the concept of marked mirroring is that it underplays the irreducibly kinaesthetic aspects of the pro-
cess: Shai, D. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Beyond Words: Parental Embodied Mentalizing and the Parent Infant Dance’, 
in M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (eds), Mechanisms of Social Connections: From Brain to Group, Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 185– 203. More than marked mirroring, the revised account in Shai 
and Fonagy emphasizes repair of interactive missteps as the paradigmatic form in which parental reflective func-
tion contributes to child attachment security, felt coherence, and socio- emotional development. See also Shai, 
D. and Meins, E. (2018). ‘Parental Embodied Mentalizing and its Relation to Mind‐Mindedness, Sensitivity, and 
Attachment Security’. Infancy, 23(6): 857– 872.
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Drawing on these ideas, Fonagy and colleagues proposed that patterns of attachment 
should be regarded as a correlate of the child’s early mentalizing capacities, achieved through 
recognizing themselves in the minds of their caregiver. He felt that attachment researchers 
had reified the infant classifications and failed to truly develop proposals about ‘the mech-
anisms or psychic processes that may underlie such behavioral clusters’.81 He speculated that 
secure attachment reflected a child’s experiences of being treated by their caregiver as having 
intentions and/ or mental states. Avoidant and ambivalent attachment reflected obstacles in 
the caregiver’s recognition of their need for a secure base or a safe haven, and in turn could 
be anticipated to contribute to deficits in reflective function: “The avoidant child shuns the 
mental state of the other, while the resistant child focuses on its own state of distress to the 
exclusion of intersubjectivity”.82
Yet despite such qualitative differences, Fonagy and colleagues argued that the underlying 
mechanisms were likely best characterized in terms of a dimension. Ultimately, for Fonagy 
and colleagues, the importance of individual differences in attachment was that they con-
tributed to or hindered the child’s capacity for mentalization. It was this, not attachment 
itself nor the representations of caregivers that stem from them, that they felt contributed 
to a child’s later socio- emotional development. Fonagy and Target argued that ‘the influ-
ence of attachment security on later development has nothing to do with representations of 
early relationships, and a futile search for this link has distracted attachment researchers’.83 
The transition in the stance of Fonagy and colleagues can be seen in comparing the develop-
mental model in a 1998 diagram with one 10 years later. Attachment security still figures in 
the second diagram, but it is not treated as a necessary path to child mentalising, nor neces-
sary for a child’s emotion regulation or later mental health.
 81 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Points of Contact and Divergence between Psychoanalytic and Attachment Theories: Is 
Psychoanalytic Theory Truly Different?’ Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19(4): 448– 480, p. 469.
 82 Ibid. 460.
 83 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘Early Intervention and the Development of Self- Regulation’. Psychoanalytic 

















Figure 3.1 Developmental model (‘paraphrased from Hegel’).
Source: Reproduced from Peter Fonagy, ‘Prevention, the Appropriate Target of Infant Psychotherapy’, 
Infant Mental Health Journal, 19(2): 124– 150, Figure 4, DOI: https:// doi.org/ 10.1002/ (SICI)1097- 
0355(199822)19:2<124::AID- IMHJ4>3.0.CO;2- O Copyright © 1998 Michigan Association for Infant Mental 
Health.
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Finally, a fourth revision to attachment theory proposed by Fonagy and colleagues ad-
dressed the concept of security and its clinical implications. Bowlby and several other at-
tachment theorists had argued that the therapist offered a ‘secure base’ to the patient, from 
which they could venture to explore difficult thoughts and feelings. This process activated 
the patient’s expectations about attachment relationships, and at the same time provided 
an opportunity to reflect on them. In this way, the therapy could contribute to revision in 
internal working models and a potential increase in the security of these models. Fonagy 
and colleagues agreed that the therapeutic relationship activated the patient’s expectations 
about attachment relationships. However, he did not believe that the benefits to the patient of 
therapy stemmed from an increase in attachment security.
Instead, Fonagy praised Patricia Crittenden for the proposal that, when the attachment 
system is activated by perceived external or internal sources of threat, both children and 
adults would be predisposed to fall back on automatic processing.84 Drawing ideas from 
Linda Mayes, Fonagy and Bateman redescribed this process as a tendency among patients 
with BPD to fall into an implicit, non- mentalizing form of processing when the attachment 
system was activated.85 As the attachment bond between therapist and client intensifies, the 
quality of mentalizing of patients, especially those with BPD, was anticipated to drop off. 
The therapeutic task, then, was to help patients retain their capacity to mentalize even in the 
context of attachment relationships. It was anticipated that successes in the mentalization of 
attachment relationships, because of their foundational position for psychological develop-











Figure 3.2 Developmental model.
Source: Reproduced from Carla Sharp and Peter Fonagy, ‘The Parent’s Capacity to Treat the Child as a 
Psychological Agent: Constructs, Measures and Implications for Developmental Psychopathology’, Social 
Development, 17(3): 737– 754, DOI: https:// doi.org/ 10.1111/ j.1467- 9507.2007.00457.x Copyright © Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd. 2008.
 84 Fonagy, P. (1998). ‘Moments of Change in Psychoanalytic Theory: Discussion of a New Theory of Psychic 
Change’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 19(3): 346– 353: ‘At the heart of this new theory is the notion of implicit or 
procedural memory borrowed from cognitive science (Schacter, 1992). Bob Clyman (1991) should be credited 
with bringing this idea to the attention of psychoanalysts, and Crittenden (1990) with integrating the idea with 
attachment theory’ (p. 348).
 85 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. W. (2006). ‘Mechanisms of Change in Mentalization‐Based Treatment of BPD’. 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 62(4): 411– 430. See also Mayes, L. C. (2006). ‘Arousal Regulation, Emotional 
Flexibility, Medial Amygdala Function, and the Impact of Early Experience: Comments on the Paper of Lewis et al’. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1094: 178– 192.
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For reasons that may have evolutionary significance, the intense activation of the networks 
underpinning attachment feelings and experiences also appears to inhibit the intensity of 
cognitive and emotional scrutiny over mental contents. This state of affairs creates a unique 
opportunity for the psychotherapist. By balancing the activation of attachment against the 
presentation of negative mental contents, they are able to present new stimuli (mental con-
tents) to the patient without evoking mental resistance against the incorporation of new 
ways of experiencing the world into existing cognitive– emotional schemata.86
Fonagy and colleagues proposed that a therapeutic focus on mentalization would be of 
benefit to patients with most mental health problems. Putting matters stridently, Fonagy and 
Target stated that, ‘in our view, change can happen solely through the revival of reflective 
function.’87 However, they argued that a focus on mentalization in the context of attachment 
relationships would especially benefit patients with BPD, because they regarded this condi-
tion as primarily reflecting deficits in mentalizing in the context of attachment relationships. 
If difficulties with mentalizing could be drawn as a spectrum, BPD was conceptualized as 
the extreme end of this spectrum. However, at times, they also described the pathway to 
other conditions— such as dissociative disorders— in exactly the same terms as the pathway 
to BPD, in terms of a turning away from conceiving of the mind of the caregiver resulting 
in mentalization deficits.88 By the early 2000s, such diffuse appeal to the same explanatory 
mechanism and psychological constructs was starting to raise serious questions about the 
exact meaning of mentalization and about the specificity of the developmental model under-
pinning it. However, this model was anchored in place, at least for a time, by the manner in 
which Fonagy and colleagues made use of the concept of disorganized attachment.
Disorganization and mentalization
The concept of disorganized attachment was introduced by Mary Main and Judith Solomon, 
and technically refers to the display of conflicted, confused, or apprehensive behaviour by 
young children in the Strange Situation procedure. In writing with the Steeles in the early 
1990s, reporting empirical findings from studies using the Strange Situation, this was the 
meaning of the term in Fonagy’s work.89 Fonagy and Target were enthusiastic, stating that 
 86 Fonagy, P. and Adshead, G. (2012). ‘How Mentalisation Changes the Mind’. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 
18(5): 353– 362, p. 359.
 87 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2005). ‘Some Reflections on the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalytic Therapy’, in J. 
Auerbach, K. Levy, and C. E. Shaffer (eds), Relatedness, Self- definition and Mental Representation: Essays in Honor 
of Sidney J. Blatt, New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 191– 212, p. 200, italics added.
 88 E.g. Fonagy, P. ([1997] 2002). ‘Multiple Voices versus Meta- Cognition: An Attachment Theory Perspective’, 
in V. Sinason (ed.), Attachment, Trauma and Multiplicity: Working with Dissociative Identity Disorder, 
London: Brunner- Routledge, pp. 71– 85. The in- but- mostly- out status of dissociation within Fonagy’s explana-
tory model would later be a point of acknowledged self- criticism e.g. Ensink, K., Bégin, M., Normandin, N., 
Godbout, N., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Mentalization and Dissociation in the Context of Trauma: Implications for 
Child Psychopathology’. Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 18(1): 11– 30: ‘The finding that dissociation is central 
in processes associated with externalizing and sexualizing behaviors, partly by itself and partly with RF, nuanced 
our predictions based on the model proposed by Bateman and Fonagy (2008) in which mentalizing is considered 
to be the key mental process that has a social regulation role . . . dissociation was not considered in Bateman and 
Fonagy’s conceptual model’ (p. 24).
 89 However, already in these writings, non- apprehensive conflict was downplayed in favour of an emphasis on 
fear and confusion. See e.g. Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G. S., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘The Capacity 
for Understanding Mental States: The Reflective Self in Parent and Child and its Significance for Security of 
Attachment’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 12(3): 201– 218: ‘A small group of infants show a fourth pattern of re-
sponse: one of confusion and disorganization (D)’ (p. 206).
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‘the most promising area of attachment research is undoubtedly the study of disorganized/ 
disoriented attachment behaviour’.90 However, in the context of this enthusiasm, the term 
‘disorganized attachment’ took on a further life through the 1990s and 2000 in the writings 
of Fonagy and his immediate collaborators. This usage was cut free from the actual observ-
able characteristics of disorganized attachment. The most important factor was that Main, 
Solomon, and colleagues had used the term ‘disorganized’ to refer to their observations, but 
had intended a technical meaning that they did too little to clarify for the reader: observa-
tions of conflict, confusion, and apprehension, from which can be inferred conflict of expect-
ations about the availability of the caregiver as a safe haven. Seeing the confusion their early 
writings have caused for subsequent researchers, Main, Solomon, and colleagues have ac-
cepted a portion of the responsibility for subsequent hazy or spurious uses of the category.91
Fonagy’s group, however, were especially vulnerable to this wider problem. After Howard 
and Miriam Steele left for New York, none of Fonagy’s circle of collaborators were reli-
able coders of disorganized attachment, allowing their theorizing to drift free from the 
operationalization of the construct.92 Use of the concept of disorganized attachment seems 
to have been implicitly shaped by the narrative need for an antagonist within stories about 
the development of mentalizing.93 This was likely unintentional. However, unmoored to the 
construct’s operationalization, the result has been an account of disorganization that slips 
into metaphor, or— since the metaphorical status is not signalled— into ‘pretend mode’ (see 
Chapter 5).
To take one example: in a chapter from 2010, Fonagy, Luyten, Bateman, Gergely, 
Strathearn, Target, and Allison depict disorganized attachment as ‘undirected/ bizarre be-
haviour’ and ‘trying to escape the situation even in the caregiver’s presence.’94 However 
 90 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 244.
 91 Duschinsky, R. and Solomon, J. (2017). ‘Infant Disorganized Attachment: Clarifying Levels of Analysis’. 
Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 22(4): 524– 538; Reijman, S., Foster, S., and Duschinsky, R. (2018). ‘The 
Infant Disorganised Attachment Classification: “Patterning within the Disturbance of Coherence”’. Social Science 
& Medicine, 200: 52– 58. On the ‘concept creep’ of ideas like disorganized attachment that signify psychological 
harm, see also Haslam, N. (2016). ‘Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology’. 
Psychological Inquiry, 27(1): 1– 17.
 92 Target, M., Mayes, L., and Bach, S. (2000). ‘Panel 4: The Pathology of the Self: The Fragmented Self, Disorders 
of the Self, and the Dissolution of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 63– 72. 
Hepworth remarked that ‘it is interesting to note Breuer and Freud’s (1895) comment in Studies on Hysteria: “It is 
easy to fall into a habit of thought which assumes that every substantive has substance behind it. We find as time 
goes on, that we have actually formed an idea which has lost its metaphorical nature, and which we can manipulate 
easily, as though it were real” (pp. 227– 228)’ (p. 63). See also Reijman, S., Foster, S., and Duschinsky, R. (2018). ‘The 
Infant Disorganised Attachment Classification: “Patterning within the Disturbance of Coherence”’. Social Science 
& Medicine, 200: 52– 58.
 93 E.g. Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Target, M. (2002). Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the 
Development of the Self, London: Karnac Books: ‘At the extreme end of the safety- to- fearfulness dimension, there 
can be no strategy because the attachment system is not there to sustain a consistent set of defences. In these cases 
the interpretive mechanism that sustains social relations functions so poorly that the capacity to arrive at repre-
sentations of the motivational or epistemic mind states of the other, independent of those of the self, is profoundly 
compromised. This is attachment disorganisation or, rather, the absence of the mental function that sustains at-
tachment. Thus we conceive of attachment disorganisation as lying at the opposite end of the scale to attachment 
security and as an indicator of the regular failure of the interpersonal interpretive mechanism’ (pp. 135– 136). 
Fonagy has subsequently acknowledged that the 2002 book was ‘patchy’. One of the most powerful contributing 
problems is the multiple and conflicting ways that the different chapters use the concepts of disorganization 
and mentalizing. BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific 
Podcast, 28 January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2.
 94 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Bateman, A. W., Gergely, G., Strathearn, L., Target, M., and Allison, E. (2010). 
‘Attachment and Personality Pathology’, in J. Clarkin, P. Fonagy, and G. Gabbard (eds), Psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders: A Clinical Handbook, Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 
Inc., pp. 37– 88, 40– 41.
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‘undirected/ bizarre behaviour’ is a partial description of one of the seven indices of disor-
ganized attachment (‘undirected/ misdirected behaviour’). Trying to escape the situation 
is actually coded as avoidant attachment (‘5b’ in the avoidance scale protocols: baby ‘tries 
to go past her out the door’), and is not necessarily treated by coders as disorganization.95 
Fonagy and colleagues then say, ‘in these individuals, the attachment system may be quite 
readily triggered, and they may appear to be constantly preoccupied with attachment re-
lationships’.96 This is ambivalent/ resistant, not disorganized attachment. Some infants in 
dyads classified as disorganized show preoccupation with attachment relationships. Others 
combine conflicted, confused, or apprehensive behaviours with avoidance of the caregiver. 
Others combine these behaviours with otherwise secure use of the caregiver as a secure base 
and safe haven.
Over time, Fonagy has come to increasingly acknowledge that the relationship between 
disorganized attachment and mentalizing is weak and probably indirect (see Chapter 7).97 
However, through the 1990s, 2000s, and early 2010s, reference to disorganized attachment 
in causal accounts of disturbed development by Fonagy and colleagues was pervasive,98 
and one of the least meticulous aspects of their developmental model. Rather than the ob-
servable behaviour, or known correlates, the characterization of disorganized attachment 
seemed shaped more by connotations of the word ‘disorganized’ itself, which in ordinary 
language means to be thrown into chaos. This was facilitated, not just in the work of Fonagy 
and colleagues but also in much other speculation about disorganized attachment, by Mary 
Main’s introduction of the term with a technical meaning, but without adequate definition 
or explanation.99 In a chapter from 2007, Fonagy and Higgitt acknowledged this problem, 
observing that ‘disorganised attachment is currently poorly described in the literature,’ 
implying that this has hampered their own use of the concept.100
Examination of appeals to disorganized attachment in their writings reveals that 
Fonagy and colleagues have offered diverse non- overlapping descriptions of the nature of 
 95 Ainsworth, M., Blehar, M., Waters, E., and Wall, S. ([1978] 2015). Patterns of Attachment: A Psychological 
Study of the Strange Situation, Bristol: Psychology Press, p. 347.
 96 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Bateman, A. W., Gergely, G., Strathearn, L., Target, M., and Allison, E. (2010). 
‘Attachment and Personality Pathology’, in J. Clarkin, P. Fonagy, and G. Gabbard (eds), Psychodynamic 
Psychotherapy for Personality Disorders: A Clinical Handbook, Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 
Inc., pp. 37– 88, 40– 41.
 97 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds about: Part 
1. Borderline Personality Disorder as a Limitation of Resilience’. Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion 
Dysregulation, 4: 11: ‘We have previously placed considerable weight on the nature of attachment disorganiza-
tion in our accounts of BPD based on the mentalizing model. We maintain that the role of attachment is highly 
significant in the developmental origins of PD. However, we argue that its role might perhaps be best understood 
as only one (albeit very important) form of content learned from the social environment. This is congruent with 
recent work suggesting that the relationship between infant attachment status and later outcomes is more compli-
cated than that suggested by early attachment studies. Other findings have suggested limited evidence for linking 
childrearing environments to later outcomes.’
 98 Fonagy was also a strong advocate for the category to professional groups, above all clinicians and teachers: 
e.g. speaking to the House of Commons Education Committee (2016) ‘Mental Health and Well- Being of Looked 
After Children’, HC 481’, Wednesday, 13 January. Accessed at: http:// data.parliament.uk/ writtenevidence/ 
committeeevidence.svc/ evidencedocument/ education- committee/ mental- health- and- wellbeing- of- looked- 
after- children/ oral/ 26927.pdf: ‘Here is agreed risk and also an opportunity for teachers to benefit from under-
standing problems that arise in relation to disrupted attachment and the disorganisation of attachment. In the 
NICE [National Institute for Health and Care Excellence] guidance development group that I chaired, one of the 
recommendations that we identified was in relation to training teachers to be more aware of the attachment issues.’
 99 Duschinsky, R. (2015). ‘The Emergence of the Disorganised/ Disoriented (D) Attachment Classification, 
1979– 1982’. History of Psychology, 18(1): 32– 46.
 100 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The Early Social and Emotional Determinants of Inequalities in Health’, 
in G. Baruch, P. Fonagy, and D. Robins (eds), Reaching the Hard to Reach: Evidence- Based Funding Priorities for 
Intervention and Research, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3– 34, p. 13.
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Table 3.1 Descriptions of disorganized attachment in Fonagy and colleagues
Characterization Example
1 A combination of 
avoidant and resistant 
attachment behaviour
Luyten, P., van Houdenhove, B., Lemma, A., Target, M., and Fonagy, 
P. (2012). ‘A Mentalization- Based Approach to the Understanding 
and Treatment of Functional Somatic Disorders’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy, 26(2): 121– 140: ‘When attachment figures have been 
insufficiently available, abusing and/ or nonresponsive, attachment 
deactivating or hyperactivating strategies, or a combination of 
both, as is typically observed in disorganized attachment, become a 
habitual response to stress’ (p. 126).
2 The breakdown of 
combinations of 
avoidant and resistant 
attachment behaviour 
into a diffuse state
Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, 
in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds.), Handbook of Mentalizing in 
Mental Health Practice (pp. 385– 418). Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association: ‘Patients with dysfunctions of the 
attachment system may show a sequence, moving from deactivating 
strategies to hyperactivating strategies if the former fail, or may 
show marked oscillations between the two strategies . . . depressed 
individuals with these features often show many borderline 
features . . . At higher levels of personality functioning, these patients 
may show a pattern of fearful- avoidant attachment, and thus a 
typical approach- avoidance conflict with regard to attachment 
relationships. This conflict is typically expressed either in very brief 
and barren attachment relationships, as in patients with schizoid 
and schizotypal features, or in hypermentalising accounts revealing 
both their desire for and their fear of relationships, as in patients 
with hysterical features. It is our impression that in individuals at 
lower levels of personality functioning, disorganised attachment 
is related to identity diffusion, while individuals at higher levels of 
personality functioning seem to be characterised by marked rigidity. 
Hence, whereas the former group may be particularly responsive 
to mentalisation interventions, the latter may show high levels of 
pseudomentalising, which is not only difficult to distinguish from 
genuine mentalisation, but also perhaps more difficult to treat’ 
(pp. 413– 414).
3 A hyperactivating 
strategy similar to 
anxious attachment, 
though often with 
‘frantic attempts to 
downregulate’
Fonagy, P. (1998). ‘Prevention, the Appropriate Target of Infant 
Psychotherapy’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 19(2): 124– 
150: ‘Anxious attachment or disorganization of attachment develops 
(Erickson, Sroufe, and Egeland, 1985; Greenberg et al., 1993) to the 
mother as part of a strategy to avoid being blocked from access to her’ 
(p. 135).
Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based 
Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd 
edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Disorganised— 
Incoherent: hyperresponsive, but often frantic attempts to 
downregulate’ (p. 123).
4 The absence of 
coherent affect 
regulation
Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2000). ‘Early Influences on Development 
and Social Inequalities: An Attachment Theory Perspective’, in A. R. 
Tarlov and R. F. S. Peter (eds), The Society and Population Health 
Reader. Vol. II: A State and Community Perspective (pp. 104– 130), 
New York: New Press: ‘Disorganised or unresolved patterns are held 
to be indicative of an absence of coherent affect- regulation strategies’ 
(p. 109).
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disorganized attachment (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Each of these five descriptions is an ex-
trapolation from some among the behaviours used to code disorganized attachment. The 
most common description of disorganized attachment as a whole, especially in writings 
with Luyten, is of a combination of avoidant and resistant attachment.101 In fact, only a 
small fraction of child– caregiver dyads who receive a disorganized attachment classifica-
tion show both avoidance and resistance.102 Another common description is of disorganized 
 101 This claim seems to be based on a conflation of disorganized attachment as an assessment for the Strange 
Situation with the co- occurrence of anxiety and avoidance in self- report measures of attachment. In the early 
1990s, Shaver and colleagues claimed that the co- occurrence of attachment anxiety and avoidance is analogous to 
Main and Solomon’s disorganized attachment classification. This was based on a proposal by Bartholomew, who 
called this co- occurrence ‘fearful attachment’. However, examination of Barthlomew’s 1989 unpublished doctoral 
thesis indicates an important qualification: Bartholomew regarded fearful attachment not as a general analogue 
for the disorganized attachment classification, but as an analogue for approach– avoidance conflict specifically. 
Jacobvitz and colleagues criticized the assumption by Shaver and others that disorganized attachment is the same 
as co- occurrence of attachment anxiety and avoidance. Brennan, K. A., Shaver, P. R., and Tobey, A. E. (1991). 
‘Attachment Styles, Gender, and Parental Problem Drinking’. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 8: 451– 
466; Bartholomew, K. (1989). Attachment Styles in Young Adults: Implications for Self- Concept and Interpersonal 
Functioning, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University; Jacobvitz, D., Curran, M., and Moller, N. 
(2002). ‘Measurement of Adult Attachment: The Place of Self- Report and Interview Methodologies’. Attachment 
& Human Development, 4(2): 207– 215, p. 209. There is also no prospective or concurrent association between 
measures of disorganized attachment and co- occurrence of anxiety and avoidance in self- report measures of at-
tachment. Roisman, G. I., Holland, A., Fortuna, K., Fraley, R. C., Clausell, E., and Clarke, A. (2007). ‘The Adult 
Attachment Interview and Self- Reports of Attachment Style: An Empirical Rapprochement’. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 92(4): 678– 697; Fraley, R. C., Roisman, G. I., Booth- LaForce, C., Owen, M. T., and Holland, 
A. S. (2013). ‘Interpersonal and Genetic Origins of Adult Attachment Styles: A Longitudinal Study from Infancy to 
Early Adulthood’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(5): 817– 838, web- based supplement C.
 102 Some infants show co- occurrence of avoidance and resistant attachment, and on this basis receive a disorgan-
ized classification. But this is hardly the predominant phenotype. A rare form of behaviour under Index I of the Main 
and Solomon coding protocols is hyperarousal followed by relatively abrupt downregulation. However, this is by no 
means a behaviour representative of the category as a whole. Most child– caregiver dyads who receive a disorganized 
classification do so on the basis of other forms of behaviour in the Main and Solomon indices, such as other kinds of 
approach/ avoidance conflict, stereotypies or confusion, or apprehension without any apparent conflict. The predomin-
ance of different forms is anticipated to depend somewhat on the kinds of adversities faced by the sample. Solomon, J., 
Duschinsky, R., Bakkum, L., and Schuengel, C. (2017). ‘Toward an Architecture of Attachment Disorganization: John 
Bowlby’s Published and Unpublished Reflections’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 22(4): 539– 560.
Characterization Example
5 The absence of 
any strategy to 
interpersonal 
relationships– for 
instance, the absence 
of help- seeking in the 
context of need
Stein, H., Koontz, A. D., Fonagy, P., Allen, J. G., Fultz, J., Brethour, 
J. R., . . . and Evans, R. B. (2002). ‘Adult attachment: What are the 
underlying dimensions?’. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research 
and Practice, 75(1): 77– 91: ‘With more insecurity comes an increased 
need for a strategy to manage attachment relationships. At the extreme 
insecure end of the dimension, adaptive strategies again diminish, from 
dismissing or preoccupied strategies to no coherent strategy. Thus, there 
are probably three important positions, conflated until now: low insecurity 
with no need for special strategy; moderate to high insecurity with specific 
strategies for sustaining relationships; and extreme insecurity with a 
disorganized attachment system that precludes strategy’ (p. 88).
Bevington, D., Fuggle, P., and Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Applying Attachment 
Theory to Effective Practice with Hard- To- Reach Youth: The AMBIT 
Approach’, Attachment & Human Development, 17(2): 157– 174: ‘The 
core assumption of AMBIT is that those considered “hard to reach” are 
hard to reach for reasons: their avoidance of help is frequently active 
and intentional, rooted as it may be in profound disorganizations 
within their attachment systems’ (p. 160).
Table 3.1 Continued
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attachment as the absence of any logic to interpersonal interactions in the context of emo-
tional dysregulation. Again, there are some infants in the disorganized category who show 
pervasive disturbances of affective control. However, these are a vast minority.103 Children 
classified as disorganized under the Main and Solomon protocols do not show a coherent 
avoidant or resistant strategy; but this does not mean that their behaviour lacks strategy or 
Table 3.2 Descriptions of the proximal mechanism of disorganized attachment in Fonagy and 
colleagues
Characterization Example
1 Principally driven   
by the child’s 
constitutional 
characteristics
Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., and Luyten, P. (2012). ‘Introduction 
and Overview’, in Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health 
Practice (pp. 3– 42). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing: ‘Abnormal hippocampal and hyperactive amygdala 
functioning in children who are at risk for later developing BPD 
may cause highly anxious and emotionally labile infant behaviour 
and thus an infant who is not able to benefit from the regulating 
qualities of the attachment relationship. This constellation might 
well create disorganised attachment relationships, principally 
driven by the child’s constitutional characteristics’ (p. 8).
2 Dissociation Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘The Transgenerational Transmission of 
Holocaust Trauma’, Attachment & Human Development, 1(1): 92– 
114: ‘The behaviour of the infant in this situation gives clear 
indication of multiple, incoherently integrated structures, highly 
reminiscent of dissociative adult patients’ (p. 97).
3 Fear of the caregiver Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Violence in our Schools: What can 
A Psychoanalytically Informed Approach Contribute?’ Journal 
of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 5(2): 223– 238: ‘Neither 
disorganization of the attachment system nor violence are static. The 
attachment system becomes disorganized in the face of external and 
internal demands to deal with safety issues. It is the persistence of 
fear alongside the activation of the attachment system that accounts 
for the picture of disorganization. This means that assessment must 
always be focused on the interplay of the situation and the person. 
It is neither the situation nor the person that represents the risk, but 
rather the interaction of the two’(p. 227).
4 Disruption of the ‘self ’ Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Target, M. (2002). Affect 
Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self. 
London: Karnac Books: ‘The disorganisation of self disorganises 
attachment relationships by creating a constant need for this 
projective identification’ (p. 12).
5 A preoccupation 
with ensuring perfect 
contingency from 
caregivers
Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Target, M. (2002). Affect 
Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self. 
London: Karnac Books: ‘An early association between disorganised 
infant attachment and an abnormal preference for perfect 
contingencies’ (p. 250).
 103 Lyons- Ruth and colleagues have criticized the characterization of disorganized attachment as the absence of 
any strategy to interpersonal relationships, observing that a majority of infants who receive the classification none-
theless show proximity- seeking and contact maintenance with their caregiver when distressed, in the manner of 
the secure category. Lyons- Ruth, K., Bureau, J. F., Easterbrooks, M. A., Obsuth, I., Hennighausen, K., and Vulliez- 
Coady, L. (2013). ‘Parsing the Construct of Maternal Insensitivity: Distinct Longitudinal Pathways Associated 
with Early Maternal Withdrawal’. Attachment & Human Development, 15(5– 6): 562– 582.
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any form of regulation.104 Part of the problem is that it is not entirely clear what is meant by 
‘absence of coherent affect regulation’ or ‘absence of any strategy’. But, in general terms, they 
are at best very partial characterizations of disorganized attachment, and rather misleading. 
It would appear that Fonagy and colleagues are not primarily talking about the same thing 
that developmental attachment researchers have operationalized under the rubric of ‘dis-
organized attachment’. This is not to minimize the importance of the process they are dis-
cussing. However, it remains insufficiently clear what this process is, and use of the term 
‘disorganized attachment’ is misleading.
As well as offering descriptions of disorganized attachment at a behavioural level, Fonagy and 
colleagues variously offer five different characterizations of the proximal mechanism of disor-
ganized attachment: constitutional factors; dissociation; fear of the caregiver; disruption of the 
‘self ’; and a preoccupation with perfect contingencies in attachment relationships. It is absolutely 
possible that the forms of behaviour observed by Main and Solomon in the Strange Situation are 
prompted by these diverse mechanisms. It may be that all these pathways lead to a single phe-
nomenon of ‘disorganized attachment’; or they may be different pathways to different forms of 
confusion, conflict, or apprehension in attachment relationships. The greater problems, however, 
are that Fonagy and colleagues do not reconcile these different accounts theoretically, and some 
are lacking much in the way of evidence.105 For instance, in 2002, Fonagy and colleagues write 
that ‘The disorganization of self disorganizes attachment relationships’; in 2004, they write ‘dis-
organized attachment is rooted in a disorganized self ’.106 Of course, it is quite possible for there 
to be a bidirectional relationship. However, the two claims are not reconciled. A hazy notion of 
disorganized attachment, combined with a hazy concept of ‘self ’ (see Chapter 6), appears to have 
hindered the precision of causal claims, and the coherence of the theory built from them. In their 
writings, Fonagy and colleagues also offer various characterizations of what disorganized attach-
ment entails at a cognitive level. These include the ‘absence of stable representation of interactions 
and therefore predictability’, internalization of ‘confusing and hostile parenting’,107 and failure to 
develop emotional awareness.108 Again, however, these accounts are not reconciled.
 104 For instance, a toddler who is solicitous and caring towards their parent when distressed is not showing an 
avoidant or resistant strategy, and would likely be placed in the disorganized classification, despite the fact that 
their behaviour is strategic and their affects may be coherent in their expression (Chapter 7). Mary Main and Erik 
Hesse, personal communication, August 2019: ‘Development allows humans to override a behavioural system in 
other ways than the two conditional strategies, producing a wider variety of potential strategies than those avail-
able to infants. These might well not be conditional strategies in the technical sense of being a behavioural reper-
toire made available by human evolutionary history for solving problems of survival and reproduction. They could 
be described as “strategic” in the non- technical sense— but it depends on how the word is being used.’
 105 For instance: the claim that all disorganized attachment represents a preoccupation with perfect contingen-
cies in attachment relationships, emphasized especially by Fonagy and colleagues in the early 2000s, seems to have 
been downplayed over the past decade. One reason is that the evidence base for the claim has not expanded beyond 
Gergely’s original studies. The primary subsequent source of supportive evidence comes from the observation 
of poor caregiver– infant contingency among infants who would later receive a disorganized classification in the 
Strange Situation by Beebe, B., Jaffe, J., Markese, S., Buck, K., Chen, H., Cohen, P., . . . and Feldstein, S. (2010). ‘The 
Origins of 12- Month Attachment: A Microanalysis of 4- Month Mother– Infant Interaction’. Attachment & Human 
Development, 12(1– 2): 3– 141. However, there would be a variety of other ways of interpreting this finding, besides 
the idea that all disorganization reflects preoccupation with perfect contingencies. See e.g. Bernier, A. and Meins, 
E. (2008). ‘A Threshold Approach to Understanding the Origins of Attachment Disorganization’. Developmental 
Psychology, 44(4): 969– 982; van IJzendoorn, M. H. and Bakermans- Kranenburg, M. J. (2019). ‘Bridges across the 
Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment Gap’. Current Opinion in Psychology, 25: 31– 36.
 106 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorders: Mentalization 
Based Treatment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 90.
 107 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Points of Contact and Divergence between Psychoanalytic and Attachment Theories: Is 
Psychoanalytic Theory Truly Different?’ Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19(4): 448– 480, p. 467.
 108 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach to Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576: ‘Disorganised infants, even if interpersonally perceptive, fail to integrate this 
emotional awareness with their self- organisation’ (p. 565).
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Furthermore, this picture seems to have been based in part on the connotations of the 
word ‘disorganized’. The primary trainers in coding disorganized attachment, Alan Sroufe 
and Elizabeth Carlson, have criticized the depiction of disorganized attachment as lack of 
predictability, which they regard as an erroneous extrapolation from the fact that some, not 
all, children in this category show confused behaviours.109,110 The idea that disorganized at-
tachment entails confusion of representations about attachment figures may also have partly 
have stemmed from Main’s original Berkeley study, where some children showing disor-
ganized attachment in infancy showed themes of conflict, confusion, and/ or fear in story- 
stem narratives about attachment relationships at age 6.111 However, this is not necessarily 
the same as the absence of stable representations about interactions. Nor does it imply that 
the children lack predictability in their behaviour. In fact, in their classic study, Main and 
Cassidy found that infants from dyads classified as disorganized showed highly concerted, 
goal- directed behaviour on reunion at age 6 with their caregivers, either controlling and so-
licitous or controlling and punitive.112
As we will see in the subsequent chapters, many of the themes gestured to by disorganized 
attachment— fear, constitutional factors, dissociation, disruption of the ‘self ’— have played a 
significant role in the developing conceptual system of Fonagy and colleagues. Yet, recogni-
tion of the distinct role of these factors has been hindered by the absorptive construct of dis-
organized attachment. The concept of disorganized attachment, as a container, has tended 
to devour the elements that it ostensibly contains. This problem has been supported by the 
lack of clarity in attachment research in general, and in the work of Fonagy and colleagues 
in particular, regarding what exactly constitutes an attachment relationship as opposed to 
other kinds of relationship. As articulation of role of fear, constitutional factors, dissoci-
ation, disruptions to the ‘self ’, and other more specific factors has improved in the work of 
Fonagy and colleagues over the decades, appeal to disorganized attachment by Fonagy and 
colleagues has been dropping away in recent years. These conceptual improvements stem 
especially from self- criticism and important theoretical innovations in the 2000s, prompting 
revisions in the model used by Fonagy and colleagues in conceptualizing the development of 
mentalizing and non- mentalizing. These revisions will the focus of the next chapter.
 109 Padrón, E., Carlson, E., and Sroufe, A. (2014). ‘Frightened Versus Not Frightened Disorganized Infant 
Attachment: Newborn Characteristics and Maternal Caregiving’. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 
84(2): 201– 208.
 110 See also Duschinsky, R. (2018). ‘Disorganization, fear and attachment: Working towards clarification’. Infant 
Mental Health Journal, 39(1): 17– 29.
 111 Kaplan, N. (1987). Individual Differences in 6- Years Olds’ Thoughts about Separation: Predicted from 
Attachment to Mother at Age 1. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Berkeley, CA: Department of Psychology, 
University of California.
 112 Main, M. and Cassidy, J. (1988). ‘Categories of Response to Reunion with the Parent at Age 6’. Developmental 
Psychology, 24(3): 415– 426. It should also be noted that subsequent findings since Main have found much less 
stability than the original study between disorganized attachment in the Strange Situation and later representa-
tional measures (r =. 26). Pinquart, M., Feußner, C., and Ahnert, L. (2013). ‘Meta- Analytic Evidence for Stability 
in Attachments from Infancy to Early Adulthood’. Attachment & Human Development, 15(2): 189– 218. An im-
portant reason for this difference was that Main and colleagues developed their story- stem coding system quasi- 
inductively on the sample, and then examined its retrodiction of the Strange Situation. Associations between the 
Strange Situation and the story- stem narratives at age 6 was therefore not an independent finding but a methodo-
logical principle for the elaboration of the 6- year coding system. It should not be assumed that disorganized attach-




By the end of the 1990s, Fonagy and colleagues had worked for 10 years in developing the 
concept of mentalization, alongside a developmental model of its emergence from early 
child– caregiver relationships. They had highlighted the importance of mentalization for 
psychotherapy, and especially for work with patients with borderline personality disorder 
(BPD). Furthermore, the reflective functioning scale for the Adult Attachment Interview 
had been validated as a measure of mentalization in the context of attachment relationships 
and demonstrated impressive prediction to infant– caregiver relationships as assessed in the 
Strange Situation procedure. Yet, over the 2000s, Fonagy and colleagues became more and 
more dissatisfied with their initial model, identifying that the concept of ‘mentalization’ 
was too absorptive and that they had placed too much weight on early childhood experi-
ences and the role of disorganized attachment. Attempts to correct these problems led to 
a revised and more mature account of forms of mentalizing.1 In this chapter, we will trace 
these developments of the 2000s, paying particular attention to Fonagy and Luyten’s 2009 
account of four dimensions of mentalizing. The chapter will close by attempting to discern 
the underpinning logic of the concept of mentalization across its diverse uses and defin-
itions. Synthesising the various uses of the term, mentalization will be ultimately defined as 
a capacity to:
 1. conceive of
 2. and make available for reconsideration
 3. the thoughts
 4. and feelings
 5. implicated in motivations and intentions
 6. in order to account for and explain
 7. the observable social behaviour
 8. and present and past perceptual experience
 9. of oneself
 10. and others.
Self- criticism
As we saw in the previous chapter, in the 1990s, Fonagy and colleagues had tended to write 
about reflective functioning and mentalization as if they were relatively basic and discrete. 
 1 The characterization of the 2009 paper as the commencement of a ‘mature model of mentalizing’ is supported 
by Fonagy’s description of the work in the UCL REF 2014 impact case study as the place where ‘the model is fully 
developed’: University College London (2014). REF 2014: Psychology, Psychiatry and Neuroscience impact case 
study. Accessed at: https:// results.ref.ac.uk/ (S(jj2mvvb3fbee3zpqb1artx2d))/ DownloadFile/ ImpactCaseStudy/ 
pdf?caseStudyId=44202.
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However, in the late 1990s and especially from the early 2000s, the terms ‘reflective func-
tioning’ and ‘mentalizing’ were increasingly recognized as descriptive accounts of composite 
psychological processes. Particular attention was given to effortful attentional control and 
affect regulation as developmental requisites2 and component elements of mentalization, as 
well as— additionally— effects of mentalization. For instance, attentional control would help 
an individual retain access to inferential information about the other’s mind even in the con-
text of distractions or stress. In turn, awareness of the other’s mind could help inform atten-
tional processes, helping to organize and scaffold them.3
Fonagy characterized attentional control, affect regulation, and mentalizing as 
interacting elements of a meta- process he termed the ‘interpersonal interpretive func-
tion’.4 This was the beginning of the network approach to mental health that would be de-
veloped in the work of Fonagy and colleagues in later years (see Chapter 7). In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, however, Fonagy and colleagues initially adopted a more linear 
model, grounded in attachment theory. They proposed the importance of attachment pat-
terns for attentional control and affect regulation, which in turn serve as the scaffolding for 
mentalization in general.5
Despite this importance given to attachment, a transition in Fonagy and colleagues’ per-
spective was growing acknowledgement that adverse early caregiving experiences was not 
the only factor in play. Already in 1997, Fonagy and Target acknowledged that ‘the child’s 
biological vulnerabilities such as hyperactivity, attention problems, low impulse control, 
are all likely to obstruct the opportunity the child has for evolving a mentalized reflective 
model’.6 One early project addressing potential biological vulnerabilities was Pasco Fearon’s 
1998 doctoral study under Fonagy’s supervision. Sixty- two same- sex twins were seen in the 
Strange Situation procedure with a primary caregiver. Fearon found that there was no more 
concordance in the twins’ patterns of attachment to a primary caregiver than would be ex-
pected by chance.7 These findings were then replicated in collaboration with van IJzendoorn 
 2 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘Early Intervention and the Development of Self- Regulation’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 22(3): 307– 335: ‘There is good reason to believe that the capacity for effortful attentional control may be 
necessary for the development of the mentalizing function. First, there is a chronological overlap between these 
developments and they share a common developmental timetable. Second, brain imaging studies suggest that the 
structures for mentalizing and those for effortful control are at least close if not overlapping in location. Third, 
individuals with Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits (e.g. individuals with autism) also have difficulty with executive 
function tasks that require inhibitory control. Finally, success at the mentalizing tasks requires a certain capacity 
for attentional control’ (p. 322).
 3 See also Jones, B. and Allison, E. (2010). ‘An Integrated Theory for Attention- Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
[ADHD]’. Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 24(3): 279– 295.
 4 Fonagy, P. (2002). ‘The Internal Working Model or the Interpersonal Interpretive Function’. Journal of Infant, 
Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 2(4): 27– 38.
 5 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach To Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576: ‘An enfeebled attentional control system is a likely consequence of attachment 
disorganisation, perhaps linked with enfeebled affect representation, and serves to undermine the development 
of mentalisation as well as its appropriate functioning in later development. The prepotent response is to attri-
bute one’s own mental state to the other. Attentional control is essential if the child is to arrive at a differentiation 
of their own and others’ thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires. The disruption of attentional control is likely to 
account for many instances where we encounter temporary and selective disruptions of mentalising’ (p. 556). See 
also Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘Early Intervention and the Development of Self- Regulation’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 22(3): 307– 335: ‘All the key mechanisms underpinning the enduring effects of early relationship experi-
ences interface with individuals’ capacity to control (a) their reaction to stress, (b) their capacity to maintain fo-
cused attention, and (c) their capacity to interpret mental states in themselves and others’ (p. 307).
 6 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1997). ‘Attachment and Reflective Function: Their Role in Self- Organization’. 
Development and Psychopathology, 9(4): 679– 700, p. 696.
 7 Fearon, P. (1998). Determinants of Mother- Infant Attachment Classification In Twins. Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, London: University College London.
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and colleagues at Leiden.8 However, a later study by Fearon with 551 twin pairs, and using an 
adaptation of the Adult Attachment Interview for adolescents, found very substantial associ-
ations between monozygotic twins’ scores for coherence and their overall security of attach-
ment (r = .42), but substantially lower associations for dizygotic twins (r = .20).9 Fearon and 
colleagues concluded that genetic factors may have little influence on infant attachment, but 
that genetic expression may have greater influence by adolescence.
Fonagy and colleagues were also interested in the potential for heritable contributions 
to other aspects of psychological functioning relevant to mentalization, such as predis-
position to mental illness. For instance, a study by Belsky, Caspi, and colleagues, in which 
Fonagy was involved, found that 47% of early adolescents showed clinical levels of BPD 
symptomatology if they had experienced maltreatment and also had a parent with mental 
health problem, whereas only around 7% of adolescents showed these symptoms when 
one or the other factor was present. Although, naturally, parental mental illness could also 
contribute to child caregiving and the general atmosphere of the home, the researchers 
interpreted these findings as indicating the potentiating role of genetic vulnerability when 
combined with maltreatment.10 Whereas Fonagy had earlier emphasized a solely envir-
onmental pathway to BPD, the collaboration with Belsky and Caspi indicated concern 
with the potential for genetic susceptibilities that could interact with environmental risk 
factors.
As well as growing interest in genetic factors, the 2000s also saw a strengthening em-
phasis in the writings of Fonagy and colleagues on the diversity of social experiences that 
could influence mentalizing capacities. Fonagy and Target described the importance of non- 
parental influence and care— for instance, the role of grandparents, older siblings, teachers, 
and friends: ‘Children can perceive and conceive of their mental states to the extent that the 
behaviour of those around them has implied that they have them. This can happen through 
an almost unlimited set of methods.’11 One important study in support of this position from 
the early 2000s was the trial of a school- based intervention, which will be discussed fur-
ther in Chapter 9.12 The weight given to additional discrete figures beyond the primary care-
giver was in line with developments in attachment theory.13 Nonetheless, this innovation put 
additional pressure on the integrity of the conceptualization of reflective functioning and 
mentalizing as unitary processes.
 8 Bokhorst, C. L., Bakermans‐Kranenburg, M. J., Pasco Fearon, R. M., van IJzendoorn, M. H., Fonagy, P., 
and Schuengel, C. (2003). ‘The Importance of Shared Environment in Mother– Infant Attachment Security: A 
Behavioral Genetic Study’. Child Development, 74(6): 1769– 1782.
 9 Fearon, P., Shmueli‐Goetz, Y., Viding, E., Fonagy, P., and Plomin, R. (2014). ‘Genetic and Environmental 
Influences on Adolescent Attachment’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 55(9): 1033– 1041.
 10 Belsky, D. W., Caspi, A., Arseneault, L., Bleidorn, W., Fonagy, P., Goodman, M., . . . and Moffitt, T. E. (2012). 
‘Etiological Features of Borderline Personality Related Characteristics in a Birth Cohort of 12- Year- Old Children’. 
Development and Psychopathology, 24(1): 251– 265: ‘This analysis presents the number of extreme borderline 
group and comparison children in four groups of children defined by family history (positive/ negative) and phys-
ical maltreatment (positive/ negative). Children with both risk factors were 13.41 (95% CI = 8.61, 22.04) times 
more likely to be in the extreme borderline group than were children with neither risk factor. In contrast, children 
with only positive family history were only 2.53 (95% CI = 1.64, 3.92) times more likely, and children with only 
maltreatment were only 2.15 (95% CI = 0.69, 6.71) times more likely to be in the extreme borderline group relative 
to children with neither risk factor’ (pp. 258– 259).
 11 Fonagy, P., and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach to Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576, p. 562.
 12 Twemlow, S. W., Fonagy, P., and Sacco, F. C. (2005). ‘A Developmental Approach to Mentalizing 
Communities: II. The Peaceful Schools Experiment’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 69(4): 282– 304.
 13 van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2005). ‘Attachment in Social Networks: Toward an Evolutionary Social Network 
Model’. Human Development, 48(1– 2): 85– 88.
80 Mentalization in transition
In their 2003 book, Psychoanalytic Theories, Fonagy and Target reviewed each psychoana-
lytic model, and appraised its strengths and weaknesses. Admirably, their own work was not 
spared such appraisal. One major criticism they levelled at themselves was that ‘some people 
seem to be able to mentalise well but show poor functioning’. That is to say, some people’s 
difficulties in mentalizing primarily occur in relation to attachment relationships and 
not in relation to other relationships. Ultimately, they acknowledged, it was not clear that 
mentalization and reflective function should be regarded as ‘a single mechanism’.14 Similarly, 
an individual may be good at identifying mental states, such as the difference between sad-
ness and tiredness, but not thinking about or contextualizing these states— or vice versa. 
The individual may be good at thinking about others, but not themselves— or vice versa. 
An individual may be good at sustaining mentalization but find it difficult to regain when 
lost— or vice versa. These are all highly clinically relevant distinctions. Over the 2000s, there 
was growing awareness among Fonagy and colleagues that a whole menagerie of various 
clinically- relevant differences could be observed within, and to an extent hidden by, the con-
cept of mentalization if one opened up the roof and looked inside.
Impetus to address these problems came with public criticisms by Choi- Kain and 
Gunderson in their 2008 review of mentalization as a concept and psychological construct. 
Choi- Kain and Gunderson expressed concern that Fonagy and colleagues too often had 
veered towards treating mentalization as a single thing, which they felt was encapsulated in 
the way that reflective function had been operationalized:
There are limitations in interpreting the meaning of a given reflective functioning score. 
The capacity that is assessed by the Reflective Functioning Scale is multidimensional, with 
factors such as plausibility, consistency, complexity, and originality. However, the grading 
is done using a unidimensional score that cannot be submitted to factor analysis. In two 
different transcripts coded for reflective functioning with a score of 3, one transcript may 
reflect a consistently superficial, clichéd, and general understanding of mental states, while 
the other transcript reflects a highly variable capacity to understand mental states with 
some moments of antireflectiveness and other moments of marked reflectiveness.15
This concern was fully accepted by Target, Fonagy, and Luyten in papers over the subse-
quent months.16 They proposed that mentalization represented a hierarchically organized 
set of capacities. This meant that different components tended to occur together, giving 
 14 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 281. A finding that may have influenced this conclusion was that avoidant/ 
dismissing adolescents were found to be ‘capable of mentalising in a nonpersonal context, such as the stories used 
to elicit mentalising, but show more difficulty in generating an organised, elaborated and coherent response to 
personal questions concerning attachment figures.’ Humfress, H., O’Connor, T. G., Slaughter, J., Target, M., and 
Fonagy, P. (2002). ‘General and Relationship- Specific Models of Social Cognition: Explaining the Overlap and 
Discrepancies’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43(7): 873– 883, p. 880.
 15 Choi- Kain, L. W., and Gunderson, J. G. (2008). ‘Mentalization: Ontogeny, Assessment, and Application in the 
Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 165(9): 1127– 1135, p. 1133.
 16 Target, M. (2008). ‘Commentary’, in F. N. Busch (ed.), Mentalization: Theoretical Considerations, Research 
Findings, and Clinical Implications (Psychoanalytic Inquiry Book Series: Volume 29), New York: Analytic Press, 
pp. 261– 279: ‘Mentalisation is not a unitary capacity that a person either does or does not have. It is really a hier-
archy of capacities’ (p. 270); Fonagy, P. and Luyten, P. (2009). ‘A Developmental, Mentalization- Based Approach 
to the Understanding and Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. Development and Psychopathology, 
21(4): 1355– 1381: ‘Research with this scale makes the further assumption that mentalization elicited in relation to 
past relationships will be related to current and even future relationships (Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Higgitt, 
1991). However, research has called into question the assumption that working models are traitlike. The substan-
tial within- person variation in internal working models of others (e.g., father vs. mother) (e.g., Fraley, 2007; Pierce 
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the aggregate impression of mentalization and reflective function as unitary properties of 
a person. This aggregation, as it appeared in the context of the Adult Attachment Interview, 
was what was measured by the reflective functioning scale. But, in fact, substantial differ-
ences would be anticipated in the challenges individuals face in mentalizing, depending on 
their history and the characteristics of the present situation.
Fonagy, Gergely, and Target acknowledged that mentalization requires ‘a complex set 
of cognitive capacities’. These include the abilities: ‘1) to represent causal mental states of 
others with counterfactual contents (false beliefs), 2) to represent causal mental states of 
others with fictional contents (pretence, imagination, fantasy), 3) to simultaneously repre-
sent and differentiate between the mental models of the self and of the other about reality, 
4) to infer and attribute the mental states of others from visible behavioural cues, and 5) to 
detect our own perceptible (behavioural, physiological, emotional, arousal, etc.) cues in 
order to infer, interpret, and attribute mental states to our self.’17 It by no means could be 
assumed that these cognitive capacities would have the same developmental trajectory, 
neurological supports, or social scaffolding for their elaboration. The conditions that would 
help one capacity flourish might even at times inhibit one or all of the other four. The dis-
tinctions between the five cognitive sub- capacities of mentalization suggest important 
individual differences in the capacity to mentalize the self compared with the capacity to 
mentalize others, and to distinguish these. However, they also imply that individuals may 
differ in the cognitive supports that permit the imaginative capacity to envision and repre-
sent counterfactual mental states, and the ability to detect observable cues for inferring and 
interpreting mental states.
A second major self- criticism raised by Fonagy and Target in Psychoanalytic Theories was 
the concern that, as a consequence of its origins in psychoanalysis, there ‘is over- emphasis 
on the earliest years as formative’ in their work to date.18 At this point, in 2003, Fonagy and 
colleagues still generally claimed that disorganized attachment, conceptualized as a kind of 
relational trauma, specifically would form the most important pathway to difficulties with 
mentalizing. When this trauma was severe and/ or remained unresolved, the result could be 
anticipated to be BPD.19 However, this account did not sit well with the growing recogni-
tion of the variety of factors that could influence attentional control, affect regulation, and 
mentalization in general. In the mid- 2000s, Fonagy and colleagues— Bateman especially— 
were struck by growing evidence from longitudinal research suggesting that the majority of 
patients with BPD do not have a history of sexual or physical abuse, though these experiences 
are certainly more common in this population.20 Childhood and adolescence were clearly 
& Lydon, 2001) supports a view of internal working models as hierarchically organized networks’ (p. 1374). For 
a recent re- affirmation that the mentalisation construct remains obscure, see Sharp, C., Shohet, C., Givon, D., 
Penner, F., Marais, L., and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Learning to Mentalize: A Mediational Approach for Caregivers and 
Therapists’. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 27(3): e12334.
 17 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., and Target, M. (2007). ‘The Parent– Infant Dyad and the Construction of the Subjective 
Self ’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3– 4): 288– 328, p. 290.
 18 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 282. The self- criticism was reiterated in Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The 
mentalization- focused approach to self pathology’. Journal of Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576: ‘we have placed 
too much emphasis on parents (particularly mothers)’ (p. 562).
 19 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459.
 20 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorders: Mentalization Based 
Treatment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27– 37.
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important periods for the development of mental health symptoms.21 However, the exact 
developmental processes in question required further examination. Whereas Fonagy and 
colleagues had previously emphasized the integral role of attachment in the development 
of BPD, this claim was increasingly tempered. A prominent criticism of the emphasis on at-
tachment was offered by Gergely at a conference in 2005. Gergely argued that mentalization 
capabilities develop alongside, not out of, qualitative differences in attachment.22 He also 
proposed a developmental role for epistemic trust (see Chapter 7).
Four poles of mentalizing
Responding to problems with the construct of ‘mentalization’ and the question of devel-
opmental trajectory, Fonagy worked with Patrick Luyten in the late 2000s to address these 
concerns. Drawing on a review by Lieberman of the neuroscientific basis of forms of social 
cognition, in a paper published in 2009, Fonagy and Luyten described four ‘polarities’ of 
mentalization: internal and external; affective and cognitive; self and other; implicit and ex-
plicit.23 They proposed these polarities as the most significant areas of potential individual 
differences in mentalizing. Following Lieberman, they also speculated that they would be 
subserved by different neurological structures. Since they were introduced, the four polar-
ities have been absolutely central to guidance on matters of clinical technique offered by 
Fonagy and colleagues over the subsequent 10 years. They have regarded it as extremely 
helpful for clinicians to consider whether patients can engage flexibly in different forms of 
processing: internal and external; affective and cognitive; self and other; implicit and explicit. 
When a patient seems to be stuck on one ‘side’ of the polarity, Fonagy and colleagues have ad-
vised that clinicians should consider attempting a ‘contrary move’ to support mentalization 
on the other ‘side’.24 This has been generally well received, and regarded as a helpfully specific 
and coherent piece of guidance. Yet, as well as pragmatic guidance for clinical technique, the 
four polarities were also presented as an account of the fundamental aspects of mentalization 
as a construct, and have subsequently been discussed in these terms.
A first distinction drawn by Fonagy and Luyten was between attention to the internal 
thoughts and feelings of a person, and attention to their behaviour. This distinction appeared 
to be an attempt to respond to their clinical impression that many patients with BPD can be 
vigilant and effective in observing external behavioural cues and have specific capabilities 
to notice the emotional states of others. Experimental researchers had also begun to docu-
ment that patients with BPD do no worse, and sometimes actually better, than controls in 
facial emotion recognition and in theory of mind tasks.25 However, the distinction between 
 21 Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., and Walters, E. E. (2005). ‘Lifetime 
Prevalence and Age- Of- Onset Distributions of DSM- IV disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication’. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(6): 593– 602.
 22 The conference paper was later published as Gergely, G. and Unoka, Z. (2008), ‘Attachment, Affect- Regulation 
and Mentalization: The Developmental Origins of the Representational Affective Self ’, in C. Sharp, P. Fonagy, 
and I. Goodyer (eds), Social Cognition and Developmental Psychopathology Social Cognition and Developmental 
Psychopathology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 303– 340.
 23 Fonagy, P. and Luyten, P. (2009). ‘A Developmental, Mentalization- Based Approach to the Understanding 
and Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. Development and Psychopathology, 21(4): 1355– 1381. See 
also Lieberman, M. D. (2007). ‘Social Cognitive Neuroscience: A Review of Core Processes’. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 58: 259– 289.
 24 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 197.
 25 Domes, G., Czieschnek, D., Weidler, F., Berger, C., Fast, K., and Herpertz, S. C. (2008). ‘Recognition of Facial 
Affect in Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of Personality Disorders, 22: 135– 147; Arntz, A., Bernstein, D., 
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external and internal mentalization was quite a confused one. Previously, attention directed 
towards external behavioural cues rather than their internal mental states was not considered 
part of mentalizing: in fact, it had been considered specifically as a form of non- mentalizing 
(see Chapter 5). In Fonagy and Luyten’s proposal, this non- mentalizing was termed ‘external 
mentalizing’. It was contrasted with the identification and interpretation of mental states, 
which was now officially termed ‘internal mentalizing’, but generally just ‘mentalizing’. There 
was evident room for muddle here, with ‘mentalizing’ being used to mean non- mentalizing.
Part of the problem was the expansive semantic domain covered by the term 
‘mentalization’. Where mentalising meant the capacity to notice and respond to mental states 
in others, then vigilance in observing external behavioural cues could be an asset. However, 
where mentalisation was taken to mean the more general capacity to describe and interpret 
thoughts, feelings and intentions in oneself and others, then a focus on external behaviour at 
the expense of consideration of the motivations and inner life of the other or the self was 
non- mentalizing. Later, Fonagy and Bateman would claim that ‘mentalising is optimal when 
the dimensions— for example, emotion and cognition, or representation of self and other— 
are in balance and nonmentalizing modes are inactive.’26 It is telling that the example of in-
ternalizing and externalizing mentalizing is not chosen to illustrate the ideal state of balance, 
because ‘external mentalizing’ veers towards a form of non- mentalizing. Detection and in-
terpretation of observable behavioural cues is clearly a helpful contributor to mentalization, 
but only when it is in the service of envisioning and representing mental states. And this is 
not ‘balance’ between two poles.
In Fonagy and Luyten’s 2009 paper, another distinction was drawn between the ‘poles’ 
of cognitive and affective mentalizing. This was, in fact, more a formalization of an existing 
distinction than a new addition to the theory. Since his earliest writings, Fonagy had tended 
to use the phrase ‘thoughts and feelings’ as a synonym for mental states, and this usage be-
came more frequent in his writings with Target.27 In their 2009 paper, Fonagy and Luyten 
drew a distinction between the capacity to identify and interpret thoughts, and the capacity 
to identify and interpret feelings. The former was termed ‘cognitive mentalizing’ and the 
latter was termed ‘affective mentalizing’. This echoed developments in Baron- Cohen’s work, 
which distinguished between systematizing and empathizing forms of social cognition.28 
Cognitive mentalizing and affective mentalizing appear in Fonagy and Luyten’s 2009 paper 
to reflect the target of the activity— thoughts or feelings. It was not in the first instance a 
distinction regarding how the thought or feeling was recognized, which was generally as-
sumed to be aligned and therefore left undistinguished. In principle, mental states could 
be understood through various means, among them formal- deductive reasoning and em-
bodied affective resonance. The former might often be used to interpret thoughts. However, 
Oorschot, M., and Schobre, P. (2009). ‘Theory of Mind in Borderline and Cluster- C Personality Disorder’. Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 197: 801– 807.
 26 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. viii.
 27 E.g. Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the 
Anna Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 100; Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality II: The Development 
of Psychic Reality from a Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479, p. 473; 
Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in Borderline 
Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81: 853– 873, p. 854.
 28 Baron- Cohen, S., Golan, O., Chakrabarti, B., and Belmonte, M. K. (2008). ‘Social Cognition and Autism 
Spectrum Conditions’, in C. Sharp, P. Fonagy, and I. Goodyer (eds), Social Cognition and Developmental 
Psychopathology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29– 56.
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it can certainly be applied to feelings. In the latter case, then technically, according to Fonagy 
and Luyten’s 2009 paper, formal- deductive reasoning would then be affective mentalizing. 
Likewise, embodied affective resonance is often used to interpret feelings, but might also be 
used to understand thoughts. In the latter case, technically embodied affective resonance 
would then be cognitive mentalizing. In sum, the characterization of cognitive and affective 
mentalizing by Fonagy and Luyten failed to draw a distinction between the cognitive/ af-
fective means of understanding and the target of mentalization. This has caused serious prob-
lems for subsequent work in discussions of phenomena like empathy, with a lack of clarity in 
the respective roles of cognition and affect, and the relative interdependence and independ-
ence of mentalizing and empathy.29 Sharper attentiveness in the work of Jurist between affect 
as the means of understanding and as the target of mentalization has yet to filter effectively 
into wider discussions in the mentalization literature of the cognitive/ affective ‘poles’.30
A third distinction drawn by Fonagy and Luyten was between mentalizing the self and 
mentalizing others. However, this was, by their own admission, not actually an opposition 
of the same kind as the others. When Fonagy and colleagues first announced the reflective 
functioning scale in 1991, they had acknowledged that— in contrast to Main’s metacogni-
tive monitoring scale— their reflective functioning scale collapsed differences between 
people who were good at reflecting on their own mental states, and those who were good 
at reflecting on the mental states of others.31 Yet, at the time, and through to the late 1990s, 
Fonagy and colleagues argued that mentalization of self and others was ultimately integrated 
into a unitary process in the course of development, which meant that it was reasonable to 
measure them all together with a unitary scale.32 In their 2009 paper, Fonagy and Luyten 
still held that the capacity to mentalize the self and others would generally come together. 
The reason for this was that they held that the capacity to understand the self is secondary, 
essentially an extension of the capacity to understand others in the context of attachment 
relationships. They held that it would be impossible to have a good understanding of the 
self and a poor understanding of others.33 This claim appears to have been backtracked in 
 29 Cf. Borelli, J. L., Stern, J. A., Marvin, M. J., Smiley, P. A., Pettit, C., and Samudio, M. (2020). ‘Reflective Functioning 
and Empathy among Mothers of School- Aged Children: Charting the Space Between’. Emotion, Early View. As such, 
the relationship and potential overlap between mentalization- based therapy (MBT) and therapeutic modalities such 
as compassion- focused therapy remain to be worked out. This is a question currently pursued by Steve Pilling and col-
laborators: ‘Compassion and mentalization: complementary, overlapping or opposed?’. Accessed at: https:// www.ucl.
ac.uk/ psychoanalysis/ events/ 2021/ may/ compassion- and- mentalization- complementary- overlapping- or- opposed.
 30 Jurist, E. L. (2005). ‘Mentalized Affectivity’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22(3): 426– 444.
 31 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G. S., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘The Capacity for Understanding 
Mental States: The Reflective Self in Parent and Child and its Significance for Security of Attachment’. Infant Mental 
Health Journal, 12(3): 201– 218: ‘The primary difference lies in the emphasis in Main’s scale upon reflection by the 
subject on his or her own cognitive capacity (Flavell, 1976). In contrast, our scale emphasizes the use of psycho-
logical constructs to understand the behavior of self and other. The advantage of Main’s scale is that it does not 
confound the subject’s tendency to self- reflection with his or her accuracy in so doing. Our scale, by collapsing 
accuracy and habitual mode of thinking runs the risk of ascribing a high degree of reflective self function to indi-
viduals who are able to tell a plausible but inaccurate psychological story’ (p. 215).
 32 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1997). ‘Attachment and Reflective Function: Their Role in Self- Organization’. 
Development and Psychopathology, 9(4): 679– 700: ‘The “fractionation” or splitting of all abilities as a function of 
tasks and domains is well demonstrated and we might expect reflective function to be subject to the same kind 
of developmental decalage (unevenness) which characterizes the rest of cognitive development . . . Reflective 
function does not begin as a general capacity but is a particular skill tied to the task and domain where it is 
learned . . . Normal development is from fractionation towards integration, which involves the coordination of 
previously separate skills’ (pp. 695– 696).
 33 For evaluation of Fonagy and Luyten’s position on self– other interaction in the formation of subjectivity, see 
Liljenfors, R. and Lundh, L. G. (2015). ‘Mentalization and Intersubjectivity towards a Theoretical Integration’. 
Psychoanalytic Psychology, 32(1): 36– 60.
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subsequent work, or even reversed into the proposition that “to mentalise others requires the 
capacity to mentalise the self.”34 The developmental precedence and the causal precedence 
of mentalizing others and mentalizing the self has been an ongoing and unsolved problem 
in the work of Fonagy and colleagues. Nonetheless, there is clearly a distinction here. In the 
Fonagy and Luyten 2009 paper, as well as in subsequent work, the authors have urged at-
tention to the possibility that individuals may have better understanding of others than of 
themselves, or poor understanding of both— for instance, through confusion of the mental 
states of self and other.
Perhaps the most important of the four distinctions drawn by Fonagy and Luyten was be-
tween automatic and controlled mentalizing, a distinction drawn from existing discussions 
in social cognition. There had been growing attention in the 2000s in cognitive neuroscience 
to the distinction between automatic and controlled mental processes.35 Drawing on this 
literature, in 2004, Frith had argued that people at the high- functioning end of the autistic 
spectrum may lack automatic mentalizing, but have acquired skills in explicit mentalizing on 
the basis of experience and reasoning.36 The distinction between automatic and controlled 
mentalizing appealed to Fonagy and Luyten’s mutual commitment to psychoanalysis, and 
the importance of non- conscious processes, including clinicians’ own implicit understand-
ings.37 The characterization of automatic mentalizing offered by Fonagy and Luyten has dis-
satisfied many commentators as insufficiently fleshed out.38 However, in general terms, it 
would appear that they regarded automatic mentalizing as a quick, affect- led, unintended 
 34 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder in Community and Prison 
Settings’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 335– 349, p. 347. One way of interpreting this 
claim would be that Bateman and colleagues are here describing one part of a spiral. This is implied by Fonagy, 
P. and Allison, E. (2018). ‘The Origin of Human Life: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective’, European 
Psychoanalytical Federation, 31st Annual Conference, Warsaw, 24 March: ‘Our model suggests that our under-
standing of ourselves emerges from an internalization of the understanding that others have of us (the primary 
caregiver). In order to understand them, however, we rely on self- understanding. If our self- understanding is good 
enough this creates the potential to establish a virtuous cycle. The better I understand myself, the better I will be 
able to understand my caregiver understanding me; this will enable me to elaborate my understanding of myself, in 
turn improving my capacity to grasp what she is teaching me about myself, and so on.’
 35 Satpute, A. B. and Lieberman, M. D. (2006). ‘Integrating Automatic and Controlled Processes into 
Neurocognitive Models of Social Cognition’. Brain Research, 1079: 86– 97.
 36 Frith, U. (2004). ‘Emanuel Miller Lecture: Confusions and Controversies about Asperger Syndrome’. Journal 
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(4): 672– 686.
 37 E.g. Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Epilogue’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 271– 280: ‘As clinicians, our helpfulness 
to our patients may have more to do with the quality of implicit mentalization we offer through a general attitude 
rather than explicit elaboration of specific mental contents as has been frequently suggested in the past’ (p. 271). 
The line of influence is not clear, but this would seem well aligned with Bion’s recommendation that psychoanalysts 
should attempt to avoid constructing determinate thoughts and articulated feelings in sessions in order to keep 
themselves open for implicit understandings. Ogden, T. H. (2015). ‘Intuiting the Truth of What’s Happening: On 
Bion’s “Notes on Memory and Desire”’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 84(2): 285– 306. See also Bion, W. R. (1970). 
Attention and Interpretation, London: Karnac Books: ‘There is the possibility of suppressing one or all of these 
functions of memory, desire, understanding, and sense either together or in turn. Practice in suppression of these 
faculties may lead to an ability to suppress one or other according to need, so that suspension of one might enhance 
the effect of domination by the other’ (p. 44).
 38 E.g. Køster, A. (2017). ‘Mentalization, Embodiment, and Narrative: Critical Comments on the Social 
Ontology of Mentalization Theory’. Theory & Psychology, 27(4): 458– 476: ‘implicit mentalization suffers the some-
what unfortunate fate within MT of being attributed a gross significance in the literature while never receiving a 
systematic theoretical articulation’ (p. 464). Perhaps of particular importance for conceptualizing the distinction 
between the two, it remains unexamined whether the object of controlled mentalizing is always first an object 
of automatic mentalizing, as Hegel would suggest. This is hinted at in Shai, D. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Beyond 
Words: Parental Embodied Mentalizing and the Parent Infant Dance’, in M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (eds), 
Mechanisms of Social Connections: From Brain to Group, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 
pp. 185– 203. However, questions of embodied mentalizing, even if acknowledged, have not been well integrated in 
subsequent work by Fonagy and colleagues.
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process of identifying and making use of knowledge of mental states, running in the back-
ground of lived experience without awareness or effort, and responsive to the challenges of 
the particular moment. Controlled mentalizing seems to have been regarded as the delib-
erate, cognition- led and effortful attempt to identify and reason about mental states, a rela-
tively slow and serial process, somewhat more removed from the hurly- burly of the demands 
of the moment.
The way that the distinction between automatic and controlled processing was intro-
duced by Fonagy and Luyten gives the impression that automatic processing is the same as 
implicit, non- mentalizing processing. However, elsewhere in the article, it is implied that it 
is possible to have i) automatic mentalizing and ii) automatic non- mentalizing; just as it is 
possible to have iii) controlled mentalizing and iv) controlled non- mentalizing. Havsteen- 
Franklin has recently drawn out these distinctions, and termed this the ‘mentalizing quad-
rant’.39 It is very confusing for Fonagy and Luyten to refer to both automatic mentalizing and 
automatic non- mentalizing as ‘automatic mentalizing’. It forces them into strange claims, 
such as that the fight/ flight/ freeze response is a form of mentalizing.40 Or again, consider 
that Fonagy and colleagues have described the reflective functioning scale for the Adult 
Attachment Interview as measuring automatic mentalizing.41 This would simply be contra-
dictory if by this they meant implicit, non- mentalizing processing.42 In brief, Fonagy and 
Luyten’s primary characterization of automatic and controlled mentalization presumed 
alignment with non- mentalizing and mentalizing, when even statements in their own art-
icle suggest a more complicated situation.43 It also presumed alignment of automatic with 
fast, and controlled with slow, mentalizing. This provides no place for the implicit, slow pro-
cesses of ‘feeling things out’ that precisely, as Fonagy has acknowledged elsewhere, comprise 
a large bulk of work in psychotherapy.44 It also leaves unclear the respective role of culture in 
 39 Havsteen- Franklin, D. (2019). ‘Creative Arts Therapies’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, pp. 181– 195, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, Figure 11.1. This point is also suggested in Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- 
Based Treatment For Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7– 9. 
See also Davidsen, A. S. and Fosgerau, C. F. (2015). ‘Grasping the Process of Implicit Mentalization’. Theory & 
Psychology, 25(4): 434– 454.
 40 Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, P. and Ensink, K. (2019). ‘Mentalising and Trauma’, in Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, pp. 79– 102, p. 84.
 41 E.g. Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment For Personality Disorders: A 
Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 111.
 42 Allen has likewise characterized implicit mentalizing in terms that suggest that it is mentalising, and distinct 
from implicit non- mentalizing: ‘We are mentalizing implicitly when we empathize intuitively and nonverbally, 
“mirroring” others’ emotional states. We mentalize implicitly when we respond with a look of interest to what our 
patient just said, perhaps leaning forward a bit and raising our brow.’ Allen, J. G. (2003). ‘Mentalizing’. Bulletin of 
the Menninger Clinic, 67(2): 91– 112, p. 95.
 43 Recently, Fonagy and colleagues have tended to refer less to automatic and controlled mentalizing, and instead 
to ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ mentalising. This follows Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow, London: Macmillan. 
Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony Bateman 
and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77, p. 68.
 44 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Epilogue’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67(3): 271– 280. See also Jurist, E. L. (2005). 
‘Mentalized Affectivity’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 22(3): 426– 444. Recently it has been acknowledged that ‘MBT 
is constrained by its representational conceptualization’. Sharp, C., Shohet, C., Givon, D., Penner, F., Marais, L., 
and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Learning to Mentalize: A Mediational Approach for Caregivers and Therapists’. Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 27(3): e12334. The focus of MBT on representational processes has various roots, 
among them the development of ideas of mentalizing from work using the Adult Attachment Interview (see 
Chapter 3). However, an additional factor is the lack of space in the theory for considering implicit, slow processes 
of ‘feeling things out’, which occur without explicit representational content and sometimes without a discrete 
intention.
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implicit mentalizing— perhaps as conventional response, perhaps as habit— and controlled 
mentalizing— perhaps as semiotic scaffolding for reflection. This makes automatic and con-
trolled mentalization appear to be solely kinds of individual response, cutting them out from 
their constitutive contexts. As we shall see in Chapter 9, Fonagy and colleagues have spot-
lighted such processes as central to their current thinking about mentalization; however, 
they are yet to reconsider automatic and controlled mentalizing on this basis.
Fonagy has spoken of his dismay at the lack of uptake of the 2009 model of four dimen-
sions by other researchers and clinicians, and he has speculated that the model may be too 
complicated.45 We hold that, rather than too complicated, the lack of uptake results from the 
fact that the account is confusing on several grounds. For instance, the term ‘mentalizing’ 
in the account of automatic and controlled processes sometimes was used, precisely, to 
mean ‘non- mentalizing’. Likewise, ‘external mentalizing’ sometimes meant, precisely, ‘non- 
mentalizing’. The opposition between affective and cognitive mentalizing was also not es-
pecially sharp, because it was not clear whether what is ‘affective’ or ‘cognitive’ refers to the 
target of understanding or the mechanism for understanding. The opposition between auto-
matic and controlled mentalizing also gives no clear place to the slow process of ‘feeling 
things out’, which is not well characterized either as automatic or controlled processing.
Leaving the four poles of mentalizing aside, the Fonagy and Luyten paper also offered 
an important revision of the developmental model. They argued that attachment relation-
ships calibrate: i) the threshold at which an individual will feel tugged towards automatic 
processing under conditions of high arousal, ii) the extent to which automatic processing is 
able to identify and interpret mental states; iii) the ability of the individual to resist the tug 
of automatic processing and retain the capacity for explicit reasoning; and iv) the extent to 
which familiar others are sought in the context of high arousal.46 Fonagy and Luyten an-
ticipated that secure attachment would raise the threshold for activation of the attachment 
system, increase capacities for automatic mentalizing, stabilize the retention of explicit rea-
soning, and draw effectively on social support for the maintenance of emotion regulation. 
Just like the secure infant in the Strange Situation can shift readily between exploration and 
care- seeking, depending on the context, Fonagy and Luyten presumed that secure attach-
ment would facilitate the easy shift of gears between automatic and controlled mentalizing 
depending on what was called for.47
Avoidant attachment would raise the threshold for activation of the attachment system, 
reduce capacities for automatic mentalizing about the self, stabilize the retention of explicit 
reasoning, and make less use of familiar others in achieving emotion regulation. However, 
this explicit reasoning could still have gaps or lapses in mentalizing where it would otherwise 
 45 Duschinsky, R., Collver, J., and Carel, H. (2019). ‘“Trust Comes from a Sense of Feeling One’s Self Understood 
by Another Mind”: An Interview with Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 224– 227.
 46 Fonagy, P. and Luyten, P. (2009). ‘A Developmental, Mentalization- Based Approach to the Understanding 
and Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. Development and Psychopathology, 21(4): 1355– 
1381: ‘Neuroimaging studies support the notion that attachment history affects the setting of the “switch,” which 
turns the mentalizing system from planned, controlled and organized cognition to automatic processing with nar-
rowed, poorly sustained attention, and increased vigilance for attachment disruptions such as rejection and aban-
donment’ (p. 1368).
 47 The point is made again, and somewhat more clearly, in Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). 
Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: ‘Particularly in a secure attachment environment, when things are running smoothly on an interpersonal 
level, more deliberate or controlled mentalising is not called for; in fact, the use of such a mentalising style might 
hinder such interactions, making them feel unduly weighty or uncomfortably overwrought (hypermentalised)’ 
(p. 8); ‘Well functioning mentalising involves the ability to switch flexibly and responsively from automatic to con-
trolled mentalising’ (p. 9).
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need to be informed by affect and automatic mentalizing.48 By contrast, ambivalent/ resistant 
attachment and disorganized attachment would be anticipated to i) lower the threshold for 
activation of the attachment system, ii) reduce capacities for automatic mentalizing about 
others and prompt self/ other confusions, iii) destabilize the retention of explicit reasoning, 
and iv) contribute to difficulties in making use of familiar others for emotion regulation.49 
This configuration is of particular importance for Fonagy and Luyten, because they regarded 
these interacting elements specifically as the basis for the development of BPD. There may be 
few deficits in mentalizing for patients with BPD when they are calm. But it was anticipated— 
and indeed later research would find— that in response to arousal, and specifically the acti-
vation of the attachment system, the anticipated difficulties in mentalizing would become 
evident.50 Early disruptions in attachment would make mental states difficult to identify and 
attribute to self or other, while simultaneously prompting vigilance regarding mental states, 
which would be interpreted as potentially threatening. The lowered threshold for activation 
of the attachment system would keep controlled mentalization offline, hindering the integra-
tion of affective and cognitive forms of mentalizing. In turn, this would sustain difficulties in 
mentalizing the self and others, and ensuing difficulties in making use of social relationships 
for modulating troubling affects (see Figure 4.1).51
In short, Fonagy and Luyten’s model suggested that difficulties with mentalising, affect 
regulation, social relationships and executive function can exacerbate one another. When 
arousal is low and there is little perception of threat few, if any, deficits in mentalisation 
are likely to be evident. However, when the individual faces difficult feelings or situations, 
Fonagy and Luyten proposed that the result will be a lowered threshold for entering a state of 
automatic non- mentalized responding, and a raised threshold for engaging in the controlled 
mentalized processing that might help integrate affective arousal with cognitive under-
standing and perspective. Automatic, non- mentalized responses are likely to be headlong, 
lacking in measure and composure, and predisposed to contribute to relationship difficul-
ties, especially in attachment relationships.52 In this state, there is little patience for prompts 
 48 See also Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A 
Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Explicit reflection cannot feel real unless it is context-
ualised by intuitive awareness of the mental states being reflected on’ (p. 10).
 49 The distinction between ambivalent/ resistant and disorganized attachment is not sharply drawn in the work 
of Fonagy and colleagues. This aligns with the work of Roisman and colleagues, whose psychometric studies have 
suggested that the two categories should be treated as contributories to a single dimension of dysregulated attach-
ment. See e.g. Raby, K. L., Labella, M. H., Martin, J., Carlson, E. A. and Roisman, G. I. (2017). ‘Childhood Abuse 
and Neglect and Insecure Attachment States of Mind in Adulthood: Prospective, Longitudinal Evidence from a 
High- Risk Sample’. Development and Psychopathology, 29(2): 347– 363. Other attachment researchers have con-
tested this position e.g. van IJzendoorn, M. H. and Bakermans‐Kranenburg, M. J. (2014). ‘Confined Quest for 
Continuity: The Categorical versus Continuous Nature of Attachment’. Monographs of the Society for Research in 
Child Development, 79(3): 157– 167. It is interesting, in this regard, that though borderline individuals are over- 
represented in the preoccupied classification of the Adult Attachment Interview on a three- way analysis, when 
the unresolved classification is included, there is no over- representation in the preoccupied classification— only 
in the unresolved classification. This finding could in principle be used to support either position. Bakermans- 
Kranenburg, M. J. and van IJzendoorn, M. H. (2009). ‘The First 10,000 Adult Attachment Interviews: Distributions 
of Adult Attachment Representations in Clinical and Non- Clinical Groups’. Attachment & Human Development, 
11(3): 223– 263, p. 230.
 50 E.g. Dixon- Gordon, K. L., Chapman, A. L., Lovasz, N., and Walters, K. (2011). ‘Too Upset to Think: The 
Interplay of Borderline Personality Features, Negative Emotions, and Social Problem Solving in the Laboratory’. 
Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 2: 243– 260; Sharp, C. (2014). ‘The Social- Cognitive Basis 
of BPD: A Theory of Hypermentalizing’, in C. Sharp and J. L. Tackett (eds), Handbook of Borderline Personality 
Disorder in Children and Adolescents, Volume 5, New York: Springer, pp. 211– 225.
 51 Fonagy, P. and Luyten, P. (2009). ‘A Developmental, Mentalization- Based Approach to the Understanding and 
Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. Development and Psychopathology, 21(4): 1355– 1381.
 52 See also Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre: ‘there is no context more likely to induce a loss of mentalizing than 
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to stop and reconsider before acting. Repeated or sustained deployment of these responses 
will also hinder the capacity of the individual to identify and understand their own mental 
states and experience fulfilment from their relationships, contributing to identity diffusion 
and feelings of inner emptiness.
In 2012, Luyten, Fonagy, and colleagues built on this account to propose a multidimen-
sional approach to the assessment of mentalizing.53 They advised that psychological as-
sessment should appraise the extent to which the mentalizing profile differs across specific 
attachment relationships. Some relationships may prompt lowered or raised thresholds for 
states of automatic, non- mentalized processing, and may hinder or support the maintenance 
of the capacity for controlled, mentalized processing. They emphasized the importance of the 
extent to which an individual can accept help and support in sustaining mentalizing under 
conditions of perceived threat or arousal. They also presented the concept of a ‘mentalizing 
profile’ as a characterization of how an individual functions on each of the four axes: whether 
the individual attends only to external behavioural cues, or also considers internal feelings, 
thoughts, and motivations; whether the individual can describe and interpret more readily 
thoughts or feelings; whether the individual has greater ability to consider mental states in 

































Figure 4.1 Model of the causes and feature of BPD.
Source: Reproduced from Peter Fonagy and Patrick Luyten, ‘A Developmental, Mentalization- Based Approach 
to the Understanding and Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’, Development and Psychopathology 
21(4): 1355– 1381, Figure 2, DOI: https:// doi.org/ 10.1017/ S0954579409990198 Copyright © Cambridge 
University Press 2009.
attachment relationships of all kinds, including family interactions. It is here that relationships tend to be at their 
most fraught, their most loving and their most intense emotionally, and so the stage is set on a daily basis for inter-
actions that potentially stimulate a loss of mentalizing in one or more members of the family.’
 53 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lowyck, B., and Vermote, R. (2012). ‘The Assessment of Mentalization’, in A. W. 
Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 43– 66.
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others or also to understand mental states in themselves; and how readily the individual en-
ters into states of automatic, non- mentalized processing, as well as whether they can readily 
access states of controlled, mentalized processing. However, without any measure available 
of the four poles of mentalizing, the concept of the mentalizing profile has remained a recom-
mendation for clinical practice based much more in theory than in dedicated empirical re-
search. This has made claims about the mentalizing profiles of different client groups, or the 
treatments that should be tailored to different mentalizing profiles, essentially unfalsifiable. 
Given the problems with the four poles framework, it is not certain that creation of such a 
measure is even technically possible without significant further revision to the framework. 
Nonetheless, the proposal to attend to mentalizing profiles represents an advance in advo-
cating a reduction of the reification of mentalizing in clinical practice.
In line with this concern for greater specificity in conceptualizing mentalization, Berthelot, 
Fonagy, and colleagues attempted a replication of the Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, and Higgitt 
study of intergenerational transmission, with a sample of 57 mothers screened for high prob-
ability of inadequate care in their own childhoods.54 Adult Attachment Interviews and Strange 
Situation procedures were conducted, as in the original study. However, as well as using the 
reflective functioning scale on the Adult Attachment Interviews conducted with the mothers, 
the researchers also elaborated a sub- scale focused specifically on the capacity of the speaker 
to mentalize about traumatic episodes at any point in their attachment history. As in the ori-
ginal study, in 72% of cases, there was a match between the Adult Attachment Interview clas-
sification of the caregiver and Strange Situation classifications of the infant– caregiver dyad on 
security/ insecurity. In the case of speakers unresolved for loss or trauma, 70% had relation-
ships classified as disorganized in the Strange Situation procedure. In a regression, unresolved 
trauma accounted for 22% of variance in infant attachment disorganization. The general re-
flective function scale made no additional contribution to predicted variance. Yet, when re-
flective function about attachment- related trauma was entered into the regression, the model 
accounted for 41% of variance. The researchers concluded that it was not lack of mentalization 
in general that was influential for predisposing disorganized infant– caregiver attachment rela-
tionships, but the caregiver’s capacity to mentalize about specific attachment- related traumas.55
Another qualification to the Fonagy and Luyten model came through Fonagy’s collabor-
ation with Karin Ensink and colleagues. Fonagy and Luyten had implied an undifferentiated 
contribution of non- mentalizing to mental health symptoms. Yet the pathway to impulsive 
and aggressive behaviour might not be the same as to inner emptiness and depression. This 
is hinted at by Figure 2 in Fonagy and Luyten’s paper, where internalizing and externalizing 
symptoms were placed in different boxes. But the distinction was not drawn in the text.56 
Ensink and colleagues conducted a study with 74 mother– child dyads where the child had 
experienced sexual abuse, and 96 matched controls.57 The children in the study were aged 
 54 Berthelot, N., Ensink, K., Bernazzani, O., Normandin, L., Luyten, P., and Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Intergenerational 
Transmission of Attachment in Abused and Neglected Mothers: The Role of Trauma‐Specific Reflective 
Functioning’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 36(2): 200– 212.
 55 See also Borelli, J. L., Cohen, C., Pettit, C., Normandin, L., Target, M., Fonagy, P., and Ensink, K. (2019). 
‘Maternal and Child Sexual Abuse History: An Intergenerational Exploration of Children’s Adjustment and 
Maternal Trauma- Reflective Functioning’. Frontiers in Psychology, 10.
 56 The researchers have recently conducted factor analytic work on self- report items of depression, identifying 
a distinct factor in which depression is accompanied by aggression. Rost, F., Luyten, P., and Fonagy, P. (2018). 
‘The Anaclitic– Introjective Depression Assessment: Development and Preliminary Validity of an Observer‐Rated 
Measure’. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 25(2): 195– 209.
 57 Ensink, K., Bégin, M., Normandin, N., Godbout, N., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Mentalization and Dissociation in 
the Context of Trauma: Implications for Child Psychopathology’. Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 18(1): 11– 30.
Four poles of mentalizing 91
7– 12 and completed the adaptation of the Adult Attachment Interview for this age group, 
which was coded for age- appropriate reflective function. Child dissociative, externalizing, 
and inappropriate sexual behaviours were assessed by parent report; depression was meas-
ured by child self- report. Path analysis modelling revealed that the association between 
sexual abuse and impulsivity and aggression accounted for around 60% of variance, and was 
entirely mediated by child reflective function and dissociation. Most of the mediation was 
accounted for by dissociation. However, there was also some sequential mediation through 
the effects of sexual abuse on reflective function, which in turn contributed to dissociation. 
Similar findings were found for inappropriate sexual behaviours. By contrast, 34% of the 
effects of abuse on child depression could be accounted for by child reflective functioning, 
and here dissociation had no mediating role. Ensink and colleagues concluded from their 
findings that the Fonagy and Luyten model needed to be rectified to specify the role of dis-
sociation rather than merely absorbing it into non- mentalizing, given the finding of serial 
mediation between reflective function and dissociation in predicting impulsivity and ag-
gression. Fonagy has admitted that dissociation has tended to be a rather ‘shadowy concept’, 
and requires renewed discrimination and attention from non- mentalizing.58 This has been 
facilitated in recent years by the availability of a self- report measure of mentalizing (see 
Chapter 5).59
A response to the limitations of the Fonagy and Luyten 2009 account was presented by 
Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, and Campbell in 2017 in a landmark paper entitled ‘What We have 
Changed our Minds about’.60 The major amendment made there to the model of the genesis 
of BPD was to qualify the importance of early attachment. Instead of insisting on the im-
portance of early disorganized attachment (see Chapter 3), Fonagy and colleagues argued 
for a cycle that could begin at any point between problems in relationships, difficulties in 
sustaining attention to and understanding mental states, and heightened negative affect. 
Problems in attachment relationships across childhood and adolescence might contribute to 
all three processes, but without attachment being regarded as a foundational cause, as in the 
Luyten and Fonagy 2009 model. It was now proposed that the roots of borderline as a ‘per-
sonality’ disorder lay not in the long- term influence of attachment or in the stability of per-
sonality, but in the stability of the interaction between problems in relationships, difficulties 
in sustaining attention to and understanding mental states, and heightened negative affect. 
This account will be discussed further in Chapter 7.61 Another shift from 2009 to 2017 has 
been to stress the importance of social interaction in stabilizing or destabilizing mentalizing 
capacities. In particular, Fonagy’s collaboration with Liz Allison, Chloe Campbell, and 
Patrick Luyten had led to a perspective that does not treat mentalization as a good in itself, 
 58 Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Preface’ to Werner Bohleber, Destructiveness, Intersubjectivity and Trauma: The 
Identity Crisis of Modern Psychoanalysis, London: Routledge, pp. xi– xiv, p. xii. See also Schimmenti, A. (2015). 
‘Behind the Closed Doors of Mentalizing. A Commentary on “Another Step Closer to Measuring the Ghosts 
in the Nursery: Preliminary Validation of the Trauma Reflective Functioning Scale”’. Frontiers in Psychology, 
6: 380; Ensink, K., Fonagy, P., Berthelot, N., Normandin, L., and Bernazzani, O. (2015). ‘Response: Behind 
the Closed Doors of Mentalizing. A Commentary on “Another Step Closer to Measuring the Ghosts in the 
Nursery: Preliminary Validation of the Trauma Reflective Functioning Scale”’. Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 697.
 59 E.g. Huang, Y. L., Fonagy, P., Feigenbaum, J., Montague, P. R., Nolte, T., and Mood Disorder Research 
Consortium (2020). ‘Multidirectional Pathways between Attachment, Mentalizing, and Posttraumatic Stress 
Symptomatology in the Context of Childhood Trauma’. Psychopathology, 53: 48– 58.
 60 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds about. Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4: 9.
 61 See also Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, 
and Problems with Self and Identity: A Social- Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88– 105.
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but as a catalyst to allow an individual to sift and learn from social experience, effectively and 
with good discrimination. This will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
Defining mentalizing
In a recent commentary, Fonagy and colleagues recalled that ‘initially we provided a model 
proposing improvements in the capacity to mentalize as a central mechanism shared by a 
wide range of treatment approaches. Further reflection and empirical and clinical evidence 
have led us to doubt the sufficiency of this assumption. We have all seen many patients whose 
capacity to mentalize benefited from psychanalytic psychotherapy without corresponding 
improvement in their social- emotional functioning. It seems, then, that we should be more 
specific.’62 Even allies of Fonagy and colleagues have come to characterize the concept of 
‘mentalization’ as functionally ‘bloodless’ now.63 Such a characterization takes matters too 
far. The concept remains very much alive and purposive. However, to support future at-
tempts at greater specificity, as well as effective articulation and review of ideas in the rest of 
the book, to close this chapter we will present a survey of definitions of mentalization over 
30 years: from Fonagy’s first use of the term in 1989 to the present. Our discussion of the dif-
ferent definitions is certainly not an end in itself; instead, our intention is to be constructive 
in attempting to map the scope of the concept, on the way to a new synthesis and definition. 
This will then support an analysis of the central elements of the construct, to facilitate the dis-
cussion of the subsequent chapters. Twenty- eight distinct definitions of mentalization can 
be identified in the writings of Fonagy and his collaborators. These can be seen in Table 4.1.
Remarks on the definitions of mentalizing:
i. Conceiving and reconsidering: The initial definition, in 1989, of the capacity to ‘conceive’ of 
mental states, was too narrow. The capacity to conceive of mental states would not be helpful to 
an individual if these conceptions could not then be employed. A second attempt can be seen 
in the definition, in 1995, of mentalization as the capacity to think about mental states, which 
also presumably contains the capacity to conceive of the states thought about. From 1999, this 
is further revised to the capacity to ‘understand and interpret’ the mental states. This is then 
relatively stable over time. The 2012 definition unpacks interpreting mental states as entailing 
two processes: ‘describing’ and ‘explaining’. This is different from behaviour, which is to be 
‘understood’ in terms of mental states. Understanding, then, appears to be the successful out-
come of describing and explaining behaviour in terms of mental states, though this is not pinned 
down. The definitions do not imply that affectively attuning to mental states is construed as 
mentalizing, except insofar as it is encompassed by conceiving of or reconsidering mental states.
ii. No future: From the late 1990s, definitions stress that thinking, understanding, or 
interpreting are all integrative forms of mental processing. From the mid- 2000s, we see a 
specification of integration of experiences and representation as a requisite component of 
mentalization. The nature of representation here is not specified, but would seem entailed by 
thinking, understanding, and interpreting. Across the definitions, it seems to be implied that 
the perceptual experiences that mentalization targets may occur in the present or be drawn 
 62 Fonagy, P., Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Commentary on “ ‘Trust Comes from a Sense of Feeling One’s 
Self Understood by Another Mind’: An Interview with Peter Fonagy”’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 228.
 63 See e.g. Auerbach, J. Allen, J. G., Fonagy, P., and Bateman, A. W. (2007) ‘Mentalizing in Clinical Practice (Book 
Review)’. Accessed at: https:// www.apadivisions.org/ division- 39/ publications/ reviews/ mentalizing- 2.
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Table 4.1 Definitions of mentalization
Year Source Definition of mentalization
1989 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating 
Mental States: Theory of Mind in 
Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the 
Anna Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 97.
‘For the sake of brevity rather then 
reification I would like to label the capacity 
to conceive of mental states in oneself, as 
the capacity to mentalize.’
1995 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1995). 
‘Understanding the Violent 
Patient: The Use of the Body and the 
Role of fhe Father’. The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 487– 
501, p. 487.
‘Mentalisation, as the capacity to think 
about mental states’
1995 Fonagy, P. and Target (1995). ‘Playing 
with Reality: The Development of 
Psychic Reality and its Malfunction 
in Borderline Personalities’. 
The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 76: 39– 44.
‘With the capacity to mentalize, to see 
ideas as merely ideas and not facts, to play 
with different points of view, there comes 
the capacity to test ideas against reality 
and therefore to moderate their impact’ 
(p. 229).
1996 Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘The Significance 
of the Development of Metacognitive 
Control over Mental Representations 
in Parenting and Infant 
Development’. Journal of Clinical 
Psychoanalysis, 5(1): 67– 86, p. 74.
‘The psychological processes underpinning 
the view of oneself and others as motivated 
by mental states’
1997 Fonagy, P. (1997). ‘Where Cure was 
Inconceivable. The Aims of Modern 
Psycho- Analysis with Borderline 
Patients’. Texte, 3(17): 11– 25, p. 15.
‘These representations were 
unmetabolized, in Bion’s terms, non- 
mentalising within our theoretical 
framework.’
1997 Fonagy, P. ([1997] 2002). ‘Multiple 
voices versus meta- cognition: An 
attachment theory perspective’, 
in V. Sinason (ed.), Attachment, 
Trauma and Multiplicity: Working 
with Dissociative Identity Disorder 
London: Brunner- Routledge, pp. 71– 
85, p. 79.
‘The symptom of dissociation itself, 
the predominance of multiple voices in 
treatment may be usefully seen as the 
converse of mentalization.’
1998 Fonagy, P. (1998). ‘Prevention, 
the Appropriate Target of Infant 
Psychotherapy’. Infant Mental Health 
Journal, 19(2): 124– 150, p. 136.
‘Mentalizing, conceiving of interpersonal 
experience in terms of mental states or 
minds’ (p. 136).
1999 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Points of 
Contact and Divergence between 
Psychoanalytic and Attachment 
Theories: Is Psychoanalytic Theory 
Truly Different?’ Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 19(4): 448– 480, p. 461.
‘The notion of reflective function or 
mentalization is already present in Freud’s 
(1911) notion of Bindung, or linking. 
Bindung refers to the qualitative change 
from the physical (immediate) to the 
psychological (associative) quality of 
linking’
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1999 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Male Perpetrators 
of Violence against Women: An 
Attachment Theory Perspective’. 
Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic 
Studies, 1(1): 7– 27, p. 13.
‘Mentalization, the capacity to understand 
and interpret human behavior in terms of 
the putative mental states underpinning 
it, arises through the experience of having 
been so understood in the context of an 
attachment relationship.’
2000 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). 
‘Playing with Reality: III. The 
Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in 
Borderline Patients’. The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81: 853– 
873, p. 854.
‘The capacity to mentalize: to assume 
the existence of thoughts and feelings in 
oneself and in others, and to recognize 
these as connected to outer reality’
2002 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E.L. and 
Target, M. (2002). Affect Regulation, 
Mentalisation and the Development of 
the Self, London: Karnac Books, p. 3.
‘Mentalisation . . . is the process by which 
we realise that having a mind mediates our 
experience of the world’
2003 Allen, J. G. (2003). ‘Mentalizing’. 
Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 
67(2): 91– 112, p. 94.
‘Mentalizing entails interpreting the 
behavior of oneself and others in terms of 
intentional mental states, such as desires, 
feelings, beliefs, and the like’
2004 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2004). 
Psychotherapy for Borderline 
Personality Disorders: Mentalization 
Based Treatment, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 70.
‘The capacity to think about mental states 
as separate from, yet potentially causing 
actions.’
2006 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The 
Mentalization- Focused Approach to 
Self Pathology’. Journal of Personality 
Disorders, 20: 544– 576, p. 545.
‘Mentalization involves both a self- 
reflective and an interpersonal 
component. It is underpinned by a 
large number of specific cognitive 
skills, including an understanding of 
emotional states, attention and effortful 
control, and the capacity to make 
judgements about subjective states as 
well as thinking explicitly about states of 
mind— what we might call mentalization 
proper. In combination, these functions 
enable the child to distinguish inner 
from outer reality and internal 
mental and emotional processes from 
interpersonal events.’
2007 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., and Target, 
M. (2007). ‘The Parent– Infant 
Dyad and the Construction of the 
Subjective Self ’. Journal of Child 
Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3– 
4): 288– 328, p. 288.
‘We define mentalization following a 
tradition in philosophy of mind established 
by Brentano (1973/ 1874), Dennett 
(1978) and others as a form of mostly 
preconscious imaginative mental activity, 
namely, perceiving and interpreting human 
behaviour in terms of intentional mental 
states (e.g., needs, desires, feelings, beliefs, 
goals, and reasons).’
2008 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2008). 
‘Comorbid Antisocial and Borderline 
Personality Disorders: Mentalization‐
Based Treatment’. Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 64(2): 181– 194, p. 182.
‘Mentalizing simply implies a focus on 
mental states in oneself or in others, 
particularly in explanations of behaviour’
Table 4.1 Continued
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2008 Sharp, C. and Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘The 
Parent’s Capacity to Treat the Child 
as a Psychological Agent: Constructs, 
Measures and Implications for 
Developmental Psychopathology’. 
Social Development, 17(3): 737– 754, 
p. 740.
‘What exactly does mentalizing mean 
within this context? Slade (2005), writing 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, 
summarizes the concept as referring 
to both a cognitive process, akin to 
psychological insight or perspective- 
taking, and an emotional process, that is, 
the capacity to hold, regulate, and fully 
experience one’s own and others’ emotions 
in a non- defensive way without becoming 
overwhelmed or shutting down.’
2008 Bouchard, M. A., Target, M., Lecours, 
S., Fonagy, P., Tremblay, L. M., 
Schachter, A., and Stein, H. (2008). 
‘Mentalization in Adult Attachment 
Narratives: Reflective Functioning, 
Mental States, and Affect Elaboration 
Compared’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 25(1): 47– 66, p. 48.
‘Mentalization is a term used by both 
developmental psychologists and 
psychoanalysts to refer to a core process 
of human social functioning and self- 
regulation, involved in the establishment 
of robust links between personally 
meaningful early experiences and their 
representation . . . However, mentalization 
has been diversely construed and 
measured.’
2009 Slade, A. (2009). ‘Mentalizing the 
Unmentalizable: Parenting
Children on the Spectrum’. Journal 
of Infant, Child, and Adolescent 
Psychotherapy, 8(1): 7– 21, p. 8.
‘The term mentalization (or reflective 
functioning) refers to the capacity
to envision mental states in the self or 
other, to use an understanding of mental 
states— intentions,
feelings, thoughts, desires, and beliefs— to 
make sense of, and even more important, 
to anticipate
another’s (or her own) actions.’
2010 Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘Attachment 
Trauma and Psychoanalysis: Where 
Psychoanalysis meets Neuroscience’, 
in M. Leuzinger- Bohleber, J. Canestri, 
and M. Target (eds), Early Development 
and its Disturbances: Clinical, 
Conceptual and Empirical Research on 
ADHD and other Psychopathologies 
and its Epistemological Reflections, 
London: Karnac Books, pp. 53– 75, 
p. 55.
‘Mentalization is a concept originally 
introduced by French psychoanalysts 
(Luquet 1981, 1987; Marty and De M’Uzan 
1963) working with psychosomatic 
patients. They noted a lack of symbolization 
of mental states in such individuals, a 
lack of freedom in free association, and a 
characteristic way of thinking too close 
to sensations and primary unconscious 
fantasies.’
2012 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2012). 
‘Mentalization‐Based Therapeutic 
Interventions for Families’. Journal 
of Family Therapy, 34(4): 347– 370, 
p. 347.
‘Mentalizing is a process and it generally 
occurs without effort or specific 
consciousness. It can be summarized as 
seeing ourselves from the outside and 
seeing others from the inside.’
2012 Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W. and 
Luyten, P. (2012). ‘Introduction 
and Overview’, in Handbook of 
Mentalizing in Mental Health 
Practice. Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 3– 42, p. 3.
‘Mentalising is a term that has been 
introduced simultaneously into 
neuroscience and clinical thinking to 
denote the remarkable and pervasive 
human tendency to look beyond the 
visible shell of the body in understanding 
behaviour and seeking descriptions and 
explanations in terms of states of mind.’
Table 4.1 Continued
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2015 Target, M. (2015). ‘A Developmental 
Model of Sexual Excitement, 
Desire and Alienation’. 
Sexualities: Contemporary 
Psychoanalytic Perspectives, 
Alessandra Lemma and Paul E. Lynch 
(eds), London: Karnac Books, pp. 43– 
62, p. 46.
‘Mentalization is the conscious or 
preconscious recognition that behaviour is 
understandable given underlying mental 
states and intentions, that it therefore has 
motivation and meaning.’
2016 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). 
Mentalization- Based Treatment for 
Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 291.
‘Mentalising needs to be defined along the 
lines of being a mental process by which we 
attribute intentions to each other; it is how 
we understand each other and ourselves as 
being driven by underlying motives.’
2017 Bo, S., Sharp, C., Fonagy, P., 
and Kongerslev, M. (2017). 
‘Hypermentalizing, Attachment, 
and Epistemic Trust in Adolescent 
BPD: Clinical Illustrations’. 
Personality Disorders, 8(2): 172– 182, 
p. 173.
‘Mentalizing is related to the concepts 
of Theory of Mind, social cognition, 
metacognition, and emotional sensitivity, 
but considered a broader concept referring 
to the process of understanding and linking 
behavior and mental states’
2017 Bevington, D., Fuggle, P., Cracknell, 
L. and Fonagy, P. (2017). Adaptive 
Mentalisation- Based Integrative 
Treatment: A Guide for Teams 
to Develop Systems of Care, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p. 24.
‘Mentalising will be considered as a mental 
process that is fundamentally about the 
constant, concerned effort required to hold 
an adaptive balance between competing 
components of psychological functioning.’
2017 Perroud, N., Badoud, D., Weibel, S., 
Nicastro, R., Hasler, R., Küng, A.L., 
Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Dayer, A., 
Aubry, J.- M., Prada, P. and Debbané, 
M. (2017). ‘Mentalization in Adults 
with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder: Comparison with Controls 
and Patients with Borderline 
Personality Disorder’. Psychiatry 
Research, 256: 334– 341, p. 334.
‘The capacity to
appreciate the mental states that underlie 
behaviour’
2019 Duschinsky, R. Collver, J., and 
Carel, H. (2019). ‘Trust Comes 
From a Sense of Feeling One’s Self 
Understood by Another
Mind: An Interview With Peter 
Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 
36(3): 224– 227.
‘To have mentalizing you need to be 
balanced on four dimensions
of mentalizing: between cognition and 
affect,
self and other, inside and outside, and 
reflective and
intuitive. We concluded that if you are 
balanced on these
four dimensions then you’re mentalizing.’
2019 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). 
‘Introduction’. In Anthony Bateman 
and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice 
(pp. 3– 20). New York: American 
Psychiatric Association, p. 3.
‘Mentalising describes a particular facet 
of the human imagination: an individual’s 
awareness of mental states in himself or 
herself and in other people, particularly in 
explaining their actions.’
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from the past. Contrary to the operationalization of reflective function (see Chapter 3), there 
is no explicit indication that future experiences are considered relevant for mentalizing. The 
reason for this is unclear but may be because concrete particulars are less available for future 
than present or past perceptual experience, resulting in a tangible object for mentalizing.
iii. Not simply a focus: At times, mentalization is defined as a ‘focus’ on mental states, for 
instance in 2008. Here mentalization is not a capacity, but the extent of sustained atten-
tion. Certainly, possession of the capacity increases the extent it will be used. But focus of 
mental states seems a potential correlate of mentalization, rather than a necessary element. 
Relevant here, perhaps, is that measures of mind- mindedness are unrelated to measures 
of mentalization.64 It is telling that the definition of mentalization in terms of a focus on 
mental states drops away as the concept of ‘hypermentalization’— overactive and ineffective 
mentalization— is introduced and distinguished from ‘mentalization’ proper.
iv. Self and others: The 2012 definitions appear to distinguish the kind of mentalizing re-
quired for understanding and interpreting the mental states of oneself and visible others. The 
mental states of oneself require objectification and interpretation (‘seeing ourselves from 
the outside’); the mental states of others require inference and interpretation (‘seeing others 
from the inside’). However, placed together with the other definitions, such as the 2009 def-
inition by Slade, it would appear that mentalization also still encompasses the ability to think 
about the self ’s own social behaviour as well as the internal experience of others. These are all 
called ‘mentalizing’, even if they may have different underpinning processes.
v. Intentions: The content of ‘mental states’ is variously defined. In 1995, mentalization is 
equated with the capacity to take multiple points of view, suggesting that thinking about 
mental states is the same as the ability to take multiple perspectives. However, in 1996, the 
content of mental states is specified as motivations/ intentions. In 2000, this content is spe-
cified as ‘thoughts and feelings’, which are presumed to be the basis for motivation. This is 
aligned with Target’s definition where intentions are distinguished from mental states, but 
recognition of both is required. In 2007, mental states are described as including ‘needs, 
desires, feelings, beliefs, goals, and reasons’, which encompasses various forms of thought, 
feeling, and motivation. The 2009 definition gives intentions as a species of mental state, 
alongside feelings and thoughts, and some others. By contrast, the 2016 definition reverts to 
the 1996 sense of mental states as motivations/ intentions, highlighting the instability of the 
theorized content of mental states.
Yet what is meant by intentions? Fonagy and colleagues seem to use the term in two senses. 
First, ‘the intentionality of mental states such as beliefs and desires refers to their “aboutness” 
(Brentano 1874; Dennett and Haugeland 1987)— thus a belief is “about” an actual or possible 
state of affairs.’65 Following Brentano, then, for mental states to be intentional means only that 
they are directed towards some object, that ‘in perception something is perceived, in imagin-
ation, something is imagined, in a statement something stated, in love something loved, in 
 64 E.g. Barreto, A. L., Fearon, R. P., Osório, A., Meins, E., and Martins, C. (2016). ‘Are Adult Mentalizing Abilities 
Associated with Mind- Mindedness?’ International Journal of Behavioral Development, 40(4): 296– 301.
 65 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Target, M. (2002). Affect Regulation, Mentalisation and the 
Development of the Self, London: Karnac Books, p. 147, discussing Brentano, F. ([1874] 2015) Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge: ‘every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of 
the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not 
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object’ (p. 92).
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hate hated, in desire, desired, etc.’66 Brentano’s meaning appears to have been much closer to 
our notion of attention than intention.67However, Dennett (mis)read into Brentano’s appeal to 
‘intention’ the implication that we interpret minds through ascription of motivations in order 
to account for and explain behaviour and experience, with motivations conceptualized as like 
individual will.68 Fonagy and colleagues do not appear to recognize that ‘intention’ is being 
used in different ways by Brentano and Dennett. As a result, it remained unclear for Fonagy 
and colleagues what exactly is the object of mentalizing: i) intentional mental states, ii) mental 
states and intentions, or iii) mental states or intentions. The difference is potentially vast, 
depending on what is meant by intentional, and consequential both for theory and clinical 
work to encourage mentalizing. Not least it runs the risk of confusing the way a person takes 
a stance on, and responds to, the prompts of the state of affairs that comprises their environ-
ment (Brentano) with the expression of an individual’s will (Dennett). We will return to this 
problem later (Chapter 9). For now it can be identified, across the definitions of mentalizing, 
that the general idea appears to have been that mentalization entails the acknowledgement of 
mental states, where mental states are implicated in motivations and intentions.
As the table of definitions of mentalizing signals, there are many meanings of 
mentalization. It is unlikely that any one definition can, or perhaps should, completely en-
compass them all. However, in considering its different definitions, a workable characteriza-
tion of the core elements of mentalization can be picked out:
A capacity to:
 1. conceive of
 2. and make available for reconsideration
 3. the thoughts
 4. and feelings
 5. implicated in motivations and intentions
 6. in order to account for and explain
 7. the observable social behaviour
 8. and present and past perceptual experience
 9. of oneself
 10. and others.
When all 10 of these elements are present, full mentalizing can be regarded as present. 
Bringing together all elements in this configuration is rare. More commonly, specific 
mentalizing can be identified where certain elements are not needed in a particular situation. 
For a form of specific mentalizing to take place, examination of the definitions suggests that 
certain elements are essential. When mentalizing is solely automatic, conceiving (1) is more 
important than reconsidering, though the availability for reconsideration (2) remains. When 
mentalizing is controlled, reconsideration is dominant, though access to conceiving is still 
needed. In principle, either (3) (thoughts) or (4) (feelings), is absolutely required, because 
these are the denotation of ‘mental states’, though naturally the distinction between thoughts 
 66 Husserl, E. ([1901] 1970). Logical Investigations, Volume 2, London: Routledge, p. 95, glossing his teacher 
Brentano’s discussion of ‘aboutness’.
 67 Cf. Watzl, S. (2011). ‘Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness’, in C. Mole, D. Smithies, and W. 
Wu (eds). Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 145– 173.
 68 Dennett, D. C. (1991), The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
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and feeling is an abstraction, and other mental states are possible. For instance, values may 
be encompassed by the concept of mental states, and considered fed by both thoughts and 
feelings— though the definitions offer little guidance in considering such a case.
It is possible to conceive of motivations or intentions without attributing them to mental 
states, but this would not be mentalizing (see Chapter 5). Also essential are (2) and (6), the 
ability to reconsider mental states and to use them to account for or explain. Just to conceive 
of mental states is not enough, as shown by the rectification of Fonagy’s original 1989 defin-
ition in 1995 by Fonagy and Target to ‘the capacity to think about mental states’. To an extent, 
both (7) (observable behaviour) and (8) (present and past experience) are needed as the 
objects of the activities of accounting for and explaining. When one or the other is missing, 
the interpretation starts to spin loose and feed on itself, rather than remaining informed by 
the thoughts and feelings implicated in behaviour. It could be imagined that other objects of 
mentalization would be possible besides observable behaviour, present experience, and past 
experience. As we have seen, for example, Dunn proposed the social standards of groups as a 
possible object of mentalization. However, this possibility appears to have been excluded by 
Fonagy and Target. As such, examining the definitions, mentalization needs to be of either 
(9) (the self) or (10) (another person), or both.
So, for instance, only thoughts (3) or feelings (4) may be relevant to a particular occa-
sion for mentalizing. This corresponds to Fonagy and Luyten’s distinction between affective 
and cognitive mentalizing. Or, to take another example, only the mental states of oneself 
(9) or another (10) may be relevant to a particular situation. This corresponds to Fonagy and 
Luyten’s distinction between mentalizing self and other. Mentalizing may also be used to 
conceive of thoughts and/ or feelings without an attempt to then develop an account for mo-
tivations and intentions. When a therapist offers ‘brief, accurate and simple statements of the 
analyst’s perception of the patient’s current mental state’, this may— or may not— also entail 
an account of the patient’s motivations or intentions.69
Examination of the 10 elements of mentalization also revises and clarifies Fonagy and 
Luyten’s distinction between internal and external mentalizing. Fonagy and Luyten charac-
terized attention to (8) as ‘internal mentalizing’ and attention to (7) as ‘external mentalizing’. 
But (7) alone is not mentalizing. The analysis above identifies either or both of (3) and (4) as 
required. Yet an important distinction can be drawn between attempts to mentalize the ob-
servable behaviour of others— and attempts to mentalize the observable behaviour of one-
self. In fact, this would be a fruitful distinction because the 2012 Asen and Fonagy definition 
implies that these occur through distinct processes. But the implication is left unexplored, 
perhaps in part because it cross- cuts Fonagy and Luyten’s internal/ external polarity and the 
self/ other polarity.
In their 2016 book. Bateman and Fonagy assert that ‘good mentalizing takes but one 
form.’70 They give two characteristics of all good mentalizing:
 • ‘Tentativeness— on the whole, a lack of absolute certainty about what is right and what 
is wrong, and a preference for complexity and relativism.
 69 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1995). ‘Understanding the Violent Patient: The Use of the Body and the Role of the 
Father.’ The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 487– 501, 498. In Bion’s terms, the analyst may offer aware-
ness and comment on a patient’s mental state without moving from receptive attention into explanatory forms of 
thought (i.e. ‘downwards’ on the grid). Bion, W. R. (1963). Elements of Psycho- Analysis, London: Karnac Books.
 70 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 116.
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 • Moderation— a balanced attitude to most statements about mental states in both one-
self and others that comes from accepting the possibility that one is not in a privileged 
position in regard to either one’s own mental state or that of another person.’71
They then give eight characteristics of good mentalizing of others, which differ from eight 
characteristics of good mentalization of oneself, suggesting that they do not take the same 
form.72
Good mentalization of others is described as:
 • acknowledging the opacity of other minds;
 • not being paranoid;
 • expressing a desire to reflect on how others think;
 • awareness of different perspectives;
 • interest in others;
 • openness to discovery;
 • a forgiving stance;
 • oriented by a sense that, on the whole, the reactions of others are predictable given 
knowledge of what they think and feel.
Good mentalization of oneself is described as:
 • acknowledging that the self can change;
 • adopting a developmental perspective;
 • recognizing that feelings can be confusing;
 • recognizing that there may be feelings outside of conscious awareness
 • awareness that we can have incompatible ideas and feelings;
 • inquisitive about ourselves;
 • interested in the way our mind works differently to others;
 • recognizing the impact of affects.
Clearly the qualities in each set may vary independently of one another. One person’s 
mentalizing of themselves may have strengths in acknowledging change over time but 
struggle to recognize the impact of affects. Another person’s mentalizing of themselves 
may have strengths in inquisitiveness about their own mind and how it differs from others. 
But the individual may regard feelings as simply present or absent, rather than acknow-
ledging the role of hybrids and half- formed emotions. The more important point, though, 
is that good mentalization of others and good mentalization of the self look very different 
 71 Ibid. 118.
 72 Bateman and Fonagy also identified three qualities of the self- representation that facilitate mentalizing:
 ‘a. Advanced pedagogic and listening skills.
 b. Autobiographical continuity— the capacity to remember oneself as a child and evidence the experi-
ence of a continuity of ideas.
 c. Rich internal life— the person rarely experiences their mind as empty or content- less.’ Bateman, 
A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 117.
However, these three appear rather a hodgepodge. The first seems less a quality of the self- representation than a 
skill, and of more relevance for mentalizing others (depending on what is meant by pedagogic) than mentalizing 
the self. It is not clear exactly how autobiographical continuity facilitates mentalizing others, though access to 
episodic memory will certainly facilitate mentalizing the self. The construct of ‘rich inner life’ seems, from other 
statements by the authors, to be an effect of mentalizing, rather than a quality of it.
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in Bateman and Fonagy’s estimation. Good mentalization of others requires no develop-
mental perspective or particular interest in feelings or their conflict. Instead, the focus is 
on awareness of different perspectives, relatively opaque to one another. By contrast, good 
mentalization of the self is not, perhaps surprisingly, characterized by a sense that we are 
predictable on the basis of knowledge of what we think and feel. Self- forgiveness is also not 
characteristic. Instead, the focus is on taking a developmental perspective and awareness 
of the preconscious mind. Luyten, Malcorps, Fonagy, and Ensink have subsequently added 
‘belief in changeability’ as characteristic of good mentalizing of oneself, whereas this is not 
mentioned for mentalizing of others.73
Overall, the qualities that characterize good mentalizing of others seem to privilege 
considering their different thoughts and perspectives; the qualities that characterize good 
mentalizing of oneself seem to privilege scrutiny of feelings and awareness of change in 
perspectives over time. It seems difficult to sustain Bateman and Fonagy’s claim that good 
mentalizing ‘takes but one form’, when their own descriptions are considered closely. It is 
an encouraging development that the adaptation of the reflective functioning scale for chil-
dren by Karin Ensink, in her doctoral work supervised by Target and Fonagy, distinguishes 
between mentalizing the self (RF- S) and mentalizing others (RF- O), and research using 
this scale has begun to document their distinct correlates and developmental trajectories.74 
It can be hoped that this measurement innovation will be extended to other measures of 
mentalization, including for reflective function as measured in adults.75 Indeed, Debbané 
and Bateman and Morken and colleagues76 have all argued that disentangling RF- S and RF- 
O as distinct causal processes will be important for supporting future advances in MBT.77
 73 An updated list of the qualities of good mentalizing of oneself is provided by Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, 
P., and Ensink, K. (2019). ‘Assessment of Mentalising’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 37– 62:
 • ‘Developmental perspective
 • Realistic scepticism
 • Internal conflict awareness
 • Self- inquisitive stance
 • Awareness of importance of affect
 • Acknowledgment of unconscious and preconscious functioning
 • Belief in changeability’ (p. 46).
Comparison of the two lists indicates that interest in how our mind works differently from others has dropped 
out of good mentalizing, as has recognition that feelings can be confusing. They have instead been replaced by be-
lief in changeability.
 74 Ensink, K. (2004). Assessing Theory of Mind, Affective Understanding and Reflective Functioning in Primary 
School‐Aged Children. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, London: University College London; Ensink, K., 
Normandin, L., Target, M., Fonagy, P., Sabourin, S., and Berthelot, N. (2015). ‘Mentalization in Children and 
Mothers in the Context of Trauma: An Initial Study of the Validity of the Child Reflective Functioning Scale’. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 33(2), 203– 217; Bizzi, F., Ensink, K., Borelli, J. L., Mora, S. C., and 
Cavanna, D. (2019). ‘Attachment and Reflective Functioning in Children with Somatic Symptom Disorders and 
Disruptive Behavior Disorders’. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 28(5): 705– 717. A parallel distinction has 
been made in scaling the Parent Development Interview for mentalization by Suchman, N. E., DeCoste, C., Leigh, 
D., and Borelli, J. (2010). ‘Reflective Functioning in Mothers with Drug Use Disorders: Implications for Dyadic 
Interactions with Infants and Toddlers’. Attachment & Human Development, 12: 567– 585.
 75 For one attempt, see Dimitrijević, A., Hanak, N., Altaras Dimitrijević, A., and Jolić Marjanović, Z. (2018). 
‘The Mentalization Scale (MentS): A Self- Report Measure for the Assessment of Mentalizing Capacity’. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 100(3): 268– 280.
 76 Debbané, M. and Bateman, A. (2019). ‘Psychosis’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 417– 
429, p. 426.
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Forms of non- mentalizing
Introduction
According to the definitions discussed in Chapter 4, mentalization is absent when an in-
dividual interprets their own or others’ psychological experience and/ or social behaviour 
without reference to mental states (thoughts and/ or feelings). This could occur for any 
number of reasons. Fonagy and colleagues fail to draw an important distinction between 
non- mentalizing and ‘not mentalizing’. In the former, mentalizing is specifically blocked. In 
the latter, mentalizing is neither active nor blocked. Ordinary life is full of ‘not mentalizing’. 
Indeed, a great deal of our time is spent in interactions shaped by social conventions about 
the limits on appeal to mental states, where breach of these limits is treated as threatening, 
over- sincere, or an imposition.1 Such conventions can help procedural interactions run 
smoothly, without the threat of exposure or unwanted intimacy. However, individuals who 
have been trained by circumstances or have trained themselves to hold fast to mentalizing, 
rather than finding it a capacity to turn on or off as needed, may find such interactions hard 
to sustain. In considering ‘not mentalizing’, it is important to identify that even apparently 
mentalizing interactional frames can be conventionalized into ‘not mentalizing’: ‘How are 
you?’ ‘Good thanks, how are you?’.
In some cases, the opening question may function as a conventionalized opening for a 
mentalizing interaction that may or may not be taken up.2 In other cases, there is no true 
opening, only convention. Numerous cases of ‘not mentalizing’ may reflect domains of 
activity in which mental states are of secondary causal concern, but not blocked. Making 
music, for example, may not in the first instance represent a concern with mental states. Yet, 
attention to mental states is not blocked and may be specifically cultivated through taking 
an inquisitive stance to features such as sequence, tone, level of arousal, and the relation 
established with the audience.3 To take another example: an endocrinologist may interpret 
an adolescent’s psychological experience through reference to hormones rather than mental 
states. Or a scientist may interpret an adolescent participant’s experience through reference 
to neurological structures, or some other relatively material cause. This is not mentalizing 
rather than non- mentalizing. It could be contrasted to the same interpretation by a parent 
or a scientist who uses a material interpretation to duck consideration of the adolescent’s 
thoughts or feelings. Then we have non- mentalizing, through a focus on physical at the ex-
pense of psychological explanation, even if the physical cause is causally important in shaping 
behaviour.
 1 See e.g. Benwell, B. and McCreaddie, M. (2016). ‘Keeping “Small Talk” Small in Health- Care 
Encounters: Negotiating the Boundaries between On- and Off- Task Talk’. Research on Language and Social 
Interaction, 49(3): 258– 271.
 2 Cameron, B. L. (2004). ‘Ethical Moments in Practice: The Nursing “How Are You?” Revisited’. Nursing Ethics, 
11(1): 53– 62.
 3 Strehlow, G. and Hannibal, N. (2019). ‘Mentalizing in Improvisational Music Therapy’. Nordic Journal of Music 
Therapy, 28(4): 333– 346.
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Fonagy and colleagues have argued that all of us find ourselves in non- mentalizing states 
at points, which are simply part of the human condition. The researchers propose that non- 
mentalizing modes of processing operate according to very different assumptions com-
pared to mentalized experience, and an individual in one of these states often disbelieves in 
mentalized accounts of reality. This can contribute to the intractability of these states, their 
contribution to extreme and unmeasured decision making, to conflicts in interaction with 
family and friends, and to the wider culture and political context of a society.4 Fonagy and 
colleagues have described three forms of non- mentalizing: pretend mode, psychic equiva-
lence, and teleological mode. Sometimes they have implied that these are just three kinds 
of non- mentalizing that they have happened to stumble upon, and they have no particular 
importance beyond other forms of non- mentalizing, which could readily be identified.5 
More frequently, however, pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode are de-
scribed definitively as ‘the’ forms of non- mentalizing.6 Pretend mode, psychic equivalence, 
and teleological mode have featured primarily in the writings of Fonagy and colleagues for 
clinical audiences. The characterization of the three modes of non- mentalizing is among 
the most potentially insightful contributions of their work. Nonetheless, no attempt has 
been made to operationalize the specific modes of non- mentalizing, with the exception of 
hypermentalizing, leaving their reflections speculative and obstructing further scientific de-
velopment of the theory.7
This chapter will begin by describing pretend mode and specifying how it dif-
fers from mentalizing. A specific kind of pretend mode will then be described, termed 
‘hypermentalizing’ by Fonagy and colleagues. Particular attention will be given to the pre-
tend mode, in part because it has been discussed in most detail by Fonagy and colleagues; in 
part because it has two different forms; and also because it illustrates the way that the same 
capacity for pretend can be an asset or a disadvantage depending on its integration with 
other psychological processes and depending on the context. The chapter will then move on 
 4 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization- Based Therapeutic Interventions for Families’. Journal of Family 
Therapy, 34(4): 347– 370.
 5 E.g. Brent, B. K. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘A Mentalization- Based Treatment Approach to Disturbances of 
Social Understanding in Schizophrenia’, in P. Lysaker, G. Dimaggio, and M. Brüne (eds), Social Cognition and 
Metacognition in Schizophrenia: Psychopathology and Treatment Approaches, San Diego, CA: Elsevier, pp. 245– 
259: ‘One of the consequences of impaired mentalization from an MBT Standpoint is the likelihood that early, 
“pre- mentalistic” forms of thinking may emerge during stress; including: (1) psychic equivalence thinking, in 
which the ability to consider outside perspectives on one’s inner experience becomes lost and one’s own thoughts 
and/ or feelings are taken as unequivocally real; (2) pretend mode thinking’ (p. 248, italics added).
 6 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2004). ‘Playing with the Reality of Analytic Love: Commentary on Paper by Jody 
Messler Davies “Falling in Love with Love”’. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 14(4): 503– 515: ‘The modes of mental func-
tioning that developmentally predate mentalization: the teleological stance, psychic equivalence, and pretend 
mode’ (p. 511); Fonagy, P., Campbell, C. and Bateman, A. (2017). ‘Mentalizing, Attachment, and Epistemic Trust 
in Group Therapy’. International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, 67(2): 176– 201: ‘When mentalizing fails, individ-
uals often fall back on non- mentalizing ways of behaving, which have some parallels to the ways young children 
behave before they have developed their full mentalizing capacities. The modes are: psychic equivalence, teleo-
logical, and pretend modes’ (p. 179).
 7 The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire operationalizes ‘hypomentalising’, which is anticipated as the 
outcome of psychic equivalence and teleological mode. Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Moulton- Perkins, A., Lee, Y. 
W., Warren, F., Howard, S., . . . and Lowyck, B. (2016). ‘Development and Validation of a Self- Report Measure 
of Mentalizing: The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire’. PLoS One, 11(7): e0158678. Some aspects of non- 
mentalizing were distinguished by Hausberg, M. C., Schulz, H., Piegler, T., Happach, C. G., Klöpper, M., Brütt, 
A. L., . . . and Andreas, S. (2012). ‘Is a Self- Rated Instrument Appropriate to Assess Mentalization in Patients with 
Mental Disorders? Development and First Validation of the Mentalization Questionnaire (MZQ)’. Psychotherapy 
Research, 22(6): 699– 709. However, Fonagy and colleagues have never cited this measure; the reason for this is 
unknown. A new clinician- report measure of non- mentalizing distinguishes the three modes: Gagliardini, G. and 
Colli, A. (2019). ‘Assessing Mentalization: Development and Preliminary Validation of the Modes of Mentalization 
Scale’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 249– 258.
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to address the two other kinds of mentalizing: psychic equivalence and teleological mode. 
It will be demonstrated how the forms of non- mentalizing are not simply the absence of 
mentalizing, but draw on specific aspects of the capacity to mentalize. This can be seen in 
Table 5.1, which offers a summary characterization of the key conclusions from this chapter 
about the forms of non-mentalizing and their respective relationships with mentalization.
Pretend mode
As described in Chapter 2, one of Fonagy’s first projects after appointment as research dir-
ector at the Anna Freud Centre was collaboration with Target, Edgcumbe, and Miller in 
developing a manual for child analysis. In the course of this work, Fonagy and Target worked 
out ‘a heuristic map of the emergence of mentalisation’. They observed that children:
appear to be able to use the notion of mental states but paradoxically use it only when they 
can clearly separate it from physical reality (for example, in play). In this state of mind, 
which we have called pretend mode, thoughts and feelings can be envisioned and talked 
about but they correspond to nothing real.8
The concept of pretend mode— together with the idea of psychic equivalence— was intro-
duced and elaborated in a series of major papers by Fonagy and Target published in the mid- 
1990s in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis under the title ‘Playing with Reality’. The 
 8 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in Brownescombe Heller, M., and Pollet, S. (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts 
in the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176, p. 160– 161.
Table 5.1 Descriptions of non- mentalizing forms
Form of non- mentalizing Description Aspect of mentalizing
Pretend mode To conceive of thoughts 
and feelings implicated in 
motivations or intentions
Conceiving of the thoughts 
and feelings implicated in 
motivations and intentions of 
oneself and others.
Pretend mode:   
hypermentalizing
To conceive of thoughts and 
feelings implicated in motivations 
or intentions in order to account 
for and explain the observable 
social behaviour of others
Conceiving of the thoughts 
and feelings implicated in 
motivations and intentions in 
order to account for and explain 
the observable social behaviour 
and others.
Psychic equivalence To account for and explain 
thoughts and feelings and 
observable social behaviour in 
terms of immediate experience
Accounting for and explaining 
the thoughts and feelings and 
the observable social behaviour 
[in terms of] present and past 
perceptual experience of oneself.
Teleological mode Observable social behaviour is 
used to account for and explain 
the motivations and intentions of 
others and of oneself
Observable social behaviour [are 
used] to account for and explain 
the motivations and intentions 
of oneself and others.
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concept was then further articulated by Bateman and Fonagy in their book on Mentalisation- 
Based Treatment for Personality Disorders.9
In the paper first introducing the concept of pretend mode, Fonagy gives the illustration 
of his work with a child patient. Rebecca was five years old when she was brought to the 
Anna Freud Centre for treatment by her mother. She lived sometimes with her grandparents 
and sometimes with her mother; her father had been a casual partner of her mother, and 
had no involvement in raising Rebecca. Rebecca’s symptoms included a combination of fears 
and conduct problems, which began following the death of her grandfather. Her play with 
Fonagy consisted essentially of a single game, in which Rebecca was an older girl, Hannah, 
and Fonagy was cast in the role of the father. Fonagy characterized this game as pretend 
mode on the basis that Rebecca could not tolerate any discussion that implied questioning 
whether the narrative corresponded to reality. The whole question was forbidden: ‘She re-
fused to accept that her wish for grandfather or me to be her real father did not make it true. 
I could be either her analyst or her father, but never the analyst representing the father.’10 
What made the game Rebecca was playing ‘pretend mode’ was that elements of imagination 
were being used to create accounts of her own mind and the mind of father figures specific-
ally at the expense of her personal experience of the ‘hurt and shame of being fatherless’.11
In part, this use of pretend mode reflected Rebecca’s developmental stage, in which the dis-
tinction between representation and reality is not always fully secured. However, Rebecca’s 
intolerance of any questioning of her narratives of having a father also had roots in her home 
environment, in which her family could not discuss Rebecca’s worries about lacking a father. 
As a consequence, Fonagy proposed, the worries were cut off from the specifics of her own 
life as they entered into a fantasy narrative. And they were also cut off from modulation or 
doubt. Furthermore, Rebecca seemed stuck in this state, stating and re- stating the narrative 
about having a father such that it inhibited her capacity to engage in other forms of play. Had 
Rebecca been able to enter into pretend mode and then exit in a flexible way, then pretend 
mode would not have been at the expense of tolerating thoughts and feelings. In turn, these 
thoughts and feelings would then have been available for modulation, rather than expressed 
as fears and aggression.
Fonagy and colleagues described how components of mentalizing are ‘hijacked into the 
pretend mode of experience’.12 This claim becomes somewhat clearer by considering the 
ideas of Fonagy and colleagues as responding to those of Bion. For Bion, the identification, 
modulation, and coordinated expression of thoughts and feelings depend on a psychological 
apparatus that he terms the ‘alpha function’. The alpha function protects thoughts and feel-
ings from invasion by proto- thoughts and feelings (e.g. unconscious wishes, passing ideas, 
aspects of embodied sensory experience) that would otherwise hinder their coherence. It 
also protects proto- thoughts and feelings from conscious processes that might otherwise 
stifle their creativity and richness, and in turn the capacity to convey this creativity and rich-
ness to determinate thoughts and feelings as the ability to consider different perspectives and 
develop these perspectives by learning from experience. However, the alpha function can 
 9 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 10 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Playing with Reality: The Development of Psychic Reality and its Malfunction in Borderline 
Personalities’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 39– 44,p. 41.
 11 Ibid. 43.
 12 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 437.
106 Forms of non-mentalizing
be fragmented back into its constituent parts. When this happens, like a vehicle, the alpha 
function goes into reverse.13 The most potent obstacle to coherent thinking and feeling is the 
activity of these fragments. Not only does the unintegrated activity of these fragments sys-
tematically hinder their use as part of the alpha function for coherent thinking and feeling, 
but there is also the potential for invasion of thoughts and feelings by proto- thoughts and 
feelings, and vice versa. This leads to fragmented conscious thoughts and feelings, and over- 
concrete proto- thoughts and feelings. Both states hinder the potential for both perspective 
taking and for learning from new experiences.
Likewise, for Fonagy and colleagues, the forms of non- mentalizing are so potent pre-
cisely because they ‘hijack’ the constituent parts of mentalizing. Non- mentalizing is not then 
simply the obverse of mentalizing, but turns the equipment of mentalizing against itself. This 
point aligns with Bion’s earlier proposal that it may be productive for theorists to shuttle be-
tween attention to the elements that facilitate learning from experience, and attention to the 
elements that block learning from experience.14 In the previous chapter, we considered the 
elements of mentalization through attention to the various definitions that have been offered 
by Fonagy and colleagues. Mentalization was conceptualized as a capacity to conceive of and 
make available for reconsideration thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations and in-
tentions in order to account for and explain the observable social behaviour and perceptual 
experience of oneself and others. In these terms, pretend mode can be regarded as conceiving 
of thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations or intentions. But it is the severed first part 
of mentalization. For mentalization requires also some attempt to account for and explain 
observable social behaviour and/ or perceptual experience. Also highly conspicuous in its 
absence is the modulated and generative doubt about thoughts and feelings that underpins 
reconsideration. The resulting experience has something of an ‘as if ’ quality, but it is not in-
terrogated in terms of whether it agrees with reality.
Hypermentalizing
For Fonagy, the idea of ‘as if ’ thinking seemed to very much characterize his experience 
as a clinician working with patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) symptoms, 
where all kinds of things would be narrated, but without connection to the particulars of 
actual experience or behaviour, and without attention to the extent to which they corres-
ponded with reality.15 As a result, therapeutic progress grinds to a halt.
Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, and Target suggested five features of pretend mode that distin-
guish it from mentalizing:
 13 Bion, W. R. (1963). Elements of Psycho- Analysis, London: Karnac Books.
 14 Bion, W. R. (1962). Learning from Experience, London: Karnac Books: ‘Instead of sense impressions being 
changed into alpha- elements for use in dream thoughts and unconscious waking thinking, the development of the 
contact- barrier is replaced by its destruction. This is effected by the reversal of alpha- function so that the contact- 
barrier and the dream thoughts and unconscious waking thinking which are the texture of the contact- barrier 
are turned into alpha- elements, divested of all characteristics that separate them from beta- elements and are then 
projected thus forming the beta- screen . . . The reversal of alpha- function does violence to the structure associated 
with alpha- function’ (p. 25).
 15 Fonagy, P. (1997). ‘Where Cure was Inconceivable. The Aims of Modern Psycho- Analysis with Borderline 
Patients’. Texte, 3(17): 11– 25: ‘The patient’s pseudo- insights do not correspond to the primary level of their internal 
experience’ (p. 22). See also Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Fonagy on “Playing with Reality: I. Theory of Mind and the Normal 
Development of Psychic Reality”’. PEP/ UCL Top Authors Project, 1(1): 27.
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 1. First, accounts organized by pretend mode tend to be ‘overly analytical, repetitive 
and lengthy’.16 Without the need to lock in pragmatically to the work of attempting to 
account for and explain the particulars of observable social behaviour, present percep-
tions or concrete past experiences, the activity of conceiving of thoughts and feelings 
can run without restraint.
 2. Second, narratives tend to be out of touch with the speaker’s own affective experience 
as formed by the obstacles and tasks that prompt this experience. There is an ‘as if ’ 
quality to the discourse: cogs are spinning, but the mechanism has not engaged with 
practical problems and their particularity.
 3. In parallel, the accounts tend to be out of touch with the genuine bases on which the 
speaker could claim self- worth and perceived control over their life.
 4. Fourth, speech in pretend mode rather than mentalizing is signalled by difficulties for 
the speaker in switching perspectives— for instance, from a focus on the motivations of 
the self to those of the other, or vice versa. Finally, Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, and Target 
proposed that accounts in pretend mode tend to position the audience in such a way as 
to be subject to the speaker— for example, obligated to offer attention or compassion, 
or to place the audience under the speaker’s control. Pretend mode is not informed by 
concern with the present or past perceptual experience of others, and therefore tends 
to treat the needs of the speaker as of utmost importance.
 5. This is not to imply that mentalization is always motivated by compassionate im-
pulses.17 Nonetheless, Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, and Target do seem to imply that ef-
fective mentalizing should, in general, contribute to motivations more accurately 
reflecting the needs of others and oneself, which in turn should contribute to benefi-
cence. (We will return to this assumption in Chapter 8).
The form of pretend mode most easily confused with mentalization has been termed 
by Sharp, Fonagy, and colleagues ‘hypermentalization’.18 Bateman and Fonagy define 
hypermentalizing as ‘a tendency to elaborate models of internal states in the absence of rele-
vant evidence’.19 In hypermentalization, pretend mode is applied to the sustained attention 
to the thoughts and feelings of other people through the interpretation of their observed 
 16 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 385– 418, 
p. 410.
 17 Fonagy and colleagues offer few discussions of what motivations especially prompt mentalizing. This can 
give the impression that mentalizing others is free from uncivilized motivations and fantasies, such as the wish to 
control others, envy of their thoughts or feelings, or inability to be alone with our own thoughts and feelings. There 
is no reason that their position should imply this, and it would appear an implausible stance. Fonagy’s citations of 
Hegel are always of the Phenomenology of Spirit. However, a shift in Hegel’s position from the Phenomenology to 
later work such as The Science of Logic was towards the claim that reflection is not self- grounded, and that forms 
of accurate and well- judged understanding and reasoning about ourselves and others need to be examined for 
the forces and desires that organize and animate them, and which may not be fully understood or well reasoned. 
Hyppolite, J. ([1952] 1997). Logic and Existence, New York: SUNY University Press. Similar points have been made 
about reflection within psychoanalysis. See e.g. Bion, W. ([1977] 2019). Bion in New York and Sao Paulo, and Three 
Tavistock Seminars, London: Karnac Books.
 18 Sharp, C., Pane, H., Ha, C., Venta, A., Patel, A. B., Sturek, J., and Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Theory of Mind and 
Emotion Regulation Difficulties in Adolescents with Borderline Traits’. Journal of the American Academy of Child 
& Adolescent Psychiatry, 50(6): 563– 573; Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for 
Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘The biggest challenge in rec-
ognising mentalising is being able to distinguish it from pseudomentalising’ (p. 127).
 19 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Preface’, in Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, p. xx.
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behaviour. The researchers characterized three forms of hypermentalization. These illustrate 
both the diversity of hypermentalization, and its characteristic continuities:
Intrusive pseudomentalising: opaqueness of minds is not respected; extends knowledge of 
thoughts and feelings beyond a specific context; presents knowledge of thoughts and feel-
ings in an unqualified way; presents thoughts and feelings with a richness and complexity 
that is unlikely to be based on evidence; when challenged, defaults to nonmentalising 
accounts.
Overactive form of pseudomentalising: idealisation of insight for its own sake; thoughts 
about other felt by them as confusing and obscure.
Destructively inaccurate pseudomentalising: denial of objective realities that undermine 
subjective experience; cast in terms of accusations; denying someone’s real feelings and re-
placing them with a false construction.20
If pretend mode entails conceiving of thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations 
or intentions, hypermentalization has further components of actual mentalizing. To 
hypermentalize is to conceive of thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations or inten-
tions in order to account for and explain the observable social behaviour of others. So close 
to mentalization in many regards. All that is missing are the ability for reconsideration of 
mental states and attention to the specifics of present or past perceptual experience. But 
this is enough to unmoor the other component parts of mentalization, which start to float 
downriver. Conclusions are generated for which there is no basis in experience, and these are 
insulated from meta- cognitive reappraisal.21 In this sense, the distinction between psycho-
logical theory and hypermentalizing is somewhat porous, and will depend on the extent to 
which the theory is grounded in the concrete specifics of observation and measurement, and 
the extent to which the theory is open to reconsideration of its constituent elements. These 
are qualities that Fonagy described in the 1990s and 2000s as particularly under threat in 
psychoanalytic theory, but which are constitutive risks of any theory- building, which must 
stretch out from the heavy particularities of concrete experience, making use of both the 
buoyancy and the gravity of concepts. Localized access to pretend mode is vivifying for in-
novation, nonconformity to existing common sense and ethical vision, all components to 
varying degrees of any adequate psychological theory. However, the generation of theory 
needs to be pared with its pruning and evaluation (see Chapter 2).
Bo, Sharp, Fonagy, and Kongerslev have described hypermentalization as a breakdown 
of communication between affective and cognitive mentalizing. We would offer a different 
characterization: that hypermentalization lacks components 2 (reconsideration) and 8 (pre-
sent or past perceptual experience) from the definition of mentalization presented in the 
previous chapter. The advantage of this conceptualization is that it aligns with Bateman and 
Fonagy’s observation that, in hypermentalization, it is controlled mentalization specific-
ally that is offline, rather than cognition in general.22 Cognition in the form of component 
 20 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 128.
 21 Bo, S., Sharp, C., Fonagy, P., and Kongerslev, M. (2017). ‘Hypermentalizing, Attachment, and Epistemic Trust 
in Adolescent BPD: Clinical illustrations’. Personality Disorders, 8(2): 172– 182.
 22 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 12– 13.
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6 (accounting for and explain) is still very firmly in play in hypermentalization. The other 
advantage of our characterization is that it is not clear what it means for a breakdown of 
communication to occur between affective and cognitive mentalizing. Our characterization 
specifies that the issue lies in the fact that reflection is not informed by perceptual experience 
and is not available for reconsideration, which is why it is a form of pretend mode thinking. 
This also explains why hypermentalization is a form of pretend mode thinking, a position 
which is asserted but not explained by Fonagy and colleagues.
Fonagy has speculated that the patients who helped Freud generate psychoanalysis as 
a talking cure were displaying symptoms of BPD, and that much of their thinking and 
speech reflected hypermentalizing. They could elaborate on their mental states at length. 
But they were also highly and quite enduringly suggestible, since their specific difficulty 
was in recognizing and reflecting on present or past experience as a source of thoughts 
and feelings. In this state, a shared pretend mode can readily be elaborated on the basis 
of clinician suggestion.23 For Fonagy, a significant proportion of psychoanalytic theor-
izing, based on work with hypermentalizing patients, is itself the speculative attribution of 
mental states cut rather free of attention to concrete particulars. There are also weak mech-
anisms available for disconfirming psychoanalytic hypotheses, both in the consulting 
room and in interaction between analyst peers (see Chapter 2). The characterization of 
some— though by no means all— psychoanalytic theorizing as hypermentalizing appears 
rather a devastatingly apt characterization, from Freud to the present day.24 Fonagy and 
colleagues have also proposed that the apparent success of patients with BPD on meas-
ures of theory of mind and interpretation of facial cues is actually because these meas-
ures fail to distinguish mentalization from hypermentalization. Individuals engaged in 
hypermentalizing may pay detailed attention to the external indicators of mental states 
assessed by these measures, but the initial ideas of participants are left unchecked by the 
potential for reconsideration.
To empirically examine this proposition, Sharp, Fonagy, and colleagues conducted a 
film- based assessment of social cognition with 111 adolescent inpatients between the ages 
of 12 and 17.25 The movie comprised a 15- minute film about four characters at a dinner 
party. At 45 points the movie was stopped, and participants were asked what the characters 
 23 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’, Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899: ‘From the de-
scriptions, Freud’s patients sound very borderline. Of course, it’s not surprising that much of psychoanalysis was 
discovered with those patients, because they are incredibly accessible to elaborating their mental states. They 
hyper- mentalize quite a lot. Also, unfortunately, they are very suggestible. If you tell them that this or that has hap-
pened, because they can’t turn inside and check out what’s going on in their own mind.’
 24 One illustration is Freud’s appeal to symbolism to ‘overcome’ the opacity of the patient’s mind. Freud, S. ([1900] 
2001). The Interpretation of Dreams. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume 4, London: Vintage: ‘We are thus obliged, in dealing with those elements of the dream- content which must 
be recognized as symbolic, to adopt a combined technique, which on the one hand rests on the dreamer’s associ-
ations and on the other hand fills the gaps from the interpreter’s knowledge of symbols’ (p. 353). In itself, reference 
to cultural discourses in interpreting mental states seems readily justifiable (see Chapter 9). However, the very 
speculative account of mythic symbolism deployed by Freud can be seen to predispose hypermentalising in his 
clinical work. See e.g. Kris, A. O. (1994). ‘Freud’s Treatment of a Narcissistic Patient’. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 75: 649– 664; Koellreuter, A. (ed.), (2016). What is this Professor Freud Like?: A Diary of an Analysis 
with Historical Comments, London: Karnac Books.
 25 Sharp, C., Pane, H., Ha, C., Venta, A., Patel, A. B., Sturek, J., and Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Theory of Mind and 
Emotion Regulation Difficulties in Adolescents With Borderline Traits’. Journal of the American Academy of Child 
& Adolescent Psychiatry, 50(6): 563– 573. See also Somma, A., Ferrara, M., Terrinoni, A., Frau, C., Ardizzone, I., 
Sharp, C., and Fossati, A. (2019). ‘Hypermentalizing as a Marker of Borderline Personality Disorder in Italian 
Adolescents: A Cross- Cultural Replication of Sharp and Colleagues’(2011) Findings’. Borderline Personality 
Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 6(1): 5.
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were thinking, feeling, or intending. The assessment was coded to distinguish between 
mentalizing and hypermentalizing. A clinical interview was also used to assess for BPD, and 
23% of the sample met diagnostic criteria. Participants also completed a self- report measure 
of emotion regulation, the ‘Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Strategies Scale’. This measure 
treats as a single dimension a variety of somewhat different phenomena under the umbrella 
of ‘emotion regulation’: ‘awareness and understanding of emotions, acceptance of emotions, 
the ability to engage in goal- directed behavior and refrain from impulsive behavior when 
experiencing negative emotions, as well as the flexible use of situationally appropriate strat-
egies to modulate emotional responses’.26
Sharp and colleagues found that the degree of mentalizing had no association 
with symptoms of BPD— in direct conflict with Fonagy’s early theory of the develop-
mental pathway to BPD. However, in clear agreement with Fonagy and colleagues’ 
later account, the researchers found a very substantial (r = .41) relationship between 
hypermentalizing and symptoms of BPD, independent of age, gender, and other mental 
health symptoms. Sharp and colleagues also reported that 44% of the relationship be-
tween hypermentalizing and symptoms of BPD was mediated by difficulties with emotion 
regulation (see Figure 5.1). The findings demonstrate the importance of distinguishing 
between hypermentalizing and mentalizing, both for assessments of social cognition and 
theoretically. And the findings suggest the importance of emotion dysregulation for the 
stabilization of hypermentalization as a form of non- mentalizing into the symptoms asso-
ciated with BPD. However, what aspects of emotion dysregulation are serving this role as 
yet remains unclear, due to the use of an umbrella measure of emotion regulation in this 
exploratory research.
 26 Sharp, C., Pane, H., Ha, C., Venta, A., Patel, A. B., Sturek, J., and Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Theory of Mind and 
Emotion Regulation Difficulties in Adolescents With Borderline Traits’. Journal of the American Academy of 
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 50(6): 563– 573, p. 566. Later research has found that the different phenomena in-
cluded in the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Strategies Scale have a bifactor structure, with one general emo-
tion dysregulation factor and five uncorrelated specific factors. Both the general factor and the specific factors 
each demonstrated incremental validity. Hallion, L. S., Steinman, S. A., Tolin, D. F., and Diefenbach, G. J. (2018). 
‘Psychometric Properties of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and its Short Forms in Adults 














Figure 5.1 Difficulties in emotion regulation (DERS) as a mediator of the relation between 
hypermentalizing (MASC) and borderline personality traits (BPFSC).
Note: Values on each path are standardized β values (path coefficient). Coefficient inside parentheses are 
standardized partial regression coefficient from equations that include both variables with direct effects on the 
criterion or dependent variable. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Source: Reproduced from Carla Sharp et al., ‘Theory of Mind and Emotion Regulation Difficulties in Adolescents 
With Borderline Traits’, Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 50(6): 563– 573, 
Figure 1, DOI: https:// doi.org/ 10.1016/ j.jaac.2011.01.017 Copyright © 2011 American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The capacity for pretend as an asset
The basis for pretend mode, hypermentalizing, and for mentalizing lies in the imaginative 
capacity to conceive of mental states. This capacity has been situated as resting developmen-
tally on ‘playful exploration’, characterized by Bateman and Fonagy as a ‘basic emotion’, like 
anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise.27 They argued that the capacity for playful explor-
ation is inherent to humans. Though Bateman and Fonagy focus their attention on symbolic 
play, in principle, playful exploration is much wider than this. It entails the manipulation of 
something in the world— for instance, a toy— to consider its modalities— for instance, what 
it must, should, can, may, or might do. With the maturation of a child’s capacity for cog-
nition, playful exploration is elaborated into the ability to take pleasure and interest from 
play with the modalities of representations, what they must, should, can, may, or might do. 
Fonagy and colleagues proposed that the ability to decouple the embodied experience of 
observed reality, and its felt immediacy, from representations of this reality is fed by playful 
exploration. This ability is of critical importance for mentalizing and reflective function: it 
is the capacity for imaginative, counter- factual representation that allows thoughts and feel-
ings to be conceived of in others.28 Fonagy and colleagues also argued, perhaps more specu-
latively, that the identification and representation of thoughts and feelings in oneself likewise 
depend on the same process.29
The imaginative capacity to decouple experience and representation allows an individual 
to negotiate the implications of past or present perception, somewhat or wholly de- realizing 
them. In his essay, ‘Psychoses and child care’, Winnicott described one form of imaginary 
play that he regarded as quite problematic. It is characterized by ‘the lack of a beginning and 
end to the game, by the degree of magical control, by the lack of organization of play ma-
terial according to any one pattern, and by the inexhaustibility of the child’.30 This seems to 
resonate with Fonagy’s account of Hannah’s narratives about her missing father, discussed 
above. By contrast, Winnicott describes a healthy form of de- realization, in which reality is 
incorporated in such a way as to make it available for perspective- taking. In agreement with 
Winnicott, Fonagy and colleagues proposed that the exercise of imagination can contribute 
to mentalization in the symbolic play of young children.
This was illustrated by a study by Tessier, Normandin, Ensink, and Fonagy.31 The re-
searchers studied 39 children aged between 3 and 8 who had experienced sexual abuse, and 
 27 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 305. Though not cited, given the use of the term ‘explor-
ation’, in the background here may be Bowlby and Hinde’s idea of the exploratory behavioural system as, like at-
tachment, a form of behaviour predisposed in humans by our evolutionary history. See Bowlby, J. (1969/ 1982). 
Attachment, London: Penguin, p. 238 and Hinde, R. A. (1954). ‘Factors Governing the Changes in Strength Of a 
Partially Inborn Response. 1. The Nature of the Response, and an Examination of its Course’. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society, B, 142: 306– 331.
 28 Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment 
of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656: ‘Pretence and the understanding 
of another’s mental state have in common the need to be able to entertain a belief whilst at the same time knowing 
this to be false’; Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, 
and Problems with Self and Identity: A Social‐Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88- 105 
: ‘Mentalizing is the basic social cognitive tool that individuals use to constantly update and adaptively sketch out 
their imagined selves and the imagined minds of others.’
 29 This proposal is elaborated in a recent doctoral project, supervised by Liz Allison: Hardy, A. (2018). The ‘Reality 
Oriented’ Imagination: A Philosophical Examination of the Imagination in ‘Mentalization’ and ‘Neuropsychoanalysis. 
Unpublished doctoral thesis, London: University College London.
 30 Winnicott, D. W. (1953). ‘Psychoses and Child Care’. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 26(1): 68– 74.
 31 Tessier, V. P., Normandin, L., Ensink, K., and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Fact or Fiction? A Longitudinal Study of Play 
and the Development of Reflective Functioning’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 80(1): 60– 79.
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21 matched controls who had not experienced sexual abuse. The children were assessed with 
the Children’s Play Therapy Instrument to examine the coherence of beginning- middle- 
end sequences during a child’s fantasy play. The children also completed the adapted Adult 
Attachment Interview, coded using Ensink’s revision of the reflective functioning scale to 
be applicable to children and to distinguish mentalizing the self and mentalizing others (see 
Chapter 4). The researchers found that sexual abuse had a substantial association with re-
duced capacity to mentalize other people in the interview. But this relationship was wholly 
mediated by the coherence of sequences in the child’s fantasy play. There was, however, no 
mediation by the coherence of symbolic play on the effects of sexual abuse on the abused 
children’s reduced scores on the scale for mentalization of the self. The researchers argued 
that the capacity for effective symbolic play could serve to buffer the consequences of sexual 
abuse for making sense of other minds. But they were sorry to see that, at least on the evi-
dence of this study, such buffering did not extend to the child’s capacity for identifying and 
interpreting their own mental states in interview.
The capacity for imagination is important not just for children but for adults too. Fonagy 
and Target described in detail the value of play and imagination for sensitive caregiving in-
formed by reflective functioning. As we saw in Chapter 3, for Ainsworth, sensitivity requires 
more than the caregiver accurately identifying the child’s physical behaviour— for instance, 
an infant’s cry. Sensitivity requires the caregiver to ‘perceive and to interpret accurately the 
signals and communications implicit in her infant’s behaviour’.32 This entails conceiving 
of invisible mental states, in this case feelings implicated in motivations, which already in 
infancy may be as varied as hunger, discomfort, pain, loneliness, boredom, or confusion. 
To Ainsworth’s account of sensitivity, Fonagy and Target added that reflective function en-
tails not just a capacity to acknowledge the child’s mental states, but also the capacity for 
perspective- taking, a kind of play with representations. Perspective- taking allows the care-
giver to put their child’s demands into context and not be overwhelmed by them: a diffi-
cult task when confronted with an infant’s seemingly endless crying. Nonetheless, Fonagy 
and Target proposed that if the caregiver feels overwhelmed and totally subjected to the 
child’s displayed emotion, this in turn offers reduced containment for the child.33 By con-
trast, if a child’s emotion is met with acknowledgement but also with the caregiver’s cap-
acity to hold this in perspective, to remain capable of imagination and perspective- taking, 
then this will contribute to the child’s ability to ‘ultimately use the parent’s representation of 
his internal reality as the seed for his own symbolic thought, his representation of his own 
representations’.34
Fonagy and colleagues have claimed that imagination and spontaneity can support in-
novation, nonconformity, and ethical vision. In fact, engaging in psychological theory itself 
entails use of this imaginative capacity. Problems with imagination and spontaneity arise, 
they have argued, when the ‘gating mechanism’ that would usually ‘bridle’ these responses 
fails. Imagination and spontaneity are then cut loose from i) the concrete particulars of 
 32 Ainsworth, M. (1969). ‘Sensitivity vs. Insensitivity to the Baby’s Signals Scale’. Accessed at: http:// www.psych-
ology.sunysb.edu/ attachment/ measures/ content/ ainsworth_ scales.html.
 33 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality II: The Development of Psychic Reality from a 
Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479. See also Byrne, G., Sleed, 
M., Midgley, N., Fearon, R. M. P., Mein, C., Bateman, A., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Lighthouse Parenting 
Programme: Description and Pilot Evaluation of Mentalization- Based Treatment (MBT) to Address Child 
Maltreatment’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 24(4): 680– 693 .
 34 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality II: The Development of Psychic Reality from a 
Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479, p. 472.
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experienced reality and/ or ii) from the stabilizing effects of social referencing and norms.35 
Their emphasis on this point can sometimes give the impression that Fonagy and colleagues 
value the stabilizing effects of social referencing and framing over nonconformity. This is 
probably an effect of the fact that their work emerges in part from a clinical context, in which 
stability and common reference points are important proximal assets and goals. However, 
Fonagy and colleagues have at times demonstrated a wider distrust in the judgement of in-
dividuals separated from social referencing and norms: ‘in general when people are left on 
their own to figure things out they tend to go astray in their thoughts and feelings’.36
Nonetheless, in their writings on play Fonagy and Target strongly underscored the bene-
fits of a child’s developmental capacity for decoupling representation from past or present ex-
perience. They reviewed evidence that suggested that the subtlety of a child’s understanding 
of their own and others’ mental states as the basis for one perspective, rather than a simple 
expression of reality, is greater while in pretend play.37 The addition of playful exploration 
may make examination of mental states easier, in part perhaps because the heavy particular-
ities of concrete experience can be dropped away. This could be why the use of projective doll 
play tasks in the assessment of children’s experience of relationships or thinking can be much 
more effective than straightforward versions of the same tasks.38
Fonagy and colleagues have argued that both the symbolic play of children and the cre-
ativity of adults are nourished by access to i) the concrete particulars of lived experience; and 
ii) to common reference points with others, including forms of social recognition and cul-
tural knowledge.39 Yet Fonagy and colleagues also appear to accept that creativity is vivified 
by the capacity— in turn— to ‘gate’ knowledge of concrete particulars and common reference 
points in the perspectives of others, and access pretend mode for particular purposes. As 
we saw in Chapter 3, Fonagy praised the work of creators such as Baudelaire, Rimbaud, and 
Nerval, for whom the bridle did not sit comfortably.40 Given the reflections of Baudelaire, 
 35 Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, 63– 77, p. 70; Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Preface’, in Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, p. xvii. For 
a comparison of mentalizing with the psychoanalytic notion of the superego, see Jurist, E. L. (2014). ‘Whatever 
Happened to the Superego?: Loewald and the Future of Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 31(4): 489– 501.
 36 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 325.
 37 E.g. Dias, M. G. and Harris, P. L. (1990). ‘The Influence of the Imagination on Reasoning by Young Children’. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 8(4): 305– 318; Gopnik, A. and Slaughter, V. (1991). ‘Young Children’s 
Understanding of Changes in their Mental States’. Child Development, 62(1): 98– 110.
 38 Woolgar, M., Steele, H., Steele, M., Yabsley, S., and Fonagy, P. (2001). ‘Children’s Play Narrative Responses 
to Hypothetical Dilemmas and their Awareness of Moral Emotions’. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 
19(1): 115– 128; Steele, M., Steele, H., Woolgar, M., Yabsley, S., Fonagy, P., Johnson, D. (2003). ‘An Attachment 
Perspective on Children’s Emotion Narratives: Links cross Generations’, in R. N. Emde, D. P. Wolf, and D. Oppen- 
heim (eds), Revealing the Inner Worlds of Young Children: The Macarthur Story Stem Battery and Parent– Child 
Narratives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 163– 181).
 39 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2018). ‘The Origin of Human Life: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective’, 
European Psychoanalytical Federation, 31st Annual Conference, Warsaw, 24 March: ‘The potential space that 
Winnicott refers to is the imagined common ground between self- reflection (the experienced self) and the experi-
ence of the other’s reflection on the self. The larger this common ground, the closer the shape of self and the other’s 
perceived view of the self, the higher the level of epistemic trust experienced by the patient and the more open the 
patient’s mind is to imagining the analyst’s experience in relation to physical or mental phenomena to which the 
patient so far has no access. Patients unlock their imagination and accept a new reality when they feel that their 
reality has been adequately imagined and accepted.’
 40 It is curious that Fonagy almost never mentions authors of fiction. The same is true for Bion. Nonetheless, 
both cite Baudelaire and Rimbaud as authors who illustrate the role of imagination and proto- thoughts and feel-
ings in the effective and powerful depiction of mental states. Bion, W. R. (1976). ‘Emotional Turbulence’, in Clinical 
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Rimbaud, and Nerval themselves on the nature and costs of creativity, it may be suspected 
that for these authors this ‘access’ was not always easy to modulate, and that this was intri-
cately bound up with its power and effectiveness.
For instance, in Baudelaire’s poem ‘Crowds’, he argues that both access to the commons 
and the potential for independence from it are necessary for genuine creation: ‘multitude, 
solitude: equal and interchangeable terms for the active, fertile poet. The man who cannot 
people his solitude will not be able, either, to be alone in a busy crowd.’41 In The Painter of 
Modern Life he defied his reader to identify a truly beautiful work of cultural production 
that was not an effective composite of intersubjectivity and current cultural knowledge, 
together with something autonomous of them, out of keeping with anything timely.42 
However, for Baudelaire, this composite was not in the first instance a methodological 
product of conscious intention, but of slow work on the self to become able to sustain and 
benefit from both rampages of individual imagination and immersion in the crowd. To 
take another example, Nerval’s final novel, left unfinished by his suicide, cuts off after the 
protagonist’s remarks of gratitude for the events that had ‘rendered me back to the renewed 
affection of my family and friends’, which had helped him to ‘a healthier view of the world 
of illusions in which I had for some time lived’. Simultaneously, he offered gratitude for his 
journeys beyond common social and cultural reference points, for all that these journeys 
could sometimes resemble hell.43
Besides the production of creative works, another context in which pretend mode has 
specific uses, one that especially interested Fonagy and Target, is the therapeutic setting. 
Here the relationship between pretend mode and shared perspective taking is squared in 
the collaboration between patient and therapist. In therapy there is a ‘dual reality’.44 This 
can take clients a bit of time to recognize, and early sessions are often spent helping the 
patient discover this. The patient must talk seriously about feelings and ideas which they 
also know are false, as if this was the most important thing in the world. And then leave 
the therapeutic setting and get on with responding to the practical challenges of a life that 
only partly intersect with the matters under discussion in their therapy. The transference 
relationship with the therapist is a kind of ‘illusion’. As Fonagy puts it wryly, ‘most of us 
who have had analytic experiences know what is meant by transference love, but few of us 
have serenaded our analyst on moon- lit summer nights’.45 However, this aspect of pretend 
within the therapeutic relationship is not a deficit, but part of how it works. Therapy loses its 
effectiveness if it is wholly subjected to the ugly, dismal, unsafe, or stultifying, because ‘the 
intrusion of unassimilable reality destroys the possibility of play, and this includes playing 
Seminars and Other Works, London: Karnac Books, pp. 295– 305, p. 304. This seems less likely to be influence, and 
more likely theoretical convergence to the point of aesthetic overlaps.
 41 Baudelaire, C.- P. (1995). Selected Poems, trans. Carol Clark, London: Penguin, p. 201.
 42 Baudelaire, C.- P. (1972). ‘The Painter of Modern Life’, in Selected Writings on Art and Literature, trans. P. E. 
Charvet, London: Penguin, pp. 390– 436.
 43 Nerval, G. ([1855] 1999). ‘Aurélia’, in Richard Sieburth (ed.), Selected Writings, London: Penguin, pp. 265– 316, 
p. 316.
 44 Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the Treatment 
of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656, p. 652.
 45 See also Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘2: Peter Fonagy’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 11(4): 575– 584: ‘Therapy, cer-
tainly psychoanalytic therapy, is in many respects a “pretend” experience. Therapist and patient discuss fantasies, 
feelings and ideas which they “know” at the same time to be false. John Klauber wrote beautifully about this in his 
paper on transference as an illusion (in Klauber and others, 1988). Most of us who have had analytic experiences 
know what is meant by transference love, but few of us have serenaded our analyst on moon- lit summer nights’ 
(p. 578), citing Klauber, John (1988). Illusion and Spontaneity in Psychoanalysis, London: Free Association Books.
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with ideas’.46 Part of the difficulty in supporting mentalization in self- critical, depressed 
patients is that ‘these patients may have little capacity for adaptive pretend functioning’, cut-
ting off possibilities for playing with ideas.47 Yet, when there is also some pretend in play to 
offer safety, therapy is most beneficial when it intersects with the patient’s lived experience 
outside therapy and the ugly, dismal, unsafe, or stultifying things that it may contain. This 
was part of what impressed Fonagy about Hurry’s approach to his own analysis as an ado-
lescent: his cheap, ugly car— seen by Hurry out of the window— could be valued for what it 
signified to an isolated young man (see Chapter 1).
In a child’s— or an adult’s— symbolic narratives, observations of social behaviour and 
aspects of perceptual experience are incorporated into the play, giving it vitality and reson-
ance. This is the paradox and magic of play. But in pretend mode as a form of non- mentalizing, 
thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations or intentions are conceived specifically at the 
expense of awareness of observable social behaviour and/ or perceptual experience. Fonagy 
and Target proposed that factors that undermine the development of mentalization— in the 
1990s and 2000s they emphasized especially disorganized attachment relationships— may be 
anticipated to hinder the integration of imagination and understanding.48 On the one hand, 
the capacity for decoupling representation may risk representation uninformed by reality. 
This will result in chaotic or confusing narratives without effective sequencing. On the other 
hand, when mentalizing capacities are fragile, the decoupled representation may still feel like 
reality. Then children’s experiences of pretend may be quite anxiety- provoking.49 Recently, 
Fonagy and colleagues have come to characterize dissociation as an extreme form of pretend 
mode, in which observable social reality and/ or perceptual experience are not simply ignored, 
but lost from awareness, through immersion in the pretend mode of non- mentalizing.50 
Pretend mode does not simply predispose mental health problems, but in fact is proposed as 
the process through which certain symptoms such as dissociation occur.
Fonagy and Target have offered guidance on helping children and adults integrate im-
agination and understanding in the context of therapeutic work. Greater use of pretend 
mode is developmentally appropriate for children. Here the therapist may wish to facilitate 
pretend, while nourishing it with concrete particulars and intersubjective understanding, 
allowing the child to conceive of and reconsider their experiences. Target has reflected that, 
when working with older patients who lean heavily on pretend mode, in her experience, 
clinical ‘technique needed to be modified in the early stages to enable these patients, already 
too loosely connected to reality, to engage more authentically. Consistent gentle confronta-
tion, and little development of a shared pretend mode, helped to create traction. After that, a 
more usual analytic technique became effective.’51 Skårderud and Fonagy have also stressed 
 46 Target, M. (1998). ‘The Recovered Memories Controversy’. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79: 1015– 
1028, p. 1026.
 47 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 385– 
418, p. 411.
 48 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality II: The Development of Psychic Reality from a 
Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479.
 49 Kaplan, N. R. (1989). Individual Differences in Six- Year- Olds’ Thoughts about Separation: Predicted from 
Attachment to Mother at One Year. Unpublished doctoral thesis, Berkeley: University of California. Luyten, P. 
and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Assessing Mentalizing in Attachment Contexts’, in S. Farnfield and P. Holmes (eds), The 
Routledge Handbook of Attachment: Assessment, London: Routledge, pp. 210– 216.
 50 Target, M. (2007). ‘The Interface between Attachment and Intersubjectivity: Another Contribution from 
Karlen Lyons- Ruth’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 26(4): 617– 621, p. 620.
 51 Target, M. (2008). ‘Some Thoughts on Lying and Pretending’. Plenary delivered to the British Psycho- 
Analytical Society Scientific Meeting, 18 June 2008, unpublished manuscript, Mary Target personal archive.
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the importance of authenticity for work with adolescent and adult patients reliant on pre-
tend mode processing. They urge that clinicians feel able to think aloud, referring to ideas, 
perspectives, meanings, feelings. But that these should always be tagged as belonging to the 
therapist. Otherwise there is a risk that the patient will pick up these elements as the basis for 
a shared pretend mode, without traction for the concretely lived experience of the patient 
and the personal and social challenges they face.52
Psychic equivalence
Besides pretend mode, a second kind of non- mentalizing described by Fonagy and col-
leagues was what they termed ‘psychic equivalence’. In this state, aspects of present experi-
ence are taken to represent facts that are inevitable and true.53 Within psychic equivalence, 
it is extremely difficult for the individual to entertain the idea that there could be any other 
perspective on how things are besides how it feels right now. As we saw in Chapter 4, 
mentalization may be conceptualized as a capacity to conceive of and make available for 
reconsideration thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations and intentions in order to 
account for and explain the observable social behaviour and perceptual experience of oneself 
and others. In these terms, psychic equivalence means to account for and explain thoughts and 
feelings and observable social behaviour in terms of an immediate experience. Missing here is 
the capacity to conceive of and reconsider perceptions of things. Present perceptions, even 
sensory perceptions, are profoundly mediated by wider psychological and social processes. 
But they may possess the quality of feeling immediate to the individual. Hegel termed this the 
feeling of ‘sense certainty’.54 In psychic equivalence, sense certainty is mistaken for reality. 
Present perceptions and their felt immediacy dominate the scene. For instance, feeling be-
trayed, an individual interprets the mental states and behaviour of themselves and others in 
terms of a betrayal. Feeling a sense of togetherness with another person, psychic equivalence 
leads an individual to the conclusion that this is because they are in reality together or a 
single unit, which can set up future disappointments.
Rather than perceptual experience being understood in terms of feelings and thoughts as 
implicated in motivations and intentions, within psychic equivalence mental states and be-
haviour are understood only in terms of an immediate experience. Indeed, even the capacity 
 52 Skårderud, F. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Eating disorders’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 347– 384, 
p. 378.
 53 Initially there was some ambiguity in Fonagy and Target’s account of psychic equivalence about what inner ex-
perience was considered ‘equivalent’ to. They later acknowledged that ‘In previous writings, we had conflated two 
features of psychic equivalence: (a) equation with other minds and (b) equation with the physical.’ Fonagy, P. and 
Target, M. (2007). ‘Playing with Reality: IV. A Theory of External Reality Rooted in Intersubjectivity.’ International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 88: 917– 937, p. 927. This ambiguity is resolved by the 2010s, where— following the main 
line of argument present already in Fonagy and Hepworth’s writings from the 1990s— psychic equivalence was 
taken to be an equation of personal perception and reality. What matters for psychic equivalence is the lack of me-
diation that would occur when perceptions are recognized as perceptions, rather than reality.
 54 Hegel, G. W. F. ([1807] 1977). The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. Heidegger offers a characterization of sense certainty that highlights the way that sense certainty undercuts 
perspective- taking since there is no perspective available to take: ‘sense certainty asserts itself to be the unchanging 
relation, admitting no distinction between I and object, wherein the poles of the relation as well as the relation 
itself are undifferentiated and not distinguished.’ This requires ongoing efforts to dodge or suppress information 
that might otherwise suggest this distinction: ‘What is shown again and again is the effort to keep from falling out 
of immediacy . . . and not posing questions.’ Heidegger, M. ([1930– 1931] 1988). Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 70– 2.
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to compare and integrate information from different senses may be lost, as any immediate 
experience, even from one sense alone, gains the quality of sense certainty and comes to feel 
absolute and necessary. Possible differences between past experience and current percep-
tions are likewise lost or sidelined.
In clinical settings, psychic equivalence can contribute to a variety of symptoms. One of 
the central axes of trauma symptomatology is flashbacks, in which memories are experi-
enced in the mode of psychic equivalence, feeling terrifyingly immediate, actual, and in-
evitable.55 Another of trauma’s central axes is avoidance of reminders of the event. Again, 
this can be interpreted as the operation of psychic equivalence, in which the experience 
of the reminder is felt to threaten the immediacy of the traumatic experience. The feeling 
of concreteness associated with psychic equivalence can also contribute to somatic symp-
toms following trauma, through the equation of psychological and physical pain and ex-
haustion.56 In contrast to experiences that feel over- real and inescapable, prompted by 
psychic equivalence, ‘the alternative to this mode of functioning, the heir of the pretend 
mode of psychic reality, is dissociation in the wake of trauma. The most characteristic fea-
ture of traumatization is the oscillation between these two modes of experiencing internal 
reality.’57
Psychic equivalence can also contribute to the symptoms of BPD in the domain of per-
sonal relationships. Under the terms of psychic equivalence, individuals cannot experience 
their fears, grievances, expectations, and other affectively laden attributions as unfounded, 
even when they seem improbable. And the present appears as the only reality: the sense 
of time, of existing with a past and future, is disturbed by the immediacy and unalterable 
quality of the individual’s experience. This hinders access to strategies such as patience, 
helpful distraction, taking a moment to regain composure, and other techniques deployed 
by the ‘gating mechanism’ that would otherwise prevent our current perceptions from stam-
peding into the form of set certainties.58 In a state of psychic equivalence, individuals can 
also be hyper- reactive to shame, because the badness of the self is experienced as total and 
without possible respite.59 Likewise, frustrations can blow up into dramatic outbursts and 
aggression, but without an accurate sense of the cause of the frustration: ‘In explaining a vio-
lent outburst, for instance, the patient might refer to the oppressive character of the room he 
was in.’60
Fonagy and colleagues proposed that the most important trigger for psychic equivalence 
is high arousal/ emotionality. Strong emotion can also help sustain psychic equivalence by 
hindering access to controlled mentalizing.61 Fonagy and colleagues do not, so far as we 
 55 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 442.
 56 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A. and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 385– 
418, p. 397.
 57 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G. and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 442.
 58 Fonagy, P., Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77, p. 70.
 59 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 70.
 60 Ibid. 130.
 61 Ibid. 43.
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can tell, ascribe a fundamental proximal trigger for pretend mode or teleological mode in 
this way, putting into relief the special link they see between high arousal/ emotionality and 
psychic equivalence. In fact, given that they regard high arousal/ emotionality as giving ex-
perience intensity, immediacy, and urgency, there is a sense in which the boundary between 
the constructs of high arousal/ emotionality and psychic equivalence is permeable. Bateman, 
Fonagy, and Campbell propose that ‘emotions always feel real’.62 Nonetheless, not all high 
arousal/ emotionality leads to psychic equivalence. When Fonagy and colleagues discuss the 
kind of high arousal/ emotionality that leads to psychic equivalence, they tend to use the 
term ‘dysregulated emotion’,63 which might give one axis of specification to this notoriously 
hazy concept.64
As we saw earlier, Fonagy and colleagues do not wish to denigrate non- mentalizing, 
despite the fact that they feel that it can contribute to suffering, hinder measured decision 
making, and fuel interpersonal conflict. The capacity for pretend and ‘as if ’ thinking can 
be an asset. Likewise, Fonagy and colleagues observe that the raw certainty and immediacy 
of psychic equivalence plays a part in many of the most dramatic, invigorating, and mean-
ingful aspects of human life. Psychic equivalence can provide essential winter fuel for the 
hard times faced by individuals holding fast to ethical conviction or sense of vocation, al-
lowing a personal perception of injustice or calling to outweigh other concerns. This can 
allow such values to take precedence over mental states such as disappointment or a wish 
for easier, pragmatic solutions. Likewise, psychic equivalence can contribute to the feeling 
of our personal relationships as consequential, and even to some of their satisfactions. 
Part of the pleasure of adult sexuality, Fonagy and Target claim, stems from entry into a 
state of psychic equivalence: the immediate experience of giving and receiving pleasure can 
 62 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, 323– 334, p. 330. Given reflection, this claim seems somewhat unlikely. Jurist gives a whole 
chapter in his book on mentalizing emotion to discussing emotions that do not feel wholly real, and that prompt 
doubt in themselves. In a sense, this claim might instead be regarded as definitional, in clarifying what Fonagy and 
colleagues actually mean by emotion— i.e. an affective state which cannot prompt doubt in the reality of what is 
perceived. This gives further evidence for the porous boundary between the constructs of arousal/ emotionality 
and psychic equivalence, discussed earlier in the chapter, if states of arousal/ emotionality imply a lack of doubt in 
current perceptions. On emotions that do not feel wholly real, see Jurist, E. (2018). Minding Emotions: Cultivating 
Mentalisation in Psychotherapy, New York: Guilford Press, Chapter 1.
 63 E.g. Bateman, A., Fonagy, P., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman 
and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, 323– 334: ‘We see dysregulated emotional thinking as triggering the concreteness of the 
psychic equivalence mode, which in turn makes it difficult for the individual to accept alternative perspectives that 
could help to contextualise and downregulate the intensity of the experience’ (p. 326).
 64 Dysregulation connotes both intensity and out- of- context affect, but in fact only one or the other may be a 
problem. It suggests all affects that are poorly regulated, but it is not clear that joy or awe or political outrage, even 
if dysregulated, would be what Fonagy and colleagues wish to capture. It is also not clear whether the term ‘emo-
tion dysregulation’ is intended to capture states such as flat affect. This would seem to depend on what is meant by 
‘regulation’. Berlant, L. (2015). ‘Structures of Unfeeling: Mysterious Skin’. International Journal of Politics, Culture, 
and Society, 28(3): 191– 213. One well- known definition of emotion regulation is that of Gross, in which it encom-
passes five processes: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and 
response modulation. It might be that for Fonagy and colleagues emotion dysregulation is the breakdown of one 
or more of these processes and/ or other social processes. However, if so, then this would call for work to clarify the 
specific breakdowns on these five dimensions they anticipate would be associated with non- mentalizing modes. 
Appeal merely to the umbrella term ‘dysregulated emotion’ has negative consequences for the work of Fonagy 
and colleagues— for instance, in contributing to the difficulties keeping track of attentional deployment, which is 
sometimes distinguished from and sometimes included within emotion dysregulation; also in contributing to dif-
ficulties distinguishing emotion dysregulation from non- mentalizing. Gross, J. J. and Jazaieri, H. (2014). ‘Emotion, 
Emotion Regulation, and Psychopathology: An Affective Science Perspective’. Clinical Psychological Science, 
2(4): 387– 401.
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be felt to characterize the relationship and the lovers themselves (see Chapter 6).65 The psy-
chic equivalence underpinning romantic love, especially early in the relationship, is so taken 
for granted that expressions of this mode of thought are culturally mandatory and conven-
tional. It is hard to find a Valentine’s Day card that is not framed from the position of psy-
chic equivalence: characterizing the beloved as the best person in the world; collapsing past, 
present, and future in asserting eternal feelings; the relationship is described as magical, mi-
raculous, without mundane cause or precedent.
Fonagy and Target also claimed that making use of psychic equivalence is part of how 
talking therapies offer relief from symptoms. Talking therapies provide ‘a unique oppor-
tunity for psychic change by offering a situation where an individual may re- experience the 
concreteness of the psychic equivalent mode of functioning with regard to his emotional 
life, together with the imaginative freedom and clear separation from external reality.’66 The 
patient can experience fantasies, thoughts, and feelings as real and concrete, without these 
threatening to become so outside the clinic, thanks to the aspects of therapy that helpfully 
invoke pretend mode.67 For instance, the therapist can offer reassurances that the patient’s 
expression of a wish to do something illegal or immoral will not be taken as, in itself, cause for 
concern or result in negative consequences for the patient or their relationship with the ther-
apist. Once fantasies, thoughts, and feelings in their intensity and immediacy have emerged, 
the therapist can then work with the patient to make these adequately specified, represented, 
and made available for discussion and thought. This can only take place, however, once genu-
inely held fantasies, thoughts, and feelings are made available: ‘without the emotional imme-
diacy and conviction, starting with the rawness of psychic equivalence, reflection would be 
sterile intellectualisation’.68 It is precisely out of an experience of immediately perceived reality 
as the truth that reality, perception, and truth can be articulated and distinguished.
Teleological mode
In research on theory of mind in the early 1990s, cognitive scientists drew a distinction be-
tween ‘teleological causality’ and ‘psychological causality’. In the former, an individual’s ac-
tion is represented as causally related to a future goal state; in the latter, action is represented 
as ‘intentionally’ related to a future goal state.
Q: Why did the chicken cross the road?
Teleological causality: To get to the other side.
Psychological causality: It wanted to be on the other side.69
 65 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2004). ‘Playing with the Reality of Analytic Love: Commentary on Paper by Jody 
Messler Davies “Falling in Love with Love”’. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 14(4): 503– 515; Target, M. (2007). ‘Is our 
Sexuality our Own? A Developmental Model of Sexuality Based on Early Affect Mirroring’. British Journal of 
Psychotherapy 23(4): 517– 530.
 66 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality II: The Development of Psychic Reality from a 
Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479, p. 469.
 67 Target, M. (2008). ‘Some Thoughts on Lying and Pretending’. Plenary delivered to the British Psycho- Analytical 
Society Scientific Meeting, 18 June. Accessed at: https:// wcp.memberclicks.net/ assets/ documents/ friday- eveplenary- 
target- lyingandpretending.pdf: ‘Islands of unbearable experience (as with Dr P), may be identified through the 
analyst’s sensitivity to the rawness of psychic equivalence, and his maintenance of the safe “pretend” frame.’
 68 Ibid.
 69 Csibra, G. and Gergely, G. (1998). ‘The Teleological Origins of Mentalistic Action Explanations: A 
Developmental Hypothesis’. Developmental Science, 1(2): 255– 259, p. 255.
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It was anticipated that teleological and psychological interpretations could be hierarch-
ically organized. In one hierarchy, the cause of an action could be understood with refer-
ence to an ‘intention’: ‘he thanked me because he was grateful’. Or, in another hierarchy, 
an intention could be understood in terms of an action: ‘he thanked me so must have been 
grateful.’70
Drawing on these ideas, Gergely, Csibra, and colleagues examined the emergence of the 
capacities for representing a person’s action as causally related to a future goal state.71 In pa-
pers over the late 1990s, Gergely and Csibra characterized mentalizing explanations as those 
in which teleological causality occurs in the service of psychological causality. Conversely, 
teleological causality in the absence of concern with intentions represented a kind of non- 
mentalizing when applied to the explanation of social behaviour:
Developmentally, teleological interpretations are transformed into causal mentalistic ones 
by ‘mentalizing’ the explanatory constructs of the teleological stance: i.e. by turning rep-
resentations of actual reality constraints into ‘beliefs’ (which mentally represent such con-
straints), and representations of future goal states of reality into ‘desires’ (which mentally 
represent goal- states).72
Gergely and Csibra argued that the two stances have very different implications for social 
interaction. When teleological causality alone is dominant, action can be modified only 
through direct and prompt action— for instance, through physical obstruction. Yet, when 
intentions are used to account for causal actions, ‘one becomes able to influence the other’s 
actions by changing the mental causes that generate it: i.e. by modifying the other’s inferred 
beliefs and desires through communicative interventions such as informing, promising, or 
pleading’.73
Fonagy and Target accepted the claim that teleological thinking in the absence of con-
cern with intentions represented a kind of non- mentalizing.74 To pretend mode and psy-
chic equivalence, they therefore added a third kind of non- mentalizing, which they termed 
‘teleological mode’. This they defined as a form of mental processing in which behaviour is 
interpreted and evaluated only for its observable consequences without reconsideration of 
the mental states that may have motivated or prompted it. As with pretend mode and psy-
chic equivalence, Fonagy and Target regarded teleological mode as having a precursor in the 
thinking characteristic of young children:
The compelling nature of physical reality is also obvious when children only impute inten-
tion from what is physically apparent. We noted that this teleological mode of thinking was 
present from a very early stage, but is compelling for all of us at moments when mentalizing 
 70 Leslie, A. M. (1993). ‘A Theory of Agency’, Technical Report TR- 12, Rutgers University Center for Cognitive 
Science.
 71 Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G. and Bıro, S. (1995). ‘Taking the Intentional Stance at 12 Months of Age’. 
Cognition, 56: 165– 193.
 72 Gergely, G. and Csibra, G. (1997). ‘Teleological Reasoning in Infancy: The Infant’s Naive Theory of Rational 
Action: A Reply to Premack and Premack’. Cognition, 63(2): 227– 233, pp. 231– 232.
 73 Csibra, G. and Gergely, G. (1998). ‘The Teleological Origins of Mentalistic Action Explanations: A 
Developmental Hypothesis’. Developmental Science, 1(2): 255– 259, p. 259.
 74 First mentioned in Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Attachment and Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of the 
American Psychoanalytic Association, 48(4): 1129– 1146.
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has ceased, when physical reassurance is demanded and required if emotion regulation is 
to be reinstated.75
Likewise, in ‘states of reverie, dreaming, or intense emotional arousal, these old “vestigial” 
structures may become reactivated’, and the world’s meanings become oriented around the 
physical qualities of things rather than thoughts and feelings about them.76 For instance, 
unmentalized feelings of inner disintegration and mess evoking intense emotional arousal 
may prompt a bout of cleaning or list- making.77 The gesture of organizing is forced to carry 
a burden of achieving felt coherence, since this cannot be shouldered by acknowledged feel-
ings. Risky sexual behaviour may likewise have a basis in many cases in teleological mode— 
for instance, in the assumption that interpersonal affection or self- worth can be real only if 
accompanied by physical behaviour taken to demonstrate this.78
This is not to say that thoughts and feelings are absent in teleological mode: mental states 
can be recognized, but only when they are felt to be observable.79 They do not serve as a basis 
for developing inferences about motivations. Instead, thoughts and feelings are equated with 
concrete behaviour and its observable causes. Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, and Target provided 
as an example the way that an individual may only feel loved if he or she has access to tangible, 
ideally physical signifiers of others’ affection.80 Such thinking can make individuals operating 
in teleological mode unusually attentive and vigilant to others’ behavioural cues. This permits 
an indirect attention to and awareness of mental states, via ‘hypervigilance’ to their observ-
able behaviour.81 However, mental states are not used to account for the motives behind be-
haviour. Nor are they available for reconsideration. As a consequence, one’s own and others’ 
 75 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- Based Treatment and its Roots in 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in Brownescombe Heller, M., and Pollet, S. (eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts 
in the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176, p. 161.
 76 Fonagy, P. (1994). ‘Mental Representations from an Intergenerational Cognitive Science Perspective’. Infant 
Mental Health Journal, 15(1): 57– 68, p. 64.
 77 This example is from Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality 
Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 137. For careful disambiguation of the 
concept of enactment, which has links to teleological mode, see Bohleber, W., Fonagy, P., Jiménez, J. P., Scarfone, 
D., Varvin, S., and Zysman, S. (2013). ‘Towards a Better Use of Psychoanalytic Concepts: A Model Illustrated Using 
the Concept of Enactment’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 94(3): 501– 530.
 78 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, 323– 334, p. 327.
 79 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘The Role of Attachment, Epistemic Trust and Resilience in Personality Disorder: A Trans- 
Theoretical Reformulation’, DMM News, 22, September. Accessed at: http:// www.iasa- dmm.org/ images/ uploads/ 
DMM%20%2322%20Sept%2016%20English.pdf: ‘The teleological mode refers to states of mind where mental 
attitudes are only recognised if they are accompanied by a tangible signifier and lead to a definite outcome. Hence, 
the individual can recognize the existence and potential importance of states of mind, but this recognition is 
limited to very concrete, observable situations’ (p. 3).
 80 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 385– 
418, p. 400.
 81 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Attachment and Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 48(4): 1129– 1146: ‘It is conceivable that, at a stage when such nonconscious mind- reading skills begin 
to evolve, the implications for the child of trying to infer the intentions behind their caregivers’ reactions are so 
negative that they are forced to fall back on the strategy of influencing the other by action rather than by words. 
However, they retain access at a nonconscious level to mental states, although they repudiate consciousness of it. 
It is not that borderline patients are “mind blind”; it is rather that they are not “mind conscious”. They pick up on 
cues that influence the behavioural system, but these do not surface in terms of conscious inferences’ (p. 1141). 
On the focus on observable behaviour under teleological mode as a form of hypervigilance, see Bateman, A., 
Fonagy, P., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, 323– 334, p. 328.
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physical cues and observable behaviour can give diverse and conflicting signals without the 
means to sift and interpret them. As we saw in Chapter 1, Fónagy and Fonagy had highlighted 
that secondary meanings are present across human speech in both childhood and adulthood, 
making almost every communication resonate with a variety of interpretable meanings. Only 
a fraction of this is concerted and conscious: ‘the face and the prosodic qualities of speech are 
a theatre for too many states of mind for a coherent understanding of a relationship to be reli-
ably achieved by these means.’82 These external signs taken in isolation are unstable and labile, 
often showing contradictions between primary and secondary meanings. As a result, external 
behaviours can fail to reflect the underpinning, psychological organization.83
Like pretend mode and psychic equivalence, teleological mode has been regarded by Fonagy 
and colleagues as a hijacked component of mentalization. Specifically, it represents the severed 
component of accounting for and explaining observable social behaviour.84 In mentalizing a 
capacity to conceive of and make available for reconsideration thoughts and feelings impli-
cated in motivations and intentions is deployed in order to achieve this accounting and ex-
plaining. In teleological mode, observable social behaviour is used to account for and explain 
the motivations and intentions of others and oneself. This is in contrast to mentalization where 
thoughts and feelings are used to account for and explain observable behaviour and perceptual 
experience. In the terms of Luyten and Fonagy’s four polarities, teleological mode is a kind of 
non- mentalizing in which ‘external mentalizing’ is used to infer internal states.
An interesting finding by Gagliardini and Colli has been that mentalization- based ther-
apists and psychoanalytic therapists may be more disposed to spot teleological mode than 
cognitive- behavioural therapists, given the greater focus of CBT on behaviours and mani-
festations of mental states, which may make teleological mode normalized to a certain ex-
tent by this modality.85 The precise contours of teleological mode can be seen by examining 
a strategy often used in CBT for patients with personality disorders: drawing up contracts 
with patients. A contract represents a physical embodiment of a determinate plan for future 
observable behaviour. Use of contracts became a popular clinical strategy from the 1980s 
in mandating patients with BPD to put aside specific self- destructive coping strategies.86 
Luyten and Fonagy, writing in 2012, argued that use of contracts is inappropriate when pa-
tients are operating to a significant degree in teleological mode. In this mode, patients do not 
have adequate ‘capacity for volition’, so are not able to offer meaningful consent for a contract, 
which requires a minimal degree of knowledge of one’s own plans.87 By contrast, Skårderud 
and Fonagy, writing in the same year, argued that ‘because of the teleological stance that 
those with eating disorders often display, we consider written agreements to be very useful. 
 82 Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Discussion of Juan Pablo Jimenez’s Paper, “A Fundamental Dilemma of Psychoanalytic 
Technique. Reflections on the analysis of a Perverse Paranoid Patient”’, in J. P. Jimenez and Moguillansky, R. (eds), 
Clinical and Theoretical Aspects of Perversion, London: Karnac Books, pp. 63– 76, p. 71.
 83 The classic work here is Sroufe, L. A. and Waters, E. (1977). ‘Attachment as an Organizational Construct’. 
Child Development, 48(4): 1184– 1199. See also Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Target, M. (2002). Affect 
Regulation, Mentalization and the Development of the Self, London: Karnac Books.
 84 In a presentation from October 2007, Fonagy characterized teleological mode as ‘misuse of (cognitive) 
mentalization’. Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘Infancy and Borderline Personality Disorder’. Accessed at: https:// www.hebpsy.
net/ articles.asp?id=1510.
 85 Gagliardini, G. and Colli, A. (2019). ‘Assessing Mentalization: Development and Preliminary Validation of 
the Modes of Mentalization Scale’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 249– 258.
 86 See Bloom, H. and Rosenbluth, M. (1989). ‘The Use of Contracts in the Inpatient Treatment of the Borderline 
Personality Disorder’. Psychiatric Quarterly, 60(4): 317– 327; Miller, L. J. (1990). ‘The Formal Treatment Contract 
in the Inpatient Management of Borderline Personality Disorder’. Psychiatric Services, 41(9): 985– 987.
 87 Luyten, P. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘The Multidimensional Construct of Mentalization and its Relevance to 
Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder’, in A. Fotopoulou, D. Pfaff, and M. A. Conway (eds), From the 
Couch to the Lab: Trends in Psychodynamic Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405– 427, p. 407.
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They can assist in bringing about the mental attitude that “I believe it because I see it and I try 
to cooperate because I actually have signed”.’88
The apparent conflict is resolved, however, by Bateman and Fonagy in their 2016 book 
on Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders. There the authors advocated 
against contracts that assume an individual’s capacity to know his or her own present or 
future intentions, and especially those that lead to discharge when the conditions are not 
fulfilled. However, contracts that target particular areas likely to cause problems in treatment 
specifically when the patient enters teleological mode can be a useful resource for engaging 
the patient in that mode.89 For example, a contract that states ‘Even if I demand it, please 
be careful about changing my medication in a crisis. I can consider this later when I am 
calmer’ can be helpful in response to the teleological demand to do something in response to 
felt crisis, even if this something is not a well- measured or ultimately beneficial response.90 
The case of written contracts between therapist and patient illustrates that what is missing 
in teleological mode is above all the capacity to conceive of and reflect on the feelings and 
thoughts implicated in intentions, which can be accessed only indirectly insofar as they are 
equated with tangible signifiers such as a contract.
Why three forms of non- mentalizing?
Table 5.1 summarises the forms of non- mentalizing discussed so far. As mentioned at the 
start of this chapter, Fonagy and colleagues have tended to describe pretend mode, psychic 
equivalence, and teleological mode as ‘the’ three forms of non- mentalizing. Occasionally 
they have been referred to as three possible forms among others. And on one occasion 
hypermentalizing was added as a fourth.91 But in general the description of the three, with a 
definite article, is consistent. In Fonagy and Target’s initial introduction of pretend mode and 
psychic equivalence, the pair are presented as a natural fit as the opposite of mentalization. 
Mentalization was conceptualized as attention to and reflection on the reality of relation-
ships, combined with the imaginative capacity to infer these invisible internal states. With 
the actual reality of relationships brought offline, Fonagy and Target assumed the result 
would be pretend mode. When the capacity to imagine invisible internal states went off-
line, Fonagy and Target assumed that the result would be psychic equivalence. In fact, before 
the co- authored papers with Target, Fonagy had initially termed psychic equivalence ‘actual 
 88 Skårderud, F. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Eating Disorders’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 347– 384, p. 366. 
This aligns with Fonagy’s earliest discussion of contracts with patients with borderline personality disorder, in 
which he and Higgitt were broadly in favour. Higgitt, A. and Fonagy, P. (1992). ‘Psychotherapy in Borderline and 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder’. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 161(1): 23– 43.
 89 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Because of the teleological stance that those with eating dis-
orders often display, we consider written agreements to be very useful here (p. 99); ‘Contracts tend to be indi-
vidualised and specific, often targeting particular areas likely to cause problems in treatment. We are not great 
proponents of draconian contracts likely to lead to discharge when their conditions are not fulfilled. Fluctuating 
mentalising capacity means that a patient who agrees to a contract at one point may not actually have the same 
competence in a different context’ (p. 166).
 90 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 62– 64.
 91 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lowyck, B., and Vermote, R. (2012). ‘The Assessment of Mentalization’, in A. W. 
Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 43– 66, Table 2.10.
124 Forms of non-mentalizing
mode’ to signify the over- definite sense that immediate experience is taken to represent facts 
that are inevitable and true. The phrase ‘actual mode’ signals the binary opposition he saw 
with pretend mode.92
This model was forced to shift in the 2000s with the addition of teleological mode. Perhaps 
it would have shifted anyway, as in the 2000s Fonagy and Target showed growing recogni-
tion that psychic equivalence needed better specification than the absence of imagination. 
Psychic equivalence seemed rather to account for observed behaviour and inferred mental 
states in terms of current perceptions. Fonagy and Target also showed growing recognition 
that pretend mode needed better specification about what aspect of reality had been seques-
tered. Yet through the 2000s there was no attempt to offer a model of the three forms of 
non- mentalizing, nor to operationalize the concepts. The reason for this is difficult to iden-
tify. It would have been quite possible, for instance, to develop a coding system of the Adult 
Attachment Interview for identifying pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological 
mode. In the mid- 2000s, Target supervised three doctoral projects creating and evaluating 
new scales for the Adult Attachment Interview based on the ideas about personality disorder 
she, Fonagy, and colleagues had been developing. However, no attempt was made to scale 
the modes of non- mentalizing. And the work from the doctoral projects was ultimately left 
unpublished.93
Ultimately, without operationalization and a clear model, the items contained in the con-
tainer of ‘non- mentalizing’ were prone to tumble about. For instance, Fonagy and collabor-
ators have at times reverted to their early account of a ‘prementalistic psychic reality, largely 
split into psychic equivalence and pretend modes’ as the polar opposites of one another, 
and in which teleological mode has no specified place.94 Similarly, the MBT Adherence and 
Competence Scale, developed by Karterud and an international team including Bateman 
and Fonagy, specifies that mentalization- based treatment requires that the therapist identify 
and seek to intervene with pretend mode and psychic equivalence, but there is no require-
ment for an MBT therapist to address teleological mode.95
One proposal put forward at times in the 1990s and early 2000s was that the logic of the 
three modes of non- mentalizing was that they reflected the thinking of pre- school children. 
During this time, Target was engrossed in reading the case files of child patients from the 
Anna Freud retrospective study, and Fonagy was practising as a child analyst. Fonagy may 
 92 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Playing with Reality: The Development of Psychic Reality and its Malfunction in Borderline 
Personalities’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76(1): 39– 44: ‘A stage of development when children ex-
perience an equivalence between the internal and external. I shall call this “actual mode”, alongside a representa-
tional mode of psychic functioning decoupled from external reality, a “pretend mode” ’ (p. 39).
 93 Pearson, J. (2007). Evaluating an Alternative Coding Manual for the AAI for Use with People with 
Personality Disorders. Unpublished DClinPsy thesis, London: University College London; Lee, T. (2007). The 
Development of an Alternative Personality Disorder Coding Manual for Use with the Adult Attachment Interview 
(AAI): A Psychoanalytical Approach. Unpublished DClinPsy thesis, London: University College London; Buettner, 
A. (2009). Personality Pathology and Memories of Childhood: Development of a New, Psychoanalytically Informed 
Measure. Unpublished doctoral thesis, London: University College London.
 94 E.g. Allen, J. G., Lemma, A., and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Trauma’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook 
of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 419– 444): ‘The 
inhibition of mentalising in a traumatising, hyperactivated attachment relationship leads to a prementalistic psy-
chic reality, largely split into psychic equivalence and pretend modes’ (p. 432).
 95 Karterud, S., Pedersen, G., Engen, M., Johansen, M. S., Johansson, P. N., Schlüter, C., . . . and Bateman, A. 
W. (2013). ‘The MBT Adherence and Competence Scale (MBT- ACS): Development, Structure and Reliability’. 
Psychotherapy Research, 23(6): 705– 717. Though it should be noted that identifying and working with psychic 
equivalence appears to be both rare, and difficult to code reliably, using this scale. It may be that the scale will 
undergo revision or refinement in the coming years. Simonsen, S., Juul, S., Kongerslev, M., Bo, S., Folmo, E. and 
Karterud, S. (2019). ‘The Mentalization- Based Therapy Adherence and Quality Scale (MBT- AQS): Reliability in a 
Clinical Setting’. Nordic Psychology, 71(2): 104– 115.
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have had in mind Ivan Fónagy’s observations of phenomena similar to psychic equivalence, 
pretend mode, and teleological mode in his diary of Peter’s development (see Chapter 1). 
Yet, from the early 2000s, Fonagy and Target began to criticize the focus of psychoana-
lytic theory on early childhood developmental stages in conceptualizing the basis for adult 
mental illness. This entailed criticism of their own earlier work to the extent that it remained 
indebted to such an approach. They concluded that at best metaphorical or heuristic links 
could be drawn between the mental processes characteristic of children and the mental pro-
cesses characteristic of unwell adults.96 Ultimately, ‘confidence in mapping particular forms 
of psychopathy to specific developmental epochs is unjustified . . . The metaphorical “baby” 
of psychanalytic theory which stands for “the past” will probably have to be abandoned.’97 
Appeal to a basis in pre- school forms of thinking could not offer a sufficient justification 
for pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode as the three forms of non- 
mentalizing. Today, forms of non- mentalizing are still described by some of Fonagy’s more 
psychoanalytically- oriented collaborators as “pre- mentalizing”, and this is even formalized 
in the name of one of the scales of the Parental Reflective Functioning Questionnaire.98 
However this appears to be a holdover rather than a considered stance. The characterization 
of non- mentalizing as reflecting a childish form of thinking has generally been abandoned 
by Fonagy, even if to a lesser extent by some of his collaborators.
With Fonagy and Luyten’s 2009 conceptualization of mentalization as having four poles, 
this introduced an account that promised not only a justification for the modes of non- 
mentalizing, but also an account of the specific proximal contexts in which they would 
occur. Since the introduction of this account, it has subsequently been advocated by Fonagy 
and colleagues that ‘imbalances within the dimensions of mentalizing predictably generate 
the nonmentalizing modes’: ‘Psychic equivalence is inevitable if emotion (affect) domin-
ates cognition. Teleological mode follows from an exclusive focus on external features of 
the neglect of the internal. Pretend mode thinking and hypermentalizing are unavoidable if 
reflective, explicit, controlled mentalizing is not well established’.99 This new framework ap-
pears to offer a logic as to why only three forms of mentalizing have been identified over two 
decades. Mentalizing has four poles: internal and external; affective and cognitive; self and 
other; implicit and explicit. External mentalizing at the expense of internalizing produces 
teleological mode. Affective mentalizing at the expense of cognitive mentalizing produces 
psychic equivalence. And automatic mentalizing at the expense of explicit mentalizing pro-
duces pretend mode.100
Yet this framework faces significant problems, partly inherited from trouble with Fonagy 
and Luyten’s original scheme of oppositions. First, the absence of cognitive mentalizing 
 96 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Genetics, Developmental Psychopathology, and Psychoanalytic Theory: The Case for 
Ending our (Not So) Splendid Isolation’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 23(2): 218– 247: “Through our growing know-
ledge of infants’ actual capacities we may limit speculation concerning the impact of infancy on adult function. 
The projective processes of infancy are unlikely to work in the adultomorphic way described by Bion (1957, 
1962a, b) and Klein (1935, 1952, 1958), but this does not mean that these descriptions do not contain important 
truths about adult mental function, simply that “infancy” is used metaphorically in these theorizations about 
mental process.” (231).
 97 Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘Development’, in R. M. Skelton (ed.), The Edinburgh International Encyclopaedia of 
Psychoanalysis, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 118– 121, p. 120.
 98 Luyten, P., Mayes, L. C., Nijssens, L., and Fonagy, P. (2017). The parental reflective functioning question-
naire: development and preliminary validation. PLoS ONE, 12(5): e0176218.
 99 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 19.
 100 E.g. Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Introduction’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, 14.
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alone does not prompt pretend mode, though it plays a major role in sustaining it. Rather, 
as we have seen, pretend mode also requires that mental processing is not informed by cur-
rent or past experience and its concrete constraints and tasks. This was the emphasis of 
Fonagy and Target’s early account but is missing as it has no place in Fonagy and Luyten’s 
model. Furthermore, explicit mentalizing at the expense of internal mentalizing would still 
be mentalizing. It would just be ponderous. To be able to engage in automatic mentalizing 
is adaptive. But Fonagy and colleagues’ recent definitions of mentalizing as a balance be-
tween the four poles (see Chapter 4) entail a conflation of mentalization with beneficial 
psychological functioning, at least in terms of the opposition between implicit and explicit 
mentalizing.
Second, problems also arise with the account of psychic equivalence as affective 
mentalizing at the expense of cognitive mentalizing. Affective mentalizing, according to 
Fonagy and Luyten, is the capacity to identify and interpret feelings in oneself or others. 
It is far from clear that psychic equivalence entails strengths in this capacity. Conversely, 
cognitive mentalizing was described as the capacity to identify and interpret thoughts in 
oneself or others. Again, as we saw earlier, psychic equivalence might better be character-
ized as accounting for and explaining thoughts and feelings and observable social behav-
iour in terms of immediate experience. Our embodied response to sensory cues means 
that present perceptions are the central site of affective experience.101 This gives the im-
pression of affect- led non- mentalizing in psychic equivalence. But this does not therefore 
imply strengths in attending to or in interpreting the feelings of others, or of oneself. An 
individual may face systematic psychological obstacles to conceiving of or reconsidering 
either i) thoughts or ii) feelings in themselves or others as implicated in motivations. These 
predicaments should receive a name and further consideration by those interested in 
mentalization (not least as a basis for critical dialogue with recent developments in work 
on ‘theory of mind’). But the key point here is that neither situation would necessarily 
imply psychic equivalence.
Such concerns suggest the need for an alternative justification for and logic to the sali-
ence of pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode. In the previous chapter, 
mentalization was defined as a capacity to:
 1. conceive of
 2. and make available for reconsideration
 3. the thoughts and
 4. feelings
 5. implicated in motivations and intentions
 6. in order to account for and explain
 7. the observable social behaviour
 8. and present or past perceptual experience
 9. of oneself
 10. and others.
 101 Skårderud, F. (2007). ‘Eating One’s Words, Part II: The Embodied Mind and Reflective Function in Anorexia 
Nervosa— Theory’. European Eating Disorders Review, 15(4): 243– 252; Shai, D. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Beyond 
Words: Parental Embodied Mentalizing and the Parent Infant Dance’, in M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (eds), 
Mechanisms of Social Connections: From Brain to Group, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 
pp. 185– 203. See also Merleau- Ponty, M. ([1945] 2012). Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes, 
London: Routledge.
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Exercise of this capacity can be regarded as requiring two major syntheses, which then in 
turn need to be integrated.102 The first synthesis is of ‘experience’. This entails conceiving of 
and perceiving reality, both mental and physical. Addressing this synthesis, Winnicott dis-
tinguished between the ‘subjectively conceived’ and the ‘objectively perceived’ self and other 
as interacting components within human perception, and urges that only when these are 
brought together is mental life experienced as alive and creatively usable.103 He was especially 
worried by a situation he described as the ‘false self ’, by which he meant a situation in which 
the experiences of others are used to account for and explain the motivations and intentions 
of others and oneself, to the exclusion of one’s own ‘subjectively conceived’ and the ‘object-
ively perceived’ experiences.104 In interpreting the idea of ‘objectively perceived’ experience, 
Winnicott emphasized that an objectively perceived object is still a perception, and therefore 
subjective in a sense, rather than the thing- in- itself. His emphasis is how we integrate per-
ceptions granted or imposed by the object with perceptions stemming from what we want 
from the object and how we find ourselves imagining it. On similar lines, mentalization de-
pends upon the achievement of a subjective conception of other and/ or oneself, fed by spe-
cific information apprehended by perceptions of felt or reported experience and observable 
behaviour. Drawing on Winnicott, Fonagy and colleagues have regularly emphasized that 
we depend upon an element of imagination in understanding motivations and intentions, 
which always have a certain opacity to us.105
The second great synthesis is of what Fonagy and colleagues term ‘understanding’. This 
entails the activity of accounting for and explaining behaviour and/ or experience with the 
 102 Drawing here from Hegel’s remarks on Kant’s synthesis of apperception and faculty of understanding. Hegel, 
G.W. F. ([1816] 2010). The Science of Logic, trans. and ed. G. Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
For Hegel, sense certainty (psychic equivalence) and mere appearance (pretend mode) were two moments in the 
dialectic that produces both lived experience, and the potential for consciousness of that experience (reflection).
 103 Winnicott, D. W. (1960). ‘The Theory of the Parent– Infant Relationship’. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 41: 585– 595; Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and Reality, London: Routledge.
 104 Dependence on the experiences and accounts of others for accounting for oneself is not in itself a false self 
in Winnicott’s terms. He terms this ‘compliance’, and sees it as an important developmental achievement. The false 
self arises when this dependence is exclusive, and one’s own experiences cannot be mined as a resource for this ac-
counting activity. Winnicott, D. W. ([1960] 1965). Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self, the Maturational 
Process and the Facilitating Environment, New York: International Universities Press, pp. 140– 152.
 105 E.g. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach To Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20(6): 544– 576: ‘Mentalizing is imaginative because we have to imagine what other people 
might be thinking or feeling; an important indicator of high quality of mentalization is the awareness that we 
cannot know absolutely what is in someone else’s mind. We suggest that a similar kind of imaginative leap is re-
quired to understand one’s own mental experience, particularly in relation to emotionally charged issues’ (p. 544). 
There are significant parallels here between the position of Fonagy and colleagues and that of Kant in concep-
tualizing ‘productive imagination’ and conceptual understanding within human cognition, and the necessity of 
both. Of particular relevance is §24 ‘On the application of the categories to objects of the senses in general’ in the 
doctrine of the elements in Critique of Pure Reason. In Kant’s Lectures on Logic, he suggested that ‘imagination and 
understanding are two friends who cannot do without one another but cannot stand one another either, for one 
always harms the other. The more universal the understanding is in its rules, the more perfect it is, but if it wants 
to consider things in concreto then it absolutely cannot do without the imagination.’ Kant, I. (2012). Lectures on 
Logic, trans. J. Michael Young, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 447: Fonagy and colleagues even tend, 
like Kant, to align productive imagination with automatic processing and conceptual understanding with con-
trolled mentalizing, though Fonagy and colleagues are less strict (but also less clear) in this assumption of align-
ment than Kant. For Kant’s position, see Leech, J. (2014). ‘Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the Possible, the 
Actual, and the Intuitive Understanding’. Kantian Review, 19(3): 339– 365: ‘We need the concepts of possibility and 
actuality to cope with our divided cognitive architecture. There is something about the way we are able to cognize 
objects, come into epistemic contact with them, and think about them, that leaves a gap between our thoughts of 
things and the existence of those things. If we are to assure ourselves of genuine representation of real objects, and 
the possibility of knowledge of them, then we need a way to distinguish the actual cases from the merely possible. 
We at least need to be able to conceptualize this difference to make sense of sceptical worries, and to formulate 
strategies for avoiding error (e.g. seek out some direct experience of a purported possible thing— a consistent con-
cept is not sufficient for existence)’ (p. 358– 359).
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discernment of motivations and intentions.106 When conception is poorly fed by specific in-
formation, the result is pretend mode: the conception of thoughts and feelings is understood 
to account for them. When this is combined with the second synthesis, and used for ac-
counting for and explaining motivations and intentions, this produces hypermentalisation. 
When specific information from perceived reality is not treated as a personal perception, but 
felt simply as reality itself, the result is a sense of overwhelming immediacy. Combined with 
the second synthesis, and used for accounting for and explaining motivations and inten-
tions, the result is psychic equivalence. Here personal experience is used to account for and 
explain the motivations and intentions of others and oneself. Mentalization also depends 
upon the achievement of an account or explanation of our own or others’ behaviour or ex-
perience. Teleological mode runs this process backwards, using observable social behaviour 
to account for and explain the motivations and intentions of others and oneself.
Consideration of mentalization in terms of the syntheses of experience and under-
standing helps clarify why pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode are 
not just incidental obstacles to mentalizing, but fundamentally incompatible. For full or spe-
cific mentalization to be present, an individual needs to be able to understand how mis-
understanding of experience can take place. Otherwise there is no access to the generative 
doubt that underpins inquisitive stance. This is specifically what the three modes of non- 
mentalizing obstruct, even if they do so each in different ways. In turn, it may be anticipated 
that lack of access to generative doubt helps stabilize non- mentalizing. Allison and Fonagy 
have recently described ‘undue certainty about the veracity of an idea as psychic equivalence, 
while a total repudiation of this certainty we denoted as pretend mode; both are charac-
teristic of a prementalizing phase in the development of psychic reality.’107 Here, again, we 
can see teleological mode dropping out when Fonagy and colleagues account for the logic 
of non- mentalizing. However, in the same terms, teleological mode can be considered as 
undue certainty that the meaning of social behaviour is signified by its outcome. In all three 
cases, generative doubt is not possible, and so neither is the inquisitive stance about mental 
states and pursuit of perspective- taking. As we saw in Chapter 4, Bateman and Fonagy have 
situated tentativeness and moderation as qualities of all good mentalizing.108
The importance of generative doubt is signalled by Fonagy’s characterization from the 
start of mentalization as making mental states available for reconsideration, albeit with 
confusion about whether this required explicit representation or could be an implicit pro-
cess.109 The importance of generative doubt has been further headlined by recent theoretical 
work. Drawing on a model of resilience developed by Kalisch and colleagues,110 Fonagy and 
 106 The term ‘understanding’ has varied meanings of course, and is not wholly stable across the writings of Fonagy 
and colleagues. Nonetheless, when the term appears, it tends to entail the development of an accurate account of 
something through appeal to intentional mental states. This has also been Fonagy’s account of the concept of under-
standing in a recent interview:BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life 
Scientific Podcast, 28 January. Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2. Though certainly there 
are differences, a predecessor for this account of ‘understanding’ is Jasper’s definition, as a process through which 
‘we sink ourselves into the psychic situation and understand genetically by empathy how one psychic event emerges 
from another’, Jaspers, K. ([1946] 1963). General Psychopathology, trans. J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton, Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 301. Perhaps the greatest difference here is that, whereas Jaspers appeals to 
empathy, mentalization is conceptualized as focused on the discernment of motivations and intentions.
 107 Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is truth relevant?’ Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303, p. 279.
 108 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 118.
 109 Fonagy, P. (1989). ‘On Tolerating Mental States: Theory of Mind in Borderline Patients’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 12: 91– 115, p. 96.
 110 Kalisch, R., Müller, M. B., and Tüscher, O. (2015). ‘A Conceptual Framework for the Neurobiological Study 
of Resilience’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38: e.92. See also Kalisch, R., Cramer, A. O. J., Binder, H., Fritz, J., 
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collaborators have characterized two forms of reconsideration that they regard as of special 
importance for how mentalization contributes to resilience.111 A first is the capacity to re-
consider the valence of a present situation. Resilience is fostered by the capacity to reappraise 
the situation to identify those elements that may be used constructively.112 Undue certainty 
or uncertainty are hinderances for this appraisal, which depends on a generative doubt about 
our first impressions.113 A second form of reconsideration that contributes to resilience is 
reappraisal of past experience. Past experience may press in on us with certain impressions 
and sensations, as well as with thoughts or feelings about what has happened. Fonagy and 
colleagues regard resilience as fostered by the capacity to reappraise the past to achieve ac-
curacy in identification of present- day threats. This includes the capacity to reappraise 
threat- associated impressions and sensations stemming from the past, that might contribute 
to inaccurate and overinclusive perceptions of threat in the present. Again, generative doubt 
is critical to this reappraisal: undue certainty or uncertainty both hinder the potential for re-
considering the past in inquisitive stance.
A methodological development has also underlined the centrality of generative doubt and 
inquisitive stance in the conceptualization of mentalizing. Recently, Fonagy and colleagues 
have worked to develop a self- report measure of mentalizing, with the promise of reduced 
labour and greater scalability compared with the Adult Attachment Interview. The construc-
tion of a self- report scale is, on the surface, paradoxical. How can an individual report on 
their capacity for conceiving and considering mental states, if this capacity is required in 
order to know the answer to the question? How can pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and 
teleological mode be identified by an individual using them, when their effect is to make 
their own premises appear certain? After some trial and error, Fonagy and colleagues sought 
to circumvent these problems by creating a Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ) 
Leertouwer, I., Lunansky, G., Meyer, B., et al. (2019). ‘Deconstructing and Reconstructing Resilience: A Dynamic 
Network Approach’. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(5): 765– 777.
 111 The term ‘resilience’ is a widely used buzzword. As Fonagy notes, ‘resilience has been conceptualised variously 
as a tool, characteristic, potential, attitude, act, asset, value, process, trait, skill, resource, strength . . . capacity, dis-
position, performance, competency’, and many others. The definition preferred by Fonagy is that of Rudrauf: ‘The 
ability of a system to resist dynamically a perturbation or adverse condition that challenges the integrity of its 
normal operation and to preserve function as a result in reference to some initial design or normative functional 
standards.’ Rudrauf, D. (2014). ‘Structure- Function Relationships behind the Phenomenon of Cognitive Resilience 
in Neurology: Insights for Neuroscience and Medicine’. Advances in Neuroscience: 1– 28, p. 4. Fonagy, P. (2015). 
‘Psychotherapy for Emerging Borderline Personality Disorder’. Keynote address to the European Society of Child 
& Adolescent Psychiatry, Madrid, 21 June. Accessed at: https:// www.escap.eu/ uploads/ Events/ Madrid%202015/ 
peter- fonagy- escap- presentation.pdf.
 112 Freund and Staudinger have criticized Kalisch for assuming that only positive appraisals contribute to re-
silience. They regard the capacity for negative appraisals as also important. Freund, A. M. and Staudinger, U. M. 
(2015). ‘The Value of “Negative” Appraisals for Resilience. Is Positive (Re) Appraisal Always Good and Negative 
Always Bad?’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38: e101. If Fonagy and colleagues are read as simply endorsing 
Kalisch’s model, they would be vulnerable to the same criticism. However, it would appear— though it is not spelt 
out— that they apply the model especially to reconsideration rather than the conception of experience. The criti-
cism by Freund and Staudinger therefore does not apply. In fact, the capacity to reappraise present- day thoughts 
and feelings more soberly is raised in Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and 
Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice 
(2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 63– 77, p. 68. Likewise implied is the contribution 
to resilience of a capacity to reappraise positive past thoughts and feelings, not just past threat- related sensations. 
These latter points are dealt with explicitly in Bo, S., Bateman, A., and Kongerslev, M. T. (2019). ‘Mentalization- 
Based Group Therapy for Adolescents with Avoidant Personality Disorder: Adaptations and Findings from a 
Practice- Based Pilot Evaluation’. Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 18(3): 249- 262.
 113 Badoud and colleagues have referred to experiences of self and others unhindered by undue certainty or 
undue uncertainty about mental states as “calibrated mentalisation”. Badoud, D., Prada, P., Nicastro, R., Germond, 
C., Luyten, P., Perroud, N., and Debbané, M. (2018). ‘Attachment and Reflective Functioning in Women with 
Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of Personality Disorders, 32(1): 17– 30, p. 22.
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with two scales.114 One scale represented over- certainty (RFQc) about the minds of one-
self and others (e.g. ‘I always know what I feel’, ‘I usually know exactly what other people are 
thinking’, ‘My intuition about a person is hardly ever wrong’). The other scale represented 
indiscriminate uncertainty (RFQu) about the minds of oneself and others (e.g. ‘People’s 
thoughts are a mystery to me’, ‘I don’t always know why I do what I do’, ‘I believe there’s no 
point trying to guess what’s on someone else’s mind’).115
It should be acknowledged that an important limitation of the RFQ is that it does not 
seek to capture any positive qualities of mentalizing that may be distinct from the absence 
of non- mentalizing, such as curiosity about mental states, concern to integrate discrepant 
information about mental states, or effective use of support from others in conceiving or 
reconsidering mental states.116 The Parental Reflective Functioning Questionnaire, de-
veloped subsequent to the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire, does have three scales, 
one of which is ‘interest and curiosity’ in the child’s mental state, which seems an attempt 
to capture some of the positive content of mentalizing irreducible to the absence of non- 
mentalizing.117 Nonetheless, the use of well- modulated doubt as the criterion of mentalizing 
in the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire still supports the conclusion that pretend mode, 
psychic equivalence, and teleological mode are the main forms of non- mentalizing because 
 114 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Moulton- Perkins, A., Lee, Y. W., Warren, F., Howard, S., . . . and Lowyck, B. (2016). 
‘Development and Validation of a Self- Report Measure of Mentalizing: The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire’. 
PLoS One, 11(7): e0158678. For critical appraisal of the psychometric properties of the two scales of the RFQ see 
Spitzer, C., Zimmermann, J., Brähler, E., Euler, S., Wendt, L. P., and Müller, S. (2020). ‘Die deutsche Version des 
Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ): Eine teststatistische Überprüfung in der Allgemeinbevölkerung’. 
Psychotherapie- Psychosomatik - Medizinische Psychologie, Early View. Müller, S., Wendt, L. P., Spitzer, C., Masuhr, 
O., Back, S. N., and Zimmermann, J. (2020). ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire’. 
https:// psyarxiv.com/ 5rhme/ . An earlier scale was developed by Hausberg, M. C., Schulz, H., Piegler, T., 
Happach, C. G., Klöpper, M., Brütt, A. L., . . . and Andreas, S. (2012). ‘Is a self- Rated Instrument Appropriate to 
Assess Mentalization in Patients with Mental Disorders? Development and First Validation of the Mentalization 
Questionnaire (MZQ)’. Psychotherapy Research, 22(6): 699– 709. This scale had four factors: avoidance of thinking 
about mental states; difficulties perceiving inner states; psychic equivalence; and difficulties modulating affect. 
However, Fonagy and colleagues appear to have not known about or ignored the existence of this scale. It is not 
mentioned anywhere in their work, not even in the 2016 paper developing their own scale.
 115 There is something of a contrast that can be drawn here between Fonagy and Bion in that the former empha-
sizes the threat of indiscriminate uncertainty. For the latter, the threat of excessive certainties is so pervasive that 
indiscriminate uncertainty— while likely to be avoided— is not explicitly characterized as a problem. For instance, 
Bion speculated that all else is ultimately disposable, but that a psychoanalytic situation is operative if neither ther-
apist nor patient feel ‘compelled to search “irritably” for certainty as a method of stifling doubts, uncertainties, 
mysteries, half- truths and neither is compelled to assert anything as a means by which doubt and uncertainties are 
evaded’. Such claims suggest that an essential strand of the psychoanalytic tradition is a commitment to genera-
tive doubt, making it seem unlikely that it would be an especially clean marker of Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy 
compared with other low- intensity psychodynamic therapies. Bion, W. R. ([1969] 2014). ‘Further Cogitations’, in 
Chris Mawson (ed.), The Complete Works of W. R. Bion, Volume 15. London: Karnac Books.. See also Ricoeur, P. 
(1970). Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, New Haven: Yale University Press.
 116 It might be argued that the relationship between mentalizing and non- mentalizing would mirror adult at-
tachment styles, which are conventionally measured on two dimensions of insecurity. However, recent psycho-
metric work on adult attachment styles has indicated that this approach neglects a third factor, of security, distinct 
from the absence of insecurity. Gillath, O., Hart, J., Noftle, E. E., and Stockdale, G. D. (2009). ‘Development and 
Validation of a State Adult Attachment Measure (SAAM)’. Journal of Research in Personality, 43(3): 362– 373; 
Frıas, M. T., Shaver, P. R., and Mikulincer, M. (2014). ‘Measures of Adult Attachment and Related Constructs’, in 
G. J. Boyle and D. H. Saklofske (eds), Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Constructs, Philadelphia, 
PA: Elsevier, pp. 417– 447. Evidence in support of this conclusion comes from a factor analysis of aspects of a 
clinician- report measure of mentalizing, in which mentalizing was identified as a distinct factor, not merely the in-
verse of the non- mentalizing factors. Gagliardini, G. and Colli, A. (2019). ‘Assessing Mentalization: Development 
and Preliminary Validation of the Modes of Mentalization Scale’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 249– 258. It is 
also notable that these researchers found that MBT therapists rated ‘good mentalizing’ higher than CBT therapists, 
suggesting that they had been trained to recognize this as a distinct quality of clinical interactions.
 117 Luyten, P., Mayes, L. C., Nijssens, L., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘The parental reflective functioning question-
naire: development and preliminary validation’. PLoS ONE, 12(5): e0176218.
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the kind of mental processing they entail specifically undermines generative uncertainty and an 
‘inquisitive stance’ towards mental states.118
A further advantage of the conceptualization of mentalization in terms of the syntheses of 
experience and understanding is that it clarifies the status of pretend mode, psychic equivalence, 
and teleological mode. Fonagy has stated his suspicion that they are not ‘a complete map of the 
nonmentalizing world’.119 We agree that there could be other forms of mental processing that 
would block generative uncertainty and access to the ‘inquisitive stance’. One example has been 
highlighted by Winnicott: when the experiences of others are used to account for and explain the 
motivations and intentions of others and oneself, to the exclusion of one’s own subjectively con-
ceived and the objectively perceived experiences. And Fonagy and Target, discussing Winnicott, 
have indeed acknowledged this as an integral obstacle to mentalization.120
A further candidate for consideration as a form of non- mentalizing has been raised by 
Ensink, Fonagy, and colleagues. They have described states of withdrawal from others as 
fundamentally ‘incompatible’ with mentalization.121 Such states could occur for various 
reasons— for instance, anticipated pain or anxiety associated with contact with others, 
whether based on their actual past behaviour or on externalization of the alien self.122 For 
instance, technology addiction has been proposed as a case in which the capacity to under-
stand the thoughts and feelings of others is blocked by a kind of withdrawal.123 Such claims 
are supported by empirical findings showing that extensive online game use is associated 
with unresolved loss and trauma on the Adult Attachment Interview, with the relationship 
mediated by symptoms of dissociation.124 If Fonagy and Luyten are right that understanding 
one’s own mind is secondary to understanding the minds of others, then sustained and in-
tense withdrawal would prove an obstacle not just to understanding the mental states of 
others but also oneself.
It might be argued that withdrawal is not a distinct form of non- mentalizing, but rather a 
moment in the process of pretend mode, which depends upon an obstruction of sources of 
specific information about reality. However, if so, it is a distinct and separable moment, since 
not all withdrawal then prompts pretend mode. Withdrawal may even protect mentalizing, 
 118 By way of comparison, Luyten and colleagues drew upon a theoretical review of the concept to identify 
three essential elements of parental reflective function (PRF) in developing a self- report measure: ‘(a) interest 
and curiosity in mental states, (b) the ability to recognize the opacity of mental states, and (c) nonmentalizing 
modes characteristic of parents with (severe) impairments in PRF (e.g. malevolent attributions, inability to 
enter into the subjective world of the child)’. Again, the first and second factors can be regarded as reflecting 
a discriminated capacity for doubt and reconsideration. Luyten, P., Mayes, L. C., Nijssens, L., and Fonagy, P. 
(2017). ‘The Parental Reflective Functioning Questionnaire: Development and Preliminary Validation’. PLoS 
One, 12(5): e0176218.
 119 Duschinsky, R., Collver, J., and Carel, H. (2019). ‘“Trust Comes From a Sense of Feeling One’s Self 
Understood by Another Mind”: An Interview with Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3), 224– 227 .
 120 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with reality: II. The Development of Psychic Reality from a 
Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479, p. 467. See also Fonagy, P., Moran, 
G. S., and Target, M. (1993). ‘Aggression and the Psychological Self ’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
74: 471– 485: ‘Winnicott (1965) describes how a “false self ”, dedicated to pleasing the object, but eschewing genuine 
reflection, may develop’ (p. 475).
 121 Ensink, K., Leroux, A., Normandin, L., Biberdzic, M., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Assessing Reflective Parenting 
in Interaction with School- Aged Children’. Journal of Personality Assessment, 99(6): 585– 595, p. 588.
 122 See Steiner, J. (2003). Psychic Retreats: Pathological Organizations in Psychotic, Neurotic and Borderline 
Patients, London: Routledge.
 123 Schimmenti, A. and Caretti, V. (2010). ‘Psychic Retreats or Psychic Pits?: Unbearable States of Mind and 
Technological Addiction’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27(2): 115.
 124 Schimmenti, A., Guglielmucci, F., Barbasio, C., and Granieri, A. (2012). ‘Attachment Disorganization and 
Dissociation in Virtual Worlds: A Study on Problematic Internet Use among Players of Online Role Playing 
Games’. Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 9(5): 195– 203.
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by sustaining a degree of reserve from collective non- mentalizing cultures (see Chapter 9).125 
Nonetheless, over time, sustained withdrawal is likely to prompt pretend mode as a form of 
non- mentalizing. Where we withdraw ‘to’ is never a sphere in which others are psychologic-
ally absent. Our self- representation will nonetheless still contain narrative representations of 
the thoughts and feelings of others, and withdrawal will hinder the updating and modula-
tion of these representational elements.126
Two further, perhaps more minor forms of non- mentalisation, mentioned above, might 
include systematic obstacles to mentalizing thoughts or feelings. However, the capacity to 
mentalize thoughts but not feelings does not represent the kind of systematic obstruction 
to generative doubt and inquisitive stance achieved by pretend mode, psychic equivalence, 
or teleological mode. Yet, as Bateman and Fonagy have observed, ‘with cognition there is 
always doubt’ and therefore the potential for ‘cognitive reappraisal’.127 Likewise, strong cap-
acities for mentalizing feelings in the context of weak capacities for mentalizing thoughts is 
likely to hinder the coherence and consistency of accounts and explanations of experiences 
and observable behaviour. However, this configuration is again unlikely to represent a sys-
tematic obstacle to mentalizing.128
A further possibility might be difficulties mentalizing past experience, as opposed to pre-
sent experience. There are innumerable ways in which present- day routines can be set up to 
hinder attention to thoughts and feelings from the past. Again, this would be troublesome 
for mentalizing, not least because comparison of past and present is a powerful aid to recon-
sideration. However, when consideration of thoughts and feelings in present experience is 
feasible, difficulties thinking about the past would rarely function as a block on mentalizing 
to the same extent as pretend mode, psychic equivalence, or teleological mode. These would 
all be minor forms of non- mentalizing, not on the same level as the pretend mode, psy-
chic equivalence, and teleological mode for obstructing generative doubt and inquisitive 
stance. Yet, in the 2000s, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Fonagy, Gergely, and Target described 
the ability to ‘represent and differentiate between the mental models of the self and of the 
other about reality’ as one of the cognitive requisites for mentalization.129 As such, a potent 
potential form of non- mentalizing, and candidate for a ‘fourth’ major form, is what Fonagy 
and colleagues call ‘the externalization of the alien self ’. This notion of ‘externalization of 
the alien self ’, and the conceptualization of the self in general, will be the subject of the next 
chapter.
 125 Duschinsky, R., Reisel, D., and Nissen, M. (2018). ‘Compromised, Valuable Freedom: Flat Affect and 
Reserve as Psychosocial Strategies’. Journal of Psychosocial Studies, 11(1): 68– 92. See also Winnicott, D. W. (1988). 
‘Withdrawal and Regression’, in Human Nature, London: Free Association Books, pp. 141– 142.
 126 Winnicott, D. W. (1945). ‘Primitive Emotional Development’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
26: 137– 143.
 127 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 52.
 128 Tuber, S. (2015). ‘Psychological Mindedness in the Face of a Learning Disability: The Utility of Play’. Journal 
of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 14(3): 288– 293; Derks, S., van Wijngaarden, S., Wouda, M., 
Schuengel, C., and Sterkenburg, P. S. (2019). ‘Effectiveness of the Serious Game “You & I” in Changing Mentalizing 
Abilities of Adults with Mild to Borderline Intellectual Disabilities: A Parallel Superiority Randomized Controlled 
Trial’. Trials, 20(1): 1– 10.
 129 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., and Target, M. (2007). ‘The Parent– Infant Dyad and the Construction of the 
Subjective Self ’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3– 4): 288– 328, p. 290.
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Conceptualizing the ‘self ’
Introduction
In Chapter 5, we described Fonagy and colleagues’ concept of ‘hypermentalization’ as a 
form of non- mentalizing in pretend mode. Hypermentalization is difficult to tell apart from 
mentalization. The elements that seem to be absent are grounding in present or past ex-
perience and the capacity for reconsideration of thoughts and feelings. Yet the construct of 
perceptual experience could use further consideration, above all in how it overlaps with or 
differs from the concept of ‘self ’. The idea of ‘the self ’ has been a critical one for Fonagy and 
colleagues for over 30 years. The theory of the self stemming from work on mentalization has 
been praised by allies as representing one of the main advances over prior work on ‘theory 
of mind’, such as Baron- Cohen (Chapter 3).1 Bateman and Fonagy have even described 
mentalizing as ‘first and foremost’ a ‘theory of the development of the self ’.2
In part, this is because mentalization has developed as a clinical theory, in a context in 
which patients themselves have described their symptoms as relating to the ‘self ’ and its 
problems.3 However, Fonagy and colleagues have also developed a surprising, and at times 
uncanny, account of the self, which has informed their theory of mentalization in diverse 
ways. This includes the distinction between mentalizing the self and mentalizing others, 
which Fonagy and Luyten gave as one of the four opposing poles of mentalization (before 
then qualifying that actually mentalizing self and mentalizing others is not actually an op-
position). Yet, beyond this, consideration of the theory of the self is also essential for under-
standing how Fonagy and colleagues believe thoughts and feelings are constructed, the 
relationship between conscious and unconscious aspects of the self, and their account of 
what we glean and protect ourselves from within present or past experience.
The terms ‘mental states’ or ‘intentions’ serve as placeholders in the work of Fonagy and 
colleagues that help mentalization theory travel across disciplinary spaces to varied audi-
ences, though at the price of simplification. At times, their writing can give the impression 
that thoughts and feelings about personal experience are lying around within minds, waiting 
to be recognized unless blocked by non- mentalizing.4 This may be an effect of Fonagy’s early 
indebtedness to the literature on theory of mind, in which mental states tend to be treated 
as singular and determinate.5 Fonagy and colleagues have paid little attention to differences 
 1 Ensink, K. and Mayes, L. C. (2010). ‘The Development of Mentalisation in Children from a Theory of Mind 
Perspective’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 30(4): 301– 337.
 2 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Development of an Attachment- Based Treatment Program for 
Borderline Personality Disorder’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 187– 211, p. 192.
 3 Adshead, G. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘How does Psychotherapy Work? The Self and its Disorders’. Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment, 18(4): 242– 249: ‘A key reason for people seeking psychological therapy is an experience of a 
disordered “self ” ’ (p. 242).
 4 Burman has discussed the apparent tension between the language of understanding mental states and the ap-
parent psychoanalytic commitments of Fonagy and colleagues. Burman, E. (2016). Deconstructing Developmental 
Psychology (3rd edn), London: Routledge, p. 160.
 5 Sedgwick, E. K. (2011). ‘Affect Theory and Theory of Mind’, in Jonathan Goldberg (ed.) The Weather in Proust, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
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between mentalizing unitary versus multiple or conflictual states of mind, which is surprising 
since their correlates could be expected to be quite different. As a point of contrast, in Bion’s 
work, thoughts and feelings could be inchoate, hybrid, characterized by inadequacy or over-
spill. He regarded this as important because whole domains of human experience are defined 
precisely by falling beneath or beyond determinate thoughts and feelings: this ranges from 
disavowed wishes, to experiences of the sublime, to taken- for- granted and sedimented habit. 
As Bion argued, even our most unitary and determinate thoughts and feelings are elaborated, 
and subjectively encountered as relevant, within a thick and heterogenous context of proto- 
thoughts and proto- feelings prompted by our past experiences and present environment.6
An interesting illustration is mood. Besides its use in the technical phrase ‘mood dis-
orders’, the term appears remarkably rarely in the writings of Fonagy and colleagues, given 
that the theory of mentalizing is centrally concerned with mental states. This is despite the 
fact that they acknowledge that improvements in mood are one of the priorities they them-
selves have for treatment, perhaps even above symptomatic improvement.7 Fonagy and col-
leagues have, if somewhat unsteadily, generally treated mental states as if they were relatively 
determinate and linked with intentions. However, it has long been recognized by scholars of 
mood, at least since Edith Jacobson in the psychoanalytic literature, that mood does not ne-
cessarily have these qualities. Indeed, a mood does not need to be ‘about’ anything particular; 
it does not need to have a particular intended object.8 This is implicitly acknowledged by 
Fonagy and colleagues on the various occasions that the term ‘mood’ does appear in their 
writing. So, for instance, in their 1991 paper, Fonagy and colleagues state that reflective func-
tioning developmentally incorporates skills at both ‘sensing and responding to the mood 
of another’ and ‘the understanding of others’ intentions’, distinguishing the two.9 In 2008, 
 6 Bion, W. R. ([1963] 1984). Elements of Psychoanalysis, London: Karnac Books; Matte- Blanco, I. ([1988] 2003). 
Thinking, Feeling, and Being, London: Routledge. Converging on a similar point from within the phenomeno-
logical tradition, see Merleau- Ponty, Maurice. ([1960] 1964). Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary, Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press; Merleau- Ponty, Maurice. ([1964] 1968). The Visible and the Invisible, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press. According to Sperber and Wilson, the penumbra of 
proto- thoughts and proto- feelings that array themselves around any potential determinate thought or feeling are 
part of what gives the question of relevance its particular urgency. For them, this is an essential reason for the 
need for epistemic vigilance, in order to filter this penumbra, and to identify those elements relevant to the self 
and/ or conversational others. This element of Sperber and Wilson’s work does not appear to have been taken up 
by Fonagy and colleagues in their appropriation of the concept of epistemic vigilance. Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. 
(2004). ‘Relevance Theory’, in L. R. Horn and G. Ward (eds), The Handbook of Pragmatics, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 
607– 632; de Saussure, L. and Wharton, T. (2019). ‘La notion de pertinence au défi des effets émotionnels’. Travaux 
Interdisciplinaires sur la Parole et le Langage (TIPA), 35: 1– 23.
 7 Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘The Changing Shape of Clinical Practice: Driven by Science or by Pragmatics?’, 
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 24(1): 22– 43: ‘From a professional’s standpoint, as from that of the ordinary member 
of the public, physical role limitation, physical function and pain have high priority, while those suffering disorders 
rate dignity and general wellbeing (mood, global assessment of life, having a partner, job, lots of social contact) as 
more important’ (p. 34).
 8 Jacobson, E. (1957). ‘Normal and Pathological Moods: Their Nature and Functions’. The Psychoanalytic Study 
of the Child, 12(1): 73– 113: ‘moods seem to represent, as it were, a cross- section through the entire state of the ego, 
lending a particular, uniform coloring to all its manifestations for a longer or shorter period of time. Since they do 
not relate to a specific content or object but find expression in specific qualities attached to all feelings, thoughts 
and actions, they may indeed be called a barometer of the ego state . . . Thus, anger at somebody or something 
may turn into an angry mood, love or hate into a kind or hostile mood, anxiety into an anxious mood, as soon 
as they have ceased to relate only to special, selected objects or notions’ (pp. 75– 76). See also Mulhall, S. (1996). 
‘Can there be an Epistemology of Moods?’. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 41: 191– 210; Ratcliffe, M. 
(2010). ‘The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life’, in P. Goldie (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
of Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 349– 371; Flatley, J. (2017). ‘Reading for Mood’. Representations, 
140(1): 137– 158.
 9 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G. S., and Higgitt, A. C. (1991). ‘The Capacity for Understanding 
Mental States: The Reflective Self in Parent and Child and its Significance for Security of Attachment’. Infant Mental 
Health Journal, 12(3): 201– 218, p. 204.
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Baradon, Fonagy, and colleagues distinguish mental states, moods, self- esteem, and sense of 
social connectedness in analysing the narratives of incarcerated mothers with care for their 
infants.10 As we shall see in Chapter 7, factor analysis of mental health symptoms reveals 
mood as a distinct sub- factor with distinct correlates. Luyten and Fonagy have discussed 
a distinction between ‘feelings’, ‘affects’, and ‘emotions’, where affects (including mood) are 
characterized as a tone rather than an intentional mental state oriented towards an object. 
They state that all three ‘would come under this category of mentalising’.11 However, as we 
saw in Chapter 4, the definitions of mentalizing are uneven in whether inchoate and non- 
intentional forms of thought and feeling form part of the construct.12
What account Fonagy and colleagues offer of the dynamic properties and emergence of 
thoughts and feelings offered is often speculative, not fully fleshed out, and discussed primarily 
in venues for psychoanalytic audiences.13 It is also generally yet to generate commentary, 
whereas the more basic elements of mentalization theory have generated a large literature, al-
beit predominantly exposition (the primary exceptions are the few dedicated critiques of the 
concept of implicit mentalizing).14 A contributing factor is that ideas of proto- thoughts and 
feelings are bound up with work by Fonagy and colleagues reflecting on the idea of the ‘self ’. 
This is a tricky concept, with a history of contradictory use of terminology regarding the self 
in psychoanalytic theory especially and psychological discourse more broadly.15
Fonagy and colleagues acknowledged the problems that the term ‘self ’ could cause, and 
took psychoanalytic theory to task for loose use of the concept, though Fonagy and col-
leagues not infrequently fail to heed their own warnings. Critics have stated that, given the 
pivotal role of the concept of ‘self ’ in work on mentalization, the lack of definition of the 
concept is a major problem for the theory as a whole.16 Fonagy and colleagues can be found 
 10 Baradon, T., Fonagy, P., Bland, K., Lénárd, K., and Sleed, M. (2008). ‘New Beginnings— An Experience- Based 
Programme Addressing the Attachment Relationship between Mothers and their Babies in Prisons’. Journal of 
Child Psychotherapy, 34(2): 240– 258, p. 249.
 11 Luyten, P. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘The Multidimensional Construct of Mentalization and its Relevance to 
Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder’, in A. Fotopoulou, D. Pfaff, and M. A. Conway (eds), From the 
Couch to the Lab: Trends in Psychodynamic Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405– 427, p. 412.
 12 For instance, in their 2007 definition of mentalizing (Chapter 4), Fonagy and colleagues appear to unpack 
emotions into ‘needs, desires, feelings’, and thoughts into ‘beliefs, goals, and reasons’. The distinction here between 
‘desires’ and ‘feelings’ links to long- standing psychoanalytic interest in desire as a form of intentionality (in the 
sense of wishes or plans regarding the past or present) that may well not be aligned with our self- representation, 
or readily conceived of or reconsidered. Green, A. (1999). The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, 
New York: Routledge.
 13 For instance, Fonagy and Allison’s theory of the nature of consciousness and of the unconscious has huge 
ramifications, but is put forward in a sustained way only in Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Psychic Reality and 
the Nature of Consciousness’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 97(1): 5– 24.
 14 E.g.Kiverstein, J. (2011). ‘Social Understanding without Mentalizing’. Philosophical Topics, 39(1): 41– 65; 
Davidsen, A. S. and Fosgerau, C. F. (2015). ‘Grasping the Process of Implicit Mentalization’. Theory & Psychology, 
25(4): 434– 454; Liljenfors, R. and Lundh, L. G. (2015). ‘Mentalization and Intersubjectivity towards a Theoretical 
Integration’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 32(1): 36– 60; Køster, A. (2017). ‘Mentalization, Embodiment, and 
Narrative: Critical Comments on the Social Ontology of Mentalization Theory’. Theory & Psychology, 27(4): 458– 
476. Another important critical commentary, addressing limitations in the acknowledgement of social context in 
the conceptualization of mentalizing, was Sperry, M. (2013). ‘Putting our Heads Together: Mentalizing Systems’. 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 23(6): 683– 699. Wide swathes of the theory of Fonagy and colleagues have been left 
largely untouched by such commentaries, most notably the concepts of the self, primary unconscious, the different 
modes of non- mentalizing, and adaptation.
 15 See e.g. Sandler, J. and Rosenblatt, B. (1962). ‘The Concept of the Representational World’. The Psychoanalytic 
Study of the Child, 17(1): 128– 145.
 16 E.g. Horne, M. (2003). ‘Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self by Peter Fonagy, 
György Gergely, Eliot Jurist, Mary Target’. Fort Da, 9(2): 107– 111; Ferraro, D. ([2011] 2014). ‘The Other, Clinical 
and Empirical: A Review of Fonagy et al. on Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self ’. 
Accessed at: https:// melbournelacanian.wordpress.com/ 2014/ 11/ 24/ the- other- clinical- and- empirical- a- review- 
of- fonagy- et- al- on- affect- regulation- mentalisation- and- the- development- of- the- self.
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at times leaning on the term’s imprecision for making evocative claims, in the manner they 
criticized in psychoanalytic discourse.17 For instance, as we saw in Chapter 3, Fonagy and 
colleagues have at times described disorganized attachment as caused by disorganization 
of the self; and at times they have described disorganization of the self as caused by disor-
ganized attachment. Of course both may be true, but it raises the question of what is meant 
by ‘self ’ in each instance. More generally, clarification of the concept of the self has im-
portant bearing for understanding the operation of both mentalizing and non- mentalizing. 
Additionally, recent statements have indicated that Fonagy and colleagues plan to further 
integrate their ideas about the self more firmly into approaches to clinical technique in the 
near future (see Chapter 8).
This chapter will begin by considering broader currents in social science and psychology that 
made the concept of ‘self ’ salient at the point that mentalization theory was being developed, 
and the ways that Fonagy and colleagues have conceptualized the self. We discuss the concept of 
‘alien self ’, introduced by Fonagy and colleagues to describe the experience of desires and elem-
ents of personal experience that disturb self- representations. We will then explore the account 
they offer of sexuality and aggression, as two inevitable and especially potent components of the 
alien self.
What is a self?
Deployment of the concept of ‘self ’ by Fonagy and colleagues can usefully be placed in the 
history of psychological theory. In Principles of Psychology in 1890, William James dedi-
cated a chapter of ‘consciousness of self ’, which he described as ‘justly regarded as the most 
puzzling puzzle with which psychology has to deal; and whatever view one may espouse, 
one has to hold his position against heavy odds’.18 From the turn of the century, the idea 
of the ‘self ’ fell into decline as part of the emergence of psychology as an empirical dis-
cipline, which distrusted the concept as a mask and obfuscation of actual psychological 
mechanisms that could be identified, operationalized, and tested. The primary exception 
was Mary Whiton Calkins, who was forced to fight the current in order to maintain ex-
periences of the ‘self ’ as a legitimate object of psychological theory and scientific inquiry. 
Calkins felt that a concept of ‘self ’ was needed in order to understand several features of 
psychological life, not least how individuals experience themselves as morally or socially 
obligated to others.19 The current reversed, however, in the early 1950s.20 Key second gen-
eration of psychoanalytic thinkers had fled Europe for New York in the 1930s and de-
veloped ego psychology, an approach that downgraded the centrality of drive theory and 
 17 E.g. Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds 
About: Part 1. Borderline Personality Disorder as a Limitation of Resilience’. Borderline Personality Disorder 
and Emotion Dysregulation, 4: 11: ‘It is not possible for these individuals to access mentalizing if the self is over-
whelmed by negative interference.’ It can be inferred here that ‘self ’ primarily means both working memory and 
phenomenological experience. But the reader is left speculating about the meaning of this claim, which appears to 
be explanatory. In fact, the underspecified use of the concept of ‘self ’ makes the claim descriptive and metaphoric.
 18 James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology, New York: Holt, p. 330. See also Baumeister, R. F. (1987). 
‘How the Self Became a Problem: A Psychological Review of Historical Research’. Psychological Review, 
52(1): 163– 176; Danziger, K. (1997). ‘The Historical Formation of Selves’, in R. Ashmore and L. Jussim (eds), Self 
and Identity: Fundamental Issues, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 137– 159.
 19 Calkins, M. W. (1915). ‘The Self in Scientific Psychology’. American Journal of Psychology, 26: 495– 524.
 20 Hilgard, E. R. (1949). ‘Human Motives and the Concept of the Self ’. American Psychologist, 4(9): 374– 382; 
Sarbin, T. R. (1952). ‘A Preface to a Psychological Analysis of the Self ’. Psychological Review, 59(1): 11– 22.
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instead accentuated the individual’s adaptation to their environment.21 In 1950, one of 
the leading ego psychologists, Hartmann, introduced the term ‘self ’ into psychoanalytic 
theory. He proposed that whereas ‘ego’ should be used for descriptions of intra- individual 
dynamics, the term ‘self ’ should be used for examining the relationship of the individual 
with others.22 This was in part in response to an ambiguity in Freud’s writings, where the 
term ‘ego’ had encompassed both senses.23 In the same period as Hartmann’s introduc-
tion of the ‘self ’ into psychoanalysis, concepts of ‘self- esteem’ and ‘self- actualization’ were 
put forward by American humanistic psychologists such as Abraham Maslow and Carl 
Rogers.24 Use of the term ‘self ’ helped Rogers contrast his humanistic therapeutic ap-
proach with Hartmann and the position of the ego psychologists, for whom the ‘ego’ was 
to a large extent unconscious. Rogers’ deployed the idea of ‘self ’ to highlight the active 
capacity of patients to know their own needs and to judge the goals and appropriate ter-
mination point for therapy.25
Examination of these discourses suggests that ‘self ’ was less a determinate single object 
than a cluster of loosely related concerns, and their interrelation. Seven different referents of 
‘self ’ may be identified:
 1. An individual as a discrete whole.
 2. Her experience as an embodied subject.
 3. Her passing or enduring knowledge of herself.
 4. Enduring qualities of her personality, which she may or may not perceive.
 5. Her agency.
 6. Her social identity.
 7. Her experience of personal authenticity.26
 21 Hartmann, H. (1939). Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation, New York: International Universities 
Press; Jacobson, E. (1954). ‘The Self and the Object World: Vicissitudes of their Infantile Cathexes and their 
Influence on Ideational Affective Development’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 9: 75– 127. Though not an 
ego psychologist, Karen Horney was also important in the development of ‘self ’ discourse in psychoanalysis, again 
as a reaction to drive theory. Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and Human Growth, New York: W. W. Norton.
 22 Hartmann, H. ([1950] 1964). ‘Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego’, in Essay on Ego Psychology, 
New York: International Universities Press, pp. 113– 141.
 23 Fromm, E. (1970). ‘Freud’s Model of Man and its Social Determinants’, in E. Fromm (ed.), The Crisis of 
Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology, New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, pp. 42– 61; 
Bettelheim, B. (1984). Freud and Man’s Soul, New York: Vintage; Borch- Jacobsen, M. (1988). The Freudian Subject, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
 24 Maslow, A. H. (1942). ‘Self- esteem (dominance- feeling) and sexuality in women’. The Journal of Social 
Psychology, 16(2): 259– 294; Maslow, A. H. (1948). ‘“Higher” and “Lower” Needs’. The Journal of Psychology, 
25(2): 433– 436; Rogers, C. R. (1950). ‘The Significance of the Self- Regarding Attitudes and Perceptions’, in M. 
L. Reymert (ed.), Feelings and Emotions: The Mooseheart Symposium, New York: McGraw- Hill. Rogers, C. and 
Dymond, R. (1954). Psychotherapy and Personality Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. The term ‘self ’ 
also came to be used by the ego psychologists.
 25 Rogers, Carl. (1942). Counseling and Psychotherapy: Newer Concepts in Practice, Boston; New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company; Rogers, C. R. (1951). Client- Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, 
and Theory, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; Symonds, P. M. (1951). The Ego and the Self, New York: 
Appleton- Century- Crofts.
 26 Our synthesis of seven referents in self discourse since the 1950s overlaps for the most part with Leary and 
Tangney’s distinctions between five meanings of the term ‘self ’ in psychology: self as total person; self as person-
ality; self as experiencing subject; self as beliefs about oneself; and self as executive agent. However, the importance 
of the use of ‘self ’ to mean experience of personal authenticity was central to its use in the 1950s, and is also very 
relevant to Fonagy and colleagues— as was the use of ‘self ’ to mean social identity in discussions about the recep-
tivity of individuals to social and developmental influence. Leary, M. R. and Tangney, J. P. (2003). ‘The Self as an 
Organizing Construct in the Behavioral and Social Sciences’, in M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (eds), Handbook of 
Self and Identity, New York: Guildford, pp. 3– 14.
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An important commentator at the time, Gordon Allport, called use of the term self ‘lazy’. He 
felt that the apparent obviousness and utility of the term lured psychologists into failing to 
draw distinctions between its varied meanings.27 It was easy for psychologists to talk right 
past one another, or their audiences, simply by assuming different meanings of the term. 
Allport felt that the concept appealed in part because of clear connections between these 
different phenomena, but simultaneously served to obscure their precise nature. Allport also 
astutely highlighted the social context of attention to the ‘self ’, reflecting on the growing im-
portance of individual self- management and personal lifestyle in the post- war economy and 
culture.28 Individual self- management and personal lifestyle would only grow as objects of 
concern and discussion over the subsequent decades (see Chapter 2). In the 1960s and 1970s, 
the ‘self ’ would be re- absorbed by psychoanalysis in the work of Winnicott and Kohut. These 
psychoanalytic thinkers argued that failures of parental empathy and soothing responsive-
ness would lead developmentally to i) inauthentic and inaccurate self- knowledge on the part 
of individuals, ii) weaknesses and incoherencies in personality structure, iii) challenges in 
modulating emotions, and iv) difficulties with social relationships. The reason lay, Winnicott 
and Kohut argued, in the fact that all four are formed on the bedrock of early child– caregiver 
relationships.29
Commenting on these developments in their early book, Personality Theory and Clinical 
Practice, published in 1985, Fonagy and Higgitt criticized Rogers and humanistic psych-
ologists for treating ‘the self as an entity and a causal agent able to consider and integrate 
perceptions’.30 This results in circular explanations, in which the role of thoughts and feel-
ings get missed because motivation is simply assigned to ‘the self ’ as the cause of action 
or beliefs. Fonagy was more sympathetic to the position of Winnicott and Kohut, whom 
he regarded as invoking the concept of ‘self ’ in analysing the developmental outcomes 
of early care.31 In the 1990s, Fonagy and Target’s own emerging theory of mentalization 
aligned well, and to an extent was influenced by Winnicott and Kohut’s emphasis on the 
caregiver’s attention to the child’s thoughts, feelings, and/ or intentions. Like these earlier 
thinkers, Fonagy and Target regarded qualities of the caregiver’s attention to the child as 
 27 Allport, G. W. (1955). Becoming; Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality, Volume 20, London: Yale 
University Press, p. 38.
 28 See also Cushman, P. (1995). Constructing the Self, Constructing America: A Cultural History of Psychotherapy, 
Cambridge, MA: Perseus; Shaw, R. and Colimore, K. (1988). ‘Humanistic Psychology as Ideology: An Analysis of 
Maslow’s Contradictions’. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 28: 51– 74; Carrette, J. (2003). ‘Psychology, Spirituality 
and Capitalism: The Case of Abraham Maslow’. Critical Psychology, 8: 73– 95; Malone, K. R. (2007). ‘The Subject 
as Drop- Out: Cultural Accountability and the Ethics of Psychoanalysis and Humanistic Psychology’. Theory & 
Psychology, 17: 449– 471.
 29 Winnicott, D. W. ([1960] 1965). Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self, the Maturational Process 
and the Facilitating Environment, New York: International Universities Press, pp. 140– 152; Kohut, H. (1971). 
The Analysis of the Self, New York: International Universities Press; Kohut, H. (1977). The Restoration of the Self, 
New York: International Universities Press. See also Harwood, I. (1987). ‘The Evolution of the Self: An Integration 
of Winnicott’s and Kohut’s Concepts’, in T. Honess and K. Yardley (eds), Self and Identity: Individual Change and 
Development, London: Routledge, pp. 55– 77; Lunbeck, E. (2014). The Americanization of Narcissism, Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
 30 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. C. (1985). Personality Theory and Clinical Practice, London: Methuen, p. 92.
 31 Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A. and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child 
& Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24. Fonagy: ‘It was from instances of its apparent falsity or damage that psy-
choanalysis first sought to define what a coherent self might be. Consider, for example, Deutsch (1942) and the “as 
if ” personality, Winnicott (1965) and the false self, or Kohut (1971) and the grandiose self . . . Paradoxically, when 
selfhood is authentic there is little need for the concept. The individual recognizes both impulse and prohibition; 
the compromise between them forms an attribute of the ego. It is when this process fails that the critical role of the 
self- structure asserts itself most urgently’ (pp. 20– 1).
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consequential for their later self- understanding, personality, capacities for affect regula-
tion, and social relationships.32
Such an account also aligned with the conclusions of attachment theory in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s— for instance, in the work of Alan Sroufe33 (see Chapter 3). These different 
perspectives all converged on an account in which the child’s sense of self is ‘originally an 
extension of experience of the other’.34 This position became an abiding commitment for 
Fonagy from the 1990s, and one that he repeatedly identified with Hegel’s claim that ‘self 
consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; 
that is, it exists only in being acknowledged’.35 The passage from Hegel was interpreted 
by Fonagy and colleagues to mean that the child’s capacity to conceive of thoughts and 
feelings within itself stems from the reflective functioning of the caregiver, who provides 
emotional containment and acknowledgement of the child’s mental states and/ or inten-
tions.36 At times, Fonagy and colleagues extended this claim, to argue that the capacity to 
mentalize the self in adulthood or even the experience of having a self is an extension of 
interaction with and acknowledgement of others.37 However, this has been an unsteady 
claim. As we saw in Chapter 4, Bateman, Fonagy, and Campbell have recently claimed the 
opposite, that ‘to mentalise others requires the capacity to mentalise the self ’.38 Examining 
the definitions of mentalizing in the final section of Chapter 4, it can be seen that some-
times Fonagy and colleagues imply that we understand the thoughts and feelings of 
 32 See the discussions of Winnicott and Kohut in Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality: II. 
The Development of Psychic Reality from a Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
77: 459– 479.
 33 Sroufe, L. A. (1989). ‘Relationships, Self, and Individual Adaptation’, in A. J. Sameroff and R. N. Emde (eds), 
Relationship Disturbances in Early Childhood: A Developmental Approach, New York: Basic Books, pp. 70– 94: ‘Self 
should be conceived as an inner organisation of attitudes, feelings, expectations, and meanings, which arises from 
an organized caregiving matrix’ (p. 71).
 34 Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality: II. The Development of Psychic Reality from a 
Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479, p. 474.
 35 Hegel, G. W. F. ([1807] 1977), Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, ed. J. N. Findlay, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 111. The first published citation of this passage by Fonagy was in Fonagy, P. and Target, M. 
(1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 
17: 33– 55; and then next in Fónagy, I. and Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘Communication with Pretend Actions in Language, 
Literature and Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 18(3): 363– 418. However, given how 
protracted the development of the latter paper was, there is reason to suspect that it is in fact the earlier work.
 36 Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Leigh, T., Kennedy, R., Matton, G., and Target, M. (1995). ‘Attachment, the 
Reflective Self and Borderline States: The Predictive Specificity of the Adult Attachment Interview and Pathological 
Emotional Development’, in S. Goldberg, R. Muir, and J. Kerr (eds), Attachment Theory: Social, Developmental, and 
Clinical Perspectives, New York: Analytic Press, pp. 233– 278, p. 256. A sharp contrast with traditional psychoana-
lytic theory was drawn in Target, M. and Fonagy, P. (1996). Playing with Reality: II: The Development of Psychic 
Reality from a Theoretical Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 459– 479: ‘For Freud, in in-
fancy and early childhood, others in the external world were extensions of the self. While this may be an accurate 
description of the phenomenology, for us it is seems more accurate to see the self as originally an extension of ex-
perience of the other’ (p. 474).
 37 E.g. Luyten, P. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘The Multidimensional Construct of Mentalization and its Relevance 
to Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder’, in A. Fotopoulou, D. Pfaff, and M. A. Conway (eds), From 
the Couch to the Lab: Trends in Psychodynamic Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405– 427: ‘The 
theoretical claim that self and other representations are shared and are the default mode of the motor system is rea-
sonably well supported, as we have seen. People have a tendency to mirror actions automatically . . . the inhibition 
of imitative behaviour involves cortical areas that are also related to mentalizing . . . the capacity to inhibit imita-
tive behaviour may be key to enabling us to generate a sense of “me”- ness through achieving a “not other”ness. In 
other words, each time we interpret the actions of another, there may be a sequence in which an initial imitative 
matching response with the other within a motor neuron self- other system interacts with the reflective mentalizing 
self- other system . . . This might explain why patients with BPD [borderline personality disorder] feel vulnerable to 
losing a sense of self ’ (pp. 415– 416).
 38 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder in Community and Prison 
Settings’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 335– 349, p. 347.
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ourselves through much the same means as we do the thoughts and feelings of others. And 
at other times they imply that, whereas the mental states of oneself require objectification 
and interpretation (‘seeing ourselves from the outside’), the mental states of others require 
inference and interpretation (‘seeing others from the inside’). When this contrast is drawn, 
the self ’s mental states need to be ‘recognized’, whereas the mental states of others need to 
be ‘attributed’.39
From the 1990s to the present, the question of whether adults know the minds of others 
in the same way as we know our own minds has dogged Fonagy and colleagues as an un-
resolved issue.40 However, they have been entirely consistent on the developmental claim 
that a child’s self- representation is facilitated by parental reflective functioning. When 
this occurs, not only will the child’s capacities to form representations of thoughts and 
feelings be more elaborate and sophisticated, Fonagy and colleagues anticipated that rep-
resentations of the child’s thoughts and feelings would also be comparatively more tol-
erably authentic and accurate. In the context of parental reflective functioning, Fonagy 
argued in 2000 that ‘the child’s emerging self- representation will map on to what could be 
called a primary or constitutional self (the child’s experience of an actual state of being, 
the self as it is)’, their perceptual experience.41 This growing focus on the importance of 
self- representation led Fonagy and Target to ambivalence about the way that Kohut es-
pecially, and Winnicott to an extent, invoked the idea of ‘self ’ in explaining psychological 
symptoms. In 2003, Fonagy and Target argued that ‘the self is presented by Kohut in repre-
sentational terms, yet he ascribes motivational properties to it. In this way, the self denotes 
most, if not all, of the personality and therefore becomes a superfluous term, much as 
the concept of ego was over- extended by ego psychologists.’ As a consequence, ‘by fitting 
all psychopathology into self- defects, Kohut has homogenised psychological disorder too 
much’.42
Fonagy agreed with previous commentators that psychoanalytic references to the 
‘self ’ had inherited from Freud’s ego the capacity to refer ‘alternately the individual, 
one part of a psychic structure, or the experiencing, subjective self ’.43 In addition, 
however, he felt that the term had gained the capacity to refer to an individual’s self- 
concept, and to their motivations. To call all these ‘the self ’, as did Kohut and sometimes 
Winnicott, was no doubt an evocative, metaphorical usage. But it was also a recipe for 
complacence, as a metaphorical description was substituted for work to identify pre-
cise explanation: ‘Confusion and ambiguity surround the status of the concept of self in 
psychoanalysis, particularly whether it is a theoretical (meta- psychological) construct 
of a system in the mind, part of our psychoanalytic theory of the mind, or an experien-
tial one relating to the person’s cumulative affective experience.’44 Fonagy and Target’s 
 39 Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A. and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child & 
Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24, p. 19.
 40 Køster, A. (2017). ‘Mentalization, Embodiment, and Narrative: Critical Comments on the Social Ontology of 
Mentalization Theory’. Theory & Psychology, 27(4): 458– 476.
 41 Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Attachment and Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 48(4): 1129– 1146, p. 1136. Earlier, immediate personal experience had been characterized as the 
‘prereflective self ’ by Fonagy and colleagues. Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Moran, G. S., and Higgitt, A. C. 
(1991). ‘The Capacity for Understanding Mental States: The Reflective Self in Parent and Child and its Significance 
for Security of Attachment’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 12(3): 201– 218, p. 203.
 42 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 183.
 43 Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A., and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child 
& Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24, p. 17.
 44 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘2: Peter Fonagy’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 11(4): 575– 584, p. 575.
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criticism of Kohut and other psychoanalytic theorists would later be amplified by Luyten 
and Fonagy: ‘These metaphors are tremendously helpful from a phenomenological per-
spective but also have led to the reification of these self- experiences, as if we truly “have” 
a false or fragile self, or that we “have” an ideal and an actual self. Although helpful clinic-
ally, they provide a metaphorical description of the phenomenological experience of de-
pression, rather than a true explanation.’45 The ‘self ’ is a term for psychological theorists 
to conjure with, offering a luminous feeling of comprehension. The audience tend to nod 
along, given that there is usually some among the varied meanings of the term that both 
resonate and feel urgent for each person. Indeed, if psychic equivalence means to account 
for and explain thoughts and feelings and observable social behaviour in terms of imme-
diate experience (see Chapter 5), then appeal to a hazy concept of ‘self ’ by psychological 
theorists essentially erects a screen for diverse projections of immediate experience, and 
a lure towards this form of non- mentalizing.
Fonagy and Target were impressed with the use of the term ‘self ’ by Edith Jacobson and 
Joseph Sandler, who had both restricted the word to refer to an individual’s representations 
of their embodied experience and personality, and avoided using the term to refer to the 
totality of the person. For Jacobson, for example, the term referred to the individual’s rep-
resentation of the bodily and mental qualities of the individual.46 Sandler took this further, 
generally avoiding the unqualified term ‘self ’ except where meaning would be clear from 
context, and preferring the term ‘self- representation’.47 In his later work, Sandler amended 
his formulation to clarify that what is represented in the self- representation is always the 
self- in- interaction- with- others rather than any asocial essence to the individual.48 Fonagy 
appreciated the way that Jacobson and Sandler were careful in their uses of the concept, and 
he agreed that any notion of the self is in part a representation. However, he personally dis-
agreed with quite such a radical curtailment of the term. In 2000, he offered ‘a definition of 
the self as a part of the mind that is capable equally of recognizing its mental activities as 
its own and of attributing mental states to others. It is more than a representation, because 
it has the capacity to shape and determine how representations (of itself, of others) will be 
formed.’49 For Fonagy, the self is a special kind of representation that is implicated in the con-
ception of mental states.
 45 Luyten, P. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘The Self in Depression’, in M. Kyrios, R. Moulding, M. Nedeljkovic, 
S. S. Bhar, G. Doron, and M. Mikulincer (eds), The Self in Understanding and Treating Psychological Disorders, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 71– 81, p. 72. Cf. Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Relation of Theory and Practice in 
Psychodynamic Therapy’. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 28(4): 513– 520: ‘Psychodynamic clinicians found a 
way around the empirical problems created by partially incompatible formulations that nevertheless needed to be 
employed concurrently. They loosened the definition of all the categories under consideration’ (p. 518).
 46 Jacobson, E. (1954). ‘On Psychotic Identifications’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 35: 102– 108, 
p. 102. See also Jacobson, E. (1964). The Self and the Object World, New York: International Universities Press. 
Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘2: Peter Fonagy’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 11(4): 575– 584: ‘Jacobson (1964) and Schafer 
(1968) both made, to me, helpful distinctions between self as the totality of the person and self- representation’ 
(p. 575).
 47 Sandler, J. and Rosenblatt, B. (1962). ‘The Concept of the Representational World’. The Psychoanalytic Study 
of the Child, 17(1): 128– 145: ‘By the self- representation we mean that organization which represents the person as 
he has consciously and unconsciously perceived himself, and which forms an integral part of the representational 
world’ (p. 134). See also Fonagy, P. (2005). ‘An Overview of Joseph Sandler’s Key Contributions to Theoretical and 
Clinical Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 25(2): 120– 147.
 48 Sandler, J. (1993). ‘On Communication from Patient to Analyst: Not Everything is Projective Identification’. 
The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 74: 1097– 1107.
 49 Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A., and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child 
& Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24, p. 19.
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The primary unconscious
The argument of Fonagy and colleagues about the relationship between mentalization and 
the self as a special kind of representation is intriguing and complex. Its basis lies in their 
account of perceptual experience, and its psychodynamic underpinnings. For Hegel and the 
phenomenological tradition, human experience emerges out of the prompting of the out-
side world, and an individual’s perceptual transaction with these prompts.50 It is out of this 
openness that self- perception, and the potential to doubt our perceptions, emerges. Fonagy 
and colleagues generally agreed with this premise, though they have framed it in their own 
ways. First, as we have seen (Chapter 3), Fonagy bracketed the cultural constitution of the 
subject, focusing very largely on the parent– child relationship as the pivotal ‘outside’ that 
prompts the emergence of the individual subject. He would return, however, to the ques-
tion of wider cultural factors in recent years (Chapter 9). Second, for Fonagy and colleagues, 
perceptual experience is staged in a mental setting already shaped and populated by uncon-
scious processes.
In a paper from 2016, Fonagy and Allison have distinguished three forms of unconscious 
process. First are mental processes that are simply not conscious, like the breathing reflex. 
These can become the object of consciousness and can be controlled, but are not in them-
selves potentially disruptive of the self- representation and its activity. From André Green’s 
reading of Hegel and Freud, Fonagy and Allison draw a second form of unconscious pro-
cess: mental states of fragmentation, incoherence, and meaninglessness.51 These states are 
not with reference to, or ‘about’, anything particular (Brentano’s sense of ‘intention’); nor do 
they constitute motivations regarding wishes or plans for the present or past (Dennett’s sense 
of ‘intention’).52 Fonagy and Allison termed this the ‘primary unconscious’.53 The primary 
unconscious forms an irreducible backdrop to perceptual experience of the world.
For Green, states of fragmentation, incoherence, and meaninglessness are essential to the 
creation of meaning. They contour the edges of any meaning, and keep away other poten-
tial meanings from the one found to be relevant. Any questioning or vigilance regarding a 
meaning makes use of these states, where they can serve as erasers, scrubbing out or per-
mitting alteration of existing beliefs, and allowing for detachment from existing commit-
ments, values, and desires.54 They are part of the mind’s ‘unbinding’ function. We need to 
have a sense of what would be nonsense in order to distinguish what is relevant to us and 
viable as a meaning, and to revise this sense in light of circumstance of new information. Less 
 50 Ricoeur, P. (1994). Oneself as Another, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
 51 The influence of Jim Grotstein’s work on Fonagy and Allison is difficult to pick apart. On the one hand, there 
are few elements in Fonagy and Allison’s account of the primary unconscious that are not already present in 
Grotstein’s earlier work. However, Grotstein’s account is awash with different ideas, which are not especially inte-
grated. Fonagy and Allison cite Grotstein, but do not discuss his work. A reason may be that to do so would have 
required quite an extensive and subtle discussion; it may have been more economical to just include the citation. 
Nonetheless, there are points in Grotstein that could have perhaps benefited Fonagy and Allison’s model, such as 
the distinction between nothingness and meaninglessness. Grotstein, J. S. (1990). ‘Nothingness, Meaninglessness, 
Chaos, and the “Black Hole” I— The Importance of Nothingness, Meaninglessness, and Chaos in Psychoanalysis’. 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 26: 257– 290.
 52 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Psychic Reality and the Nature of Consciousness’. The International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 97(1): 5– 24: ‘As we move towards the primary unconscious, the mental world loses its ‘aboutness’, 
its intentional character, the quality rooted in the dyadic consciousness of marked contingent mirroring or even its 
failed derivatives through projective identification’ (p. 14).
 53 Ibid.
 54 Green, A. ([1993] 1999). The Work of the Negative, trans. A. Weller, London: Free Association Books; Green, 
A. (1998). ‘The Primordial Mind and the Work of the Negative’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
79: 649– 665.
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positively, when individuals have had experiences that lead them to fear states of fragmen-
tation, incoherence, and meaninglessness, then this can hold them in place, making change 
and learning from experience more difficult, and contributing to credulity. Fonagy and 
Allison, however, do not seem sure whether they would assign the primary unconscious the 
‘unbinding’ role it is assigned by Green.55 And they do not return to the idea of the primary 
unconscious, or to Green’s work, in their subsequent discussions of epistemic vigilance and 
credulity. In their paper, the emphasis is rather on the way that the primary unconscious en-
ters into determinate mental states as breakdowns, disruptions, or dislocations.56 In charac-
terizing states of fragmentation, incoherence, and meaninglessness, Fonagy and Allison are 
explicit that these mental states are not marked by particular intentions. Indeed, when clin-
icians mischaracterize such disruptions experienced by patients in terms of motivations and 
intentions— i.e. mentalize them— this tends to exacerbate the states of fragmentation, in-
coherence, and meaninglessness. By contrast, Allison and Fonagy reported that supportive 
interventions that do not treat such states as representing intentions tend to be more clinic-
ally effective.
Distinct from the primary unconscious, what Fonagy and Allison have described as ‘the 
psychoanalytic unconscious’ is formed by disturbing or disruptive ‘intentions’ (in the sense 
of wishes and plans) with reference to the self, others, or the world. The idea is a kind of 
re- description of Freud’s description of the unconscious in terms of wishes as the origin of 
the conflicts and slips of everyday life, or Klein’s description of the unconscious in terms 
of phantasies invested in day- to- day perceptions and interactions.57 For Fonagy, ‘Freud’s 
major discovery, is that what the philosophers of mind call the intentional stance, which 
Richard Hopkins calls the sentential stance, applies to non- conscious as well as conscious 
mental functioning.’58 This account of Fonagy and Allison of wishes as intentional may be 
regarded as a revision of Freud’s original concept of libido as essentially object- seeking (i.e. 
pertaining to wishes or plans regarding the past or present), a model set out most influen-
tially in The Unconscious in 1915.59 The idea that intentionality characterizes non- conscious 
as well as conscious mental states is a distinct, intriguing, and arguable claim about psy-
chological life. Certainly there are other theorists, including Freud in his later work, who 
have discussed non- conscious mental states that lack intentionality, most importantly some 
 55 Relevant here perhaps is Winnicott’s distinction between unintegration (relaxation of an integration) and 
disintegration (the breakdown of an integration), a distinction that Green tends to elide. Winnicott, D. ([1962] 
1965). ‘Ego Integration in Child Development’, in The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment, 
New York: International Universities Press, pp. 56– 63; Winnicott, D. W. (1988) ‘Chaos’, in Human Nature, 
London: Free Association Books, pp. 135– 138.
 56 However, elsewhere Fonagy and colleagues have considered meaninglessness in ways that seem to corres-
pond to Green’s characterization e.g. Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Discussion of Juan Pablo Jimenez’s Paper, “A Fundamental 
Dilemma of Psychoanalytic Technique. Reflections on the Analysis of a Perverse Paranoid Patient”’, in J. P. Jimenez 
and R. Moguillansky (eds), Clinical and Theoretical Aspects of Perversion, London: Karnac Books, pp. 63– 76: ‘The 
hallmark of the pretend mode is the experience of meaninglessness in the midst of the act of symbol creation’ 
(p. 69), though it may be that for Fonagy and colleagues there is more than one kind of experience of meaningless-
ness, and only sometimes is this inflected by the primary unconscious.
 57 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Psychic Reality and the Nature of Consciousness’. The International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 97(1): 5– 24: ‘The implicit great threat posed by the primary unconscious is to the intentional 
quality or aboutness of experience— the feeling that it is being directed toward something. We take the view that 
the primary unconscious is not object related, and here we diverge from the Kleinian position that phantasies, that 
is, representations of instinctual aims towards objects, are the ‘primary content of unconscious mental processes’ 
(Isaacs, 1948, p. 81). The intrusions of the primary unconscious undermine the implicitly purposeful character of 
human experience, replacing intentionality with diffused meaninglessness’ (p. 15).
 58 Low, J. (2003). ‘Psychoanalysis— It is a Signifier’. Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, 13, 
citing from an interview with Peter Fonagy.
 59 Freud, S. ([1915] 2001). The Unconscious. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Volume 14, London: Vintage.
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forms of anxiety.60 The claim that intentionality is an inherent characteristic of the psycho-
analytic unconscious would seem to suggest a relationship with teleological mode. However, 
these links are not drawn by Fonagy and colleagues, perhaps because the concepts have been 
developed for somewhat different audiences.
A valuable point of comparison for Fonagy and Allison’s overall account of the uncon-
scious is Ronald Fairbairn.61 Fairbairn likewise divides the unconscious between states of 
fragmentation and aspects of the self- representation. However, there are critical differences. 
Fonagy and Allison offer no account of the origin or developmental function of the primary 
unconscious. Fairbairn presents an account in terms of a child’s feelings of not being loved, 
which affect all of us to varying degrees according to his argument. Fonagy and Allison do 
not discuss the interaction between the primary and psychoanalytic unconscious. By con-
trast, Fairbairn theorizes that the psychoanalytic unconscious is elaborated as a response to 
the feelings of fragmentation, incoherence, and meaninglessness that stem from feeling un-
loved. Finally, Fonagy and Allison appear to populate the psychoanalytic unconscious only 
with disturbing or disruptive intentions. By contrast, Fairbairn’s unconscious is a much more 
diverse and sociable place, including, additionally, internalized representations of loved ones 
with whom we sustain unconscious and preconscious inner dialogue.
Allison and Fonagy are in agreement with Fairbairn, however, in their argument that an 
important developmental foundation of the psychoanalytic unconscious lies in perceived 
failures or disruptions of acknowledgement and acceptance by caregivers.62 This includes 
many wishes and plans that are ‘nasty and horrid’; Fonagy and colleagues hold that the lack 
of social acknowledgement and acceptance has good reason!63 However, avoiding the deter-
minism of Fonagy’s earlier discussions of the role of infancy, Allison and Fonagy argued that 
the psychoanalytic unconscious can be elaborated throughout life. Significant or sustained 
failures of interpersonal acknowledgement in the context of high arousal can feed the psy-
choanalytic unconscious. Traumatic experiences, in particular, add to the psychoanalytic 
unconscious by offering a part- mirror to states of fragmentation, incoherence, and mean-
inglessness from the primary unconscious.64 As a result, these become fastened to certain 
 60 Freud, S. ([1926] 2001). Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 22, London: Vintage, pp. 75– 174; Arbiser, S. and Schneider, J. (eds) (2018). On 
Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, London: Routledge. For discussions of the concepts of affect and inten-
tion in Freud, as well as their limitations, see Green, A. (1999). The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, 
New York: Psychology Press; Johnston, A. (2010). ‘Affekt, Gefühl, Empfindung: Rereading Freud on the Question 
of Unconscious Affects’. Qui Parle, 18(2): 249– 289. It is not clear whether all non- conscious mental states that, by 
degrees, lack intentionality would be assimilated by Fonagy and colleagues to the primary unconscious. Some, 
such as Kierkegaard, have argued that apparently non- intentional affects, such as anxiety, may seem to intend 
no specific object because they actually refer to our relationship with the world as a whole. See e.g. Kierkegaard, 
S. ([1844] 2013). Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of 
Hereditary Sin. Kierkegaard’s Writings, Volume 8, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Other affects may 
have a similar structure, such as some forms of shame.
 61 Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1943). ‘The Repression and the Return of Bad Objects (with Special Reference to the “War 
Neuroses”)’. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 19(3– 4): 327– 341; Fairbairn, W. R. D. (1944). ‘Endopsychic 
Structure Considered in Terms of Object- Relationships’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 25: 70– 92.
 62 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1998). ‘Mentalization and the Changing Aims of Child Psychoanalysis’. 
Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 8(1): 87– 114: ‘We suggest that developmental personality disturbances arise first from 
the child’s failure to find the image of his mind, his experience of himself as a thinker of thoughts, believer of ideas, 
feeler of emotions, in the mind of the caregiver (see Fairbairn, 1952)’ (p. 93).
 63 Duschinsky, R. Collver, J. and Carel, H. (2019). ‘“Trust Comes from a Sense of Feeling One’s Self Understood 
by Another Mind”: An Interview with Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 224– 227.
 64 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Psychic Reality and the Nature of Consciousness’. The International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis, 97(1): 5– 24: ‘Neglect, physical abuse, emotional maltreatment, and all forms of adversity mirror 
and thereby, in our model, render potentially accessible to consciousness states of mind that would (‘within an 
average expectable environment’— Hartmann, 1950) remain far from conscious subjectivity in the primary uncon-
scious. Neglectful, aggressive or sexually seductive parenting part- mirrors the states of destructiveness, isolation 
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memory content and enter the psychoanalytic unconscious in the form of intrusive thoughts 
or feelings lacking an immediate object.65 Fonagy, Allison, and Campbell have also recently 
hinted that experiences that prompt pervasive distrust in the claims of others as dependable, 
generalizable, or relevant (see Chapter 7) can also contribute to states of ‘meaninglessness’, 
implicating a role for the primary unconscious.66
Fortunately, most of the time, unconscious intentions or negative states do not surface 
into the conscious meanings that organize thoughts and feelings. However, they certainly 
can and often do influence the wishes, fears, and inchoate senses that inflect and give colour 
and tone to our primary meanings (see Chapter 1). For Fonagy and colleagues, the idea of de-
terminate thoughts and feelings belonging to the self, or thoughts and feelings belonging to 
another, is therefore a post- hoc description. Seen in context, this was not an unprecedented 
claim among psychoanalytic discussions of the ‘self ’. Fonagy cited William Grossmann who 
had argued that:
The ‘self ’ appears to be both supremely subjective yet also an objective organization, an or-
ganismic property, discernible by others. This apparent objectivity of ‘the self ’ arises from 
the fact that a person and those around him may equate observable and characteristic be-
havioral organizations or traits with an internal entity, ‘the self ’. In calling the self- concept 
a theory or a fantasy, I do not wish in any way to diminish its importance in regulating be-
havior. It seems to me that . . . it organizes and directs behavior.67
From 2000 onwards, Fonagy claimed an aligned position. For him, ‘the illusion of identity is 
adaptive because predicting behavior of others, as well as our own behavior, is significantly 
simplified by the attribution of mental- state motives. In order to be able to predict, we must 
assume consistency amongst these mental states. Thus, underlying the intentional stance is 
an idealization of the self, as well as of the self of the other.’68 It is an idealization that permits 
us to generate simplified and sanitized thoughts and feelings from past experience, and to 
use these to account for our embodied, perceptual experiences and behaviour. For instance, 
Bateman and Fonagy define ‘feelings’ as ‘the conscious experience of the body state during 
and despair that are perhaps ubiquitous, if occasional states of mind. When the child’s environment is contingent 
with (matches) such devastating mind states, the part- mirroring will bring these negative states of mind closer to 
subjectivity’ (p. 15).
 65 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2015). ‘A Scientific Theory of Homosexuality for Psychoanalysis’, in A. Lemma and 
P. E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, Hove, UK: Routledge, pp. 125– 137, p. 133.
 66 Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77, p. 73.
 67 Grossman, W. I. (1982). ‘The Self as Fantasy: Fantasy as Theory’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association, 30(4): 919– 937, p. 926. Fonagy cites the conference presentation, on which the 1982 paper was based, 
in his remarks in Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A., and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal 
of Infant, Child & Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24, p. 17, citing Ticho, E. A. and Richards, A. D. (1982). 
‘Psychoanalytic Theories of the Self ’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30(3): 717– 733. He 
also cites a review of Grossman and Kohut’s concepts of the self: Havens, L. (1986). ‘A Theoretical Basis for the 
Concepts of Self and Authentic Self ’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 34(2): 363– 378. Fonagy 
may have additionally been influenced by Laplanche’s interpretation of the ego in Freud as a fantasy. Laplanche, 
J. (1976). Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Fonagy would also 
have been doing research towards his book with Hepworth on psychoanalytic theories, which mentions in passing 
Lacan’s characterization of the ego. For Lacan, at least in his early work, the ego is as an imaginary function, one 
that operates within psychological life only as a representation. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic 
Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, London: Whurr Publications, p. 17.
 68 Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A., and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child 
& Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24, p. 22.
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emotional activation’, acknowledging that this is a mediated and partial experience incorp-
orating but irreducible to the body’s inchoate and heterogenous reactions and states.69 The 
exact similarities and differences between the formation of feelings and thoughts are not at 
all well spelt out by Fonagy and colleagues. Appeal to the omnibus term ‘mental states’ has 
rather masked this question. Nonetheless, Fonagy and colleagues give the impression that a 
similar process of construction, simplification, and sanitization occurs in the formation and 
use of thoughts and memories.70 In this way, the illusion of an intentional self offers a simpli-
fied and sanitized sense of personal continuity that is nonetheless flexible enough to absorb 
the more complex and less sanitized aspects of life as they become relevant.71
As we saw in the previous chapter, Fonagy described the incoherence that confronts us 
when we try to understand others through attention to their every behavioural cue. An 
individual’s concern with ‘fleeting but genuine expressions of momentary emotional states 
is ultimately a hinderance rather than a help in their attempt to navigate complex social re-
lationships’, because other people are ‘a theatre for too many states of mind for a coherent 
understanding of a relationship to be reliably achieved by these means.’72 The simplification 
and sanitization of the other’s desires and experiences into ‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’ impli-
cated in motivations is therefore adaptive in allowing us to conceive of mental states in the 
other that can be used to account for their behaviour and infer their experience. To take an 
example: in loving, good- enough relationships, our attachment figures sometimes wish to 
kill us. This is normal. However, these wishes are usually fleeting, inchoate, and should re-
ceive acknowledgements and expression in no more than the tone or manner of safe and 
unthreatening responses.73 For instance, responsiveness may be coloured by exasperation.
When things are well, such momentary expressions are also contextualized by what hap-
pens next, as well as the wider context of the relationship. It is notable that, when coding dis-
organized attachment, the guidance from Mary Main is to discount brief displays of fearful, 
conflicted, or confused behaviour ‘if the baby goes to the parent as though for comfort after 
a bit of disorganisation’.74 A degree of simplification and sanitization is fine when past ex-
perience has led us to basically conclude that our needs will be acknowledged and, where 
possible, met. If the vile passing thoughts of our attachment figures do not hinder their re-
flective functioning, Fonagy and colleagues assume that they should not hinder our capacity 
to make use of attachment figures as a secure base and safe haven as needed as children and 
 69 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Emotions, which are the individual’s bodily reaction, as action 
programs, to specific stimuli. Feelings, which are the conscious experience of the body state during emotional acti-
vation’ (p. 307).
 70 See Fonagy, P. (1991). ‘Thinking about Thinking: Some Clinical and Theoretical Considerations in the 
Treatment of a Borderline Patient’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 72: 639– 656; Fonagy, I. (1999). 
‘The Process of Remembering: Recovery and Discovery’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 80(5): 961– 
978; Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, Chapter 6.
 71 Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, and 
Problems with Self and Identity: A Social- Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88– 105,: ‘The 
self, and particularly the sense of self‐coherence and self‐continuity over time, is an illusion (Bargh, 2011, 2014) that 
is the product of the capacity for reflective functioning or mentalizing’ (p. 91).
 72 Fonagy, P. (2011). ‘Discussion of Juan Pablo Jimenez’s Paper, “A Fundamental Dilemma of Psychoanalytic 
Technique. Reflections on the Analysis of a Perverse Paranoid Patient”’, in J. P. Jimenez and R. Moguillansky (eds), 
Clinical and Theoretical Aspects of Perversion, London: Karnac Books, pp. 63– 76, p. 71.
 73 Winnicott, D. W. (1949). ‘Hate in the counter- transference’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
30: 69– 74. See the discussion in Higgitt, A. and Fonagy, P. (1992). ‘Psychotherapy in Borderline and Narcissistic 
Personality Disorder’. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 161(1): 23– 43, p. 30.
 74 Main, M. (undated). Disorganised/ Disoriented Classification Scheme: Major Considerations, unpublished 
manuscript. Received from Elizabeth Carlson, and cited with her permission.
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as adults. The ability to use social relationships as a secure base and safe haven for help in 
processing difficult or confusing thoughts and feelings was theorized by Fonagy and col-
leagues to facilitate our capacity to conceive of and think about our thoughts and feelings in 
a coherent and consistent way.75
The implication of the argument presented by Fonagy and colleagues is that mentalization 
of one’s own and others’ mental states genuinely, even if only to an extent, creates the coher-
ence and consistency of thoughts, feelings, and/ or intentions that it appears to merely repre-
sent. What partial personal coherence and consistency an individual has as an experiencing 
embodied subject, as a knower of themselves, as a personality, as an agent, as a social identity, 
or someone able to distinguish between personally authentic and inauthentic action— such at-
tributions to the ‘self ’ are theorized by Fonagy and colleagues as consequences, not primary 
causes, of mentalizing. As Bateman and Fonagy have argued: ‘our sense of personal continuity 
is dependent on envisioning the thoughts and feelings we had in the past and how these relate 
to our current experiences . . . mentalising, the representation of our mental states, is the spine 
of our sense of self and identity’.76 The image of mentalizing as a spine for the self seems a ra-
ther essentializing metaphor, and reflects a tendency in the work of Fonagy and colleagues to 
reify the concept. Nonetheless, the intention of Bateman and Fonagy appears to be to highlight 
that mentalization and non- mentalizing are very important for the kind of self- representation 
a person develops. As such, mentalization in turn is not treated as free- standing, but as context-
ually embedded. Fonagy and colleagues also acknowledge that the characteristics of our self- 
representations do in turn ‘shape the way people mentalize themselves’ by forming ‘a kind of 
heuristic for the individual making sense of his or her actions’.77
For instance, Fonagy has stated that it is a particular point of alignment between 
mentalization- based therapy and cognitive analytic therapy to see that ‘deficits in such re-
flective self representations are causal in stunting the development of a sense of oneself as 
an effective agent’.78 However, he disagreed with cognitive analytic therapy, which he re-
garded as holding that once a representation of self is assembled, it is then passive.79 Fonagy 
and colleagues have argued that the self- representation contributes actively to the process 
of imagining mental states in oneself and others, especially once the strengthened capacity 
for abstract representation of mental states becomes potentially available in the course of 
adolescence.80 For instance, an inchoate wish or experience may be surfaced and elaborated 
 75 However, major separations or the fear or threat of separations from attachment figures may, nonetheless, 
threaten to disrupt these benefits. Fonagy, P. and Moran, G. S. (1990). ‘Severe Developmental Psychopathology and 
Brittle Diabetes: The Motivation for Self- Injurious Behaviour’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 13: 231– 248: ‘in-
ternal danger . . . is invariably associated with the psychic distance of the object, felt by the patient to be either 
invading the self or abandoning it. In either case what is feared and anticipated is the destruction of the self. This is 
because it is the coherence and continued stability of the mental representation of the self that comes under threat 
either from unwelcome affect- laden transactions with a dangerous object or enforced or violent separation from a 
desired, protective one’ (p. 233).
 76 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.
 77 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C., and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models Mentalising’, in Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 171.
 78 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘2: Peter Fonagy’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 11(4): 575– 584, p. 576.
 79 The position of Fonagy and colleagues here runs contrary to that of Meissner, who held that ‘if the self is 
merely and exclusively representational, it cannot serve as a source of action or agency . . . it fails the demands of 
the role of the self in subjectivity and personal agency’ Meissner, W. W. (1986). ‘Can Psychoanalysis Find its Self?’ 
Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 34(2): 379– 400, p. 382.
 80 See Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental 
Psychopathology, London: Whurr Publications: ‘Perhaps Sandler’s most important contribution was his distinc-
tion between the experiential and the non- experiential realms. Whereas the former referred to Sandler and Joffe’s 
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into a thought or feeling as a mental state due to its relevance to the concerns of the self- 
representation— perhaps its pertinence to personally relevant tasks, projects, or worries.
This perspective adds a deeply uncanny quality to Fonagy’s seemingly benign claim that 
caregiving that acknowledges the child as an agent supports the child’s representation of a 
‘constitutional self ’. This constitutional self is not, as it might appear at first sight, the ‘au-
thentic’ and ‘true’ self of Rogers (or, sometimes, Winnicott).81 For Fonagy, an authentic and 
true focal awareness of our own chaotic and unnerving desires would be both authentically 
disturbing and truly obstructive. Instead, the appearance of a ‘constitutional self ’ out of the 
complexity of experience is itself an illusion. Where formed through mentalization, it is an il-
lusion that is resilient to breakdown because its coherence and consistency are based around 
the capacity to conceive of thoughts and feelings, and the capacity to reconsider them when 
more complexity needs to be considered. The main forms of non- mentalizing— pretend 
mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode— also offer the illusory coherence and 
consistency needed to inform action. This is part of what makes them adaptive under par-
ticular circumstances (see Chapter 7). However, the kind of coherence and consistency they 
offer blocks access to the reconsideration of thoughts or feelings. In fact, Fonagy and Target 
proposed, they can make the generative doubt that permits reconsideration feel as a kind 
of ‘mutilation’, because a sense of personal coherence and consistency is sustained only by 
excluding such doubt.82
representational model, the latter entailed mechanisms, structures and apparatuses. The non- experiential is inher-
ently non- conscious, although it is not repressed or dynamically inhibited. The distinction between a fantasy (con-
scious or unconscious) and the organized function underpinning it (fantasizing) remains an evocative example. 
The model makes clear that experience is not the agent of change; rather, change is brought about by structures 
in the non- experiential realm, which cause corresponding changes in the experiential. Thus self- representation 
cannot be an agent, but it is an entity that will determine how mechanisms of the mind behave . . . Sandler (1990) 
clarified his view of internal objects as “structures” within the non- experiential realm, albeit constructed out of 
subjective experience, conscious or unconscious. Once created, such non- experiential structures can modify sub-
jective experience, including the child’s experience of actual objects (people)’ (p. 105). On adolescence as both a 
sensitive period and a challenging period for the solidification of a self- representation through the capacity to im-
agine mental states in oneself and others, see Sharp, C. and Rossouw, T. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Pathology 
in Adolescence’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalisation in Mental Health 
Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 281– 300. Similar ideas were presented already 
across Anna Freud’s work, and may have provided a background influence for Fonagy and colleagues on this point.
 81 The case of Winnicott, always a little tricky to pin down as a theorist, is more complicated than Rogers. When 
he introduced the concept, Winnicott urged ‘The True Self appears as soon as there is any mental organization of the 
individual at all, and it means little more than the summation of sensori- motor aliveness’: Winnicott, D. W. ([1960] 
1965). Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self, the Maturational Process and the Facilitating Environment, 
New York: International Universities Press, pp. 140– 152, p. 149. This would not be illusion in Fonagy’s terms. 
However, in Winnicott’s later writings, the term is explicitly aligned with the idea of authenticity in Romanticism, 
and takes a more essentialist cast, which draws the concept back towards Rogers and the target of Fonagy’s cri-
tique. Winnicott, D. W. (1986). ‘The Concept of the False Self ’, in Home is Where We Start From, New York: W. 
W. Norton, pp. 65– 70. The potential for Winnicott’s concept of ‘true self ’ to slide towards essentialism, and even 
moralizing essentialism, has been criticized by some commentators. However, Winnicott has also been defended 
by others on this count. See e.g. Papadima, M. (2006). ‘Dissociation, the True Self and the Notion of the Frozen 
Baby’. Psychodynamic Practice, 12(4): 385– 402; Ruti, M. (2010). ‘Winnicott with Lacan: Living Creatively in a 
Postmodern World’. American Imago, 67(3): 353– 374.
 82 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55: ‘The analytic goal must be to engender within the patient a true under-
standing. Understanding here implies detachment, i.e. the permanent loss of the omnipotent self (Gaddini, 1987). 
To admit to analytic understanding is equivalent to recognizing extreme fragility and vulnerability of a self which 
appears mutilated in comparison to the self that is proximal to the understanding object, however distorted that 
understanding may be’ (p. 53). The term ‘mutilation’, and in fact much of the wording of this statement, is drawn 
from Gaddini, E. ([1980] 1992). ‘Notes on the Body- Mind Question’, in Adam Limentani (ed.), A Psychoanalytic 
Theory of Infantile Experience: Conceptual and Clinical Reflections, London: Routledge, pp. 105– 124, p. 115.
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In a chapter from 2012, Fonagy, Bateman, and Luyten interrogated the role of ‘self ’ in 
forms of mental disorder, distinguishing between three kinds of disorders based on the fail-
ures of the illusion of personal consistency and coherence they represent.83 Disorders of the 
‘integrity of self ’, chief among them BPD, are caused by sustained use of non- mentalizing 
modes of processing, because these hinder the creation of durable, flexible, and adaptive 
illusions of individual intentionality as implicated in thoughts and feelings. Fonagy and 
colleagues described ‘disorders of self- recognition’, whereby an individual’s embodied ex-
perience has become decoupled from the appearance of personal relevance, a stance char-
acteristic of pretend mode. Capgras’ syndrome (a condition in which familiar people are 
delusionally experienced as strangers) may be an extreme form, but Fonagy and colleagues 
proposed that self- harming behaviours also reflect a disorder of self- recognition. Third, 
‘disorders of self- concept and self- image’ are prompted when non- mentalizing specifically 
distorts the simplification and sanification of embodied experience, with the result that inco-
herent or disturbing ideas or feelings, which would otherwise be fleeting or just colour per-
ception, can become pinned as stable aspects of the individual’s perception of their own state 
and worth. Skårderud and Fonagy described the case of patients with eating disorders.84 
The culture of Western societies symbolizes willpower and self- control in terms of control 
over weight. This predisposes teleological thinking in which the normal, passing feelings 
of distrust, bafflement, and frustration individuals experience may be noticed, ruminated 
on— and then mistaken as caused by the individual’s body fat. Mental states are read off per-
ceptions of physical qualities rather than physical cues being used to inform mental states.
That non- mentalizing can undermine the illusion of self- representation, and its coherent 
and consistent functioning, has significant implications for the goals of clinical work. A first 
point is that Fonagy has disagreed with those for whom ‘the main developmental achieve-
ment for any individual pertains to the achievement of a cohesive self ’.85 This is a position 
he attributes especially to Anthony Ryle and cognitive analytic therapy, though he con-
siders that it characterizes various forms of short- term counselling and psychotherapy. The 
problem with this approach, Fonagy argued, is that coherence and consistency are an illu-
sion. To direct the client to seek a cohesive self risks failing to help them develop strategies for 
dealing with the inevitable, all- too- human aspects of the mind that exceed this coherence, 
and that at times disrupt or simply run contrary to our self- representation. Among these, for 
example, are experiences of desire and frustration, as we shall discuss shortly. Fonagy wor-
ried that a focus on achievement of a cohesive self ‘may re- enforce the splitting, rather than 
aid the individual to develop a capacity to tolerate ambivalence, intense affect and, in the 
long term, reduce impulsivity and the marked oscillation of self esteem’.86
 83 Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., and Luyten, P. (2012). ‘Introduction and Overview’, in A. W. Bateman and P. 
Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing, pp. 3– 42, p. 7.
 84 Skårderud, F. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Eating Disorders’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 347– 384: ‘We will 
first describe the psychopathology of eating disorders by using the language of the mentalizing model. We under-
stand these disorders as manifestations of an underlying self- disorder. This underlying disorder should be the cen-
tral focus of psychotherapy’ (p. 348). See also Sacchetti, S., Robinson, P., Bogaardt, A., Clare, A., Ouellet- Courtois, 
C., Luyten, P., . . . and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Reduced Mentalizing in Patients with Bulimia Nervosa and Features of 
Borderline Personality Disorder: A Case- Control Study’. BMC Psychiatry, 19(1): 134.
 85 Fonagy, P. (1995). ‘2: Peter Fonagy’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 11(4): 575– 584, p. 580.
 86 Ibid. Ryle’s riposte to Fonagy was to claim that the sense of self is constituted by a person’s interpersonal 
and intrapersonal social experiences, not merely a representation of that experience. On this basis, Ryle and Kerr 
regarded the integration of a person’s interpersonal and intrapersonal social experiences as realistic and worth-
while, even if it is a task that is never complete. Ryle, A. and Kerr, I. B. (2003). Introducing Cognitive Analytic 
Therapy: Principles and Practice, New York: Wiley, p. 37.
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Nonetheless, Bateman and Fonagy listed several ways that supporting a patient’s capacity 
to mentalize and to hold off from non- mentalizing processing should contribute to greater 
coherence and consistency of the self- representation.87 First, improved mentalizing and less 
use of non- mentalizing modes can be anticipated to heighten the viability, clarity, and acuity 
of conceptions of the thoughts and feelings of oneself and others, serving to inform and sta-
bilize the self- representation.
Second, Bateman and Fonagy stated that this can help the ‘formation of a coherent sense 
of self ’.88 Here they slip back into a cluttered use of the term ‘self ’ that elsewhere they have 
criticized in others. From comparison of the Bateman and Fonagy paper with other work 
using similar language,89 the meaning would appear to be either i) that mentalization can 
be anticipated to contribute to the coherence and consistency of an individual’s experi-
ence as an embodied subject; or ii) that mentalization can be anticipated to contribute to a 
person’s sense of coherent personal agency. Or both meanings may have been intended. On 
the one hand, mentalization can be expected to help an individual sift their lived experience 
for making coherent thoughts and feelings, and also for making them available for pruning 
and revision, contributing further to coherence and consistency. On the other hand, even if 
the image of ourselves as agents is, in Fonagy’s view discussed above, an illusion, he has de-
scribed it as a helpful illusion that is partly made real by its enactment. When a person acts 
with a sense of viable personal agency, this helps organize experience by helping to support 
and refine relevant thoughts and feelings.
Third in Bateman and Fonagy’s list, they proposed that mentalization and avoidance of 
non- mentalizing can also be expected to contribute to the ‘capacity to form secure relation-
ships’.90 As we have seen, the ability to use social relationships as a secure base and safe haven 
for processing difficult or confusing thoughts and feelings was theorized by Fonagy and col-
leagues as helping to conceive thoughts and feelings and make them available for reflective 
function.
Finally, Bateman and Fonagy observed that emotional turmoil is likely to disrupt the self- 
representation and its contribution to the construction, identification, and use of relevant 
mental states. When a chronic and reciprocal disturbance occurs between emotional tur-
moil, mentalizing, and social relationships, the result is what has been called a personality 
disorder, or what Bateman and Fonagy described as a ‘destabilisation’ of ‘the self- structure’,91 
though the exact meaning of the concept of ‘self- structure’, and its place within the meta-
psychology of mentalization theory, remains uncertain. The term originates in Rogers’ 
humanistic psychotherapy as a synonym for personality, but it is not clear whether or not 
Bateman and Fonagy intended it in this sense.92
 87 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Development of an Attachment- Based Treatment Program for 
Borderline Personality Disorder’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 187– 211, p. 195.
 88 Ibid.
 89 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1997). ‘Attachment and Reflective Function: Their Role in Self- Organization’. 
Development and Psychopathology, 9(4): 679– 700.
 90 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Development of an Attachment- Based Treatment Program for 
Borderline Personality Disorder’, Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 187– 211, p. 195.
 91 Ibid.
 92 Rogers, C. R. (1959). Client- Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory, Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin. The term’s first sustained use within psychoanalysis was in conceptualizing borderline and narcissistic per-
sonality disorders— for instance, in the work of Irene Fast, as well as Kernberg and then Kohut. The first explicit 
definition of the term appears to be inFrances, A., Sacks, M., and Aronoff, M. S. (1977). ‘Depersonalization: A Self- 
Relations Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 58: 325– 331: ‘We use the term “self- structure” to 
describe the coherent organization of those previously registered self representations which provide an individual 
with his experiential sense of psychological intactness, i.e. his sense of self ’ (p. 325).
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Externalizing the alien self
As we have seen, Fonagy and colleagues characterize the coherence of self- representation 
as an illusion, but an adaptive one, because it contributes variously to the coherence and 
consistency of embodied experience, self- knowledge, self- structure, and personality, per-
sonal agency, social identity, and feelings about personal authenticity. However, for Fonagy 
and colleagues, this coherence and consistency are only ever partial, even under the best 
of circumstances. They remain vulnerable to disruption by the states of fragmentation and 
meaninglessness of the primary unconscious. And they remain vulnerable to the pull of the 
contrary and disturbing intentions of the psychoanalytic unconscious. Caregiver reflective 
function will support greater emotional containment and acknowledgement of a child’s in-
tentionality and/ or mental states, facilitating the coherence and consistency of the child’s 
emerging self- representation and their capacity to flexibly adapt this representation through 
mentalization. The result is ‘an authentic, organic self- image built around internalised rep-
resentations of self- states’.93 However, total containment and acknowledgement are impos-
sible; in fact, Fonagy has speculated that the fantasy of an omniscient mentalizing divine 
being may stem from this disappointment.94
All children develop a psychoanalytic unconscious, which for Fonagy and colleagues 
comprises intentions (in the sense of wishes and plans) with reference to the self, others, 
or the world that have been refused acknowledgement, and excluded from the self- 
representation.95 The result is the experience of an ‘alien self ’, the experience of intentions 
that do not agree with the self- representation, and so do not feel like they belong to us.96 
The idea of the ‘alien self ’ was not original to Fonagy and colleagues, but stemmed from 
second- generation Kleinian refinements of the concept of projective identification. In the 
most general terms, projective identification means to imagine some part of oneself as able 
to be split off, and to expel it outside and away— for instance, into the environment or an-
other person.97 The term ‘alien self ’ was used by second- generation Kleinians to describe the 
individual’s experience of such disowned aspects of the self.98 For Kleinians, some of these 
 93 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in 
Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5): 853– 873, p. 864.
 94 Fonagy, P. (2009). ‘Commentary on “Forgiveness”’, in S. Akhtar (ed.), Good Feelings: Psychoanalytic 
Reflections on Positive Emotions and Attitudes, London: Karnac Books/ International Psychoanalytic Association, 
pp. 411– 452: ‘In imagining understanding someone else fully, or being fully and accurately understood by them, 
we are forced into the world of imagination, the fantasy of an omniscient mentalising being’ (p. 423).
 95 The elaboration of unacknowledged experiences into intentions in the psychoanalytic unconscious is de-
scribed, though only briefly and speculatively, in Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Psychic Reality and the Nature 
of Consciousness’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 97(1): 5– 24: ‘Although it is “unmetabolized”, the 
psychoanalytic unconscious acquires a partial quality of intentionality or “aboutness” through the process of pro-
jective identification. When aspects of sexuality or destructiveness are communicated by the infant to the mother, 
she does not mirror but recognizes the experiences, transmitting them back infused with intentionality from her 
unconscious associations to the feelings’ (p. 13).
 96 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 439.
 97 Goretti, G. R. (2007). ‘Projective Identification: A Theoretical Investigation of the Concept Starting from 
“Notes on some Schizoid Mechanisms”’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 88: 387– 406.
 98 On their first usage, Fonagy and Target attribute the idea to Britton’s 1998 book on the imagination. However, 
Britton in turn was drawing on Grotstein. See Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The 
Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5): 853– 
873; Britton, R. (1998). Belief and Imagination, London: Routledge; Grotstein, J. S. (1977). ‘The Psychoanalytic 
Concept of Schizophrenia: II. Reconciliation’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 58: 427– 452; Grotstein, 
J. S. (1980). ‘A Proposed Revision of the Psychoanalytic Concept of Primitive Mental States: Part I. Introduction 
to a Newer Psychoanalytic Metapsychology’. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 16(4): 479– 546. The ‘alien self ’ was 
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aspects are wishes and plans disowned as too positive for the self- representation, forming 
an ‘ego ideal’; Fonagy and colleagues did not discuss these.99 Their account of the ‘alien self ’ 
focused on those aspects that are disowned as unacceptable to the self- representation. They 
proposed a developmental account of the emergence of this alien self:
Even the most sensitive caregiver is insensitive to the child’s state of mind more than 50% 
of the time. Thus, we all have alien parts to our self- structure. The coherence of the self, as 
many have noted, is somewhat illusory. This illusion is normally maintained by the con-
tinuous narrative commentary on behaviour that mentalisation provides, which fills in the 
gaps and weaves our experiences together so that they make sense. In the absence of a ro-
bust mentalising capacity, with disorganised patterns of attachment, the fragmentation of 
self- structure is clearly revealed.100
For Fonagy and Target, then, mentalization is partly a confabulation: the production of a 
somewhat fictionalized story, woven into the experience of an individual ‘self ’. In this, their 
position aligns with that of Winnicott, for whom the binding of the experience of self to an 
individual bounded body was dependent upon an ‘imaginative elaboration’. However, the 
reference by Fonagy and Target to ‘narrative commentary’ hints, further, that this is not just 
an elaboration based on ‘body functioning of all kinds and the accumulations of memories’, 
but also of available cultural narratives for integrating and reconciling gaps and experiences 
of being alive within a particular context.101 Though not explicit in Winnicott, this is well in 
line with his account of the importance of environmental factors and social communication 
in the formation of a sense of self.102 This role of cultural narratives in the imaginative elab-
oration of the self- representation and the alien self was not elaborated at the time by Fonagy 
and Target, conveying the impression that there would be little cross- cultural variation in the 
formation of the self as an individual. The acknowledgement of the self as a confabulation 
was not accompanied by recognition of contingency in the construction of personhood. This 
had the side- effect of contributing to a naturalization of individualism within mentalization 
theory (see Chapter 2) precisely at the point that the individual self was theorized as a nar-
rative construction and, to an extent, confabulation.103 As we shall see in Chapter 9, Fonagy 
predated in psychoanalytic theory by the idea of ‘ego- alien feelings’, which was a definite precursor, but lacked the 
implication of a sense of agency or intentionality that was within a person without belonging to them.
 99 The reason for the neglect of positive introjects by Fonagy and colleagues is not clear. It could be that they as-
sumed that positive introjects simply form part of the self- representation. Or it could be that they regarded positive 
introjects as of less clinical and developmental relevance. As a point of comparison, highlighting the importance of 
positive projective identification for caregiving, see Likierman, M. (1988). ‘Maternal Love and Positive Projective 
Identification’. Journal of Child Psychotherapy, 14(2): 29– 46. It may also be that positive introjects can contribute, 
precisely by feeling somewhat other than the self, to the successful calibration of epistemic vigilance (see Chapter 
7)— for instance, through establishing an effective ego ideal.
 100 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). ‘Evolution of the Interpersonal Interpretive Function: Clues for Effective 
Preventive Intervention in Early Childhood’, in S. W. Coates, J. L. Rosenthal, and D. S. Schechter (eds), September 
11: Trauma And Human Bonds, Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 99– 113, p. 106. See also Luyten, P., Campbell, C., 
and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, and Problems with Self and Identity: A 
Social- Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88– 105.
 101 Winnicott, D. W. (1990). Human Nature, London: Routledge, p. 23.
 102 See e.g. Winnicott, D. W. (1968). ‘Communication between Infant and Mother, and Mother and Infant, 
Compared and Contrasted’, in Walter G. Joffe (ed.), What is Psychoanalysis?, London: The Institute of Psycho- 
Analysis/ Ballière, Tindall & Cassell; Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and Reality, London: Tavistock. Cf. Hutto, 
D. D. (2008). ‘The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Clarifications and Implications’. Philosophical Explorations, 
11(3): 175– 192.
 103 Cf. Ganeri, J. (2012). The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First- Person Stance, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Ganeri, J. (2017). Attention, Not Self, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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and colleagues have recently sought to amend and advance their position with greater atten-
tion beyond the individual and to questions of cultural variation.
For Fonagy and Target, the particular importance of the imaginative integration of the 
self- representation lay in its contribution to the experience of coherence and consistency 
through supporting mentalization and the capacity to form secure attachments. By contrast, 
a more accurate characterization of our experiences, intentions, self- knowledge, etc. is of 
‘fragmentation’, a state ‘revealed’ when mentalization fails to generate confabulation and 
its ensuing coherence (see Chapter 3). The intentions of the psychoanalytic unconscious, 
let alone the meaninglessness of the primary unconscious, are disturbing and disruptive. 
As a consequence, any truly accurate and unmediated reflection of these in our behaviour 
would indeed be fearful, conflicted, and confused to an extent. The developmental im-
portance of caregiver reflective functioning, in Fonagy and Target’s account, is that it sup-
ports the development of a mental apparatus for simplifying and sanitizing experience to 
permit the formation of coherent thoughts and feelings, capable of being subject to recon-
sideration. This apparatus can even offer protection in the context of later adversity and 
trauma: mentalization can fill in the gaps and weave our experiences together enough to 
make sense.
Yet ‘in the absence of a robust mentalizing capacity, in the wake of trauma, alien fragments 
in the self- structure are likely to be clearly revealed in all of us’.104 In the 2000s, Fonagy and 
Target situated poor caregiver reflective functioning as an important developmental basis for 
a strong alien self. The child is unable to find the basis of their coherent self- representation 
and intentionality in their caregiver’s responses. This leads to the ‘internalisation of rep-
resentations of the parent’s state, rather than of a usable version of the child’s own experi-
ence’.105 These states may not be benign ones and may be further distorted by the child’s own 
unassuaged concerns if they are unable to use their caregiver as a secure base and safe haven 
for difficult thoughts and feelings. In this way, experiences of non- acknowledgement by at-
tachment figures may form ‘the germ of a potentially persecutory object which is lodged in 
the self, but is alien and unassimilable’.106
In recent years, Fonagy and colleagues have argued for an important role for later experi-
ences, after childhood, in the intensification of the experience of an alien self. In the absence 
of mentalization, traumatic experiences— for instance, political violence and torture— 
reduce an individual’s capacity to inhibit conflicting appraisals and to buffer the effects of 
emotional reactions on information processing.107 This hinders the individual’s capacity to 
sift coherent and consistent thoughts and feelings, and exclude intentions from the psycho-
analytic unconscious incompatible with the self- representation.108 Fonagy and colleagues 
 104 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach to Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576, p. 567.
 105 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality 
in Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5): 853– 873, p. 864. See also Fonagy, P., 
Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Target, M. (2002). Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and the Development of the Self, 
London: Karnac Books.
 106 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1999). ‘Towards Understanding Violence: The Use of the Body and the Role of 
the Father’, in R. J. Perelberg (ed.), Psychoanalytic Understanding of Violence and Suicide, London: Routledge, pp. 
53– 72, p. 62.
 107 Lorenzini, N., Campbell, C. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Mentalisation and its Role in Processing Trauma’, in 
Bernd Huppertz (ed.), Approaches to Psychic Trauma: Theory and Practice, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
pp. 403– 422.
 108 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds 
About: Part 1. Borderline Personality Disorder as a Limitation of Resilience’. Borderline Personality Disorder and 
Emotion Dysregulation, 4: 11.
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have also speculated that wider dehumanizing culture and institutionalized values may in-
tensify the experience of the alien self (see Chapter 9).
The experience of an alien self ‘interferes with the relationship between thought and iden-
tity: ideas or feelings are experienced that do not seem to belong to the self. The alien self des-
troys the sense of coherence of self.’ 109 The feeling of coherence within perceptual experience, 
self- knowledge, and agency may be achieved through alternate means, in the use of pretend 
mode, psychic equivalence, or teleological mode. However, Fonagy and colleagues also con-
sider another strategy that restores feelings of coherence, which stands as the closest candi-
date in their writings to a distinct, ‘fourth’ major form of non- mentalizing.110 This is termed 
‘externalization of the alien self ’. In fact, Luyten, Malcorps, Fonagy, and Ensink list external-
ization of the alien self alongside pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode 
in their table of non- mentalizing in the latest edition of the Handbook of Mentalisation in 
Mental Health Practice.111 This could be regarded as a hint that its elevation to the official 
status of a mode of non- mentalizing may be under tacit consideration. However, declining 
reference to the concept in recent years would suggest otherwise, and instead point to the ra-
ther unstable and poorly integrated status of the concept for Fonagy and colleagues.
In the externalization of the alien self, ‘the other’s mind is being controlled or manipulated 
in order to restore a sense of self in the face of an assault that has inhibited the capacity to re-
gard one’s own mind as coherent. This does not represent a complete absence of mentalizing; 
rather, it is a form of highly disrupted mentalizing in which the other’s mind is recognized 
and used to restore one’s sense of one’s own mind.’112 Externalization of the alien self is a re-
vised account of the classic but overladen Kleinian concept of ‘projective identification’. This 
may have slowed its acknowledgement as a distinct form of non- mentalizing, because there 
was already an apparently encompassing term, and one with a very complicated and messy 
history.113 This would have made attempts to excavate and redefine the concept hazardous 
for Fonagy and colleagues in the 1990s and early 2000s, not only because the work would 
have been fiddly and technical, but also because it could have appeared as a capitulation to a 
 109 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in 
Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5): 853– 873, p. 864.
 110 E.g. Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘Comorbid Antisocial and Borderline Personality 
Disorders: Mentalization‐Based Treatment’. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 64(2): 181– 194: ‘Stability is maintained 
by interpreting the world according to teleological understanding much of the time, but in many instances, we sug-
gest that stabilization of mental processes arises from the rigidity of the externalization of the alien self ’ (p. 184).
 111 Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, P., and Ensink, K. (2019). ‘Mentalising and Trauma Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 79– 102, p. 85, Table 5.1. Luyten and colleagues also hint at ‘re- 
enactment of trauma’ as a potential additional form of non- mentalizing, though it might be supposed that this 
could be accounted for in terms of the other three— or four— modes of non- mentalizing. The relationship between 
re- enactment of trauma and the forms of non- mentalizing is not addressed in depth by the authors.
 112 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Mentalizing Family Violence Part 1: Conceptual Framework’. Family Process, 
56(1): 6– 21, p. 13.
 113 Sandler, J. (ed.) (1988). Projection, Identification, Projective Identification, Karnac Books. Bateman, A. W., 
and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘What psychodynamic clinicians would recognise as “projective identification”. 
This term has many meanings, and this has led us to talk about one aspect of this— the externalisation of the 
alien part of the self ’ (p. 20). The idea of ‘externalization’ was developed by Anna Freud and Joseph Sandler in 
responding to Klein’s work, again attempting to distinguish specific meanings within the overburdened concept 
of projective identification. By ‘externalization’, Freud and Sandler intended the ascription of a troubling mental 
state of one’s own to someone or a group in the outside world, a defence mechanism they regarded as capable of 
becoming pathological if implemented too rigidly and intensely, but also as quite ordinary and sometimes func-
tional in human life. Sandler, J., Kennedy, H., and Tyson, R. L. (1975). ‘Discussions on Transference: The Treatment 
Situation and Technique in Child Psychoanalysis’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 30(1): 409– 441; Sandler, J. 
and Freud, A. (1981). ‘Discussions in the Hampstead Index on “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence”: IV. The 
Mechanisms of Defence, Part 1’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 4(3): 151– 199.
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Kleinian perspective at a point that Fonagy was being accused of being insufficiently Anna 
Freudian (see Chapter 1).114 The relatively insular London Kleinian group had taken up pro-
jective identification as their flagship concept in the 1990s, giving it a specific symbolic load 
in the immediate context in which Fonagy and colleagues were working.115
An outstanding problem with the concept of ‘externalization of the alien self ’ is inherited 
from ‘projective identification’. As Fonagy and colleagues observed in the 1990s, the con-
cept of projective identification risks confusing two things. On the one hand, phenomen-
ology: what it feels like to the individual. On the other hand, explanation: the psychological 
mechanism entailed.116 This is precisely the distinction elided by psychic equivalence, where 
experience is taken as explanation; a good part of mentalization- based therapies is helping 
patients think about their experience, and consider possible explanations.117 Fonagy and 
Target acknowledged that the concept of projective identification appeals precisely because 
it feels like it captures the way patients can get under the therapist’s skin. But the reality of 
this feeling is distinct from a conceptualization of projective identification in terms of causal 
mechanisms.118 The same problem, however, has attended their uses of the concepts of 
‘mentalization’ and ‘disorganized attachment’ (Chapter 3) as we have seen, and the concept 
of ‘epistemic trust’ as we will see in the next chapter (Chapter 7). It also attends their use of 
the terms ‘self ’ and ‘alien self ’.
Sometimes Fonagy and colleagues characterize the alien self as an aspect of an individual’s 
experience. Sometimes they treat it as a psychological structure. Sometimes it appears to be 
unconscious, outside of an individual’s experience. Sometimes it is treated as an aspect of all 
 114 See e.g. Bach, S., Alvarez, A., Mayes, L., and Fonagy, P. (2000). ‘Panel 3: Fantasy Life and the Self ’. Journal of 
Infant, Child & Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 51– 62: ‘Peter Fonagy: I always had terrible trouble with the notion 
of projective identification. I was trained at the Anna Freud Centre and we just didn’t talk about things like that’ 
(pp. 60– 61).
 115 Hargreaves, E. (2004). In Pursuit of Psychic Change: The Betty Joseph Workshop, London: Routledge. See also 
Baert, P. (2012). ‘Positioning Theory and Intellectual Interventions’. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 
42(3): 304– 324. See also Brown, L. J. (2012). ‘The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. By Elizabeth Bott Spillius, 
Jane Milton, Penelope Garvey, Cyril Couve, and Deborah Steiner (Review)’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 81(3): 775– 
780: ‘Some years ago, I attended a symposium on the Controversial Discussions, hosted by the Massachusetts 
Institute for Psychoanalysis, at which the featured speakers were Ron Britton (representing the Kleinian view), 
Peter Fonagy (the contemporary Freudian view), and David Tuckett (the Independent view). At one point, Fonagy 
spoke about the tendency toward insularity among Kleinians, and also acknowledged a measure of envy about that 
group’s collective focus on systematically developing their concepts’ (p. 775).
 116 In the estimation of Fonagy and Hepworth, confusion of phenomenology and explanation character-
ized much of Klein’s terminology. Technically, this would mean that much of Kleinian therapy would be con-
ducted close to psychic equivalence, a state in which phenomenology is taken for explanation. Fonagy, P. and 
Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, London: Whurr 
Publications: ‘Criticisms address the “fuzziness” of Klein’s descriptions. The emphasis on “phantasy” as the 
building block of mental structure means that mental structuralization has been moved into the experiential realm 
(see Sandler & Joffe 1969), rather than being seen as inaccessible to awareness. This carries the advantage of close-
ness to clinical experience, and rids theory of much reified pseudo- scientific terminology. However, it bypasses 
essential questions and findings about the mechanisms underpinning mental functions.’ (135, parentheses sup-
pressed); ‘The attainment of the “depressive position” illustrates some of the ambiguities of Kleinian terms. This 
change (whether or not seen as a stable development stage) clearly implies a qualitative shift in the perception of 
the object from part to whole. It is not clear, however, if it also implies a) consciousness of conflicted feelings about 
the same person (e.g. love and hate); b) the unconscious integration of various images with no necessary conscious 
correlate; c) the ability to recognize that the same person can generate conflicting feelings, but that these do not 
necessarily “belong” to that person’ (p. 136).
 117 E.g. Lemma, A., Target, M., and Fonagy, P. (2011). Brief Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy: A Clinician’s Guide, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘A DIT formulation has several components: 1) It describes the problem as seen 
by the patient. 2) It contextualizes the problem in a developmental framework . . . 3) It pulls together this infor-
mation into an account that meaningfully links the patient’s difficulties with a psychological, dynamic process’ 
(pp. 111– 112).
 118 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 135
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psychological processes to a greater or lesser degree. All of these are possibilities of course. 
A confusion between phenomenology and explanation has meant that Fonagy and col-
leagues have never really sorted these matters out or articulated their interrelation. Fonagy 
and colleagues tend to lack clarity on whether the feeling of externalizing the alien self is 
a fantasy and/ or a kind of psychic equivalence, or whether something is actually external-
ized.119 If the former, the actual mechanisms that allow the other’s mind to be controlled 
or manipulated would need to be articulated, as would the exact overlap or causal relation-
ship between externalization of the alien self and psychic equivalence.120 Kleinians such as 
Bion had identified this as a problem already for their concept of projective identification,121 
and this issue appears to have been inherited by Fonagy and colleagues. Appeal to the alien 
self appears particularly in their more clinical publications. It rarely figures in their papers 
more concerned with underpinning mechanisms. Again, this may also have made it harder 
for externalization of the alien self to become identified as a fourth major mode of non- 
mentalizing, or for clarifying justification to be offered as to why it does not receive this 
status.
Like in pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode, in externalization of 
the alien self— conceived of as a psychological mechanism— elements of mentalization are 
hijacked. Present and past perceptual experience, observable social behaviour, and motivations 
and intentions of the other are conceived, accounted for and controlled in order to avoid con-
ceiving of thoughts and feelings in oneself. Bateman and Fonagy have described how ‘if the 
alien self is an experience of vulnerability, the person creates this experience in his com-
munication partner by generating chronic uncertainty; if it is aggression, he simply has to 
irritate him; if it is depression or lack of interest and hopelessness, then he might force him to 
experience the potential of helping, only to dash his hopes again and again’.122 Fonagy gave 
the autobiographical example of his panicked phone calls home to his parents as an adoles-
cent living alone in London, where he would ‘talk about his situation in catastrophic terms 
until his parents were palpably panicked, and then he would end the conversation feeling 
relieved’.123 (see Chapter 1).
Illustrating the externalization of the alien self, Fonagy and Target described the case 
of Callum, who displayed aggressive and controlling behaviour when his mother was pre-
sent, and intense separation anxiety when she was absent. Fonagy and Target acknowledged 
that an aspect of these symptoms expressed attachment anxiety about the availability of the 
caregiver, based on past experiences. Yet they argued that ‘Callum’s need for closeness to his 
mother is not simply motivated by anxiety but also by the need for a vehicle to contain the 
 119 Concerns about the lack of clarity in use of the concept of ‘externalization’ in this regard have been offered 
by Auerbach, J. S. (2005). Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. L., and Targe, M. ‘Affect Regulation, Mentalization, and 
the Development of the Self (Book Review)’. Accessed at: https:// www.apadivisions.org/ division- 39/ publications/ 
reviews/ affect.
 120 The possibility that the alien self is a kind of psychic equivalence is tantalizingly suggested in the first edition 
of Bateman and Fonagy’s Psychotherapy For Borderline Personality Disorder. Though the link is not discussed in the 
text, in Figure 3.6, Bateman and Fonagy suggest that externalization of the alien self has a special causal relation-
ship with psychic equivalence not possessed by teleological mode and pretend mode. However, the nature of this 
link is not elaborated. And the diagram disappears from the subsequent edition of the book. If externalization of 
the alien self is indeed partly a species of psychic equivalence, then this would suggest another reason for its exclu-
sion as a fourth form of non- mentalizing.
 121 Bion, W. ([1977] 2019). Bion in New York and Sao Paulo, and Three Tavistock Seminars, London: Karnac Books.
 122 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21.
 123 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21.
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alien part of himself ’.124 In controlling his mother’s behaviour, he also achieved an indirect 
form of self- control, permitting greater feelings of coherence.
Fonagy and colleagues have described the alien self as formed by our intentions that 
are not given acknowledgement, initially by caregivers and then later in other social inter-
actions. Sexuality and aggression are therefore powerful components of the alien self of most 
humans. Fonagy and colleagues have argued that these are the forms of intentionality that 
receive the least acknowledgement from caregivers, and that have the most circumscribed 
place in social interaction, ‘thus always remaining somewhat alien, and so prone to acting 
out’,125 though they acknowledge that there will be cultural variability in the degree and 
form of acknowledgement of these forms of intentionality. They suggest, for instance, that 
new social media may offer representations of sexuality and aggression that offer modes 
of part- acknowledgement and part- construction to sexual and aggressive intentionality 
(see Chapter 9). As a result, these aspects of the alien self may impinge more into the self- 
representation and its activities.126 Nonetheless, Fonagy and colleagues have assumed that 
some externalization of the sexual and aggressive selves is a basic facet of human experi-
ence.127 It is the externalization of the sexual and aggressive selves that gave earlier psycho-
analytic theory, including Anna Freud, the impression that sexuality and aggression could be 
conceptualized as drives, characterized by intentions that in key regards exceed or transgress 
an individual’s image of themselves.128 The externalization of alien self in the cases of sexu-
ality and aggression will be discussed in turn.
Sexuality and aggression
In Freud’s classical stance, a child’s sexual wishes are inherently unrealizable. The wishes are 
therefore excluded from consciousness but remain live in the unconscious. This creates a 
foundational conflict, implicated in various ways in mental health symptoms. For instance, 
in phobias, a forbidden sexual wish is regarded as linked to a particular object, which is then 
associated with fear and aversion. From the 1990s, Fonagy and Target expressed their agree-
ment with Freud that sexual intentions are, at base, incongruent with self- representations. 
 124 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). ‘Evolution of the Interpersonal Interpretive Function: Clues for Effective 
Preventive Intervention in Early Childhood’, in S. W. Coates, J. L. Rosenthal, and D. S. Schechter (eds), September 
11: Trauma And Human Bonds, Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 99– 113, p. 110.
 125 Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2015). ‘Bad Blood Revisited: Attachment and Psychoanalysis, 2015’. British 
Journal of Psychotherapy, 31(2): 229– 250, p. 241.
 126 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2015). ‘A Scientific Theory of Homosexuality for Psychoanalysis’, in A. Lemma 
and P. E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, Hove, UK: Routledge, pp. 125– 
137: Primary unconscious becoming more important, as more mirroring of it: ‘The discomfort of desire as made 
real by its social experience is here to stay. We predict that, if anything, its potential for impingement will be en-
hanced by the increased contingent mirroring of psychic experience made available by the panoply of electronic 
media, the iPhone and Android apps’ (p. 135).
 127 Slade has argued that some affects are inherently difficult to mentalize, among these ‘negative affects such 
as fear, sadness, and particularly anger.’ Slade, A. (2009). ‘Mentalizing the Unmentalizable: Parenting Children on 
the Spectrum’. Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 8(1): 7– 21, p. 8. While sexuality and aggres-
sion were given particular attention by Fonagy and Hepworth, it seems quite possible that experiences of fear will 
also contribute to the alien self. Fonagy and Hepworth’s focus on sexuality and aggression perhaps stemmed from 
their salience for psychoanalytic theory. Fear may also have been subsumed under the attachment response, even 
though Bowlby distinguished them and their activating and terminating conditions as behavioural systems. The 
neglect of fear may also perhaps arise from an expectation that caregivers are able to acknowledge their child’s fear 
more than their sexuality or aggression. If the latter assumption has been in play, it is— at least— debatable.
 128 See e.g. Freud, A. (1949). ‘Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development; Normal and Pathological’. The 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 3: 37– 42.
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And they acknowledged that many patients with severe mental health problems also report 
unusual or distorted concern with their bodies, which may include problems related to sexu-
ality. However, they argued that the basis of the symptoms lies in ‘the consequence of inad-
equate and incomplete self representation’.129
The concern with the body that may characterize these patients is actually a secondary effect 
of this inadequate and incomplete self- representation: under conditions of anxiety or worry, 
difficulties in integrating thoughts and feelings prompt ‘a movement back to a pre- reflective 
bodily self ’.130 Some use of this strategy is wholly ordinary, and in fact beneficial: ‘the move-
ment between physical and psychological experiences of the self is a dialectic. At times of psy-
chological stress, we all find relief in exercise, in sexuality and other forms of regression to a 
pre- reflective state.’131 This movement is by no means the root of the patient’s problems. As 
such, Fonagy and Target argued that ‘classical technique, focusing upon the individual’s sexual 
conflicts without addressing the fragility of the self structure, will rarely lead to a satisfactory 
therapeutic solution’.132 What efficacy classical technique possessed was often based, they ar-
gued, in the capacity for discussion of sexual conflicts to serve as a concrete set of metaphors 
for other patterns in the life of the patient. But this metaphorical use and its benefits were only 
accessible to patients who were already capable of reconsidering their self- representation and 
its functioning.
A decade later, Fonagy and Target returned to these questions in characterizing the adult 
experience of sexuality. This was prompted by interest in the way that consideration of sexu-
ality had increasingly dropped out of psychoanalysis. They identified several factors im-
plicated in this shift. One was that the object of therapeutic concern, in the aftermath of 
humanistic psychology, had increasingly become the interplay between self coherence and 
interpersonal relationships. Fonagy and Target explicitly criticized psychoanalytic thinkers 
such as Laplanche who emphasized sexuality at, in their view, the expense of concern with 
interpersonal relationships. A second factor they felt was implicated in the turn away from 
sexuality was that psychoanalysts felt stigmatized by the accusation that they were ob-
sessed with sex. A third factor, Fonagy and Target argued, was that interpretations focused 
on sexual conflicts tended to backfire with patients with personality disorders and severe 
mood disorders. For instance, forms of non- mentalization could make these interpretations 
 129 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55, p. 51.
 130 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55, p. 51. See also Fonagy, P. and Moran, G. S. (1990). ‘Severe 
Developmental Psychopathology and Brittle Diabetes: The Motivation for Self- Injurious Behaviour’. Bulletin of the 
Anna Freud Centre, 13: 231– 248: ‘Emma’s sole route to her dead mother was via the creation of a state of constant 
near- death within her own body . . . The pain and discomfort she inflicted upon herself were probably only bear-
able because of the separation of her self representation from her representation of her physical state. As her bodily 
states were, to a certain extent, represented outside of her self structure, the body was available as a stage upon 
which the nature and functioning of the mental world could be enacted’ (p. 246).
 131 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55, p. 51. See also Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. 
(2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 385– 418: ‘Exercise in particular may not only distract de-
pressed patients, but also reinstil a sense of efficacy and control, lead to a libidinal reinvestment of the body, and 
probably have a stress- attenuating effect through its effects on the dopaminergic reward system’ (p. 399). Taking 
this claim yet further, Fonagy has stated on Twitter that ‘physical exercise is the closest we have to a panacea for 
mental health problems’. Accessed at: https:// twitter.com/ PeterFonagy/ status/ 1160575072068866050?s=20.
 132 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Understanding and the Compulsion to Repeat: A Clinical Exploration’. 
Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17: 33– 55, p. 51.
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appear as sexual suggestions by analysts, resulting in interpersonal drama and therapeutic 
complications.133
Fonagy and Target expressed concern that disinterest in sexuality in psychological theory 
put at risk attention to the alien self, present in all of us and with an especially active and dis-
ruptive role for patients with mental health problems. They speculated that caregivers are 
primed by evolutionary factors, often expressed in culturally specific ways, to ignore or reject 
signals of their child’s sexual excitement. Without secondary representation and acknow-
ledgement, sexual intentions will, and absolutely should, form a part of the child’s alien self. 
Depending on the kind of non- acknowledgement a child’s sexual experiences have received, 
this will colour the way in which they feature within the alien self: ‘sexual feelings may feel 
too dangerous to share: they may for example be felt as too contagious and overwhelming to 
the relationship (unmarked mirroring), unacceptable (for example when there has been re-
flection of excitement and curiosity as aggression, or clear expression of disgust at the sexual 
body).’134 These are the kinds of concerns associated with what Fonagy and Allison have sub-
sequently termed the psychoanalytic unconscious. Yet states of fragmentation, incoherence, 
and meaninglessness may also be implicated in some of sexuality’s less intentional mental 
states and actions: ‘There is a vacuum within a part of the self, where internal reality remains 
nameless, sometimes dreaded, perhaps vacuous or frightening— or exciting and mysterious, 
as is the case in normal sexuality.’135
There is no direct expression of sexual excitement. It is always mediated by developmental 
and cultural factors in how it is experienced and expressed, and by the qualities of the person 
or situation prompting desire. Despite this diversity, Fonagy and Target nonetheless argued 
that sexual excitement always entails some involvement of the alien self, even when this ex-
citement finds expression in culturally permitted forms. Sexual pleasure comes in part from 
the externalization of the alien self in the excitement experienced in relation to an actual 
or fantasized partner.136 The implication is that there is a fundamental incompatibility be-
tween sexual excitement and mentalizing. Holding the two together is an essentially un-
stable achievement at best.137 As such, ‘normal sexuality, while not pathological, mimics a 
form of pathology . . . or is at least in the borderline spectrum’.138 Mentalizing may help gen-
erate ‘the interpersonal context for an erotically imaginative intercourse’, in which a spiral of 
reciprocally recognized cues supports intimacy and pleasure. Nonetheless, despite the debt 
that these pleasures may owe to mentalizing, their urgency will also be lessened by it. We 
may close our eyes in sexual pleasure, Fonagy suggested, in part because close attention to 
the other’s thoughts and feelings rather counteracts feelings of sexual excitement, since these 
 133 Fonagy, P. (2006). ‘Psychosexuality and Psychoanalysis: An Overview’, in P. Fonagy, R. Krause, and 
M. Leuzinger- Bohleber (eds), Identity, Gender and Sexuality: 150 Years after Freud, London: International 
Psychoanalytic Association Press, pp. 1– 19.
 134 Target, M. (2015). ‘A Developmental Model of Sexual Excitement, Desire and Alienation’, in Alessandra 
Lemma and Paul E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, London: Karnac Books, 
pp. 43– 62, p. 49.
 135 Target, M. (2007). ‘Is our Sexuality our Own? A Developmental Model of Sexuality Based on Early Affect 
Mirroring’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 23(4): 517– 530, p. 521.
 136 Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘A Genuinely Developmental Theory of Sexual Enjoyment and its Implications for 
Psychoanalytic Technique’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56(1): 11– 36: ‘One’s own pleasure 
can be experienced only when it has been placed into the other, in fantasy’ (p. 24). The model is not well adapted for 
examining fetishes where the other will not experience pleasure. Fonagy marked this as a problem for full explor-
ation on another day (p. 27), though without subsequently returning to the question.
 137 Target, M. (2007). ‘Is our Sexuality our Own? A Developmental Model of Sexuality Based on Early Affect 
Mirroring’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 23(4): 517– 530, p. 524.
 138 Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘A Genuinely Developmental Theory of Sexual Enjoyment and its Implications for 
Psychoanalytic Technique’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56(1): 11– 36, p. 19.
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are premised on localized non- mentalizing in the externalization of the alien self.139 Target 
has added that sexual pleasures may be helped along by other modes of non- mentalizing. 
We may experience pleasure as a demonstration of the strength or quality of the relationship 
(psychic equivalence). A partner’s pleasure may be experienced as concretely affirming their 
love (teleological mode). Or we may take pleasure from feelings of being merged with the 
other and safe from the world (pretend mode).140
The non- mentalizing of externalization of the alien self in sexuality may have an evolu-
tionarily adaptive function. Not only does it direct sexuality away from the family during 
adolescence, helping to avoid incest. Fonagy and Target also offered their suspicion that 
the potential for localized heedlessness and recklessness in sexual life is adaptive for repro-
ductive success, even if it may be very inconvenient in other ways.141 They proposed that, 
at an evolutionary level, sexual desire is in tension with the evolutionary benefits of sta-
bility and interpersonal understanding. Likewise, at the level of the individual, Fonagy and 
Target proposed that there is a trade- off between sexual excitement and the other benefits 
of relationships. The better integrated self- representation afforded by the relationship as a 
secure base and safe haven quietens the demands of the alien self, and with it the intensity 
of sexual excitement. The partner is partly internalized through preconscious identification, 
as a shared sense of ‘we’, which replaces the sense of mystery and excitement with familiarity 
and security.142 Though many relationships may be able to toggle backwards and forwards 
between the two, Fonagy and Target suggest that the relative incompatibility of sexuality and 
mentalizing is one of several reasons that desire tends to fade over time in long- term rela-
tionships. When this happens, sexual excitement may still be evoked by other people, they 
argued, to the extent that these individuals elicit aspects of the alien self that have not found 
purchase and integration within the present relationship.143
On the basis of this account, Fonagy and Target argued that sexuality should neither be 
the central focus of therapy nor should it be ignored or treated only as a metaphor. When 
sexual excitement appears in a therapeutic context, the therapist is advised to offer ‘recogni-
tion of the feelings, minor resonance without reciprocal excitement, without denial or dis-
tortion’.144 Sexuality is part of the alien self for a reason: its expression is often inappropriate 
and difficult to reconcile with mentalizing. Yet sexuality is relevant in therapeutic contexts, 
because it can provide important signals of the activity of the alien self. Sexuality may be used 
as ‘a vehicle for carrying repudiated aspects of the self such as aggression, envy, grandiosity, 
 139 Ibid. 26. However, there may be gender differences here: ‘I believe that while male sexual enjoyment cul-
minates in the full externalization of the self into the object and its unconsciously fantasied control therein, female 
sexual arousal begins with an intersubjective identification with the partner and becomes increasingly “private” 
and inwardly turning as excitement mounts. In both cases, intersubjectivity is critical to fulfillment, but while 
male excitement moves toward seeing the split- off self as the other, the vector or focus of female excitement is an 
increasingly direct experience of a self uncontaminated by incongruity, assuming that a previous successful pro-
jection has taken place’ (p. 33).
 140 Target, M. (2015). ‘A Developmental Model of Sexual Excitement, Desire and Alienation’, in Alessandra 
Lemma and Paul E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, London: Karnac Books, 
pp. 43– 62, p. 46– 47.
 141 Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘A Genuinely Developmental Theory of Sexual Enjoyment and its Implications for 
Psychoanalytic Technique’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56(1): 11– 36, p. 24.
 142 Target, M. (2015). ‘A Developmental Model of Sexual Excitement, Desire and Alienation’, in Alessandra 
Lemma and Paul E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, London: Karnac Books, 
pp. 43– 62, pp. 51– 52.
 143 Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘A Genuinely Developmental Theory of Sexual Enjoyment and its Implications for 
Psychoanalytic Technique’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56(1): 11– 36, p. 25.
 144 Target, M. (2007). ‘Is our Sexuality our Own? A Developmental Model of Sexuality Based on Early Affect 
Mirroring’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 23(4): 517– 530, p. 527.
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derogation, contempt, or plain selfishness’.145 Put another way, the most potent metaphors 
rub both ways, with true aspects as well as pretend aspects at once. Even if sexuality is in part 
a metaphor for other troubles, this is grounded in the powerful alien self aspects of sexuality:
Sexuality is not at root conflictual; rather, conflicts come to be expressed via the sexual 
metaphor. It is this psychic flypaper quality that makes psychosexuality such a key part 
of understanding our patients. Many truly painful conflicts are sexual, not because they 
are rooted there but because the otherness quality of sexuality frames the conflict as 
being external. As the psychosexual expresses, and does not disguise, the relational, fre-
quently the only genuine route to understanding relational issues is through psychosexual 
experience.146
When therapists direct attention away from sexuality, this leaves the patient without support 
for making sense of and modulating feelings that may be sexual or that may be framed in 
terms of sexuality. Fonagy and colleagues hold that sexuality should be recognized by ther-
apists, but so as to focus on supporting the patient’s capacity to mentalize related thoughts 
and feelings. Discussion of sexual matters may be inhibited in short- term therapeutic work 
by the patient’s shame or worries. And over time, the experience of the therapist as a secure 
base can be expected to inhibit sexual excitement. But at the point that the therapeutic rela-
tionship is evoking the alien self, and remains exciting and mysterious, sexuality is likely to 
be an especially important theme.
Having considered sexuality, we can now turn to a second, parallel contributor to the alien 
self in the work of Fonagy and colleagues. This is aggressive intentions. Whereas Fonagy and 
colleagues describe sexuality in terms that suggest that externalization of the alien self is 
generally involved, their stance appears to be less ambitious in relation to aggression, seeing 
externalization as an important cause but not implicated in aggression in all its forms.147 By 
contrast, the multiple causal factors that contribute to aggression are acknowledged espe-
cially in writing for developmental psychology audiences, in the context of a discipline in 
which unitary causal lines are not regarded as persuasive.148 For instance, Fonagy has re-
cently highlighted the importance of economic deprivation for the prevalence of conduct 
problems, without implying that this relationship is fully mediated by externalization of the 
alien self.149 Nonetheless, the writings of Fonagy and colleagues suggest that externaliza-
tion of the alien self may have a significant role to play in the initiation and maintenance of 
violence.
In classical psychoanalysis, a child’s aggressive wishes— like their sexual desires— cannot 
be fully realized and are prohibited by both caregivers and wider society. Again, for Freud, 
the conflict between unconscious aggressive intentions and conscious recognition of the 
inappropriateness of aggression was anticipated to be implicated in the symptoms of pa-
tients.150 Subsequent psychoanalytic theorists such as Kernberg built on this position to 
 145 Fonagy, P. (2009). ‘Foreword’, in C. Clulow (ed.), Sex, Attachment and Couple Psychotherapy, London: Karnac 
Books, p. xx.
 146 Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘A Genuinely Developmental Theory of Sexual Enjoyment and its Implications for 
Psychoanalytic Technique’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 56(1): 11– 36, p. 28.
 147 Though admittedly what appears as a theoretical difference may be an artefact of genre. Fonagy and col-
leagues barely mention sexuality outside of their writings for psychoanalytic audiences.
 148 Cicchetti, D. and Rogosch, F. A. (1996). ‘Equifinality and Multifinality in Developmental Psychopathology’. 
Development & Psychopathology, 8: 597– 600.
 149 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘The Future Prospects of Mentalization Based Therapies’, 5th International Congress of 
Mentalisation Based Treatments, Haarlem, The Netherlands, 22 November.
 150 See Freud, A. (1949). ‘Notes on Aggression’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 13(5): 143– 151.
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argue that excessive destructive and envious intentions, combined with a caregiving envir-
onment that was not able to offer containment of these responses, predispose BPD.151 They 
described by Fonagy, Moran, and Target, the authors set themselves against this account. 
They argued that aggression might better be seen as a defence against particular thoughts 
and feelings.
They described Moran’s treatment of a patient, David. On the basis of the concept of 
mentalizing theory, they argued that his ‘unprovoked, excessively aggressive acts could now 
be seen to be aimed at objects whom he experienced as viewing him in a negative way. It 
seemed as if, through attacking these individuals, he could temporarily rid himself of bad 
reflections of himself . . . It was preferable for David to strip his mind almost bare of mental 
content than to be exposed to the terrible power of the shaming gaze.’152 This account allowed 
the authors to pinpoint the conditions under which David would show aggression: ‘his ag-
gression was activated on the numerous occasions when his sense of self required reinforce-
ment and his identity was in need of bolstering’.153 Though the concept would only be offered 
some years later, we can see in this characterization the proposal that aggression represented 
a means for David to externalize an alien self associated with shame. This defence was inter-
preted as reflecting David’s difficulties in conceiving of and reflecting on his mental states 
and those of others. However, the defence was achieved precisely by reinforcing and solidi-
fying this state of affairs.
Given that all humans have an alien self, rather than solely ask how violent behaviour 
develops, Fonagy and Target’s perspective suggested that another focus should be on how a 
failure to inhibit violent behaviour develops.154 Fonagy and Target proposed that violence 
did not reflect a single developmental trajectory: multiple developmental trajectories might 
converge on deficits in mentalizing combined with thoughts or feelings experienced as un-
bearable and as requiring externalization. Pervasively aggressive behaviour was therefore 
interpreted by Fonagy and Target as reflecting, and reinforcing, ‘a wish to attack thoughts, 
in oneself or in another’.155 For instance, they described self- harm as an externalization into 
the pre- reflexive body of intolerable thoughts or feelings that would otherwise occur in the 
patient’s own mind. The ritualized and structured form of an act of self- harm offers a way to 
access a certain kind of regularized feeling, and therefore provide a certain sense of clarity. 
 151 Fonagy’s impression of Bion and Kernberg’s positions is set out in Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (1990). ‘A 
Developmental Perspective on Borderline Personality Disorder’. Revue Internationale de Psychopathologie, 1: 125– 
159, p. 142.
 152 Fonagy, P., Moran, G. S., and Target, M. (1992). ‘Aggression and the Psychological Self ’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 15: 269– 284, pp. 279– 80.
 153 Ibid. 281.
 154 This was well aligned with the emergent perspective of developmental psychopathology e.g. Rutter, 
M. and Sroufe, L. A. (2000). ‘Developmental Psychopathology: Concepts and Challenges’. Development and 
Psychopathology, 12(3): 265– 296: ‘The search needs to be for factors that fail to inhibit aggressive- disruptive be-
haviour, as well as for factors that foster it’ (p. 276). More recently, see Patalay, P., Fink, E., Fonagy, P., and Deighton, 
J. (2016). ‘Unpacking the Associations between Heterogeneous Externalising Symptom Development and 
Academic Attainment in Middle Childhood’. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 25(5): 493– 500.
 155 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1995). ‘Understanding the Violent Patient: The Use of the Body and the Role of the 
Father’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 76: 487– 501, p. 489. The authors also offered some unpersua-
sive reflections on gender differences in violence. Ibid.: ‘Why do aggressive men more often direct their hostility 
towards others, while self- mutilation is more common in women? We believe that both forms of violence suggest 
an attempt to be rid of an intolerable phantasy of the thoughts in somebody’s mind, originally the thoughts of a 
parent. The gender imbalance may then reflect a wish to attack the thinking of the same- sex parent (with whom 
identification is potentially more painful and inescapable). For both girls and boys, the mother’s thoughts about 
the child have generally been intersubjectively experienced earlier, and are probably represented as within the 
child’s mind. The father’s thinking is, we suggest, represented in both sexes as external. The intolerable mental pres-
ence of the same- sex parent would then be felt to be inside the woman’s mind, but outside the man’ (p. 498).
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And this is achieved in such a way as to direct attention to the body, and away from mental 
states. Likewise, Fonagy theorized that male violence against women represents an attack on 
thinking, this time through the body of the other. He was interested by the way that, in his 
experience, perpetrators reported that control over and intimidation of women offered them 
a feeling of personal coherence.156
In a paper from 2003, Fonagy characterized violence that functions to support the feeling 
of personal coherence as ‘representational violence’, because the object of the violence is used 
to ‘represent’ the aspects of the alien self that are refused mentalization.157 He contrasted 
this with a second basis for violence, ‘violence in the negative’. In this form, states of frag-
mentation, incoherence, and meaninglessness from the primary unconscious have become 
associated with specific other people or groups. These then have to be ‘destroyed to protect 
the mind from states which are experienced as out of control’.158 When some capacity for 
mentalization is available, the limited responsibility of the other for these states can usually 
be acknowledged. When mentalization is offline, and especially when teleological mode is 
active, physical force may be regarded as necessary in order to achieve control and change 
in the situation. Fonagy summarized: ‘representational violence’ is aimed at an object in its 
function as a signifier for mental states that are refused to be conceived or considered as 
thoughts or feelings; ‘violence in the negative’ is aimed at a signifier in order to prevent its 
expression of states of fragmentation, incoherence, and meaninglessness.
However, in another article of the same year, Fonagy argued that not all violence fits into 
this scheme, and that psychological theory ‘must take proper account of the existence of 
positive, survival- oriented aggression and also of aggression that is a genuine protest against 
hardship in life’.159 He argued that violence should not be denigrated: evolutionary pressures 
will have required humans to be capable of both nonviolent group life and of enacting vio-
lence under situations of threat, proposing that mentalization may have evolved as a cap-
acity in part to help sustain nonviolence in social contexts where we feel recognized, while 
prompting non- mentalizing and violent responses in environments of nonrecognition.160 
This perspective has significant implications for prevention (see Chapter 9). Similarly, the 
idea of social acknowledgement as a prompt, primed by evolution, for mentalizing rather 
than violence may help explain why ‘restorative justice’ approaches, in which an offender 
and victim of crime interact face to face and offer mutual acknowledgement, have been 
found to be especially powerful at reducing violent crime, compared with other less serious 
forms of crime.161 Restorative justice approaches differ markedly from the usual approach 
of criminal justice systems, which institutionalize teleological mode thinking in demanding 
concrete retribution for crime, even in the face of evidence that this appears to make future 
crime more, rather than less, likely.
 156 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Male Perpetrators of Violence against Women: An Attachment Theory Perspective’. 
Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 1(1): 7– 27.
 157 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Violence in our Schools: What can a Psychoanalytically Informed Approach 
Contribute?’. Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 5(2): 223– 238. Representational violence: ‘The first kind of 
violence arises because of the overriding need for coherence in the experience of an agentive self . . . For its effect-
iveness, it depends on the experience of having created an intentional state in the victim that enhances the strength 
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 158 Ibid. 235.
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In recent years, and in line with other perspectives in developmental psychopathology,162 
Fonagy has increasingly drawn distinctions between mild aggressive problems and more 
intractable forms of antisocial personality disorder, while continuing to regard deficits in 
mentalizing as relevant to both. Various developmental pathways may converge in contrib-
uting to the inhibition of mentalizing, which can contribute to the externalization of the 
alien self, reduced feelings of personal agency, hostile attributions regarding others, and a 
low threshold for violent actions.163 In reflecting on these developmental pathways, Fonagy 
has acknowledged the likelihood that ‘some particularly intractable conduct problems have 
a genetic basis’.164 He has not held out expectation for an ‘aggressive genotype’. Rather, he has 
been more persuaded by the idea that there may be both genetic and environmental con-
tributions to attentional control and affect regulation, which help sustain mentalizing. This 
conclusion is supported by findings that 90% of children with a diagnosed conduct disorder 
also have another mental health problem— for instance, with attentional problems 10 times 
higher than in the general population.165
What especially distinguishes antisocial personality disorder, for Bateman and Fonagy, 
are feelings of shame in the alien self, which are externalized through the domination of other 
people. This externalization is prompted by psychic equivalence, where shame threatens to 
dominate and define reality.166 The externalization of the alien self functions through the 
denigration and intimidation of other people, which holds at bay questions these others or 
the self might pose about the individual’s worth. Any potential or perceived slight is met 
with hostility, perhaps supported by teleological mode in which physical retribution seem 
the only real response.167 Like the other forms of non- mentalizing, the externalization of the 
alien self presents specific obstacles to the modulated doubt that helps sustain the inquisitive 
stance and consideration of alternate perspectives. Externalization of the alien self seeks to 
control the other’s behaviour, motivations, and experience, and in this way to avoid rele-
vant feelings and thoughts that might otherwise disrupt a brittle self- coherence. The ques-
tion of how to conceptualize whether such strategies are ‘adaptive’ will be pursued further 
in the next chapter. By the end of the 2000s, this account of adaptation had come to rather 
eclipse the idea of the alien self, which remained ‘on the books’ but without any scientific 
operationalization and poorly integrated with subsequent theoretical developments. This 
may be attributed to the essentially psychoanalytic underpinnings of the concept of exter-
nalization of the alien self, which has meant that the concept travels less easily, and is less 
 162 E.g. Mesman, J., Stoel, R., Bakermans- Kranenburg, M. J., van IJzendoorn, M. H., Juffer, F., Koot, H. M., 
and Alink, L. R. (2009). ‘Predicting Growth Curves of Early Childhood Externalizing Problems: Differential 
Susceptibility of Children with Difficult Temperament’. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 37(5): 625– 636.
 163 Taubner, S., Gablonski, T.- C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Conduct Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter 
Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 301– 321.
 164 Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘The Neuroscience of Prevention’. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 105(3): 97– 
100, p. 98.
 165 Pilling, S. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Developing Clinical Guidelines for Children and Adolescents: Experience 
from the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence’, in P. Sturmey and M. Hersen (eds.), Handbook of 
Evidence- Based Practice in Clinical Psychology, Volume 1, Child and Adolescent Disorders, New York: Wiley, pp. 
73– 102, p. 74.
 166 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental Roots of 
Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 446.
 167 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds.), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 289– 
308; Bateman, A., O’Connell, J., Lorenzini, N., Gardner, T., and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘A Randomised Controlled 
Trial of Mentalization- Based Treatment versus Structured Clinical Management for Patients With Comorbid 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder’. BMC Psychiatry, 16(1): 304.
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intelligible to the scientific and policy audiences of the more recent work of Fonagy and col-
leagues.168 Nonetheless, Fonagy and colleagues’ recent interest in wider social systems and 
institutionalized non- mentalizing have drawn attention to experiences of social alienation 
(see Chapter 9). It may be that the alien self will receive renewed interest, through this link 
with alienating social systems.
 168 It may be that the reduced prominence of externalization of the alien self can also be attributed to the chan-
ging membership of Fonagy’s closest collaborators, with Target working increasingly less closely with Fonagy in 
recent years.
7
Adaptation and mental health
Introduction
Dominant models of mental illness often treat it as a discrete pathology, distinct from or-
dinary human psychology. One of the more subversive aspects of psychoanalysis was the 
desire to look at typical and atypical psychological phenomena together, and examine vari-
ation between them in terms of common mechanisms.1 This included speculations about 
neurological mechanisms relevant to both the makings of ordinary life and the formation of 
symptoms. Dreams, jokes, and the slips of everyday life were included by Freud within the 
same framework as obsessional symptoms, somatic disorders, and psychosis:
The theoretical importance of this conformity between dreams and symptoms is illumin-
ating. Since dreams are not pathological phenomena, the fact shows that the mental mech-
anisms which produce the symptoms of illness are equally present in normal mental life, 
that the same uniform law embraces both the normal and the abnormal and that the find-
ings of research into neurotics or psychotics cannot be without significance for our under-
standing of the healthy mind.2
There was a price to this strategy for psychoanalytic theory. Many of the concepts used to link 
typical and atypical phenomena— such as ‘defence’— were forced to become over- absorptive 
of different meanings, to the point that their meaning became lost. Yet at the same time, 
Freud intended that this approach would reduce the stigma attached to mental illness and 
support preventative work with people who were not yet unwell.
Very much the same situation has played out for the concept of ‘mentalizing’. This con-
cept likewise was treated by Fonagy as relevant to typical and atypical mental development, 
of transdiagnostic significance, and not wholly conscious. Though Fonagy and colleagues 
would regard their claims about neurology to be less speculative than Freud’s, these claims 
have likewise addressed mechanisms relevant to both ordinary life and the formation of 
symptoms. Like Freud, the simultaneous attention to typical and atypical development by 
Fonagy and colleagues has been pursued in part as a way to combat the ‘unfounded, crass, 
insuperable prejudice’ associated with mental illness.3 There have been theoretical gains 
associated with this approach. Insight into successful mentalizing offered ideas for con-
ceptualizing mental ill health; and insight into forms of non- mentalizing offered ideas for 
conceptualizing the structure of the self, the nature of perceptual experience, and the specific 
 1 Freud, S. ([1901] 2001). The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, in James Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 6, London: Vintage.
 2 Freud, S. ([1923] 2001). ‘Two Encyclopaedia Articles’, in James Strachey (ed.), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 18, London: Vintage, pp. 233– 260, p. 241.
 3 Luyten, P. and Fonagy. P. (2012). ‘The Multidimensional Construct of Mentalization and its Relevance to 
Understanding Borderline Personality Disorder’, in A. Fotopoulou, D. Pfaff, and M. A. Conway (eds), From the 
Couch to the Lab: Trends in Psychodynamic Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405– 427, p. 406.
Adaptation and attachment 167
qualities of psychological insight. However, like several of Freud’s concepts, along the way, 
uses of the idea of mentalization expanded, and expanded.
This prompted the work of Chapters 4 and 5 to attempt to pin down more precisely the 
definition and constituent elements of mentalization and non- mentalization, and to ask 
whether they are simple opposites. It also prompted effort in the previous chapter to draw 
out the complex picture of how Fonagy and colleagues have discussed the role of uncon-
scious processes in everyday life, including in experiences of sexuality and aggression. In this 
chapter, we turn to consideration of Fonagy and colleagues’ conceptualization of the nature of 
mental illness, predominantly in papers written for researchers in the field of developmental 
psychopathology, though with some eye to clinical audiences. We start with criticisms of 
Fonagy and Target’s work from the 1990s, raised by allies such as Jeremy Holmes and Otto 
Kernberg who alleged that mentalization risked becoming a disempowering, deficit- focused 
model of mental ill health. One resource available to Fonagy and colleagues in responding 
to this concern was attachment theory, which had developed a theory of attachment strat-
egies as evolutionarily primed responses to adverse conditions. We will survey the reflec-
tions Fonagy and colleagues have offered on three attachment theorists— Mary Main, Pat 
Crittenden, and Jay Belsky. The synthesis proposed by Fonagy and colleagues will then be 
described. The position of Fonagy and colleagues gives prominence to attachment relation-
ships in calibrating an individual’s sense of vigilance or trust in the perspectives of others, as 
the precondition of learning from them. In recent years, this concern with vigilance, trust, 
and learning has been central to the theoretical work of Fonagy and colleagues, laying the 
ground for very important advances in specifying the role of mentalization in both ordinary 
life and the alleviation of mental ill health.
Adaptation and attachment
Through the 1990s and at the start of the 2000s, Fonagy, Target, and collaborators had a 
tendency to denigrate non- mentalizing. They described non- mentalizing as an ‘unholy per-
version of reflection’,4 and as a ‘stunted or twisted’ version of mentalization.5 The ambition in 
these passages appears to have been to offer lively description of the way in which forms of 
non- mentalizing seem to utilize many of the same component elements as mentalization— 
for instance, that pretend mode utilizes the imaginative capacity to conceive of mental states 
that is required, too, for mentalization. However, the language is also stigmatizing, perhaps 
an unintended reflection of the authors’ clinical frustration with recalcitrant cases. In the 
mid- 2000s, important criticisms were raised of the assumptions about mentalization that 
such language seemed to express. Jeremy Holmes and Otto Kernberg are psychoanalytic 
psychiatrists, and friends and allies of Fonagy and Target. Both were early advocates for 
mentalization in the 1990s,6 and have subsequently co- authored work with Fonagy.7 Yet, 
 4 Bach, S., Mayes, L., Alvarez, A. and Fonagy, F. (2000). ‘Panel 1: Definition of the Self ’. Journal of Infant, Child & 
Adolescent Psychotherapy, 1(3): 5– 24, p. 21.
 5 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The Persistence of Dual Psychic Reality in 
Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5): 853– 873, p. 859.
 6 Kernberg, O. F. (1997). ‘The Nature of Interpretation: Intersubjectivity and the Third Position’. The American 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 57(4): 297– 312; Holmes, J. (1998). ‘The Changing Aims of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy: 
An Integrative Perspective’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 79: 227– 240.
 7 E.g. Shedler, J., Beck, A. T., Fonagy, P., Gabbard, G. O., Kernberg, O., Michels, R., and Westen, D. (2011). 
‘Response to Skodol Letter’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 168(1): 97– 98; Chiesa, M., Fonagy, P., Holmes, J., 
and Drahorad, C. (2004). ‘Residential versus Community Treatment of Personality Disorders: A Comparative 
Study of Three Treatment Programs’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 161(8): 1463– 1470. See also Hepworth, 
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they criticized Fonagy and Target for tending to characterize non- mentalizing as a ‘deficit’ 
or ‘impairment’, without considering whether it may have benefits or adaptive aspects.8 
This was out of keeping with a growing critique of deficit thinking in mental health in the 
2000s: it was held that mental health theory and practice should recognize the strengths of 
users of services, acknowledge their agency beyond that ‘granted’ by professionals, and dif-
ferentiate between short- term and long- term advantages and disadvantages.9 For instance, 
substance use might be reframed as, in certain contexts, a form of self- medication against 
other difficulties.10
Fonagy and colleagues accepted the criticism of Holmes and Kernberg as partially justi-
fied. There was a tendency towards deficit- thinking in their theorizing.11 The criticism was 
not wholly justified, however. Fonagy and Target had conceptualized symptoms of mental 
ill health as intelligible responses to adverse situations. One of the characteristic features 
of the Anna Freudian tradition, within which Fonagy and Target had trained, was a con-
cern with ‘lines of development which lead from the individual’s state of infantile immaturity 
and dependence to the gradual mastery of his own body and its functions, to adaptation to 
the object world, reality and the social community’ (pp. 47– 53).12 Anna Freud identified 
this adaptation with the ego.13 She opposed the ego to the id, conceptualized as continually 
seeking ‘fulfilment of drive derivatives which are unacceptable to the environment, bringing 
with it the threat of punishment or loss of love, and, instead of serving adaptation, disturbing 
it.’14 Defence mechanisms were regarded by Anna Freud as compromises between the ego 
and the id, representing the best available adaptation of the child to his or her environment. 
This adaptation would be shaped by the extent of supports available in that environment, and 
the extent of effective dominance of the ego over the id. In this subtle perspective, depending 
M. (2019). ‘“Peripheral Visions”: A Conference Celebrating the Contribution of Jeremy Holmes and 20 Years of 
Psychoanalytic Studies at Exeter University, UK’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 35(2): 215– 216.
 8 Holmes, J. (2005). ‘Notes on Mentalizing— Old Hat, or New Wine?’, British Journal of Psychotherapy, 
22(2): 179– 198; Kernberg, O. F., Yeomans, F. E., Clarkin, J. F. and Levy, K. N. (2008). ‘Transference Focused 
Psychotherapy: Overview and Update’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 89: 601– 620.
 9 E.g. Blundo, R. (2001). ‘Learning Strengths- Based Practice: Challenging our Personal and Professional 
Frames’. Families in Society, 82(3): 296– 304; Crossley, N. (2004). ‘Not being Mentally Ill: Social Movements, System 
Survivors and the Oppositional Habitus’. Anthropology & Medicine, 11(2): 161– 180.
 10 Khantzian, E. J. (1997). ‘The Self- Medication Hypothesis of Substance Use Disorders: A Reconsideration and 
Recent Applications’. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 4(5): 231– 244.
 11 See e.g. Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is Truth Relevant?’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303, 
p. 286. They now acknowledge ‘when we think about mental ill health, particularly in children and young people, 
inorganic metaphors of damage or even plasticity may be less helpful than ways of thinking that recognize the 
human capacity for growth and adaptation in conditions. Of course, this capacity is not infinite and can be con-
strained by both biological and environmental factors, but it is at times grossly underestimated both by those 
who tend to think of disorder in terms of irreparable damage and by well- meaning professionals who believe that 
recovery occurs only as a consequence of intervention’, Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child 
Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, London: Anna Freud Centre.
 12 Freud, A. (1962). ‘Assessment of Childhood Disturbances’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 17(1): 149– 
158, p. 152– 3. See also Joffe, W. G. and Sandler, J. (1979). ‘Adaptation and Individuation’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud 
Centre, 2(3): 127– 161; Sandler, A.- M. (2012). ‘Anna Freud’s Influence on Contemporary Thinking about the Child’, 
in N. Malberg and J. Raphael- Leff (eds), The Anna Freud Tradition: Lines of Development, London: Karnac Books; 
Midgley, N. (2012). Reading Anna Freud, London: Routledge.
 13 The work of Anna Freud and Heinz Hartmann would together prove influential for the central role of the 
concept of ‘adaptation’ within subsequent ego psychology. See e.g. Rapaport, D. and Gill, M. M. (1959). ‘The 
Points of View and Assumptions of Metapsychology’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 40: 153– 162. It 
is commonly pointed out that ‘adaptation’ receives special attention in the work of these central European Jewish 
émigrées, who had to acclimatize to America and England. Two generations later, there seem relevant analogies to 
the case of Fonagy.
 14 Freud, A. (1981). ‘Insight: Its Presence and Absence as a Factor in Normal Development’. The Psychoanalytic 
Study of the Child, 36(1): 241– 249, p. 243.
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on development and context, exactly the same behaviour could be in the service of the ego 
and adaptation, or represent defence and the compromise of ego and id:
A five- year- old may ask his mother for an extra cardigan ‘so as not to catch cold’; or a six- 
year- old may anxiously wash his hands before dinner since ‘there might be germs’. Should 
that be understood as early compliance with adult rules, i.e. a welcome sign of adaptation, 
or, rather, as an ominous sign of hypochondriacal tendencies and of pathogenic defence 
mechanisms used in the struggle against anal messing? Obviously, only an approximate 
timetable for normal advance towards compliance with hygiene and cleanliness can supply 
the answer.15
In the 1990s, when Fonagy and colleagues were working on a manual for child psycho-
analysis at the Anna Freud Centre, they adopted an aligned perspective, arguing that ‘the 
child needs his defences and has good reason for erecting them’.16 Speaking on BBC tele-
vision, Fonagy criticized therapeutic approaches that do not take into account the difficult 
feelings or the problems in a child’s environment against which defences may have been elab-
orated: ‘if you are systematically undermining that very fragile, that very vulnerable sense of 
who that child is you could end up in the situation where the child becomes really very much 
more depressed and hopeless and helpless. My concern about it is that you are destroying 
something in the child that is the child’s own. However distorted and however maladaptive it 
is, it is the child’s own.’17
The concept of ‘adaptation’ would be a piece of the inheritance of Fonagy and his collab-
orators from the Anna Freudian tradition.18 Yet a problem with the Anna Freud’s concept of 
‘adaptation’ was its multiple meanings, a problem raised with Freud late in her life by Joseph 
 15 Freud, A. (1983). ‘The Past Revisited’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 6(1): 107– 113, p. 111.
 16 Fonagy, P., Edgcumbe, R., Target, M., and Miller, J. (1999). Contemporary Psychodynamic Child 
Therapy: Theory and Technique, London: Anna Freud Centre and University College London: ‘Early in treatment, 
it is usually safer to begin with verbalisation of affect until the child’s emotional balance is clear enough for the ana-
lyst to predict how he might react to interpretation of unconscious wishes. Even so, it is also usually more readily 
acceptable to the child to interpret defences before the wishes or impulses against which the child is defending. 
Bypassing the defences with a direct interpretation of an unconscious wish ignores the fact that the child needs his 
defences and has good reason for erecting them’ (p. 103). See also Fonagy, P., Bleiberg, E., and Target, M. (1997). 
‘Child Psychoanalysis: Critical Overview and a Proposed Reconsideration’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics 
of North America, 6: 1– 38: ‘For these children, the possibility of relinquishing their single, fixed, concrete model 
of self- other relatedness triggers terror and confusion. Therapists more profitably point out the advantages of not 
changing, remarking on the price children would pay if they were to give up their maladaptive, but often life- 
saving, defences and self- other internal models’ (p. 31).
 17 BBC2 (2001). ‘Taming the Problem Child, 9 p.m. Horizon, Thursday, 8 March. Accessed at: http:// www.bbc.
co.uk/ science/ horizon/ 2000/ problemchild_ transcript.shtml.
 18 Target, M. (2018). ‘20/ 20 Hindsight: A 25- year Programme at the Anna Freud Centre of Efficacy and 
Effectiveness Research on Child Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy’, Psychotherapy Research, 28(1): 30– 46: ’Our effort 
in this direction, the HCAM [Hampstead Child Adaptation Measure], distinguished 14 domains of normal and 
abnormal development which could be tracked cross- sectionally and longitudinally, going well beyond symptoms 
to cover things like the child’s capacity to have relationships, to play, learn, look after himself physically, regulate 
moods, manage stress, and so on’ (p. 43). To take another example, a scale for the extent to which an individual’s 
behaviour appears adaptive would be developed by Steele, H., Steele, M., and Kriss, A. (2009). The Friends and 
Family Interview (FFI) Coding Guidelines. Unpublished manuscript: ‘This scale refers specifically to responses to 
the question asking what the respondent does when distressed or upset. An adaptive strategy may involve seeking 
comfort from others (e.g. parents, friends, or siblings), engaging in a favorite activity that relieves their unhap-
piness (e.g. listening to music, walking the dog), or simply thinking things through.’ See also Chow, C. C., Nolte, 
T., Cohen, D., Fearon, R. P., and Shmueli- Goetz, Y. (2017). ‘Reflective Functioning and Adolescent Psychological 
Adaptation: The Validity of the Reflective Functioning Scale– Adolescent Version’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 
34(4): 404– 413.
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Sandler, and which she seemed to accept.19 What may be adaptive in the short run may not 
be adaptive in the long run, and vice versa. What may be adaptive for a species may not be 
adaptive for an individual. Furthermore, the term ‘adapt’ could mean simply the extent to 
which an individual can respond to a challenge, or the extent to which they can thrive in the 
face of it.20 There can also be a subtly normative aspect, in which adaptation to an environ-
ment may mean capitulation to its norms and existing power relations.21 By the time Fonagy 
was developing his ideas in the 1980s and 1990s, he was in discussion with psychoanalysts 
such as Sandler who were acknowledging these various meanings of the concept of adap-
tation, and the threat that the concept might smuggle unacknowledged assumptions about 
what counts as the good life. But psychoanalytic discourse frequently lost track of the dis-
tinctions. And there was no strong theory available for how individual responsiveness and 
thriving might relate to the evolutionary level of adaptation.
In this context, Fonagy and colleagues took particular interest in developments in attach-
ment theory in conceptualizing adaptation, defences, and mental health and ill health. These 
developments had been prompted by an influential, but unpublished, conference paper pre-
sented by Mary Ainsworth at the International Conference on Infant Studies in April 1984.22 
In this paper, Ainsworth expressed concern that the term ‘adaptation’ represented a twig- 
thicket of different meanings; attention to these different meanings offers clarification on the 
relationship between mentalizing and ‘adaptation’. Like Sandler, Ainsworth acknowledged 
that ‘adaptation’ could refer to processes at a species level, in identifying a behavioural system 
or trait as contributing to survival or reproduction. Secondly, ‘adaptation’ could refer to an 
individual level, identifying a behaviour or trait as responsive to the available rewards and 
punishments of the immediate environment.23 Ainsworth also observed a third meaning of 
the concept: ‘In the developmental mental health sense the focus is on how individual dif-
ferences in development, and on evaluation of how well or how poorly such development 
equips the individual to cope with the impact of the environment in which he lives.’24 What 
distinguished this third meaning of the concept from the second was that an evaluation 
was entailed. The second meaning was merely an acknowledgement that an individual may 
 19 Sandler, J. and Freud, A. (1981). ‘Discussions in the Hampstead Index on “The Ego and the Mechanisms of 
Defence”: V. The Mechanisms of Defence, Part 2’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 4(4): 231– 277; Sandler, J. and 
Freud, A. (1982). ‘Discussions in the Hampstead Index on “The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence”: VIII. Denial 
in Word and Act’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 5(3): 175– 187. See also Joffe, W. G. and Sandler, J. (1968). 
‘Comments on the Psychoanalytic Psychology of Adaptation, with Special Reference to the Role of Affects and the 
Representational’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49: 445– 454. Early concerns about the term ‘adapta-
tion’ were raised by Hartmann, one of the popularizers of the concept within the psychoanalytic community. See 
Hartmann, H. (1939). ‘Psycho- Analysis and the Concept of Health’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
20: 308– 321.
 20 Winnicott, in turn, used the term ‘adaption’ in a different, slightly non- standard way, developing further the 
idea of ‘responding’. His predominant use of the term characterized the way that a caregiver moulds his or her body 
and interactions to fit around those of the child. Winnicott, D. W. ([1960] 1965). The Maturational Process and the 
Facilitating Environment, New York: International Universities Press.
 21 See also Lee, N. N. (2014). ‘Sublimated or Castrated Psychoanalysis? Adorno’s Critique of the Revisionist 
Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to “The Revisionist Psychoanalysis”’. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 
40(3): 309– 338.
 22 Ainsworth, M. (1984). ‘Attachment, Adaptation and Continuity’. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Infant Studies, April, John Bowlby Archive, Wellcome Collections, PP/ Bow/ J.1/ 57. See Duschinsky, 
R. (2020). Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 2.
 23 Ibid.: ‘In the phylogenetic or evolutionary sense adaptation implies that in the course of natural selection 
those behaviours that yield survival advantage in the environment in which the evolutionary changes are taking 
place become part of the behavioural repertoire characteristic of a species . . . In the ontogenetic sense adaptation 
refers to the process through which an organism adjusts to its environment in the course of development.’
 24 Ibid.
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‘adapt’ to their circumstances. Ainsworth’s third meaning was to identify ‘adaptation’ as the 
capacity to thrive in the long term within those circumstances.
Ainsworth’s argument was terminologically complex. Indeed, the subtlety of Ainsworth’s 
argument may have contributed to her decision not to attempt to publish the article, despite 
its influence on her students and collaborators. Her proposal was that individual adaptation 
(long- term thriving) may result from adaptation (changing oneself in order to respond) to 
the environment. However, there are forms of adaptation (long- term thriving) where re-
fusal to adapt (change oneself in order to respond) is optimal— for instance, in depleting or 
punitive environments that can be changed or exited. Some forms of adaptation (thriving) 
may come at the expense of other forms of adaptation (thriving), as in the familiar case in 
which the demands of one area of life— family, work— come at the expense of others— diet, 
exercise, self- care. A further complexity lies in the fact that there are forms of adaptation (re-
sponding and/ or thriving) that are based very directly on adaptation (species- level natural 
selection), such as the deployment of conditional strategies as evolutionary- based behav-
ioural repertoires. However, there are forms of adaptation (responding and/ or thriving) that 
are more based on social learning or other processes based more on human plasticity than 
responses directly grounded in adaptation (species- level natural selection).
Working closely with Mary Ainsworth was her former student Mary Main. Ainsworth 
and Main had observed that in the Strange Situation procedure a sizeable minority of infants 
directed attention away from their caregiver on reunion. These were infants whose primary 
caregiver had more frequently rebuffed their attempts to seek closeness when distressed (see 
Chapter 3). Main argued that, from an evolutionary perspective, avoidance could be inter-
preted as a proactive response by the infant that ‘paradoxically permits whatever proximity 
is possible under conditions of maternal rejection’.25 Evolutionary processes would have 
selected for avoidance as one part of the infant repertoire for responding to caregivers, be-
cause infants who are able to avoid antagonizing their caregivers or making demands that 
their caregiver will rebuff are more likely to have survived. An infant successfully utilizing 
an avoidant strategy maintains an indirect but real proximity to their caregiver, as well as 
the regulatory control to continue to be responsive to the environment.26 Main argued that 
avoidance represented a behavioural repertoire, selected by evolutionary processes, and 
available to infants to respond to less sensitive care. Following use of the term in studies of 
animal behaviour, Main termed avoidance a “conditional strategy”, since it would be drawn 
on when the primary attachment strategy of proximity- seeking is unavailable to an infant, 
and it would provide a conditional form of access to proximity.
Main anticipated that there would be two possible conditional strategies. One of these, 
avoidance, directed attention away from cues that might activate attachment behaviour. The 
other, appearing as ambivalent/ resistant attachment in the Strange Situation, entailed vigi-
lant attention to signs of the caregiver’s potential unavailability. Both conditional strategies 
could be predicted, on average in human evolutionary history, to have provided sufficient 
indirect proximity with caregiver to have facilitated survival. In her 1984 paper, reflecting on 
Main’s theory, Ainsworth stated that it may be that avoidance hinders adaptation (long- term 
thriving), or could be beneficial even in the long- run if conditions continue to be difficult. 
 25 Main, M. (1979). ‘The “Ultimate” Causation of Some Infant Attachment Phenomena: Further Answers, 
Further Phenomena, Further Questions’. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2: 640– 643, p. 643.
 26 Main, M. (1981). ‘Avoidance in the Service of Proximity: A Working Paper’, in K. Immelmann, B. 
Barlow, L. Petrovich, and M. Main (eds), Behavioral Development: The Bielefield Interdisciplinary Project, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 694– 699, p. 686.
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Ainsworth offered her conviction that this was essentially an empirical matter: the question 
of whether ‘avoidant attachment may be adaptive according to ultimate criteria in the mental 
health sense is clearly a researchable proposition’.27
Main’s stance was that, even if short- term benefits could be identified, avoidance would 
hinder long- term thriving. Yet a greater threat was represented by the potential for break-
down or disruption of attachment strategies, disorganized attachment, which were argued 
to be elicited by a child’s experiences of frightened, frightening, or dissociative caregiving. 
Another student of Ainsworth’s, Patricia Crittenden, held a different position. She argued 
that there may be ecological niches where conditional strategies are simply superior, espe-
cially under conditions— most of human evolutionary history— where significant danger is 
prevalent. To characterize conditional strategies as a second- best option then would be both 
overgeneralized and potentially ethnocentric.28 Crittenden agreed with Main that there are 
two general forms of conditional strategy. She argued that Ainsworth’s avoidant attachment 
classification represented a local case of the broader strategy of inhibiting or distorting in-
formation about negative emotions. Ainsworth’s ambivalent/ resistant classification repre-
sented a local case of the broader strategy of inhibiting or distorting information about the 
temporal and causal sequencing of others’ availability, permitting the maintenance of vigi-
lance. Crittenden proposed that with maturation, and responding to experiences of threat 
or danger, additional forms of these two strategies become available.29 To the extent that 
symptoms are prompted by close relationships and/ or experiences of threat, she suggested 
that many forms of mental illness may be regarded as effects of conditional strategies. For 
instance, one kind or component of post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is avoidant symp-
toms, numbness, and other inhibitions of negative emotions. Another kind or component 
of PTSD is hyperarousal and vigilance for threats or potential separations from attachment 
figures.30
In the 1990s, Fonagy was impressed by Main’s account of conditional strategies as be-
havioural repertoires made available by human evolutionary history. This model aligned 
with Anna Freud’s suggestion that many forms of mental illness begin as a local response 
to adverse circumstances, and that they remain relevant and perhaps even helpful so long 
as those adversities continue. However, Main’s account added to Freud’s an underpinning 
ethological– evolutionary framework, in which certain profiles of symptoms have an under-
pinning logic and connection in their likelihood of contributing to survival in the face 
of adversity. Yet, in recent years, Fonagy has increasingly advocated for Crittenden’s pos-
ition, which he has described as ‘more inspiring’.31 Crittenden’s account of the conditional 
 27 Ainsworth, M. (1984). ‘Attachment, Adaptation and Continuity’. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Infant Studies, April, John Bowlby Archive, Wellcome Collections, PP/ Bow/ J.1/ 57.
 28 Crittenden, P. M. (2000). ‘A Dynamic- Maturational Model of the Function, Development, and Organization 
of Human Relationships’, in R. S. L. Mills, and S. Duck (eds), Developmental Psychology of Personal Relationships, 
New York: Wiley, pp. 199– 218.
 29 Crittenden, P. M. (1997). ‘Truth, Error, Omission, Distortion, and Deception: The Application of Attachment 
Theory to the Assessment and Treatment of Psychological Disorder’, in S. M. C. Dollinger and L. F. DiLalla (eds), 
Assessment and Intervention across the Lifespan, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 35– 76.
 30 Crittenden, P. M. (1997). ‘Toward an Integrative Theory of Trauma: A Dynamic- Maturational Approach’, 
in D. Cicchetti and S. Toth (eds), The Rochester Symposium on Developmental Psychopathology, Volume 10, 
Risk, Trauma, and Mental Processes, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, pp. 34– 84; Crittenden, P. M. 
and Heller, M. B. (2017). ‘The Roots of Chronic PTSD: Childhood Trauma, Information Processing, and Self- 
Protective Strategies’, Chronic Stress, 1: 1– 13.
 31 Fonagy, P. (2013). ‘Commentary on “Letters from Ainsworth: Contesting the ‘Organization’ of Attachment”’. 
Journal of the Canadian Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 22(2): 178– 179: ‘Most would agree that, clinic-
ally, Crittenden’s approach is more inspiring, particularly in understanding the behaviour of children and young 
people whose life has been blighted by malevolence on the part of their carers’ (p. 179).
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strategies aligned with the Fonagy and Luyten characterization of affective and cognitive 
‘poles’ of mentalization (see Chapter 4), and with Luyten’s distinction between avoidant and 
anxious forms of depression.32 Fonagy appreciated Crittenden’s claim that, when adversi-
ties continued, a conditional strategy may have distinct advantages for an individual, as well 
as significant costs. This aligned with Anna Freud’s approach to thinking about defences, 
and appeared to Fonagy to be a destigmatizing perspective.33 Fonagy was also interested by 
the idea that even symptoms of PTSD such as hypervigilance may, in certain ways, serve as 
coping strategies when they become woven into day- to- day living, part of how an individual 
works out their characteristic response to challenges.34
Another attachment theorist, Jay Belsky, had likewise argued that conditional strat-
egies may have advantages within certain ecological niches. Belsky speculated that humans 
evolved to treat the early care we receive from attachment figures as a ‘signal’ about the safety 
or danger of the environment. He suggested that sensitive care prompts a secure attach-
ment relationship, reflecting confidence in others and their availability in the expectation of 
a more favourable environment. Insensitive care prompts an insecure attachment relation-
ship, reflecting caution about trust in others and their availability in the expectation of a less 
favourable environment. An individual’s endocrinology, behaviour, and forms of informa-
tion processing may then be calibrated by a concern with survival and short- term benefits, 
even if these come with a long- term price. Following developmental adversities, on average, 
individuals may be anticipated to be more impulsive, anxious, distractible, and more ready 
to engage in sexual and aggressive behaviours. Seeking to examine this hypothesis, Belsky 
conducted secondary analyses on the data from large cohort studies. He found that attach-
ment insecurity was associated with earlier date of menarche, and harsh early care associated 
with more sexual risk- taking behaviours.35 Belsky interpreted these findings as suggesting 
that the conditional strategies may have conferred benefits under adversity in human evo-
lutionary history. They prompt early puberty and earlier sexual behaviour, increasing the 
likelihood in evolutionary history that a woman would survive to reproduce, though this 
strategy is also costly. For instance, early menarche is associated with long- run disadvantages 
 32 Luyten, P. and Blatt, S. J. (2012). ‘Psychodynamic Treatment of Depression’. Psychiatric Clinics, 35(1): 111– 129. 
See also Rost, F., Luyten, P., and Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘The Anaclitic– Introjective Depression Assessment: Development 
and Preliminary Validity of an Observer‐Rated Measure’. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 25(2): 195– 209.
 33 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Points of Contact and Divergence between Psychoanalytic and Attachment Theories’. 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 19(4): 448– 480: ‘Crittenden’s (1990) work has been particularly helpful in translating 
behaviors typical of avoidant and resistant attachment patterns into the language of the defensive behaviors 
of infancy’ (p. 452); Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘The Role of Attachment, Epistemic Trust and Resilience in Personality 
Disorder: A Trans- Theoretical Reformulation’. DMM News, 26 September. Accessed at: http:// www.iasa- dmm.
org/ images/ uploads/ DMM%20%2322%20Sept%2016%20English.pdf: ‘The model’s emphasis on attachment as a 
means of protecting the self and one’s offspring from danger is then used to make a valuable— and in the process, 
valuably destigmatising— account of dysfunction as arising from knowledge acquired through environmental in-
fluence’ (p. 2).
 34 See e.g. Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘The Neuroscience of Related Trauma and Evidence- Based Intervention’. Accessed 
at: https:// smad6740.files.wordpress.com/ 2015/ 01/ the- neuroscience- of- related- trauma- and- evidence- based- 
intervention1.pdf: Such ‘anomalies could confer a short- term advantage: Vigilance to threat; It is found in healthy 
soldiers exposed to combat. But they constitute a latent neural risk that predisposes to an increased likelihood of 
maladaptation in safe contexts (e.g. school) and of adult psychopathology.’
 35 Belsky, J., Houts, R. M., and Fearon, R. P. (2010). ‘Infant Attachment Security and the Timing of 
Puberty: Testing an Evolutionary Hypothesis’. Psychological Science, 21(9): 1195– 1201; Belsky, J., Steinberg, L., 
Houts, R., and Halpern- Felsher, B. (2010). ‘The Development of Reproductive Strategy in Females’. Developmental 
Psychology, 46(1): 120– 128; Belsky, J. (2019). ‘Early- Life Adversity Accelerates Child and Adolescent Development’. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28(3): 241- 246. See also Szepsenwol, O. and Simpson, J. A. (2019). 
‘Attachment within Life History Theory: An Evolutionary Perspective on Individual Differences in Attachment’. 
Current Opinion in Psychology, 25: 65– 70.
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in terms of physical health. Early sexual debut may be linked to less discrimination of sexual 
partners and less safety in the relationship.
While Crittenden and Belsky frame their claims as criticism of Main’s stance, Fonagy felt 
that they reflected different levels of analysis: ‘To my mind, in the same way that light can be 
seen as either waves or particles, the consequences of attachment trauma can be seen as an 
adaptation that also reflects the absence of an organised strategy. I see no loss of meaning 
coming from this admittedly heuristic or rather deeper integration of these models.’36 Main’s 
primary concern was with motivational systems, their modulation or disruption; Belsky’s 
was with factors that might have helped past humans survive to the age of reproduction 
and see offspring survive; Crittenden’s was with the potential benefits of the inhibition or 
distortion of emotion or cognition under conditions of threat. Fonagy agreed with Main 
that childhood experiences of maltreatment or trauma can result in breakdowns or inter-
ruptions of emotion regulation and attentional control. These are important contributors to 
mentalization, so problems in these areas are likely to have significant ramifications for an 
individual in their experience of self and future social interactions. However, Fonagy agreed 
with Belsky that ‘natural selection may have solved the problem of environmental variability 
by using the attachment system as an “early warning system” to indicate to an infant the 
degree to which violent conduct may be required later in life’.37 A whole variety of social, 
genetic, and endocrinal calibrations maybe made as a result of the early warning provided 
by childhood, priming later responses.38 Finally, Fonagy agreed with Crittenden that dis-
ruptions of emotion regulation and attentional control may be patterned in ways that have 
specific advantages under conditions of adversity.39
Even emotions like fear can contribute to the development of habitual ways of responding 
that benefit an individual in certain ways.40 PTSD symptoms of hyperarousal offer a good 
illustration. Fonagy and colleagues held that Main was right that these symptoms can be 
disruptive for an individual’s capacity to regulate their feelings and maintain attention and 
responsiveness to their immediate environment. These symptoms may also be psychologic-
ally and physiologically very costly. Yet the potential for hyperarousal may have contributed 
to human survival in our evolutionary history, where dangers may have been frequent and 
pressing. If the present likewise contains significant potential dangers then, Fonagy agreed 
with Crittenden that hyperarousal can have localized advantages for an individual in cuing 
a rapid response to potential threats. If the present does not contain relevant dangers, then 
 36 Fonagy, P. (2013). ‘Commentary on “Letters from Ainsworth: Contesting the ‘Organization’ of Attachment”’. 
Journal of the Canadian Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 22(2): 178– 179, p. 179.
 37 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 62.
 38 Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What Touch can Communicate: Commentary on “Mentalizing 
Homeostasis: The Social Origins of Interoceptive Inference” by Fotopoulou and Tsakiris’, Neuropsychoanalysis, 
19(1): 39– 42: ‘The attachment relationship therefore serves as an indicator of the nature of the infant’s environ-
ment (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Simpson & Belsky, 2016), indeed it appears to be a powerful communica-
tion mechanism which works at the level of gene expression as well as at the level of social cognition, as Meaney’s 
work (Meaney, 2010; Meaney & Szyf, 2005) and some epigenetic human studies have shown’ (p. 40).
 39 E.g. Fonagy, P. and Sharp, C. (2008). ‘Treatment Outcome of Childhood Disorders: The Perspective of Social 
Cognition’, in C. Sharp, P. Fonagy, and I. Goodyer (eds), Social Cognition and Developmental Psychopathology, 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 411– 470: ‘All behavioural- emotional problems of children are both a re-
flection of biological vulnerability and/ or adversity and an effort to cope and adapt’ (p. 448).
 40 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 62: ‘The basic emotions [curiosity, fear, anger, lust, caring, 
sadness and joy] are survival and adaptive experiences, which are essential and inform action and reaction. Many 
patients will try to avoid them but in doing so will diminish their ability to appraise situations and themselves’ 
(p. 307).
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indeed, he agreed with Main, hyperarousal is likely overwhelmingly counterproductive. In 
making appeal to the concept of adaptation, Fonagy has been accused by critics of absorbing 
the problems of earlier ego psychology in identifying mental health with subjection to hege-
monic social norms.41 There is an extent to which this criticism holds, but it does not have 
full purchase. Fonagy’s use of the concept of adaptation has been qualified by acknowledge-
ment, especially in recent years, regarding the harms of social norms that institutionalize 
non- mentalizing and prompt adaptations from individuals that hinder their long- term cre-
ativity and thriving (Chapter 9).
From the perspective of Fonagy’s approach to theorizing adaptation, even mental health 
symptoms that reduce environmental responsiveness, like dissociation, may be appraised 
for the extent to which they developed in response to past adversity, and the extent to which 
they are reinforced by helping an individual respond to their current challenges.42 Fonagy 
has argued that both appraisals are important in order to understand what is maintaining 
mental health problems. Clinicians who intervene without this understanding may risk 
increasing their client’s suffering and reducing their capacity to cope with their life. Fonagy 
likewise argued that the forms of non- mentalizing may similarly have evolved as repertoires 
because they contributed to survival under conditions of adversity. According to this logic, 
where circumstances would specifically penalize mentalizing, it may risk harm to patients 
to encourage its development. However, Fonagy and colleagues also argue that, when the 
environment is safe enough to mentalize adversity and trauma, this can prove grist to the 
mill. Skills gained in processing these experiences can lead to the specific development of 
strengths in reconsidering the thoughts and feelings of oneself and others, prompting the 
phenomenon of post- traumatic growth.43 For instance, Fonagy and colleagues have docu-
mented the potential for elevated self- reported empathy in adults who have experienced 
childhood trauma.44 However, they caution that this elevated empathy is not yet well under-
stood, and could reflect hypermentalization rather than mentalization of others, or both 
may be making a contribution.
In their 2017 paper, ‘What We have Changed our Minds About’ (see Chapter 4), Fonagy, 
Luyten, Allison, and Campbell applied these ideas about adaptation in thinking about bor-
derline personality disorder (BPD). They argued that many mental disorders, BPD among 
them, are ‘nested in the context of the evolutionary priorities of the human condition’.45 
 41 Ferraro, D. ([2011] 2014). ‘The Other, Clinical and Empirical: A Review of Fonagy et al. On Affect Regulation, 
Mentalisation, and the Development of the Self ’. Accessed at: https:// melbournelacanian.wordpress.com/ 2014/ 
11/ 24/ the- other- clinical- and- empirical- a- review- of- fonagy- et- al- on- affect- regulation- mentalisation- and- the- 
development- of- the- self/ .
 42 Drinkwater, M. (2008). ‘Portraits of a Divided Self ’. Guardian, 11 September. Accessed at: https:// www.
theguardian.com/ society/ 2008/ sep/ 11/ mentalhealth: ‘Peter Fonagy, a psychology professor at University College 
London, said: “Consciousness is one of the remaining mysteries of neuroscience. We may be able to explain the 
features of [dissociative identity disorder] DID, but without understanding consciousness we cannot entirely ex-
plain how DID occurs.” Far from being considered pathological, Fonagy suggested that DID can be seen as a sign 
of resilience; a strategy for coping with extremely traumatic events. “The mind is capable of separating and we 
put traumatising events into little ‘boxes’. This can be useful as it can help people dissociate from these experi-
ences”, he said.’ See also Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Preface’, in Werner Bohleber (ed.), Destructiveness, Intersubjectivity and 
Trauma: The Identity Crisis of Modern Psychoanalysis, London: Routledge, pp. xi– xiv.
 43 Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A.W. (2016). ‘Adversity, Attachment, and Mentalizing’. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 
64: 59– 66: ‘The experience of trauma, and understanding and overcoming adversity, could also be considered to 
entail the enhancement of mentalizing in the process of overcoming trauma’ (p. 60).
 44 Greenberg, D. M., Baron- Cohen, S., Rosenberg, N., Fonagy, P., and Rentfrow, P. J. (2018). ‘Elevated Empathy 
in Adults Following Childhood Trauma’. PLoS One, 13(10): e0203886.
 45 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds 
About: Part 1. Borderline Personality Disorder as a Limitation of Resilience’. Borderline Personality Disorder and 
Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 11.
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Following Belsky, Fonagy and colleagues argued that caregiving experiences represent a 
form of social communication about the most effective way for a child to function. They 
speculated that:
In certain situations, for example, an emergency milieu characterized by high levels of 
interpersonal aggression, the heightened and immediate sensitivity and seemingly in-
stinctive and physically charged form of appraisal characteristic of BPD might in fact be 
adaptive, at least in the short term. In such an environment, extreme vigilance is a potential 
advantage, and similarly, the ability to form intense emotional relationships quickly might 
elicit resources or protection . . . we postulate that this mentalizing profile may be a re-
sponse to cues suggestive of an unreliable and potentially threatening social environment. 
We thus should be wary of seeing apparent dysfunctions of the clinically ‘hard to reach’ 
as indicative of a deficit or any kind of sub- optimal functioning (as, indeed, we have done 
previously). We would now consider that what may appear to us as dysfunction is an evolu-
tionarily primed adaptation.46
BPD is, here, regarded in a way that integrates the conclusions of Main, Belsky, and 
Crittenden. In part, it reflects breakdown of stabilizing and organizing aspects of emotion 
and attentional regulation, often but by no means always, following from adverse experiences 
of care in childhood and/ or childhood trauma. This then contributes to non- mentalizing 
social interactions with others, which helps sustain difficulties in modulating emotion and 
attention, giving the impression of a disorder of ‘personality’. In part, BPD reflects a reper-
toire pre- primed by human evolution, and elaborated on the basis of experience, in which 
early adversity and trauma function as signals that hyperarousal and a focus on short- term 
concerns will facilitate survival. The slow work of generating second- order representations 
of mental states and reappraising them is impatiently downplayed. And, in part, BPD reflects 
a profile of symptoms that may be reinforcing for an individual if it helps them cope with 
present adversities.47
For example, in environments characterized by high levels of violence, it may be expected 
that security, trust, and the mentalization of oneself and others would result in risk of ex-
ploitation and increased danger— for instance, through a failure to access aggression when 
needed.48 Functioning in teleological mode, by contrast, could be expected to achieve a more 
immediate response, with greater effectiveness at least in the short term. Bateman and Fonagy 
have claimed that it may be beneficial to ‘prioritise an external, nonreflective, rapidly re-
sponding focus on the control of others’.49 In fact, it should be acknowledged that longitudinal 
 46 Ibid.
 47 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘particularly in these individuals, subsequent adversity or 
trauma could further disrupt mentalising, in part as an adaptive manoeuvre on the part of the individual to limit 
exposure to a brutalising psychosocial environment, and in part because the high levels of arousal generated by 
attachment hyperactivation and disorganised attachment strategies serve to disrupt less well- practiced and less 
robustly established higher cognitive capabilities’ (p. 47).
 48 Bevington, D., Fuggle, P., Cracknell, L., and Fonagy, P. (2017). Adaptive Mentalisation- Based Integrative 
Treatment: A Guide for Teams to Develop Systems of Care, Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘In the face of very 
real social conflict, then a mentalising stance in relation to social relationships is likely only to leave the individual 
more vulnerable; for example, it may ultimately render the individual less able to make use of aggressive and vio-
lent social strategies, which might seem absolutely necessary for self- protection. In such an environment, more 
reactive, impulsive forms of mentalising and non- mentalising modes of behaviour, which may most conspicuously 
take the form of aggression or risky sexual behaviour, might be at one level an adaptive response’ (p. 63).
 49 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 440.
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evidence to date has generally shown the opposite: that under conditions of ongoing adversity, 
secure attachment in childhood is an asset rather than a deficit for later thriving.50 However, 
it may be that studies have not been designed to identify the specific benefits that might stem 
from non- mentalizing.51 Or that the studies have not been conducted in contexts with the 
levels of adversity and violence Fonagy and colleagues think are relevant.
Epistemic trust
Drawing on these reflections about adaptation, Fonagy and colleagues have argued that 
‘as clinicians, we may end up calling these individuals “hard to reach”, yet they are simply 
showing what may be a reasonable adaptation to a social environment where information 
from most attachment figures is “tagged” as likely to be misleading’. As such, ‘it may be more 
accurate to characterize BPD as an “emergency mode” form of social understanding’.52 
The defining characteristic of this ‘emergency form’ of social understanding is a higher bar 
for trusting the claims and experiences of others. Trust has been a topic of rapidly rising 
interest in the social sciences since the 1990s, in a social context in which management 
of vulnerability and complexity has become a central concern.53 The question of trust in 
professionals— including psychological professionals— has reflected, in intensified form, 
this wider concern, because precisely part of what it is to be a professional is to provide a ser-
vice that depends in part on trust.54 Fonagy and colleagues were also reflecting on empirical 
findings that showed that early abuse and neglect predicted later symptoms of personality 
disorder, with mediation by reflective function clearly in operation, but to less of an extent 
than anticipated.55 Other factors besides mentalization appeared to be important for the re-
lationship between early adversity and personality disorder.
Drawing from the work of Sperber and colleagues,56 Fonagy and colleagues have termed 
‘epistemic vigilance’ an attitude in which the claims and experiences of others are not felt to 
be dependable, generalizable, or relevant.57 They conceptualized epistemic vigilance as the 
 50 E.g. Sroufe, L. A., Egeland, B., Carlson, E. A., and Collins, W. A. (2005). The Development of the Person. 
New York: Guilford Press; Englund, M. M., Kuo, S. I. C., Puig, J., and Collins, W. A. (2011). ‘Early Roots of Adult 
Competence: The Significance of Close Relationships from Infancy to Early Adulthood’. International Journal of 
Behavioral Development, 35(6): 490– 496. Short- run benefits of insecure attachment under adversity, in this case 
maternal depression, have been documented by Milan, S., Snow, S., and Belay, S. (2009). ‘Depressive Symptoms in 
Mothers and Children’. Developmental Psychology, 45(4): 1019– 1033. However, the researchers found that there 
were longer- term advantages to security under conditions of adversity.
 51 Ein- Dor, T., Mikulincer, M., Doron, G., and Shaver, P. R. (2010). ‘The Attachment Paradox: How can so Many 
of Us (the Insecure Ones) Have no Adaptive Advantages?’. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(2): 123– 141.
 52 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4: 9.
 53 Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self- Identity, Cambridge: Polity Press; Sievers, B. (2003). ‘Against all 
Reason: Trusting in Trust’. Organizational & Social Dynamics 3(1): 19– 39.
 54 Gorman, E. H. and Sandefur, R. L. (2011). ‘“Golden Age,” Quiescence, and Revival: How the Sociology of 
Professions Became the Study of Knowledge- Based Work’. Work & Occupations, 38(3): 275– 302. Already in 2000, 
Fonagy was arguing that ‘Therapy is based on trust, and it is hard for it to be effective without it.’ Interview with 
Fonagy, cited in Rice, M. (2000). ‘Therapy is the New Religion’. Guardian, 13 August. Accessed at: https:// www.
theguardian.com/ theobserver/ 2000/ aug/ 13/ life1.lifemagazine11.
 55 Chiesa, M. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Reflective Function as a Mediator between Childhood Adversity, 
Personality Disorder and Symptom Distress’. Personality and Mental Health, 8(1): 52– 66.
 56 Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., and Wilson, D. (2010). ‘Epistemic 
Vigilance’. Mind & Language, 25(4): 359– 393.
 57 A different formulation is offered by Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Mentalization in Systemic Therapy 
and Its Empirical Evidence’, in Matthias Ochs, Maria Borcsa, and Jochen Schweitzer (eds), Systemic Research in 
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default state of humans, a valuable tool to protect against misinformation stemming from 
malice or incompetence on the part of others: ‘All young humans are at the mercy of a know-
ledge differential, uncertain about the trustworthiness of the information they are about to 
receive . . . We are more likely to survive and thrive if we do not forget that not everyone will 
teach us things that are true or indeed in our interest to learn.’58 It should be noted that there 
are three important differences between Sperber’s original claims and the exposition of them 
offered by Fonagy and colleagues, which was mediated by Gergely’s interpretation:59
 1) Whereas for Sperber, epistemic vigilance is a ‘suite of cognitive mechanisms’,60 the 
characterization of epistemic vigilance as an ‘attitude’ by Fonagy and colleagues con-
veys the impression of a more unitary phenomenon.
 2) Whereas for Sperber, epistemic vigilance seeks to assign the right amount of cre-
dence to people and conversations, this meaning remains operative, but Fonagy and 
colleagues also give the term the sense of distrust. For instance, Fonagy and Allison 
proposed that disorganized attachment means that a ‘child seeks others to confirm or 
deny his/ her own understanding, which he/ she has little faith in, but, being unable to 
trust information received from others, remains in a state of uncertainty and epistemic 
vigilance.’61
 3) Sperber insists that epistemic vigilance may characterize individuals, but can also char-
acterize groups, institutions, and cultures. Yet even individual epistemic vigilance occurs 
on the basis of repertoires that may be suggested or imposed by the individual’s wider 
community. Whether at an individual or a collective level, epistemic vigilance is then 
achieved through what Hutchins calls ‘distributed cognition’, a network of processes 
that together create effects greater than the sum of their parts.62 For instance, Sperber 
identifies that epistemic vigilance may be sustained by the coordination of ‘cognitive 
artefacts (e.g. measuring instruments), techniques (e.g. statistical tests of confidence), 
Individual, Couple, and Family Therapy and Counseling, New York: Springer, pp. 207– 221. There epistemic trust is 
conceptualized as treating information as possessing ‘authenticity and personal relevance’ (p. 216), rather than as 
‘dependable, generalisable or relevant’. This emphasis on authenticity is interesting, and materially distinct from 
the idea of dependable and generalizable information. Yet another definition is offered in Fisher, S., Guralnik, T., 
Fonagy, P., and Zilcha- Mano, S. (2020). ‘Let’s Face It: Video Conferencing Psychotherapy Requires the Extensive 
Use of Ostensive Cues’. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Early View: ‘Epistemic vigilance refers to the ability to be 
justifiably suspicious about socially transmitted information, in a manner that helps protect one against potentially 
deceitful or erroneous information.’
 58 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2018). ‘The Origin of Human Life: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective’, 
European Psychoanalytical Federation, 31st Annual Conference, Warsaw, 24 March.
 59 Gergely, G. (2008). ‘Learning “about” versus Learning “from” Other Minds: Natural Pedagogy and its 
Implications’, in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, and S. Stich (eds), The Innate Mind. Foundations and the Future, Volume 
3, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 170– 198. Speber became a colleague of Gergely at the Department of 
Cognitive Science at the Central European University in 2010, following retirement from CNRS, Paris. Gergely’s 
interpretation of Sperber and colleagues’ concept of epistemic vigilance pre- dates this, however.
 60 Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., and Wilson, D. (2010). ‘Epistemic 
Vigilance’. Mind & Language, 25(4): 359– 393, p. 359. See also Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (2015). ‘Beyond Speaker’s 
Meaning’. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 15(44), 117– 149.
 61 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380, p. 374.
 62 Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutchins, E. (2006). ‘The Distributed 
Cognition Perspective on Human Interaction’, in Nicholas Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson (eds), Roots of Human 
Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Human Interaction, Oxford: Berg, pp. 375– 398; Hutchins, E. (2010). ‘Cognitive 
Ecology’. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2: 705– 715. For a distributed cognition perspective on playful exploration, 
for example, see Parker- Rees, R. (2014). ‘Playfulness and the Co- Construction of Identity in the First Years’, 
in L. Brooker, M. Blaise, and S. Edwards, (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Play and Learning in Early Childhood, 
London: SAGE, pp. 366– 377.
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and procedures (e.g. for cross- examination)’.63 By contrast, Fonagy and colleagues have 
tended, except in their most recent work (see Chapter 9), to limit epistemic vigilance to 
individuals. They have also neither acknowledged nor explored the distributed cognition 
that Sperber and colleagues believe underpins epistemic vigilance, with the exception of 
some initial remarks on the affordances of mobile phone technology (see Chapter 9).
Comparing the work of Sperber and colleagues with the use of it by Fonagy and colleagues, 
the differences are quite marked. Most importantly, the concept of epistemic vigilance as 
used by Fonagy and colleagues slides between two very different meanings, without this 
distinction being marked. Sometimes, Fonagy and colleagues use the term to mean ‘dis-
crimination’, the opposite of blind trust.64 This occurs especially when epistemic vigilance is 
distinguished from ‘epistemic hypervigilance’ and ‘epistemic mistrust’. Perhaps more com-
monly, however, the term ‘epistemic vigilance’ is taken to mean, precisely, hypervigilance 
and mistrust. For Fonagy and colleagues, ‘epistemic vigilance’ often appears to mean a state 
in which information from others is not felt to have bearing or resonance. This reduces ex-
posure to others’ potential malice or incompetence, at the price of knowledge that would 
indeed be accurate and useful. In epistemic vigilance then, the betrayal and disappointment 
we dread are already within us to an extent, in the way that our dread of being undermined 
by others ultimately undermines our own capacity to benefit from encounters with others.65
In the clinic, an inability to relax epistemic vigilance can be seen when, ‘no matter how 
true or accurate the therapist’s interpretations are, the patient will not be able to make use of 
them because they are not experienced as true’, at least in any genuine and personally rele-
vant sense.66 The patient cannot learn from experience— or modify their thoughts, feelings, 
or behaviour on the basis of this learning— because they are unable to make use of potential 
inflows of information. Fonagy and colleagues therefore argued that ‘personality disorder is 
not a “disorder of personality” but an inaccessibility to cultural communication relevant to 
the self from the social context’.67
Conversely, epistemic trust has been defined by Fonagy and colleagues as ‘an individual’s 
willingness to consider new knowledge from another person as trustworthy, generalizable, 
and relevant to the self ’;68 or as ‘openness to acquiring social knowledge that is regarded as 
personally relevant and of generalizable significance.’69 As such, epistemic trust delineates 
those whose claims and experiences we (feel we can) rely upon in order to understand the 
 63 Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., and Wilson, D. (2010). ‘Epistemic 
Vigilance’. Mind & Language, 25(4): 359– 393, p. 383.
 64 The term ‘discrimination’ is from Bion, W. R. (1976). ‘Interview with Anthony G. Banet’, in Tavistock Seminars, 
London: Karnac Books, pp. 97– 114: ‘To what extent is one to allow any idea to come in? One feels that there’s a 
need for a sort of discriminating screen’ (p. 113). A related distinction between ‘default’ and blind’ trust is made in 
Granqvist, P. (2020). Attachment in Religion and Spirituality: A Wider View, New York: Guilford Press.
 65 In significant regards, the thinking of Fonagy and colleagues about epistemic mistrust echoes earlier thinking 
about the origins of prejudice in the breakdown of trust within attachment relationships as a prompt for ‘suspicion’ 
in internal working models. See Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The Development of Prejudice: An Attachment 
Theory Hypothesis Explaining its Ubiquity’, in H. Parens, A. Mahfouz, S. W. Twemlow, and D. Scharff (eds), The 
Future of Prejudice: Psychoanalysis and the Prevention of Prejudice, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 63– 79.
 66 Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is Truth Relevant?’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303, p. 285.
 67 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4: 9, p. 27.
 68 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380, p. 373.
 69 Fisher, S., Guralnik, T., Fonagy, P., and Zilcha- Mano, S. (2020). ‘Let’s Face It: Video Conferencing 
Psychotherapy Requires the Extensive Use of Ostensive Cues’. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Early View.
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world and to change ourselves to effectively respond to it.70 According to Fonagy and Allison, 
writing in 2014, ‘epistemic trust is there to ensure that the individual can safely change their 
position; it triggers the opening of what we can think of as an “epistemic superhighway”— an 
evolutionarily protected mechanism that signals readiness to acquire knowledge.’71 It is not 
stated whether, like mentalization, this epistemic trust depends on imaginative capacities, as 
a kind of suspension of disbelief (see Chapter 5). Presumably it does, unless the knowledge 
transmitted is wholly procedural rather than subjective.72 As Winnicott argued, and Fonagy 
and colleagues have echoed in other contexts, cultural knowledge needs to be both subject-
ively conceived as well as objectively discovered if it is to be alive for a person, and usable.73
In articulating the developmental basis for epistemic trust, Fonagy and colleagues criti-
cized psychoanalytic theories that sought to account for a child’s experience of the minds of 
others in terms of ‘projective identification’; the term is too overladen with different mean-
ings to convey precisely what is taking place.74 They also criticized those, such as Trevathan, 
who account for a child’s experience of the minds of others in terms of ‘intersubjectivity’.75 
Again an over- encompassing term, intersubjectivity implies that mental states are ‘shared’. 
Fonagy and colleagues have generally regarded mental states as only ever the properties 
of individuals, though in recent writing they have brought this assumption into question 
(see Chapter 9). Rather than appeal to projective identification or ideas of intersubjectivity, 
Fonagy and colleagues instead drew on the work of Gergely and Csibra to propose that epi-
stemic trust tends to be activated by interactions in which we feel the other to recognize our 
i) mental states, ii) intentionality, and iii) individuality. The concrete behaviours through 
which this sense of recognition is conveyed were termed ‘ostensive cues’ by Gergely and 
Csibra.76 For Fonagy and colleagues, ‘ostensive cues indicate to the infant that the caregiver 
 70 There remains some instability in the account of epistemic trust as to whether it refers to felt experience or a 
causal mechanism or both. For Fonagy’s emphasis on the importance of this distinction for psychoanalytic theory, 
see Chapter 6.
 71 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380, . p. 374.
 72 The extent to which imagination is implicated in procedural information has been debated by philosophers. 
Ultimately, it hinges on the definition of ‘imagination’ and the model of perceptual experience. Matherne, S. 
(2016). ‘Kant’s Theory of the Imagination’, in A. Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, 
London: Routledge, pp. 55– 68.
 73 Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Playing and Reality, London: Routledge. See the discussion of Winnicott in Fonagy, 
P. and Target, M. (1996). ‘Playing with Reality: I. Theory of Mind and the Normal Development of Psychic Reality’. 
The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 77: 217– 233.
 74 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 20.
 75 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., and Target, M. (2007). ‘The Parent– Infant Dyad and the Construction of the 
Subjective Self ’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3– 4): 288– 328. See also Gergely, G. and Csibra, 
G. (2006). ‘Sylvia’s Recipe: The Role of Imitation and Pedagogy in the Transmission of Cultural Knowledge’, in 
Nicholas Enfield and Stephen C. Levinson (eds), Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Human 
Interaction, Oxford: Berg, pp. 229– 255; Gergely, G. and Unoka, Z. (2008). ‘Attachment, Affect- Regulation, and 
Mentalization: The Developmental Origins of the Representational Self ’, in C. Sharp, P. Fonagy, and I. M. Goodyer 
(eds), Social Cognition and Developmental Psychopathology, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 305– 342.
 76 Csibra, G. and Gergely, G. (2011). ‘Natural Pedagogy as Evolutionary Adaptation’. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366(1567): 1149– 1157; Egyed, K., Király, I., and Gergely, G. (2013). 
‘Communicating Shared Knowledge in Infancy’. Psychological Science, 24(7): 1348– 1353. Subsequent research 
has suggested that Csibra and Gergely overstated the necessary role of ostensive cues for joint attention and for 
learning: e.g. Gredebäck, G., Astor, K., and Fawcett, C. (2018). ‘Gaze Following is not Dependent on Ostensive 
Cues: A Critical Test of Natural Pedagogy’. Child Development, 89(6): 2091– 2098, though the argument that os-
tensive cues may facilitate engagement with the mind of the other is unaffected by these qualifications. A further 
point to raise is that Csibra and Gergely ostensibly take the term ‘ostensive cues’ from their reading of Sperber 
and Wilson. However, comparison of the two groups of theorists suggests that the former have reified the notion, 
because for the latter it is only a designation for a set of a broader class of strategies through which attentional pro-
cesses are directed within the dance of conversation. It would also appear that, for Sperber and Wilson, ostensive 
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recognises him or her as an individual, and as a thinking and feeling (i.e. mentalizing) 
“agent” ’.77 Fonagy sometimes also refers to ostensive cues as offering acknowledgement of 
the other’s experience of ‘personal agency’, which is given no definition, but presumably sig-
nifies the felt state in which mental states, intentionality, and individuality have been acknow-
ledged. Ostensive cues are characterized as diverse and may include joint attention, turn 
taking, social referencing, and marked mirroring.78 Kindness has been conceptualized as an 
ostensive cue.79 One form of kindness, gentle touch that acknowledges and responds to em-
bodied cognition, is an especially powerful ostensive cue.80 Fonagy and colleagues argued 
that humans have evolved to treat receipt of ostensive cues as a basis for epistemic trust, since 
because they signal the presence of another mind interested in our intentions, thoughts, and/ 
or feelings, and therefore likely reflect a situation of relative safety and social supports.81
In the developmental model proposed, parental reflective function leads to the display 
of ostensive cues towards a child. In turn, Fonagy and colleagues claimed that this process 
predisposes a secure attachment relationship, because recognition of the intentions and/ or 
mental state of the child will facilitate secure base and safe haven provision. At times, Fonagy 
and colleagues appear to imply that parental reflective function leads to a quantitative in-
crease in ostensive cues towards the child. However, this does not appear to be their intended 
position. Over- use or ill- judged use of ostensive cues such as touch and eye contact would 
rather be intrusive caregiving, which has been associated with insecure and disorganized 
attachment rather than secure attachment.82 Instead, it must be assumed that ostensive cues 
are used in a ‘sensitive’ way: responding accurately to the signals and communications of the 
child in a way that is experienced by the child as appropriate and prompt. This would imply a 
reconciliation of the opposition drawn by Fonagy and colleagues between reflective function 
cues do not necessarily imply recognition of the other’s intentional agency: it depends on what is meant by the 
latter concept, which can be rather opaque (see Chapter 9).
 77 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Introduction’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook 
of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 3– 
20, p. 16.
 78 Fonagy and colleagues have recently published interesting reflections on how ostensive cues may be achieved 
through video working platforms such as Zoom— for instance, using joint attention through the screen share 
function. Fisher, S., Guralnik, T., Fonagy, P., and Zilcha- Mano, S. (2020). ‘Let’s Face It: Video Conferencing 
Psychotherapy Requires the Extensive Use of Ostensive Cues’. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Early View; 
Fonagy, P., Campbell, C., Truscott, A., and Fuggle, P. (2020). ‘Mentalising Remotely: The AFNCCF’s Adaptations to 
the Coronavirus Crisis’. Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 25(3): 178- 179. Attempts to deliver therapy remotely 
to young people in their homes also suggested to the researchers that another ostensive cue professionals may use 
is behaviour indicating that a message was for the recipient specifically rather than others in earshot.
 79 Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Kindness can Work Wonders. Especially for the Vulnerable’. Guardian, 17 May. 
Accessed at: https:// www.theguardian.com/ society/ 2020/ may/ 17/ kindness- can- work- wonders- especially- for- 
 the- vulnerable.
 80 Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What Touch can Communicate: Commentary on “Mentalizing 
Homeostasis: The Social Origins of Interoceptive Inference” by Fotopoulou and Tsakiris’, Neuropsychoanalysis, 
19(1): 39– 42.
 81 Anna Freud has been given as an example by Allison and Campbell: ‘in accounts of her interactions with 
children, one gets the strong sense that Anna Freud was tremendously gifted at eliciting epistemic trust in the chil-
dren she worked with, and that she achieved this through her genuine recognition of and interest in the minds of 
the children she worked with’. Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles 
of Sustainable Development, London: Anna Freud Centre. See descriptions in Kennedy, H. (1983). ‘Anna Freud 
1895– 1982’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 52(4): 501– 506; Solnit, A. J. and Newman, L. M. (1984). ‘Anna Freud: The 
Child Expert’, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 39: 45– 63; Blomfield, O. H. (1991). ‘Anna Freud: Creativity, 
Compassion, Discipline’. International Review of Psycho- Analysis, 18: 37– 52.
 82 Carlson, E. A. (1998). ‘A Prospective Longitudinal Study of Attachment Disorganization/ Disorientation’. 
Child Development, 69(4): 1107– 1128; Wang, F., Cox, M. J., Mills‐Koonce, R., and Snyder, P. (2015). ‘Parental be-
haviors and beliefs, child temperament, and attachment disorganization’. Family Relations, 64(2): 191– 204.
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and sensitivity discussed in Chapter 3, and account for their large shared variance in ac-
counting for child attachment security.
Yet, at the same time as contributing to attachment security, Fonagy and colleagues argue 
that (appropriate use of) ostensive cues facilitate development of a capacity to lower epi-
stemic vigilance under appropriate circumstances.83 Both secure attachment and the cap-
acity for epistemic trust are, Fonagy and colleagues suggest, resources for social adaptation 
and mentalization. They suppose that the attachment system evolved to ensure the protec-
tion of juveniles by having them seek their familiar caregiver when alarmed. However, the 
attachment system may, in human evolutionary history, have also gained the additional 
function of calibrating the capacity for epistemic trust, to equip the individual for the relative 
safety or danger of the environment in which they will grow up.84 In relative safety, the cap-
acity for epistemic trust is a great social asset. In relative danger, its risks increase.
These reflections raise the question of the exact relationship between attachment and epi-
stemic trust, not least because one way that Ainsworth had characterized individual differ-
ences in the Strange Situation was precisely in terms of the infant’s trust in their caregiver.85 
In recent years, Ainsworth’s remarks have been developed further by attachment researchers; 
there has been a growing trend for secure attachment to be re- described as a kind of trust 
in the caregiver’s availability.86 In 2014, Fonagy and Allison attempted a re- description of 
all the Strange Situation classifications in these terms. Secure attachment was conceptual-
ized as well- calibrated trust in the other. Ambivalent/ resistant attachment was interpreted 
as excessive credulity to the perspective of the other; avoidant attachment was interpreted 
as vigilance about the perspective of others. Disorganized attachment was characterized 
as a disruption in the foundational basis of trust in others, prompting a state of persistent 
epistemic vigilance.87 Fonagy and Allison claimed support for this stance from a study by 
Corriveau, Harris, Meins, and colleagues. The researchers gave children stimuli to categorize, 
with input from their caregiver and a stranger. Children from securely attached dyads relied 
 83 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380: ‘While attachment may be a key mechanism for mediating epistemic 
trust, it is secondary to an underlying biological process preserved by evolution. In other words, secure attachment 
is unlikely to be necessary for generating epistemic trust but it may be sufficient to do so, and, further, it is the most 
pervasive mechanism in early childhood because it is a highly evolutionarily effective indicator of trustworthiness’ 
(p. 375).
 84 For discussion of this claim, see Granqvist, P. (2020). ‘Attachment, Culture, and Gene- Culture Co- 
Evolution: Expanding the Evolutionary Toolbox of Attachment Theory’. Attachment & Human Development, 
23(1): 90- 113. Alongside praise for the advance represented by attention to epistemic trust in evolutionary per-
spective, Granqvist ultimately criticizes Fonagy and colleagues for neglecting the contribution of epistemic trust 
to cultural transmission and evolution. On theory of mind as an exaptation of the phylogenetically earlier attach-
ment system, see also Chisholm, J. S. (2003). ‘Uncertainty, Contingency, and Attachment: A Life History Theory of 
Theory of Mind’, in K. Sterelny and J. Fitness (eds), From Mating to Mentality: Evaluating Evolutionary Psychology, 
New York: Psychology Press, pp. 125– 153.
 85 Ainsworth characterized ambivalent/ resistant patterns as representing distrust in the caregiver. Ainsworth, 
M. D. S., Bell, S. M., and Stayton, D. J. (1974). ‘Infant- Mother Attachment and Social Development: “Socialisation” 
as a Product of Reciprocal Responsiveness to Signals’, in J. M. Richards (ed.), The Integration of a Child into a Social 
World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 9– 135: ‘It may be viewed as advantageous for an infant whose 
mother seems to him to move unpredictably and inconsistently (and whom he has not been able to learn to trust) 
to monitor her movements with exceptional alertness and to evince disturbance whenever she moves off ’ (p. 125).
 86 E.g. Verhees, M. W., Ceulemans, E., Bakermans- Kranenburg, M. J., Van IJzendoorn, M. H., De Winter, S., and 
Bosmans, G. (2017). ‘The Effects of Cognitive Bias Modification Training and Oxytocin Administration on Trust 
in Maternal Support: Study Protocol for a Randomized Controlled Trial’. Trials, 18(1): 326: ‘Bowlby proposed that 
whether children are able to develop trust in parental support depends for a significant part on children’s experi-
ences of care in response to distress during interactions with their parents. Through repeated interactions with 
sensitive and responsive parenting, children develop trust in the parent and become securely attached’ (p. 2).
 87 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380, p. 374.
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flexibly on the advice of their caregiver and the stranger, depending on who was giving the 
most plausible information. Children from avoidantly attached dyads tended to ignore the 
input from their caregiver even when the advice was relevant and helpful. Children from 
anxious/ ambivalent dyads preferred information from their caregiver when stimuli were 50/ 
50 ambiguous. Children from dyads that received a disorganized attachment classification 
showed a preference for the mother’s advice when the stimulus was novel.88 The data, how-
ever, do not line up neatly with the position of Fonagy and colleagues. The account of dis-
organized attachment as disruption of trust and the generation of epistemic vigilance finds 
little support in the study by Corriveau and colleagues. If anything, the findings weakly point 
in the opposite direction. Furthermore, elsewhere Fonagy and colleagues have associated 
both ambivalent/ resistant (or preoccupied) and disorganized (or unresolved) attachment 
with epistemic vigilance and BPD. This is poorly aligned with the finding by Corriveau and 
colleagues that ambivalent/ resistant attachment was associated with apparent trust in the 
mother when stimuli could otherwise just as easily be classified one way as the other.
Another relatively unconvincing model of the relationship between attachment and epi-
stemic trust was presented by Fonagy and colleagues in their ‘What We have Changed our 
Minds About’ paper (see Figure 7.1).
In this model, only the history of adversities feeds mentalizing problems, with difficulties 
in emotion regulation and attachment contributing only through this adversity. This does 
not seem plausible: the concepts of ‘adversity’ and ‘dysfunction’ are losing purchase, as they 
become overinvested. In the model presented in ‘What We have Changed our Minds About’, 
mentalizing problems are described as causing persistent epistemic vigilance through two 
routes. A first is through the failure to pick up on and use others’ ostensive cues as a prompt 
for epistemic trust in them. A second is through general loss of interest in social commu-
nication. In this account, there is no contribution of epistemic mistrust to difficulties in 
mentalizing; it is assumed that causality is only in the other direction.
A more recent, and more persuasive, characterization of the relationship between epi-
stemic trust and attachment was presented by Fonagy and colleagues at the Epistemic 
Petrification Conference at Bristol University in 2018. In a keynote address, Fonagy and col-
leagues updated the 1998 and 2008 models (see Chapter 3) of the role of caregiving in the 
development of mentalization (see Figure 7.2).
First, Fonagy and colleagues described a pathway in which the capacity for epistemic trust 
was supported. Sensitive caregiving was defined by Ainsworth as the caregiver’s ability to 
‘perceive and to interpret accurately the signals and communications implicit in her infant’s 
behavior, and given this understanding, to respond to them appropriately and promptly’.89 
Fonagy and colleagues argued that sensitive care is in large part underpinned by parental 
reflective function, which allows the caregiver to give ostensive cues to the child through 
behaviours that perceive and respond to signals and communications suggesting the child’s 
mental states. This facilitates the child’s development of secure attachment and epistemic 
trust. In the 2018 keynote, Fonagy and colleagues also permitted a reinforcing pathway from 
secure attachment to epistemic trust. Use of the caregiver as a secure base may facilitate 
exploration of things and people. But to find learning in the social aspects of exploration, 
 88 Corriveau, K. H., Harris, P. L., Meins, E., Fernyhough, C., Arnott, B., Elliott, L., . . . and De Rosnay, M. (2009). 
‘Young Children’s Trust in their Mother’s Claims: Longitudinal Links with Attachment Security in Infancy’. Child 
Development, 80(3): 750– 761.
 89 Ainsworth, M. (1969). ‘Sensitivity vs. Insensitivity to the Baby’s Signals Scale’. Accessed at: http:// www.psych-
ology.sunysb.edu/ attachment/ measures/ content/ ainsworth_ scales.html.
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and for this to be experienced as having genuine bearing and importance, epistemic trust is 
needed. As such, in the updated 2018 model, learning about the (social) world and the self 
are routed through epistemic trust.
The relationship between learning about the self, learning about the world, and 
mentalizing in the 2018 model is curious. Fonagy and colleagues retain from Fonagy’s 1998 
model the Hegelian position that learning about the self is mediated through learning about 
the world. But the 2018 model describes only partial mediation. This implies that an in-
dividual can engage in learning about the self through epistemic trust without learning 
about the world. This once more raises the unresolved question in Fonagy’s thinking about 
whether envisaging and conceptualizing the i) mental states and ii) behaviour of the self and 
the iii) mental states and iv) behaviour of the other can feasibly be characterized under the 
same umbrella, and whether one or another element has priority. In Fonagy and Luyten’s 






























Figure 7.1 The Natural Pedagogy Model of Personality Disorder. Illustrates the interaction 
between social dysfunction, failure in social communication, epistemic mistrust, and 
imperviousness to social influence that underpin personality disorder. Emotion dysregulation, 
disrupted attachment histories and the disorganized insecure attachment system generate 
social/ interpersonal dysfunction. This undermines accurate social communication, causing 
social disruption, the misinterpretation of social signals, and difficulty in recognizing ostensive 
cues from others. These difficulties in the area of social communication can give rise to 
epistemic mistrust in relation to the social environment. This is not inherently a maladaptive 
process: epistemic vigilance has a natural function. However, the absence of epistemic trust 
sets a limit upon social learning. This can render the individual potentially unable to function 
effectively within their social environment and can lead to further disruption in the social 
network, leaving the individual increasingly isolated and prone to further social/ interpersonal 
dysfunction
Source: Reproduced from Peter Fonagy, Patrick Luyten, Elizabeth Allison, and Chloe Campbell, ‘What We have 
Changed our Minds About: Part 2. Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental 
Significance of Social Communication’, Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(9): Figure 1, 
DOI: https:// doi.org/ 10.1186/ s40479- 017- 0062- 8 Copyright © The Authors. Licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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others given developmental priority, and experience of the mental states of oneself occurring 
on the basis provided by the former. In the 2018 model, this mediation clearly remains im-
portant. But there seems to be a direct route to learning about the self as well. Furthermore, 
whereas the 1998 diagram suggested that a mentalized account of the caregiver’s behaviour 
contributes to the development of mentalizing capacity, in the 2018 diagram there is no line 
between learning about the world and mentalizing. The implication would be that learning 
about the self has some priority, then, for the initial development of mentalizing in early 
childhood.
However, as we saw in Chapter 6, the term ‘self ’ is a complex one in the vocabulary of 
Fonagy and his collaborators. It may be suspected that the meaning of ‘self ’ in the phrase 
‘learning about the self ’ is the individual’s experience as an embodied subject, since other 
aspects of ‘self ’, such as the sense of personal agency, have clearly been theorized elsewhere 
as depending on mentalization (see Chapter 6). This is supported by the fact that the pro-
duction of a self- representation that weaves together our experiences, wishes and plans, self- 
knowledge, and other facets of the ‘self ’ is distinguished from ‘learning about the self ’ and 
placed in a bidirectional relationship with mentalizing. Hegel returns here: learning about 
and from others is placed in a bidirectional relationship with mentalizing after early child-
hood, mediated by an individual’s narratively constructed sense of self and self- relevance. 
It is this learning that supports successful navigation of the social world, and mentalizing is 
important to the extent that it facilitates such learning, not in itself.
In the 2018 keynote at the Epistemic Petrification Conference, Fonagy and colleagues also 
presented a further diagram (Figure 7.3), representing a developmental model from prob-
lems with early care to persistent use of non- mentalizing modes.
Here, neglect or traumatic attachment relationships contribute to the maintenance of epi-
stemic vigilance and to disorganized attachment.90 In the 2018 keynote, Fonagy and colleagues 





Learning channel opens selectively
Sensitive caregiving
Secure attachment
Learning about the world
Successful navigation
of the social world
Learning about
and from others
Learning about the self
Mentalizing
Figure 7.2 The role of caregiving in the development of mentalization.
Source: Reproduced from Fonagy, P. Allison, Luyten, P. and Campbell, C. (2018). ‘Epistemic Petrification’. Keynote 
address at the Epistemic Petrification Conference, Bristol University, 2– 3 July.
 90 Chiesa and Fonagy had found that abuse and neglect made independent contributions to personality disorder. 
Chiesa, M. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Reflective Function as a Mediator between Childhood Adversity, Personality 
Disorder and Symptom Distress’. Personality and Mental Health, 8(1): 52– 66.
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of epistemic vigilance. This was in contrast to an earlier version of the same diagram, presented 
in various places in 2017 including London and San Francisco, in which the pathway from disor-
ganized attachment to epistemic trust was absent.91 Difficulties sustaining epistemic trust con-
tribute to difficulties in social learning. Unlike in the model of the development of mentalizing, 
in which learning about the self and the world were distinguished as playing somewhat different 
roles, in the development of non- mentalizing their role is characterized as much the same. In 
turn, this can contribute to excessive credulity at times, because inaccuracies in the perceptions 
of others’ behaviour and one’s own mind can lead the misleading claims of others to be mistaken 
for accurate ostensive cues about one’s mental states.92 There are also bidirectional links placed 
between epistemic hypervigilance and problems with mentalizing: an important difference 
from the model in the ‘What We have Changed our Minds About’ paper, in which there was no 
path at all from epistemic vigilance to difficulties in mentalizing.93
Mentalizing diculties
Diculties learning about
the self and the world
Epistemic hypervigilance







Problems learning from others
Persistent epistemic mistrust
Excessive credulity
Figure 7.3 Developmental model from problems with early care to persistent use of non- 
mentalizing modes.
Source: Reproduced from Fonagy, P. Allison, Luyten, P. and Campbell, C. (2018). ‘Epistemic Petrification’. Keynote 
address at the Epistemic Petrification Conference, Bristol University, 2– 3 July.
 91 Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘The Concept of Epistemic Trust: Can it Help Integrate Attachment Theory?’. Paper pre-
sented to the San Francisco Centre for Psychoanalysis, Haskell Norman Prize Event, Monday, 9 January 2017. . The 
diagrams also featured in the keynote address, ‘Epistemic Trust and Attachment’, to the International Attachment 
Conference, London, 1 July 2017. There seems to be some differences among Fonagy’s collaborators on how at-
tachment theory is conceived and the extent to which early attachment is regarded as critical for later develop-
ment. For instance, we see claims such as Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, P., and Ensink, K. (2019). ‘Mentalising 
and Trauma’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 79– 102: ‘the development of the stress system . . . is 
largely determined by the quality of attachment relationships’ (p. 82).
 92 This argument appeared already in Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2000). ‘Playing with Reality: III. The Persistence 
of Dual Psychic Reality in Borderline Patients’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 81(5): 853– 873: ‘The 
patient lacks an authentic, organic self- image built around internalised representations of self- states. The absence 
or weakness of such a self- image leaves the child, and later the adult, with affect that remains unlabelled and con-
fusing, uncontained (Bion, 1962) . . . This will create a desperation for meaning, and a willingness to take in reflec-
tions from the other that do not map on to anything within the child’s own experience’ (p. 865).
 93 A certain hesitancy regarding the directionality of relations between mentalizing and epistemic trust can also 
be seen in Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, P., and Ensink, K. (2019). ‘Assessment of Mentalising’, in Anthony 
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The 2018 keynote by Fonagy and colleagues also proposed bidirectional relationships be-
tween credulity and problems with mentalizing. Non- mentalizing prompts feelings of iso-
lation and loneliness, because the individual’s mind is not able to take nourishment from 
their interactions with others. This stimulates ‘epistemic hunger’, in which the strength of 
the desire to feel recognized by others may reinforce credulity when someone seems to offer 
the possibility of recognition.94 Elsewhere during the Epistemic Petrification Conference, 
Fonagy clarified how this credulity would occur:
If I do not have any clear view of myself then when anyone says something about me, I may 
experience this as a match, and excessive trust can develop . . . So somebody says ‘you’re a 
bad person’ and I have some image of myself as evil. I may trust that statement; that’s very 
common for the patients that I treat. An analogy comes in with extremist politics here: you 
have a popular set of ideologies that are clearly defensive. They say ‘I’m being maltreated. 
The world is unjust to me. I have been excluded.’ Then you have someone who wants to 
acquire their trust, who says ‘yes, you have been excluded. You have been maltreated. You 
should be rebelling and I’m surprised that you’ve put up with this for so long.’ A populist 
ideology, and they come to be trusted. That is a sinister pattern seen in politics today in 
many places.95
In the first case, Fonagy describes the experience of match between social denigration and 
feelings of self- denigration. This is a situation he regards as especially predisposed today by 
the circulation of idealized images of lifestyle and success in social media, which can offer a 
picture of the self as bad in comparison. On the one hand, difficulties learning about the self 
and forms of non- mentalizing may facilitate this experience of match. As may adolescence, 
as a developmental stage in which cognitive and social supports for achieving clarity and spe-
cificity in self- representation are not fully online. On the other hand, the experience of social 
denigration matching feelings of self- denigration can be anticipated to contribute to further 
difficulties in mentalizing about oneself— for instance, by reinforcing both distress and de-
ployment of psychic equivalence in the form of certainty about the self ’s worthlessness. In 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 37– 62: ‘The assessor should determine to what extent mentalising im-
pairments are linked to problems with epistemic trust’ (p. 50).
 94 Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77, p. 72. Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2018). ‘The Origin of 
Human Life: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective’, European Psychoanalytical Federation, 31st Annual 
Conference, Warsaw, 24 March: ‘Epistemic hypervigilance and epistemic credulity, can co- exist and can oscillate 
rapidly. This can be confusing for the clinician whose understanding appears to be valued and idealized one day 
only to be scotomised, spat out, denigrated and spurned the next.’
 95 Duschinsky, R., Collver, J., and Carel, H. (2019). ‘“Trust Comes from a Sense of Feeling One’s Self Understood 
by Another Mind”: An Interview with Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3), 224– 227, p. 225. See also 
Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, and Problems 
with Self and Identity: A Social‐Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88- 105: ‘We under-
stand such excessive epistemic credulity as being triggered by a hyperactive or unmoored imagination generating 
a personal narrative that is too diffuse to provide an accurate sense of differential awareness of others’ capacity 
to perceive oneself. Excessive credulity results, as all personal narratives feel as if they “fit” sufficiently for trust 
to be generated, making the person vulnerable to exploitation.’ The most detailed case study of epistemic cre-
dulity offered by Fonagy and colleagues, though without using the term, is the case of Mr A. in Fonagy, P. and 
Target, M. (2005). ‘Some Reflections on the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalytic Therapy’, in J. Auerbach, K. Levy, 
and C. E. Shaffer (eds), Relatedness, Self- Definition and Mental Representation: Essays in Honor of Sidney J. Blatt, 
New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 191– 212.
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the second case, Fonagy describes the experience of political solicitation. This is, in Fonagy’s 
view, an extreme and nasty use of a skill characteristic of all effective influencers: the ‘mas-
sive difference in ability of individuals to influence (teachers, politicians, managers)’ may 
be regarded as ‘explicable in terms of varying capacity to generate epistemic trust’.96 In the 
political case under discussion, the politician’s solicitation creates the illusion of recognizing 
the listener as an intentional subject and their feelings of having been wronged. This may be 
facilitated by forms of non- mentalizing, such as psychic equivalence, in which feelings are 
conflated with political reality. In turn, the match can be anticipated to contribute to forms of 
non- mentalizing. This might include difficulties in experiencing apparent political oppon-
ents as having minds, or even being fully human like oneself; a requirement for urgent action 
in teleological mode; and/ or aspects of pretend mode in which political ideology is treated as 
reality, without attention to its actual limitations in characterizing states of affairs.
In Fonagy’s earlier work, both affect regulation and attentional control had been de-
scribed as requisites and/ or component elements and/ or effects of mentalization. He had 
also elsewhere theorized bidirectional relationships between mentalization and social 
support— for instance, in helping an individual reframe and digest difficult experiences.97 
The 2018 diagram did not include affect regulation, attentional control, or social support. 
But, in presenting his keynote, Fonagy verbally situated that they contributed to mentalizing 
difficulties. The focus in the keynote was on another relevant component, which was difficul-
ties learning about the self and the world. When these difficulties prompt non- mentalizing, 
this helps sustain a state of epistemic mistrust, blocking the capacity to experience the claims 
and experiences of others as trustworthy and relevant. In turn, problems in adapting to the 
social world are likely to ensue. This will depend in part on the extent to which epistemic 
mistrust becomes context- insensitive.98
An interesting point for the model, raised by Fonagy and colleagues elsewhere, is that it 
is not just abuse and neglect that can lead to epistemic distrust, though they regard it as an 
especially important route. Social and political forms of adversity may predispose the devel-
opment of epistemic distrust, as may various genetic and temperamental factors.99 Fonagy 
and colleagues have also argued that epistemic distrust is not simply characteristic of path-
ology, but is a feature of all our lives at times. As we saw in Chapter 6, Fonagy and colleagues 
have argued that sexuality and aggression are intentions that caregivers will, to some ex-
tent, reject or ignore rather than acknowledge. Fonagy and Allison observed that ‘this leaves 
us all with a gap, a failed definition, a rupture of epistemic trust’.100 The cycle of epistemic 
hypervigilance and epistemic credulity can therefore be expected to occur with aspects of 
 96 Fonagy, P. (2013). ‘Mentalizing and the Attachment Process’. Paper delivered at the Menninger Clinic, 
22 March. Accessed at: http:// www.creatingconnections.nl/ assets/ files/ 2013.04.18%20Peter%20Fonagy%20
Creating%20Connections.pdf.
 97 E.g. Luyten, P., Van Assche, L., Kadriu, F., Krans, J., Claes, L., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Other Disorders often 
Associated with Psychological Trauma’, in C. Dalenberg, S. Gold, and J. Cook (eds), APA Handbook of Trauma 
Psychology. Volume 1: Foundations in Knowledge, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 
243– 280, p. 246.
 98 A ‘preliminary’ distinction between state- like and trait- like problems with epistemic trust has been put 
forward in Fisher, S., Guralnik, T., Fonagy, P., and Zilcha- Mano, S. (2020). ‘Let’s Face It: Video Conferencing 
Psychotherapy Requires the Extensive Use of Ostensive Cues’. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Early View.
 99 Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, and 
Problems with Self and Identity: A Social‐Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88– 105.
 100 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2015). ‘A Scientific Theory of Homosexuality for Psychoanalysis’, in A. Lemma 
and P. E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, London: Routledge, pp. 125– 137, p. 
134. See also Lorenzini, N., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Mentalisation and its Role in Processing Trauma’, 
in Bernd Huppertz (ed.), Approaches to Psychic Trauma: Theory and Practice, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
pp. 403– 422.
Epistemic trust 189
the alien self, and perhaps with particular frequency in relation to sexual desire and aggres-
sive intentions. Given that these are among the major challenges of adolescence, it is perhaps 
then unsurprising that ‘an average adolescent is in a state of often quite acute epistemic mis-
trust’,101 though punctuated by epistemic credulity with peer groups and sometimes more 
generally.102 To the extent that epistemic hypervigilance and credulity come to dominate an 
individual’s experiences of sexuality or aggression, it can be anticipated that they will stop 
being able to take in and process information about themselves and the world.
Marinus van IJzendoorn and Marian Bakermans- Kranenburg, eminent attachment re-
searchers, also presented a paper at the Epistemic Petrification Conference. They raised 
a variety of critical points following on from the 2018 keynote paper by Fonagy and col-
leagues.103 A first was that, naturally for emergent scientific work, the model remains highly 
speculative. There is, as yet, no validated measure of epistemic trust.104 Though there are 
many measures of trust and distrust, Fonagy and colleagues would need to decide whether 
they are articulating something more specific, and how it relates to existing constructs. 
Recently Bo, Bateman, and Kongerslev used the ‘trust in peers’ sub- scale of the self- report 
Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment as a measure of epistemic trust. Yet, with items 
like ‘I trust my friends’, it is not clear that this addresses epistemic trust specifically.105 No 
measure has been developed to assess epistemic vigilance. No measure has been developed 
to assess epistemic credulity. Some of the elements of the model are also quite vague, and will 
be difficult to operationalize without further articulation— for instance, the idea of ‘difficul-
ties learning about self and the world’. Specific predictions about the relationship between 
caregiving and epistemic trust will need to be offered, likewise the relationship between epi-
stemic trust and mentalization.
A second issue raised by van IJzendoorn and Bakermans- Kranenburg was that Fonagy 
and colleagues may be underestimating the multiple causal implications of attachment 
 101 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’, Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899.
 102 See Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, M., Steele, H., Leigh, T., Levinson, A. et al. (1997). ‘Morality, Disruptive 
Behavior, Borderline Personality Disorder, Crime, and their Relationships to Security of Attachment’, in L. 
Atkinson and K. J. Zucker (eds), Attachment and Psychopathology, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 223– 274, pp. 
239– 41. The extent to which adolescence is sufficiently different in this regard from adulthood as to require a dif-
ferent model of the relationship between mentalization and mental health has been raised by Battersby, S. (2018). 
Is Mentalising Ability Associated with Mental Health Difficulties in Adolescents? A Systematic Review: Understanding 
the Construct of Mentalising in Adolescence and its Association with Mental Health, Structural Equation Model. 
Unpublished doctorate in clinical psychology, University of Edinburgh.
 103 Van IJzendoorn, M. H. and Bakermans- Kranenburg, M. J. (2018). ‘Disorganized Attachment, Entropic 
Care, Epistemic Trust, and “Unusual” Beliefs’. Paper presented at the Epistemic Petrification Conference, 2– 3 July, 
Bristol University.
 104 The Epistemic Trust Instrument was developed by Jennifer O’Connell in 2014. O’Connell, J. (2014). Can We 
Develop an Adult Assessment Tool for Measuring Epistemic Trust? Unpublished master’s thesis, London: University 
College London. However, this has yet to be used in any published study. Work is underway by the Heidelberg 
group to construct a measure of epistemic trust: Schröder- Pfeifer, P., Talia, A., Volkert, J., and Taubner, S. (2018). 
‘Developing an Assessment of Epistemic Trust: A Research Protocol’. Research in Psychotherapy: Psychopathology, 
Process and Outcome, 21(3).
 105 Bo, S., Bateman, A., and Kongerslev, M. T. (2019). ‘Mentalization- Based Group Therapy for Adolescents 
with Avoidant Personality Disorder: Adaptations and Findings from a Practice- Based Pilot Evaluation’. Journal 
of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 18(3): 249- 262. The ‘trust in parents’ sub- scale of the self- report 
Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment, taken at baseline, has also been found not to moderate reduction of 
symptoms in the course of therapy in a sample of adolescents. Such findings highlight the need for caution in 
assuming that existing measures of trust can be treated as measuring epistemic trust. Orme, W., Bowersox, L., 
Vanwoerden, S., Fonagy, P., and Sharp, C. (2019). ‘The Relation between Epistemic Trust and Borderline Pathology 
in an Adolescent Inpatient Sample’. Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 6(1): 1– 9. See 
also Gullone, E. and Robinson, K. (2005). ‘The Inventory of Parent and Peer Attachment— Revised (IPPA- R) for 
Children: A Psychometric Investigation’. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 12(1): 67– 79.
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relationships. Fonagy and colleagues were not sure whether or not disorganized attach-
ment would contribute to epistemic dysfunction. However, this may be because they have 
assumed that disorganized attachment represents a single process (see Chapter 3). One pro-
cess under the umbrella of disorganized attachment is dissociation and disorientation. Van 
IJzendoorn and Bakermans- Kranenburg asked what role epistemic hypervigilance and cre-
dulity might play in dissociative symptoms, and vice versa. As we saw in Chapter 4, in a 2017 
paper Ensink, Fonagy, and colleagues criticized earlier work on mentalization for missing 
out the mediating role of dissociation. Van IJzendoorn and Bakermans- Kranenburg offered 
aligned concerns, but added that it would be valuable to assess dissociation and disorienta-
tion in developmental perspective and in light of the attachment relationship.
Van IJzendoorn and Bakermans- Kranenburg also wondered about the integrity of the 
construct of epistemic trust. They worried that the term ‘trust’ is ambiguous.106 For instance, 
they observed that Fonagy and colleagues had discussed trust in the claims of others, and 
trust in their experience and viewpoint.107 There could also be other objects of trust, such as 
trust in the other’s availability in an attachment relationship. Trust in others’ claims, trust in 
the usefulness or applicability of their experience and viewpoint, trust in their integrity, and 
trust in the other’s beneficence towards us may all vary relatively independently from one 
another.108 Indeed, the ‘Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory’ developed by Hendirks and 
colleagues distinguishes i) expertise/ competence, ii) integrity, and iii) benevolence as sep-
arate scales.109
To give an example of such differences in forms of trust: for an individual operating in 
teleological mode, a claim substantiated by hard evidence is persuasive; the other person’s 
experience and viewpoint are not (see Chapter 5). To offer another example: a child’s trust in 
their caregiver’s availability may well be somewhat helped by trust in the adult’s claims— for 
instance, about how best to make friends at school. But even if these claims turn out to have 
been mistaken, this need not have bearing for whether the child will feel that they can re-
turn to the caregiver as a safe haven when alarmed or distressed. For Van IJzendoorn and 
Bakermans- Kranenburg, it is the availability of the caregiver as a safe haven, rather than 
 106 For discussions of the heterogenous meanings of the concept of trust, see e.g. McKnight, D. H. and 
Chervany, N. L. (2001). ‘Trust and Distrust Definitions: One Bite at a Time’, in Rino Falcone, Munindar Singh, 
and Yao- Hua Tan (eds), Trust in Cyber- Societies, New York: Springer, pp. 27– 54; Dietz, G. and Den Hartog, D. 
N. (2003). ‘Measuring Trust Inside Organisations’. Personnel Review, 32(5): 557– 588; Joni, S.- N. (2004). ‘The 
Geography of Trust’. Harvard Business Review, 82(3): 7– 11; Fink, M., Harms, R., and Möllering, G. (2010). 
‘Introduction: A Strategy for Overcoming the Definitional Struggle’. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation, 11(2): 101– 105; Driver, M. (2015). ‘How Trust Functions in the Context of Identity Work’. Human 
Relations, 68(6): 899– 923; Duncan, G. (2019). The Problem of Political Trust: A Conceptual Reformulation, 
London: Routledge.
 107 In fact, Bateman and Fonagy appear to want to encompass all objects of trust. They described epistemic 
mistrust as entailing ‘destruction of trust in social knowledge of all kinds’. Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). 
Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 27. Likewise, Luyten and colleagues give the example of a study in which ‘participants aged 12– 17 who had 
experienced physical abuse were less able than their peers, who had no history of maltreatment, to correctly learn 
which stimuli were likely to result in reward, even after repeated feedback’. In Luyten’s characterization of the study, 
epistemic distrust is generic— it entails difficulty learning from any feedback on the properties of any stimuli. 
Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, and Problems 
with Self and Identity: A Social‐Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88– 105.
 108 The most important aspect of trust for Fonagy and colleagues appears to be less our conscious feelings about 
the other’s claims, and more whether we are willing to work this knowledge into our plans. This distinction is dis-
cussed by Holton, R. (1994). ‘Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 63– 76.
 109 Hendriks, F., Kienhues, D., and Bromme, R. (2015). ‘Measuring Laypeople’s Trust in Experts in a Digital 
Age: The Muenster Epistemic Trustworthiness Inventory (METI)’. PLoS One, 10(10): e0139309. Interestingly, 
the factor of ‘perceptions of the other as reliable/ unreliable’ was excluded because it loaded on more than one 
dimension.
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their provision of trustworthy communication about the social world, which can be antici-
pated to have the more significant role in facilitating affect regulation, attentional control, 
and future social competence, though trustworthy communication may no doubt contribute 
to the experience of a caregiver as a safe haven.
Similarly, mentalization may not always contribute to epistemic trust. Fonagy and col-
leagues specifically argued in 2007 that part of the reason mentalization evolved was to fa-
cilitate our capacity for deception: ‘Mentalisation may serve competition: as the antlers of 
a reindeer are there to fight other reindeer rather than to catch prey or ward off predators. 
Self- awareness enables us to modify the way we wish to present ourselves, and to mislead.’110 
However, this statement was from a period when they assumed mentalization was one thing, 
rather than a cluster of capacities. It may be that particular forms of mentalization are less 
facilitative of social deception (for instance, reconsideration of one’s feelings in order to 
account for behaviours discrepant with our self- representation). The overarching concern 
for the 2018 model is that the relationship with experiences of care and with mentalization 
may be different, depending on the kind of trust and the kind of mentalization.
In the 2018 model of non- mentalizing, Fonagy and colleagues situated mentalizing dif-
ficulties as causing persistent epistemic mistrust, which in turn causes problems learning 
from others. But this claim could mean any number of things depending on what is meant 
by ‘mentalizing difficulties’, ‘epistemic trust’, and ‘learning’. Consider, for instance, a situation 
in which mentalizing difficulties are taken to imply problems in conceiving of the mental 
states of others, epistemic mistrust is taken to imply problems in trusting the experiences 
and viewpoints of others, and learning from others is taken to mean gaining benefits from 
the thoughts of others. In this situation, we have done no more than state the logical impli-
cations of a problem in conceiving of the mental states of others. Consider, by contrast, a 
situation in which mentalizing difficulties are taken to mean problems in reconsidering one’s 
own feelings as implicated in our behaviour, epistemic mistrust is taken to imply difficulty 
trusting the claims of others, and learning from others is taken to mean non- verbal imitation 
of valuable qualities in others. That mentalizing (in this sense) would cause epistemic mis-
trust (in this sense) would be a surprising, interesting, and falsifiable claim.
A further question left open by the 2018 keynote by Fonagy and colleagues is the relation-
ship between ‘absence of epistemic trust’ and ‘persistent epistemic mistrust’. Part of the problem, 
as has been widely acknowledged in the literature, is that the term ‘trust’ has various different 
meanings. Indeed, Lyon and colleagues have observed that ‘trust is one of the most fascinating 
and fundamental social phenomena yet at the same time one of the most elusive and challenging 
concepts one could study.111 In Fonagy’s 2018 diagram, ‘absence of epistemic trust’ is prompted 
by neglect or attachment trauma (and perhaps insecure/ disorganized attachment), whereas 
‘persistent epistemic mistrust’ is prompted by mentalizing difficulties and leads to problems 
learning from others.112 They are not simply different names for the opposite of epistemic trust.
 110 Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., and Target, M. (2007). ‘The Parent– Infant Dyad and the Construction of the 
Subjective Self ’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3– 4): 288– 328, p. 297.
 111 Lyon, F., Möllering, G., and Saunders, M. N. K. (eds) (2012). Handbook of Research Methods on Trust. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 1.
 112 Only the epistemic vigilance that contributes to mentalizing difficulties, not the epistemic mistrust that re-
sults from mentalizing difficulties, figures in the diagram presented by Taubner, Gablonsky, and Fonagy in their 
account of the emergence of conduct disorder. This is despite the fact that it could readily be imagined that epi-
stemic mistrust resulting from mentalizing difficulties could contribute to conduct problems. See Taubner, 
S., Gablonski, T.- C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Conduct Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 
pp. 301– 321, Figure 18.1.
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The 2018 diagram suggests that the relationship between absence of epistemic trust 
and persistent epistemic mistrust is mediated by mentalizing difficulties. Likewise, ab-
sence of epistemic trust, epistemic hypervigilance, and excessive credulity are all linked 
to problems learning from others only via the same route. There is no direct path from 
epistemic hypervigilance and/ or excessive credulity to problems learning from others 
except via mentalization. This suggests differences between absence of epistemic trust 
and persistent epistemic mistrust in terms of their expected correlates. Though Fonagy 
and colleagues discuss epistemic trust as if it were a single construct, they seem to be 
describing two distinct processes— or at least two distinct facets of an umbrella process 
(see Table 7.1).
What Fonagy and colleagues term ‘absence of epistemic trust’ is described as contrib-
uting to mentalizing difficulties, whereas ‘persistent epistemic mistrust’ is fed by mentalizing 
difficulties. ‘Absence of epistemic trust’ is treated as causing difficulties learning about the 
self and the world; ‘persistent epistemic mistrust’ causes difficulties learning from others. 
‘Absence of epistemic trust’ relates to epistemic vigilance in Sperber’s original sense: the con-
cern to assign the right amount of credence to people and conversations is unable to be re-
laxed when needed. This leads to problems with mentalizing, by contributing to epistemic 
hypervigilance. ‘Persistent epistemic mistrust’ relates to epistemic vigilance in Fonagy’s re-
vised sense: the experiences and claims of others are categorically distrusted. In both cases, 
the well- modulated and constructive doubt required for reconsideration of thoughts and 
feelings is hindered. For this reason, it is rather surprising that persistent epistemic mistrust 
is only ever an effect of problems with mentalizing, rather than also making a reciprocal 
contribution.
One explanation may be that, whereas the account of ‘absence of epistemic trust’ by 
Fonagy and colleagues seems to be primarily in dialogue with developmental psychology, 
his account of the ‘persistent epistemic mistrust’ is primarily in dialogue with personality 
and clinical psychology. The researchers’ characterization of ‘persistent epistemic mistrust’ 
suggests a state in which the thoughts (and perhaps feelings) of others as implicated in their 
motivations and intentions are not felt to be trustworthy, generalizable, and relevant to the 
Table 7.1 Distinction between absence of epistemic trust and persistent epistemic mistrust
Psychological process Absence of epistemic trust Persistent epistemic mistrust
Apparent meaning Inability to relax ordinary 
concern to assign the right 
amount of credence to people 
and conversations, blocking fast 
learning
The experiences and claims of 
others are categorically regarded 
as not to be trusted, generalized or 
regarded as relevant
Underpinned by Epistemic vigilance (in Sperber 
and colleagues’ original sense, 
and one of the senses used by 
Fonagy and colleagues)
Epistemic vigilance (in Fonagy and 
colleagues’ distinct sense)
Key anticipated correlates Causal contribution to i) non- 
mentalizing and to ii) difficulties 
in mentalizing
Caused by i) non- mentalizing, and 
ii) difficulties in mentalizing
Disciplinary context Linguistics (specifically 
pragmatics), plugged into 
developmental psychology
Cognitive science (specifically 
natural pedagogy), plugged into 
personality and clinical psychology
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self. Fonagy and colleagues situate mentalizing difficulties as mediating the effect of absence 
of epistemic trust on the capacity to learn from others. This may be because, in itself, ex-
treme doubt or the absence of doubt about knowledge beyond perceptual experience do not 
represent a total block on learning from others, where this learning can figure within per-
ceptual experience. What does present such a block is when others are not experienced as 
having thoughts (and feelings) distinct from our own perceptual experience, or when these 
are fabricated in pretend mode. Then there is nothing external from which to learn, even if 
others present claims about the credibility and relevance of their thoughts for us. Perceptual 
experience is experienced as immediate and immutable (psychic equivalence, teleological 
mode) or irrelevant (pretend mode), rather than as a contingent state that may be refined or 
modulated by the capacity to conceive or reconsider the thoughts and/ or feelings of others. 
In general, mistrust is the expectation that others lack the competence or willingness to be 
reliable in acknowledging and meeting what we need or wish from them.113 Difficulties in 
conceiving or, especially, reconsidering the thoughts (and/ or feelings) of others can be re-
garded as causing a specific form of mistrust, one in which there is little that can be learnt 
from the mental states of these others, since precisely these mental states are foreclosed or 
prejudged by non- mentalizing.
Fonagy and colleagues describe the effects of difficulties mentalizing others on the cap-
acity to learn from others. Factors that have a predictable impact on mentalizing others, 
such as in- group/ out- group dynamics, can be expected to likewise shape whether we are 
open to learning from these others. Missing, however, is attention to the effects of diffi-
culties mentalizing the self on epistemic trust.114 Likewise, Fonagy and colleagues have as 
yet not been clear about whether epistemic trust/ mistrust of feelings operates in the same 
way as epistemic trust/ mistrust in thoughts. Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy have recently 
claimed that ‘critical thinking— some form of epistemic vigilance— is a highly valuable 
social cognitive resource’.115 This implies that the capacity to reconsider thoughts impli-
cated in motivations and intentions of oneself can be facilitated by epistemic vigilance 
(this may link to the ‘unbinding’ function of meaninglessness discussed in Chapter 6). It 
is not clear whether there are forms of mentalization that are helped or hindered by epi-
stemic distrust of others. However, Jurist has offered persuasive arguments that, with non- 
mentalizing and dehumanizing modes institutionalized and ascendant, epistemic distrust 
in contemporary culture and political discourse might facilitate mentalizing because it 
will facilitate reconsideration of the thoughts and feelings facilitated by this culture and 
discourse.116
Another outstanding question is what happens to mentalization when the self is subjected 
to persistent, as opposed to discriminated, epistemic mistrust. Luyten, Lemma, and Target 
have implied that this state characterizes depression, but this possibility has been raised only 
 113 Mollering, G. (2006). Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity. New York: Elsevier; Barbalet, J. (2019). 
‘The Experience of Trust: Its Content and Basis’, in Masamichi Sasaki (ed.), Trust in Contemporary Society, 
New York: Brill, pp. 11– 30.
 114 See e.g. Bion, W. ([1973] 1990). Brazilian Lectures, London: Karnac Books: ‘Some patients cannot . . . listen to 
what they themselves say. They have no respect for what they already know, so that their experience and knowledge 
are of no use to them. The question is not simply one of the relationship of the patient to the analyst, but the rela-
tionship of the patient with himself which may be so bad that he cannot even make use of what he already knows’ 
(p. 50).
 115 Asen, E., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Social Systems: Beyond the Microcosm of the Individual and 
Family’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 229– 243, p. 241.
 116 Jurist, E. (2018). ‘Preface’, in Minding Emotions: Cultivating Mentalisation in Psychotherapy, New York: 
Guilford Press.
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in passing.117 Another matter of remaining ambiguity is whether a capacity to effectively 
conceive of thoughts facilitates epistemic trust, epistemic vigilance, or either as needed in a 
discriminated way.118 Even with these questions still outstanding, the value ascribed by Asen, 
Campbell, and Fonagy to epistemic vigilance about thoughts as an asset to mentalization 
clearly disturbs any simple assumption that these are two ‘good things’ which must there-
fore come together. As we saw in Chapter 4, Bateman and Fonagy have described good 
mentalization of others in terms that seem to privilege considering their different thoughts 
and perspectives, whereas the qualities that characterize good mentalizing of oneself seem 
to privilege feelings and awareness of change in perspectives over time. This suggests that 
epistemic vigilance about the self ’s present feelings would also be an asset to this form of 
mentalizing, in facilitating the reconsideration of inner sensations, affects, and moods, and 
the potential for feelings to be different across time. This vigilance may be especially what the 
Steeles and Fonagy were referring to in their initial concept of the ‘internal observer’, which 
predated the more general concept of ‘reflective function’ (see Chapter 3).
As discussed in Chapter 3, Fonagy and colleagues have headlined vaguely or variously 
defined terms like ‘mentalization’, which can help coalition- building among groups who can 
make various investments in the same buzzword, and thereby see themselves as holding the 
same stance and allegiance. The language of epistemic trust certainly appeals for this func-
tion: ‘trust’ is an undeniably potent term in contemporary society, and especially when ad-
dressed to clinical audiences for whom various kinds of trust will be salient and important.119 
Trust is a language outlined in light, conveying shape more than contour and contrast. As 
such, the underspecification of epistemic trust may come at the price of conceptual confu-
sion, especially regarding causal relationships.
To avoid this threat, firmer conceptual clarity is also needed on the distinction between 
epistemic vigilance, absence of epistemic trust, epistemic hypervigilance, and epistemic mis-
trust. Fonagy and colleagues have repeatedly emphasized that their thinking about epistemic 
trust is work in progress. In future work, it may be helpful to follow the usage by Fonagy and 
colleagues that maximally differentiates the concepts:
 • ‘Epistemic vigilance’ would be returned to the usage of Sperber and colleagues, to mean 
a suite of cognitive mechanisms that help calibrate the credence assigned to the inferred 
experiences and claims of others. It might be added that such calibration is also relevant 
to our own inferred experiences and claims, given that these are rarely transparent to us 
in any simple way. Application of epistemic vigilance to our own thoughts and feelings 
entails generative doubt, and the potential for their reconsideration.
 • When experience has led this suite of mechanisms to be applied too rigidly and con-
servatively, the result may be identified as ‘absence of epistemic trust’. This is no longer 
a suite of mechanisms but a quality: the inflexibility of those mechanisms. This 
quality may be more or less enduring. The corresponding attitude can be termed 
 117 Luyten, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2019). ‘Depression’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 
pp. 387– 401, p. 398.
 118 The latter option— mentalization facilitating discriminated trust/ vigilance— seems to be implied, without 
being fully spelt out, in Fonagy, P., Campbell, C., and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models Mentalising’, 
in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 169– 180.
 119 Ellman, S. J. (2007). ‘Analytic Trust and Transference: Love, Healing Ruptures and Facilitating Repairs’. 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 27(3): 246– 263.
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‘epistemic hypervigilance’. This attitude has a bidirectional causal relationship with 
non- mentalizing.
 • ‘Epistemic mistrust’ can be distinguished as a chronic state in which the thoughts (and 
perhaps feelings) of others as implicated in their motivations and intentions are not 
felt to be trustworthy, generalizable, and relevant to the self. This may appear as a fixed 
aspect of an individual’s ‘personality’, but in fact should be recognized as caused by non- 
mentalizing and the absence of mentalizing, which stabilize the state.
There is also further conceptual work to be done in specifying the relationship between 
forms of epistemic trust and forms of mentalizing, including in resolving problems that 
have been obscured by over- general uses of the two concepts.120 Bateman, Fonagy, and 
Campbell have specified that teleological mode may prompt epistemic hypervigilance in 
a focus on moment- to- moment behaviour in lieu of trust in others’ stable intentions (see 
Chapter 5).121 And in earlier work Fonagy and Higgitt have described how a vicious cycle 
can arise, whereby psychic equivalence creates states of high arousal, which lead to reliance 
on pre- reflexive assumptions, which hinders the use of mentalizing, which sustains psychic 
equivalence.122 However, besides this, the relationship between epistemic hypervigilance 
and forms of non- mentalizing remains to be spelt out. Readers have tended to assume that 
Fonagy and colleagues believe that epistemic trust is an effect, not a cause, of mentalizing.123 
But the relationship is actually bidirectional and more complicated. The urgency of specifi-
cation of this theory lies partly in the fact that over the coming years Fonagy and colleagues 
will be wishing to develop a measure of epistemic trust, to empirically test anticipated re-
lationships. If this measure incorporates the present obscurity in the notion of epistemic 
 120 One way of considering epistemic trust and mentalization is in terms of constituent elements and their inter-
relation. Given the different definitions and uses Fonagy and colleagues have made of the two concepts, it would 
appear that there are eight permutations of epistemic trust to consider, against eight relevant permutations of 
mentalization:
Epistemic trust of the self ’s feelings.
Epistemic trust of the self ’s thoughts.
Epistemic trust of others’ feelings.
Epistemic trust of others’ thoughts.
Epistemic mistrust of the self ’s feelings.
Epistemic mistrust of the self ’s thoughts.
Epistemic mistrust of others’ feelings.
Epistemic mistrust of others’ thoughts.
Conceiving of the other’s feelings.
Conceiving of the other’s thoughts.
Conceiving of the self ’s feelings.
Conceiving of the self ’s thoughts.
Reconsidering the other’s feelings.
Reconsidering the other’s thoughts.
Reconsidering the self ’s feelings.
Reconsidering the self ’s thoughts.
 121 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman 
and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 323– 334, p. 328.
 122 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The Development of Prejudice: An Attachment Theory Hypothesis 
Explaining its Ubiquity’, in H. Parens, A. Mahfouz, S. W. Twemlow, and D. Scharff (eds), The Future of 
Prejudice: Psychoanalysis and the Prevention of Prejudice, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 63– 79), 
Figure 4.1.
 123 E.g. Knox, J. (2016). ‘Epistemic Mistrust: A Crucial Aspect of Mentalization in People with a History of 
Abuse?’. British Journal of Psychotherapy, 32(2): 226– 236: ‘Epistemic trust is essentially a process of trust in the 
other person’s mind and therefore depends on mentalizing’ (p. 226).
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trust— for instance, whether it can apply to the self, whether it can apply to feelings— this will 
hinder subsequent empirical work.
However, perhaps the greater urgency for theoretical specification lies in the fact that, in the 
past few years, Fonagy and colleagues have reoriented the goal of mentalization- based therapy. 
They have drawn on Bion’s emphasis on curiosity and ‘learning from experience’ as essential 
for psychological health.124 On this basis, mentalization is now considered only a means to an 
end: ‘Mentalising in itself is only an intermediate step, not the ultimate therapeutic objective’ 
because ‘true and lasting improvement, we believe, rests on . . . learning from experience be-
yond therapy.’125 In general, ‘mental disorder can be conceptualised as impairments in the cap-
acity of the individual for social learning expressed in terms of epistemic trust’.126 The question 
of the meaning and boundaries of epistemic trust and/ or mistrust is therefore of the utmost 
importance. The way in which this question is answered will functionally delineate the goals 
of therapeutic work and the model of how to achieve them. It is also of great potential signifi-
cance for conceptualizing the nature of mental illness, and how patients’ symptoms should be 
grouped and assessed. A concern with epistemic trust cross- cuts existing diagnosis- focused 
approaches to mental health, suggesting potential revisions to this approach.
Diagnoses and the p- factor
To a large extent, the delivery, resourcing, and administration of clinical services for mental 
health— as well as the curriculum and structure of clinical training— have been oriented 
by discrete diagnoses. Diagnoses are functionally attractive for bureaucratic systems, be-
cause they permit judgements about prognosis and qualitative distinctions to be drawn 
about treatment need and delivery.127 There have been long- standing critiques, however, of 
a diagnosis- centric approach to mental health. For instance, in his 1940 book, Personality 
and Mental Illness, John Bowlby described the assumption that mental illnesses ‘were sep-
arate disease- entities each with its specific pathology’ as wholly ‘untenable’. He argued that 
more important than this or that symptom was ‘the total mental state, a correct estimation 
of which will be the only reliable guide to prognosis.’128 Following the publication of the 
third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders by the American 
Psychiatric Association in 1980, Bowlby criticized the ‘categorists’ for their search ‘for diag-
nostic criteria that distinguish the mental ill from the normal’. He urged collective critique of 
such a stance by ‘those others who, like myself, believe continuity to be a more fruitful per-
spective’.129 For instance, he argued that ‘personality disorders’ did not represent a discrete 
 124 E.g. Bion, W. (1967). Second Thoughts, London: Karnac Books, p. 101: ‘lack of progress in any direction must 
be attributed in part to the destruction of a capacity for curiosity and the consequent inability to learn’.
 125 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33. See also Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is Truth 
Relevant?’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303: ‘Mentalizing in this context is not an end in itself. Mentalizing 
is the catalyst that activates the effective ingredient of therapy: learning from experience’ (p. 294).
 126 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Epistemic trust and attachment: A fresh look at therapeutic processes in personality 
disorder’. AMBIT Conference, 2 July. Accessed at: https:// www.altrecht.nl/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 11/ Ambit- 
Conference- Fonagy.pdf.
 127 Jablensky, A. (2016). ‘Psychiatric Classifications: Validity and Utility’. World Psychiatry, 15(1): 26– 31.
 128 Bowlby, J. (1940). Personality and Mental Illness, London: Kegan Paul, p. 5.
 129 Bowlby, J. (1983). ‘Darwin: Psychiatry and Developmental Psychology’, Contribution to a Symposium on 
Darwin and Psychology held at the conference of the British Psychological Society, December. London: Wellcome 
Collection, PP/ BOW/ F.3/ 132. See Duschinsky, R. (2020). Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Chapter 2.
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kind of illness but an intensified and persistent form of ordinary difficulties humans may 
experience in recognizing, contributing to, and making use of the good that can come from 
social relationships. They ‘reflect an individual’s impaired ability to recognise suitable and 
willing figures and/ or an impaired ability to collaborate in rewarding relationships with any 
such figure when found.’130
Anna Freud was also a critic of diagnosis- focused mental health practice. In her essay, ‘The 
Symptomatology of Childhood’, she argued that ‘symptoms are no more than symbols, to be 
taken merely as indications that some mental turmoil is taking place’. Excessive emphasis 
should not be given to any individual symptom or set of symptoms, because ‘their place may 
be taken almost instantaneously by other pathological formations which, although overtly 
different, express the same latent content and may be no less aggravating for the individual’s 
life’.131 Part of Freud’s concern was that exactly the same set of symptoms, corresponding to a 
particular diagnostic profile, could reflect utterly different psychological processes, and vary 
in their clinical implications:
Symptoms may be no more than the child’s answer to some developmental stress and as 
such transitory, i.e., liable to pass away together with the maturational phase which has 
given rise to them. Or symptoms may represent a permanent countercathexis against some 
threatening drive derivative and as such be crippling to further development. Or symp-
toms, though pathological in origin, may nevertheless be ego- syntonic, and merged with 
the structure of the child’s personality to a degree which makes it difficult to distinguish 
between such manifestations as outward evidence of ongoing pathological involvement or 
as more or less normal, stable features of the individual’s character.132
Freud thus advocated redirection of attention away from diagnostic categories and towards 
mental turmoil conceptualized as a latent factor. Within her clinic (latterly the Anna Freud 
Centre) she ‘developed a system of five diagnostic categories for classifying children’s psycho-
pathology: category 1 (essentially normal), 2 (transient symptomatology or developmental 
strain), 3 (neurotic, with “permanent regressions, fixations and symptom formation”), 
4 (atypical, distorted personality development), and 5 (destructive processes disrupting 
mental growth)’.133 This quasi- interval scale was among the outcome measures used in the 
Anna Freud Centre retrospective study (see Chapter 2). Another was the Hampstead Child 
Adaptation Measure developed by Target and Fonagy, in which ‘the general adjustment of a 
child’ was measured on a 100- point scale.134
For their part, Fonagy and colleagues have acknowledged the pragmatic functions of 
diagnostic- based clinical practice and have argued against the abandonment of diag-
noses. For instance, Fonagy was a co- author on a public letter advocating that diagnoses 
 130 Bowlby, J. ([1970] 1979). ‘Self- Reliance and Some Conditions that Promote it’, in The Making and Breaking of 
Affectional Bonds, London: Routledge, pp. 124– 149, p. 126.
 131 Freud, A. (1970). ‘The Symptomatology of Childhood: A Preliminary Attempt at Classification’. The 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 25(1):19– 41, pp. 19– 20.
 132 Ibid. 21.
 133 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1994). ‘Who is Helped by Child Psychoanalysis? A Sample Study of Disruptive 
Children, from the Anna Freud Centre Retrospective Investigation’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 17(4): 291– 
315, p. 296.
 134 Ibid. Recently, the AMBIT Adolescent Integrative Measure has been developed as an abbreviated version of 
the Hampstead Child Adaptation Measure. Fuggle, P., Bevington, D., Cracknell, L., Hanley, J., Hare, S., Lincoln, 
J., . . . and Zlotowitz, S. (2015). ‘The Adolescent Mentalization- Based Integrative Treatment (AMBIT) Approach to 
Outcome Evaluation and Manualization: Adopting a Learning Organization Approach’. Clinical Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 20(3): 419– 435.
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can facilitate understanding the ‘interrelation of psychological processes in an individual 
patient’, by offering a picture of how symptoms may cohere.135 Bateman and Fonagy have 
specifically defended the diagnosis of BPD, despite the fact that the category may be stigma-
tizing, and the fact that BPD is probably better conceptualized as a spectrum rather than a 
distinct clinical category.136 Fonagy would prefer a label such as ‘persistent distress disorder’ 
rather than BPD.137 But whatever the name he regards, on balance, some label as necessary to 
identify a group of patients with relatively distinct needs:
Mental health professionals have expressed a great deal of anxiety about giving a patient 
a diagnosis of personality disorder. Fears are rightly expressed about pejorative over-
tones, judgemental attitudes, blaming the patient, attacking the very ‘soul’ of the indi-
vidual . . . Despite these potential drawbacks, we firmly believe that it is both necessary and 
constructive.138
Discussing use of the BPD diagnosis for adolescents, Fonagy has argued that ‘it is time for 
clinicians to stop hanging on to outdated ideas about the alleged impossibility of diagnostics, 
saying that the diagnosis may be iatrogenic, that the disorder is “only a life phase” that “they 
will grow out of ” or that there is insufficient data. These are all unsubstantiated concerns that 
do not work in the interest of young patients.’139
To take another example: Fonagy has been willing to use the term ‘gender dysphoria’, be-
cause the diagnosis can help people questioning their gender identity to access specialist ser-
vices. However, he has simultaneously expressed concern that ‘if we label gender dysphoria a 
mental disorder, and that disorder is stigmatizing, then that can be unhelpful and may actu-
ally reduce their willingness to explore the complexity of their feelings’.140 Against those who 
characterize transgender as an identity necessitating swift movement to medical interven-
tions, Fonagy has characterized anyone professing total certainty about gender identity as 
likely to be in a non- mentalizing state. Their statements about themselves should therefore 
be treated with a degree of doubt by clinicians. However, Fonagy equally described anyone 
who thinks that gender identity can be reduced to chromosomal differences to equally be in 
a non- mentalizing state (presumably teleological mode).141 There are people, both children 
 135 Shedler, J., Beck, A. T., Fonagy, P., Gabbard, G. O., Kernberg, O., Michels, R., and Westen, D. (2011). ‘Response 
to Skodol Letter’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 168(1): 97– 98, p. 97. See also Maldonado‐Durán, M., Helmig, L., 
Moody, C., Fonagy, P., Fulz, J., Lartigue, T., . . . Glinka, J. (2003). ‘The Zero‐to‐Three Diagnostic Classification in an 
Infant Mental Health Clinic: Its Usefulness and Challenges’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 24(4): 378– 397.
 136 See also Hutsebaut, J., Debbané, M., and Sharp, C. (2020). ‘Designing a range of mentalizing interventions 
for young people using a clinical staging approach to borderline pathology’. Borderline Personality Disorder and 
Emotion Dysregulation, 7(1): 1– 10.
 137 Kirby, T. (2019). ‘Peter Fonagy— Battling the Enemy of Loneliness’. The Lancet Psychiatry, 6(12): 987.
 138 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 139 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy and the Undermining of Old Ideas on Personality Disorder’. Accessed at: https:// 
www.escap.eu/ resources/ resource- centre- disorders/ undermining- of- old- ideas- on- personality- disorder.
 140 Interview with Fonagy in Steidinger, S. (2018). ‘Trans- Actions: An Exploration of Gender Dysphoria’. 
Accessed at: https:// vimeo.com/ 285555219: ‘Enhancing an individual’s capacity to represent their subjective ex-
perience in a more coherent and more fluid way would aid the resolution of gender identity issues in a child or 
young adult above other approaches that are more “radical”, shall we say. So I would strongly wish to support an 
initiative that aimed to enhance the capacity of an individual to conceptualize themselves and their subjective ex-
perience of their gender in a more complex way as a first stop in their journey to resolving gender dysphoria.’
 141 See also Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2015). ‘A Scientific Theory of Homosexuality for Psychoanalysis’, in A. 
Lemma and P. E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, London: Routledge, pp. 125– 
137: ‘Drescher (2002) refers to this habit of thought as “binary thinking” . . . From a neuroscientific perspective, we 
might describe it as a result of failure of the mentalising capacity’ (p. 125).
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and adults, who will need specialist services to respond to discrepancies between their 
gender identity and societal gender norms. In some cases, these discrepancies may stem 
from non- mentalizing, which is why a chance to talk to a psychological professional should 
be a first step. However, in other cases, discrepancies may remain for individuals who are 
mentalizing well, and then medical intervention may be helpful. While gender identity, like 
all self- representation, is always a confabulation for Fonagy, if a diagnosis like gender dys-
phoria can be made non- stigmatizing, then it will have value in allowing individuals to ac-
cess specialist psychological and medical services.
In the case of BPD and gender dysphoria, Fonagy can be seen defending diagnostic cat-
egories. However, like Bowlby and Anna Freud, Fonagy and colleagues have more generally 
come down against diagnosis- focused mental health practice.142 In light of their account of 
non- mentalizing and epistemic mistrust as transdiagnostic risk factors, they have expressed 
concern at the limitations of a category- based system. They regard this system as neglecting 
five features of mental health that are of particular consequence for theoretical and clinical 
work, as well as health policy:
 1. Continuities between ordinary difficulties and mental illness.
 2. The interaction and patterns of co- occurrence between symptoms separated into dis-
crete diagnoses.
 3. The variability of potential symptoms within many diagnoses which may mask dif-
ferent aetiologies and trajectories.
 4. The variability in day- to- day functioning for individuals with the same diagnosis— or 
with no diagnosis.
 5. Factors that specifically contribute to thriving and resistance to mental illness, as dis-
tinct from vulnerability or risk factors.143
 142 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Even if we do not believe in categorical diagnostic systems, 
someone else in the mental health service is likely to have given the patient a diagnosis’ (p. 149).
 143 Chiesa, M., Cirasola, A., Williams, R., Nassisi, V., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Categorical and Dimensional 
Approaches in the Evaluation of the Relationship between Attachment and Personality Disorders: An Empirical 
Study’, Attachment & Human Development, 19(2): 151– 169. See also St Clair, M. C., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Fonagy, 
P., Bullmore, E. T., Dolan, R. J., . . . and Goodyer, I. M. (2017). ‘Characterising the Latent Structure and Organisation 
of Self- Reported Thoughts, Feelings and Behaviours in Adolescents and Young Adults’. PloS One, 12(4): e0175381; 
Bergen, L., and Grimes, T. (1999). ‘The Reification of Normalcy’, Journal of Health Communication, 4(3): 211– 
226: ‘Because normalcy, when it is clinically considered, actually implies a wide variation in mental states (DSM- 
IV American Psychiatric Association, 1994), we believe that one must assume that “normal” children can vary 
greatly in their reaction and susceptibility to violent television programming. The reason many ill or prodromal 
children (that is, children who do not manifest DSM- IV classifiable behaviors but who show early symptoms of 
potentially classifiable mental disorders) may be viewed as normal is because most lay people, perhaps communi-
cation researchers among them, consider normalcy to be characterized by the ability to operate within the world 
satisfactorily enough to “get along,” to interact passably or better with one’s friends, family, and colleagues (P. 
Fonagy, personal communication, January 8, 1998). This definition of normalcy does not preclude the presence 
of psychopathology, in either a clinical or prodromal stage (P. Fonagy, personal communication, January 8, 1998). 
Indeed, most of the people in the population who are ill are undiagnosed and are generally treated as being normal’ 
(p. 216). Most recently, see Wendt, L. P., Wright, A. G., Pilkonis, P. A., Nolte, T., Fonagy, P., Montague, P. R., . . . and 
Zimmermann, J. (2019). ‘The latent structure of interpersonal problems: Validity of dimensional, categorical and 
hybrid models’. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 128(8): 823– 839. Fonagy has also repeatedly drawn attention to 
lifetime prevalence data for mental illness as suggesting deficits in the assumption of health in the absence of 
a diagnosis: Schaefer, J. D., Caspi, A., Belsky, D. W., Harrington, H., Houts, R., Horwood, L. J., . . . and Moffitt, 
T. E. (2017). ‘Enduring Mental Health: Prevalence and Prediction’. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 126(2): 212– 
224: ‘Only 17% of repeatedly assessed Study members managed to reach midlife (age 38) without experiencing the 
psychiatric symptoms and resulting functional impairment necessary to meet criteria for the diagnosis of a mental 
disorder’ (p. 220).
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Fonagy and colleagues have also highlighted findings by Goldberg and colleagues, which 
show that, while there is much individual variation, on average there is a small decline in clin-
ical effectiveness for every year of experience a therapist accrues.144 Fonagy and colleagues 
conclude that these findings ‘might arise from the fact that less experienced therapists are 
more able to see the individual patient in all his or her subjective complexity rather than as 
a “walking diagnostic prototype” ’.145 Such prototyping undermines the clinician’s recogni-
tion of the specificity of their patient and their mental states, which would form the basis 
for prompting epistemic trust by the patient. Fonagy and colleagues have acknowledged 
that the spread of manualized therapy, a development they otherwise regard as positive and 
have helped support, may nonetheless have facilitated this prototyping process.146 This has 
prompted the use of web- based user- adaptable treatment manuals at the Anna Freud Centre 
for developing mentalizing teams within organizations,147 though conventional manuals 
currently remain used in most MBT.
Fonagy and colleagues have seen support for their criticisms of diagnosis- focused mental 
health practice in work by Caspi and colleagues on the ‘p- factor’, a transdiagnostic latent 
construct in the formation of mental health symptoms.148 As we have seen, precursors of 
the idea of transdiagnostic latent construct can be found already in the work of Bowlby and 
Anna Freud. In fact, already in 1946, the outgoing President of the British Psychoanalytic 
Society, Ernest Jones, had theorized in his valedictory address that later researchers would 
discover a general psychopathology factor equivalent to the general intelligence factor as-
sessed as IQ.149 Yet, until recently, this hypothesis has lacked empirical support. In 2014, 
Caspi and collaborators reported from a factor analysis of mental health symptoms shown 
by participants in the Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study. The di-
verse symptoms initially clustered into three higher order factors: internalizing symptoms, 
externalizing symptoms, and disorders of thought. However, more variance was accounted 
for by a model assuming one general psychopathology dimension. Caspi and colleagues 
termed this the ‘p- factor’. They found that the p- factor was associated with three character 
 144 Goldberg, S., Rousmaniere, T., Miller, S., Whipple, J., Nielsen, S., Hoyt, W., and Wampold, B. (2016). ‘Do 
Psychotherapists Improve With Time and Experience? A Longitudinal Analysis of Outcomes in a Clinical Setting’. 
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 63(1): 1– 11.
 145 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C., and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter 
Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 171. Fonagy has drawn comparison with ideas from Zen Buddhism here, 
citing, ‘In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities, in the expert’s mind there are few.’ Suzuki, S. (1970). Zen 
Mind, Beginner’s Mind, New York: Weatherall, p. 21. Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things 
Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.
borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- series- podcast/ .
 146 Ibid.
 147 Bevington, D. (2020). ‘Towards a Learning Stance In Teams: Developing a Community of Practice to 
Capture and Disseminate what Works for Whom’, in Ilana Crome and Richard Williams (eds), Substance Misuse 
and Young People: Critical Issues, London: Routledge, pp. 450– 466: ‘each team inherits all the generic AMBIT con-
tent as the starting point for its local manual. Teams are trained to engage in regular brief discussions about elem-
ents of practice, described in more detail below, that end in their producing key bullet points that can be owned by 
the team (manualising is thus a collective activity, never a single worker’s ideas). Teams either overwrite their own 
local versions of pages inherited from AMBIT or can add new material alongside this inherited content. Thus, local 
manuals are co- constructions that draw together centrally curated evidence- based practice and locally generated 
practice- based evidence . . . The process of a team manualising its local practice is seen as analogous to the group 
mentalising itself because it inquires and reflects on why and how we do things in this way’ (p. 459).
 148 Caspi, A., Houts, R. M., Belsky, D. W., Goldman- Mellor, S. J., Harrington, H., Israel, S., . . . and Moffitt, T. E. 
(2014). ‘The P Factor: One General Psychopathology Factor in the Structure of Psychiatric Disorders?’. Clinical 
Psychological Science, 2(2): 119– 137. See also Laceulle, O. M., Vollebergh, W. A., and Ormel, J. (2015). ‘The 
Structure of Psychopathology in Adolescence: Replication of a General Psychopathology Factor in the TRAILS 
Study’. Clinical Psychological Science, 3(6): 850– 860.
 149 Jones, E. (1946). ‘A Valedictory Address’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 27: 7– 12.
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traits: low Agreeableness, low Conscientiousness, and high Neuroticism. The researchers 
found that child maltreatment was associated with the p- factor, but not with the lower- level 
factors once the p- factor was included in the model.
In 2015, Fonagy and Campbell acknowledged that there may be diverse forms of mental 
illness with particular properties, and even predictable profiles of symptoms that give the 
impression of relative distinct disorders. Nonetheless, Fonagy and Campbell argued, ambi-
tiously, that ‘the p factor is a measurement of epistemic trust’.150 In a later statement, Fonagy 
has been more cautious: ‘it might be helpful to consider the p factor as a proxy for impair-
ments in epistemic trust’.151 Whether strongly or more tentatively presented, in the per-
spective offered by Fonagy and colleagues, the initiation and maintenance of symptoms can 
be accounted for in terms of epistemic mistrust and its relationship with non- mentalizing 
modes; and their prevention and reduction can be accounted for in terms of epistemic trust 
and its relationship with mentalization. Fonagy and colleagues argued that the character 
traits of low Agreeableness, low Conscientiousness, and high Neuroticism identified by 
Caspi and collaborators should be regarded as reflecting ‘emotion dysregulation, impulsivity 
and social dysfunction’, the key symptoms of BPD.152 While these features may be misrec-
ognized as aspects of a person’s personality, Fonagy and colleagues proposed that all three 
should be regarded as stemming from dysfunctions in epistemic trust. For instance, epi-
stemic mistrust leads to non- mentalizing modes, which in turn prompt impulsive action 
because the potential for reconsideration is taken offline.153
Collaborators of Fonagy have pursued this perspective through empirical studies. Sharp 
and colleagues conducted a factor analysis of the symptoms of 966 inpatients in a paper pub-
lished in 2015. On the one hand, there were some distinguishing features for specific forms 
of personality disorder. Disregard for safety, aggression, and lack of remorse seemed to form 
a profile aligned with the antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) diagnosis. Odd behaviour 
and beliefs aligned with the schizotypal personality disorder diagnosis. Grandiosity and need 
for admiration aligned with the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder. Moral inflex-
ibility aligned with the obsessive– compulsive personality disorder. And preoccupation with 
rejection aligned with avoidant personality disorder. On the other hand, most of the vari-
ance in symptoms could be accounted for on the assumption of a general psychopathology 
 150 Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2015). ‘Bad Blood Revisited: Attachment and Psychoanalysis, 2015’. British 
Journal of Psychotherapy, 31(2): 229– 250, p. 243
 151 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘The Role of Attachment, Epistemic Trust and Resilience in Personality Disorder: A Trans- 
Theoretical Reformulation’. DMM News, 26 September. Accessed at: http:// www.iasa- dmm.org/ images/ uploads/ 
DMM%20%2322%20Sept%2016%20English.pdf: The most recent formulation is also more cautious: ‘many 
manifestations of mental disorder may be underpinned by an inability to benefit from social communication due 
to epistemic mistrust’. Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic 
Trust’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77), p. 71.
 152 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds 
About: Part 1. Borderline Personality Disorder as a Limitation of Resilience’. Borderline Personality Disorder and 
Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 11.
 153 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘We understand impulsivity in terms of imbalance among 
the poles of mentalising: it involves a heavy emphasis on the automatic pole of the automatic- controlled dimen-
sion . . . What reflection there is will most likely be disconnected from reality [pretend mode] . . . I will entangle my-
self and my clinician in extended analyses, but offer little compelling evidence for any of my assertions. I urgently 
seek validation for my view, but even when it is forthcoming, it is meaningless because I am simultaneously aware 
that I made up my explanation; thus confirming or elaborating it only increases my sense of emptiness and mean-
inglessness’ (p. 44); ‘Impulsivity can also result from the teleological stance . . . for such a patient, what does seem to 
help are physical actions that make him/ her feel real’ (p. 45).
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factor.154 Sharp and colleagues were interested that no specific profile emerged for BPD. 
Instead, the items associated with BPD fell almost exclusively with the general factor.155 This 
included identity disturbance, feelings of emptiness, self- harm, instability of social relation-
ships, and social actions motivated by a fear of abandonment. From this, Sharp and col-
leagues concluded that the criteria for BPD do not reflect a ‘type’ of personality disorder, but 
‘best reflect general impairments’.156 This appears to offer empirical support for a position 
first put forward by Fonagy’s friend Otto Kernberg in the 1980s, that BPD is not a discrete 
form of mental illness but an indication of general psychosocial difficulties.157 On this basis 
of both theory and empirical findings, Bateman and Fonagy offered the clinical observation 
that, when symptoms of various forms of personality disorder are present, ‘treatment of BPD 
is required if comorbid disorder is to be treated’, because it is the general difficulties charac-
teristic of BPD that are the more basic, and fundamentally causal.158
In another study, also published in 2015, Patalay, Fonagy, and colleagues conducted a 
factor analysis of self- reported symptoms in a community- based sample of 23,477 early ado-
lescents, with follow- up data after one year for 10,270 participants.159 They found that most 
of the variance in symptoms in their sample could be accounted for in terms of a general 
p- factor, with lower- level dimensions of internalizing and externalizing symptoms making 
a small additional contribution (see Figure 7.4). Without the general p- factor taken into 
account, internalizing and externalizing symptoms were clearly correlated (r =.45). However, 
after removing variance associated with the p- factor, internalizing and externalizing symp-
toms were negatively correlated. The associations between female gender and internalizing 
symptoms, and between male gender and externalizing symptoms, also increased. This sug-
gests that the p- factor may have been masking the extent of the gender specificity of these 
symptoms in previous epidemiological research on mental health.
In terms of prediction, the general p- factor had a strong association with mental health 
symptoms a year on, with the internalizing and externalizing dimensions comparatively 
less effective as predictors. Patalay, Fonagy, and colleagues claimed that diagnosis- focused 
mental health practice focuses attention on specific pathways to specific problems, ignoring 
the general factors that provide the motive force behind mental illness. In particular, the re-
searchers proposed that diagnosis- focused mental health practice fails to consider the way 
 154 An exception was symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder, which turned out to be quite distinct: Sharp, 
C., Wright, A. G., Fowler, J. C., Frueh, B. C., Allen, J. G., Oldham, J., and Clark, L. A. (2015). ‘The Structure of 
Personality Pathology: Both General (‘g’) and Specific (‘s’) Factors?’. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 124(2): 387– 
398: ‘Narcissistic PD criteria’s average loading on the general factor was rather weak (r = .31). What implications 
does this have for how we conceptualize, for example, narcissistic criteria and traits?’ (p. 396). However, the 
distinct qualities of symptoms of narcissistic personality disorder have not been found to replicate: Wright, A. 
G., Hopwood, C., Skodol, A., and Morey, L. (2016). ‘Longitudinal Validation of General and Specific Structural 
Features of Personality Pathology’. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 125(8): 1120– 1134.
 155 These findings were subsequently replicated in Ibid. Here the relationship between BPD and the p- factor was 
even stronger than in the study by Sharp and colleagues.
 156 Sharp, C., Wright, A. G., Fowler, J. C., Frueh, B. C., Allen, J. G., Oldham, J., and Clark, L. A. (2015). ‘The 
Structure of Personality Pathology: Both General (‘g’) and Specific (‘s’) Factors?’. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
124(2): 387– 398, p. 394.
 157 Kernberg, O. F. (1984). Severe Personality Disorders: Psychotherapeutic Strategies. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
 158 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘treatment of BPD is required if comorbid disorder is to be 
treated; however, treating the comorbid disorder does not improve BPD’ (p. 82). See also Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., 
and Bateman, A. (2017). ‘Treating Borderline Personality Disorder with Psychotherapy: Where Do We Go From 
Here?’. JAMA Psychiatry, 74(4): 316– 317.
 159 Patalay, P., Fonagy, P., Deighton, J., Belsky, J., Vostanis, P., and Wolpert, M. (2015). ‘A General Psychopathology 
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that mental illnesses of various kinds may be prompted and maintained by the breakdown 
of processes that usually offer protection, above all epistemic trust and, stemming from it, 
the capacity to make use of social relationships for responding effectively to adversities. The 
prediction from the general p- factor more than the internalizing and externalizing dimen-
sions in the study is a finding with multiple ramifications. For instance, it implies that trials 
of psychological interventions may be radically underestimating effectiveness, if diagnoses 
are used as outcome measures rather than a general p- factor.
A later study by St Clair, Neufeld, Jones, Fonagy, and colleagues reported from a study 
of the self- reported symptoms of 2,257 volunteer participants aged between 14 and 25.160 
Again, a general latent factor accounted for much of the variance. There were also five 
lower- level factors: self- confidence, antisocial behaviour, worry and fear, aberrant thinking 
(including obsessional/ compulsive and psychotic- like experience items), and mood. One 
important finding was that states of anxiety and depression,161 as well as items related to 
somatic functioning (e.g. ‘moved and walked more slowly than usual’, ‘didn’t sleep as well 
as usual’), loaded exclusively on the general factor and not on any of the lower- level fac-
tors. This aligns with claims made by Luyten, Fonagy, and colleagues that somatic disorders 
should be regarded as expectable features of the continuum of mental distress, rather than a 
discrete diagnostic category.162
A second finding of particular theoretical importance from the St Clair study was that 
agreement or disagreement with self- report items about negative aspects of mental health 
only offered good discrimination at the high end of the general and specific factors. By con-
trast, agreement or disagreement with statements characterizing positive aspects of mental 
health offered discrimination at both ends of the spectrum. St Clair and colleagues argued 
that this underlines the necessity of concern with positive factors that protect against mental 
illness in understanding why people suffer more or less mental illness. This finding like-
wise aligns well with mentalization and epistemic trust situated by Fonagy and colleagues 
as transdiagnostic sources of resilience, which would otherwise be missed through a focus 
only on diagnostic pathology. However, it also suggests that risk factors may not simply be 
the inverse of protective factors: each may have distinct correlates. As we saw earlier, epi-
stemic mistrust is not simply the opposite of epistemic trust, and they play rather different 
roles in Fonagy and colleagues’ developmental model. It may likewise be wondered whether 
mentalization is simply the opposite of non- mentalizing, or whether mentalization and non- 
mentalizing both respectively have distinct qualities and correlates that theory and measure-
ment should seek to capture.163
 160 St Clair, M. C., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Fonagy, P., Bullmore, E. T., Dolan, R. J., . . . and Goodyer, I. M. (2017). 
‘Characterising the Latent Structure and Organisation of Self- Reported Thoughts, Feelings and Behaviours in 
Adolescents and Young Adults’. PloS One, 12(4): e0175381.
 161 St Clair and colleagues identified a lower- level factor of long- term, stable negative mood, which seemed to 
have different properties from more state- like components of depression, the latter loading exclusively on the gen-
eral p- factor. St Clair, M. C., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Fonagy, P., Bullmore, E. T., Dolan, R. J., . . . and Goodyer, I. M. 
(2017). ‘Characterising the Latent Structure and Organisation of Self- Reported Thoughts, Feelings and Behaviours 
in Adolescents and Young Adults’. PloS One, 12(4): e0175381.
 162 Luyten, P., Van Assche, L., Kadriu, F., Krans, J., Claes, L., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Other Disorders often 
Associated with Psychological Trauma’, in C. Dalenberg, S. Gold, and J. Cook (eds), APA Handbook of Trauma 
Psychology. Volume 1: Foundations in Knowledge, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 
243– 280, p. 245.
 163 The potential for mentalization to contribute to broaden- and- build cycles, but not the absence of non- 
mentalizing, has been discussed recently by Bo, S., Bateman, A., and Kongerslev, M. T. (2019). ‘Mentalization- 
Based Group Therapy for Adolescents with Avoidant Personality Disorder: Adaptations and Findings from a 
Practice- Based Pilot Evaluation’. Journal of Infant, Child, and Adolescent Psychotherapy, 18(3): 249– 262.
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A further notable finding from the study was that while psychotic experiences loaded in 
part with the aberrant thinking lower- level factor, they were also strongly associated with the 
general psychopathology factor. St Clair and colleagues interpreted the findings as showing 
that psychotic symptoms should also be regarded as expectable features of the continuum 
of the p- factor, perhaps characterizing especially its most comorbid and/ or its most severe 
end, rather than a discrete diagnostic category.164 Some psychotic symptoms, as much as 
other mental health symptoms within the overall p- factor, may be sequelae of vulnerabil-
ities such as early trauma.165 Developing ideas initially formulated by Fonagy in the treat-
ment of Mr S (see Chapter 1), Debbané, Brent, Fonagy, and colleagues have proposed that, 
like other mental health difficulties, vulnerabilities to psychotic experiences will be exacer-
bated by emotion dysregulation and biases in interpersonal attribution characteristic of the 
p- factor. These will then remain uncorrected— and treatment will prove less effective— to 
the extent that modes of non- mentalization are used intensively, and epistemic vigilance 
locked in place.166 Teleological mode can hold individuals to a single way of interpreting 
others’ behaviour. Psychic equivalence can make passing thoughts or feelings seem charac-
teristic of all reality. Pretend mode can sustain states of dissociation or hallucination, with 
hypermentalization contributing to improbable over- interpretation of others’ behaviour 
and motives. Externalization of the alien self can make an individual’s own negative feel-
ings appear to be coming from outside. Fonagy and colleagues have regarded symptoms 
of psychosis either as a facet of the overall p- factor, or else as a subfactor on a level with 
internalizing and externalizing. In either case, they have conceptualized mentalization as 
protective against psychosis, and non- mentalization as predisposing and potentially exacer-
bating psychosis. However, there remain significant ambiguities regarding this claim. Not 
least, the precise basis of the conceptual distinction between pretend mode and psychosis 
remains under- elaborated: is pretend mode an independent contributor to (some forms of) 
psychosis, a component of (some forms of) psychosis, solely a reinforcer of psychotic symp-
toms, among the consequence of (some forms of) psychosis, or all four?
A final intriguing finding from the St Clair study was that higher scores on the p- factor, 
but not the specific factors, were associated generally with attending treatment for mental ill 
health. The exception here was that both the p- factor and the mood lower- level factor pre-
dicted attending treatment for depression. However, participants who only reported high 
symptoms of the p- factor and not the symptoms of any of the lower- level factors were no 
more likely to be receiving mental health services than individuals with few or no symp-
toms. There are various interpretations that could be offered of this finding. One would be 
that there is significant unmet need among the population of individuals with only symp-
toms of the p- factor. St Clair and colleagues offered a very different interpretation, proposing 
 164 See also Stochl, J., Khandaker, G. M., Lewis, G., Perez, J., Goodyer, I. M., Zammit, S., . . . and Jones, P. B. 
(2015). ‘Mood, anxiety and psychotic phenomena measure a common psychopathological factor’. Psychological 
Medicine, 45(7): 1483– 1493.
 165 See also van Nierop, M., Viechtbauer, W., Gunther, N., Van Zelst, C., De Graaf, R., Ten Have, M., . . . and 
OUtcome of Psychosis (GROUP) investigators (2015). ‘Childhood Trauma is Associated with a Specific Admixture 
of Affective, Anxiety, and Psychosis Symptoms Cutting across Traditional Diagnostic Boundaries’. Psychological 
Medicine, 45(6): 1277– 1288.
 166 Debbané, M., Salaminios, G., Luyten, P., Badoud, D., Armando, M., Solida Tozzi, A., Fonagy, P. and Brent, 
B. K. (2016). ‘Attachment, Neurobiology, and Mentalizing along the Psychosis Continuum’. Frontiers in Human 
Neuroscience, 10: 406; Debbané, M. and Toffel, E. (2019). ‘Mentalizing Through the Early Stages of the Psychosis 
Continuum’, in João G. Pereira, Jorge de Almeida Gonçalves, and Valeria Bizzari (eds), The Neurobiology- 
Psychotherapy- Pharmacology Intervention Triangle, Wilminton, DE: Vernon Press, pp. 141– 160; Debbané, M. and 
Bateman, A. (2019). ‘Psychosis’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental 
Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 417– 429.
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that these individuals have less need of clinical services. They therefore questioned the wide-
spread use of measures of anxiety and depression in screening in primary and secondary care 
settings, because their interpretation was that patients with both specific and general mental 
health symptoms were the ones with the most need. Evidence in favour of this interpretation 
is that elevations of the p- factor alone, in the absence of any of the lower- level factors, was 
also not associated with an increase in use of alcohol, cannabis, illegal drugs, or non- suicidal 
self- injury. By contrast, the likelihood of report of these behaviours was elevated for partici-
pants scoring highly on both the p- factor and the anti- social lower- level factor, when com-
pared with just those participants scoring highly on the anti- social factor.167
In a further study on the same sample, Polek and colleagues found that the p- factor con-
tained high loadings on various sets of items.168 One set were directly suggestive of epistemic 
mistrust. This included endorsement of the item ‘I feel I have to be on my guard even with 
friends’, as well as low agreeableness and high antagonism. A second set indicated a percep-
tion of the views and norms of others as lacking relevance to the self. This included items 
such as ‘I do not care if I get into trouble’ and ‘I do not care about doing things well’. Another 
set were items suggestive of weak integration of self- representation, of emotion, and of social 
relationships, such as affirmative answers to ‘I am an odd, unusual person’ and ‘Do your 
moods change unpredictably?’. This was reflected in strong loading on self- report of feelings 
of social isolation, such as affirmative responses to the item: ‘Do you feel that you cannot get 
close to people?’ A further set were items from a measure of impulsivity, specifically those 
related to difficulties managing attention such as ‘I concentrate easily’ (reversed) and ‘I don’t 
pay attention’, as well as reporting acting without thinking about the consequences.169 Such 
findings are well aligned with the account by Fonagy and colleagues of close relations be-
tween epistemic trust, difficulties in social relationships, difficulties in the modulation of 
anger and sadness, instability and incoherence in self- representations, and disruption of at-
tentional processes.
Recently, Gibbon, Nolte, and Fonagy examined the factor structure of self- report data 
from a large study. There were 338 participants from two sources: either patients with BPD, 
recruited from clinical services in London; or patients with ASPD recruited from proba-
tion services. Active psychosis was an exclusion criteria.170 The study also included 167 
 167 On suicidality as reflecting the p- factor, see Prabhu, G., Dolan, R. J., Bullmore, E. T., Fonagy, P., Stochl, J., 
Jones, P. B., and NSPN Consortium. (2020). ‘How do the Prevalence and Relative Risk of Non- Suicidal Self- Injury 
and Suicidal Thoughts Vary across the Population Distribution of Common Mental Distress (the P- Factor)? 
Observational Analyses Replicated in Two Independent UK Cohorts of Young People’. BMJ Open, 10: e032494. 
Fonagy and Bateman have contrasted BPD and ASPD on several grounds. These contrasts include that ‘people 
with ASPD are more likely to demonstrate over- control of their emotional states within well- structured, schematic 
attachment relationships, rather than the under- control in chaotic attachment relationships that are more com-
monly found in people with BPD. Their dyscontrol may be limited to volatile anger: Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, 
P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 377– 378.
 168 Polek, E., Jones, P. B., Fearon, P., Brodbeck, J., Moutoussis, M., Dolan, R., . . . and NSPN Consortium. (2018). 
‘Personality Dimensions Emerging during Adolescence and Young Adulthood are Underpinned by a Single Latent 
Trait Indexing Impairment in Social Functioning’. BMC Psychiatry, 18(1): 23, online additional file, Table 1.
 169 Other strongly loading items were: ‘Your emotions are shallow and fake’; ‘You use or con other people 
to get what you want’; ‘I seem very cold and uncaring to others’; ‘People sometimes find me aloof and distant’; 
‘Some people find me a bit vague and elusive during a conversation’; ‘I feel very uncomfortable in social situations 
involving unfamiliar people’.
 170 Gibbon, L., Nolte, T. and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Modelling Axis I and Personality Disorder Symptomatology and 
its Associations with Childhood Trauma and Mentalising’, in L. Gibbon, An Interpretive Thematic Analysis of the P- 
Factor Literature and an Empirical Investigation of the Relationship between the P- Factor and Childhood Trauma and 
Reflective Function Childhood Trauma and Reflective Function. Unpublished DClinPsy thesis, London: University 
College London. Accessed at: http:// discovery.ucl.ac.uk/ 1574529/ 1/ Thesis_ final_ volume1_ Gibbon.pdf.
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community volunteers to serve as controls. This study was the first to consider symptoms of 
personality disorder within the same analysis as other symptoms of mental ill health.171 The 
analysis found that the best fit for the data was a general p- factor plus four lower- level dimen-
sions: internalizing, antisocial/ hostility, thought disorder, and borderline. The symptoms 
that loaded most clearly on the general p- factor were interpersonal sensitivity, depression, 
anxiety, and psychoticism. Phobias, obsessive- compulsivity, post- traumatic stress, paranoid 
thoughts, and high scores on the ‘Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale’ were also, to an 
extent, characteristic of the general p- factor. This was much in line with the findings of Caspi 
and colleagues. The internalizing dimension was notable for having strong associations with 
the other lower- level dimensions. Symptoms of post- traumatic stress fell strongly with the 
internalizing dimension. In fact, there were significant indications that the internalizing di-
mension might be better modelled as part of the p- factor. By contrast, the antisocial/ hostility 
lower- level dimension was notable for having few associations with the other lower- level 
dimensions, and items loaded only weakly on to the p- factor.
Gibbon, Nolte, and Fonagy found that self- report of childhood maltreatment was strongly 
associated with all four lower- level factors (rs = .53- .59). But these associations were very 
substantially attenuated (to rs = .20- .28) when the p- factor was included (r = .55), indicating 
that it was the associations with the p- factor that were driving the links to the lower- level 
factors. Self- report retrospective measures of childhood should not, however, be taken to be 
equivalent to the findings from prospective studies of maltreatment: a recent meta- analysis 
has shown that 52% of individuals with prospective observations of childhood maltreatment 
do not report it retrospectively, and 56% of individuals retrospectively reporting childhood 
maltreatment were not identified as maltreated in prospective studies.172 And McCrory 
and other colleagues at the Anna Freud Centre have specifically criticized the measure of 
childhood maltreatment used in the Gibbon study as overinclusive— for instance, identi-
fying being called ‘lazy’ or ‘stupid’ by people in one’s family— including siblings— as child 
maltreatment.173
Gibbon and colleagues reported findings for reflective function, measured using the RFQ. 
For the certainty sub- scale (RFQc), associations with the four lower- level dimensions were 
moderate to strong (rs = .47- .55). However, these associations mostly disappeared entirely 
once the p- factor was included (r = .50), with the exception of the borderline lower- level 
dimension which retained a moderate correlation (r = .34). For the uncertainty sub- scale 
(RFQu), associations with the four lower- level dimensions were remarkably strong (rs = .62- 
.70). These associations were very substantially attenuated after inclusion of the p- factor.174 
The RFQu had an association with the p- factor of r = .62, which is an unusually large effect 
size for a psychological study, to the point that it could suggest overlap between the con-
structs.175 Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that again the association between RFQu 
 171 A previous study did include other relevant symptoms, but not symptoms of BPD specifically, in the ana-
lysis: Hoertel, N., Franco, S., Wall, M. M., Oquendo, M. A., Kerridge, B. T., Limosin, F., and Blanco, C. (2015). 
‘Mental Disorders and Risk of Suicide Attempt: A National Prospective Study’. Molecular Psychiatry, 20(6): 718.
 172 Baldwin, J. R., Reuben, A., Newbury, J. B., Danese, A. (2019). ‘Agreement between Prospective and 
Retrospective Measures of Childhood Maltreatment: A Systematic Review and Meta- Analysis’. JAMA Psychiatry, 
76(6): 584- 593 .
 173 McCrory, E. J., Gerin, M. I., and Viding, E. (2017). ‘Annual Research Review: Childhood Maltreatment, 
Latent Vulnerability and the Shift to Preventative Psychiatry— The Contribution Of Functional Brain Imaging’. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 58(4): 338– 357.
 174 However, the internalizing and thought disorder dimensions remained barely significant correlates of RFQu 
even after taking into account the p- factor (rs = .20 and .17 respectively).
 175 Funder, D. C. and Ozer, D. J. (2019). ‘Evaluating Effect Size in Psychological Research: Sense and Nonsense’. 
Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 2(2): 156– 168.
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and the borderline dimension was not entirely attenuated when the p- factor was included, 
but remained moderate (r = .37), and the antisocial/ hostile dimension also retained a mean-
ingful association (r = .28). The strongest association between the RFQu and individual 
symptoms was with items from the ‘Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale’ (r = .69) and 
emotional instability (r = .61). The strongest association between the RFQc and individual 
symptoms was with items from the ‘Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale’ (r = .56), items 
understood to signal problems with identity176 (r = .51) and phobia (r = .47).
Overall, these findings offer clear support for the prediction by Fonagy and colleagues 
that the p- factor would be associated with non- mentalizing, though they align with other 
findings in recent years that generally suggest that RFQu has better associations with expect-
able correlates than RFQc. For instance, no association has been found for the RFQc with re-
ported interpersonal difficulties or with the ‘Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale’, or with 
observer- reported measures of mentalizing such as the Parent Development Interview.177 
The findings also suggest potential qualifications to theory. Antisocial/ hostile behaviour was 
only weakly associated with the p- factor, and retained a significant association with RFQu 
even after the p- factor was included in the model. Yet more strongly, excessive certainty and 
uncertainty regarding mental states was associated with borderline symptoms even when 
the p- factor was taken into account. This qualifies the implication that the high end of the 
p- factor = borderline = low reflective function. There appear to be aspects of BPD— and 
conduct problems to an extent— predicted by non- mentalizing that are distinct from the p- 
factor. However, these findings should be treated with caution because they are likely to have 
been affected by the specific recruitment of patients with BPD and ASPD, which may have 
bolstered the apparent independence of these lower- level factors. It might be, for instance, 
that the thought disorder lower- level factor would have retained its association with the RFQ 
if the sample had purposefully included a group of patients with psychotic and other anom-
alous experiences, rather than excluding participants with active psychosis. Or that the in-
ternalizing lower- level factor might have had more independence from the p- factor if the 
sample had included a group of patients with dysthymia.178
 176 As measured with the Personality Assessment Inventory— Borderline Features. The ‘identity problems’ sub- 
scale comprises the following questions: ‘My attitude about myself changes a lot’; ‘Sometimes I feel terribly empty 
inside’; ‘I worry a lot about other people leaving me’; ‘I often wonder what I should do with my life’; ‘I can’t handle 
separation from those close to me very well’; and ‘I don’t get bored very easily’ (reversed). Criticism of the psy-
chometric qualities of the RFQc scale has been offered by Spitzer and colleagues. For instance they observe that 
‘Although RFQ_ C is supposed to represent certainty about mental states, all items are geared towards a state of 
uncertainty with respect to their semantic content (e.g., item 1: “I find the thoughts of others confusing”, or item 
3: “When I get angry, I say things without really knowing why I am saying them”) and are, ultimately, reversely 
scored. Thus, the certainty scale is based entirely on the denial of uncertainty’. Müller, S., Wendt, L. P., Spitzer, C., 
Masuhr, O., Back, S. N., and Zimmermann, J. (2020). A critical evaluation of the reflective functioning question-
naire. https:// psyarxiv.com/ 5rhme/ . Despite such problems with the scale, for recent recent evidence that parental 
RFQc at the start of family MBT can serve as a predictor of treatment outcome, see Jewell, T., Herle, M., Serpell, L., 
Eivors, A., Simic, M., Fonagy, P., and Eisler, I. (2020). ‘Attachment and mentalization as predictors of outcome in 
family therapy for adolescent anorexia nervosa’. PsyArXiv pre- print, https:// psyarxiv.com/ fgytk/ 
 177 Euler, S., Nolte, T., Constantinou, M., Griem, J., Montague, P. R., Fonagy, P., and Personality and Mood 
Disorders Research Network (2019). ‘Interpersonal Problems in Borderline Personality Disorder: Associations 
with Mentalizing, Emotion Regulation, and Impulsiveness’. Journal of Personality Disorders, Early View; 
Handeland, T. B., Kristiansen, V. R., Lau, B., Håkansson, U., and Øie, M. G. (2019). ‘High Degree of Uncertain 
Reflective Functioning in Mothers with Substance Use Disorder’. Addictive Behaviors Reports, 10: 100193. 
However, rather than a problem with the concept of certainty about other minds as contrary to mentalizing, this 
more likely reflects a methodological limitation: such certainties come in to play under conditions of high arousal, 
not as much when completing pen- and- paper questionnaires. Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, P., and Ensink, 
K. (2019). ‘Assessment of Mentalising’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in 
Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 37– 62, p. 57.
 178 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘from a research perspective the precise nature of the 
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In diagnostic- centric practice within bureaucratically oriented healthcare systems or those 
structured by health insurance, symptoms may not be fully registered unless they can be under-
stood as surface manifestations of an underlying diagnostic entity, with expectable causes, 
qualities, and prognosis. This is an analogy with physical illness, where a given symptom (e.g. 
coughing up blood) is understood to have a single cause, which will eliminate the symptoms 
when removed. This perspective is advocated by some mental health professionals and re-
searchers. However, more structurally, it has been held in place in part by the wish of healthcare 
systems for an orderly and auditable response to individual needs and health trajectories.179
For their part, Fonagy and colleagues have advocated in favour of a focus on symptoms 
and their interactions as the primary level of analysis.180 This has led them to examine the 
role of the p- factor, as a transdiagnostic latent factor in the formation of mental health symp-
toms. They have, with varying degrees of caution, identified the p- factor with impairment 
in epistemic trust. As we saw epistemic trust, Fonagy and colleagues regard epistemic trust 
as a self- righting mechanism, which offers a means for learning, feedback, and adjustment 
in the face of challenges, as well as capitalization on available social supports— including 
the capacity to make effective use of mental health services. A reason for the occasional 
caution shown by Fonagy and colleagues in making this claim may well be that elsewhere 
they have considered various reasons why mental health symptoms might intersect and re-
inforce, which would contribute to a general latent factor. Epistemic trust may well be one 
contributor to the latent general dimension, but its identification with the p- factor would 
then be overhasty. Here we will identify six further factors in the writings of Fonagy and col-
leagues that might contribute to the existence of a latent factor of mental health symptoms.
A second reason why mental health symptoms may form a latent dimension is that the 
diverse conditions that prompt or maintain them may intersect and reinforce. This point has 
been a particular argument developed in Fonagy’s writings with his wife Anna Higgitt in the 
1990s and 2000s, reflecting her longstanding interest in health policy and work as a senior 
policy adviser to the Department for Health.181 Through research with prospective studies 
in the 1980s, Michael Rutter had first shown that most mental health conditions are best 
predicted not by particular kinds of risks but the aggregation of adversities or gaps in social 
support.182 These findings have subsequently been well replicated.183 Fonagy and Higgitt 
relationship between depression and BPD requires further elucidation . . . there is uncertainty about the extent to 
which depression and BPD should be considered as part of the same spectrum’ (p. 81).
 179 Rosenberg, C. E. (2002). ‘The Tyranny of Diagnosis: Specific Entities and Individual Experience’. The Milbank 
Quarterly, 80(2): 237– 260; Greco, M. (2016). ‘What is the DSM? Diagnostic Manual, Cultural Icon, Political 
Battleground: An Overview with Suggestions for a Critical Research Agenda’. Psychology & Sexuality, 7(1): 6– 22; 
Schnittker, J. (2017). The Diagnostic System: Why the Classification of Psychiatric Disorders Is Necessary, Difficult, 
and Never Settled, New York: Columbia University Press; Armstrong, D. (2019). ‘Diagnosis: From Classification to 
Prediction’. Social Science & Medicine, 237: 112444.
 180 Cf. Borsboom, D. (2017). ‘A Network Theory of Mental Disorders’. World Psychiatry, 16(1): 5– 13.
 181 Higgitt, A. (2000). ‘Suicide Reduction: Policy Context’. International Review of Psychiatry, 12(1): 15– 20.
 182 Rutter, M. (1987). ‘Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms’. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 
57(3): 316– 331.
 183 See also McCrory, E. J. and Viding, E. (2015). ‘The Theory of Latent Vulnerability: Reconceptualizing the Link 
between Childhood Maltreatment and Psychiatric Disorder’. Development and Psychopathology, 27(2): 493– 505; 
Caspi, A., Houts, R. M., Belsky, D. W., Harrington, H., Hogan, S., Ramrakha, S., . . . Moffitt, T. E. (2016). ‘Childhood 
forecasting of a small segment of the population with large economic burden’. Nature Human Behaviour, 1: 5; 
Most recently, the ‘Adverse Childhood Experiences’ measure has served partly as a poster- child and partly as a 
placeholder for acknowledgement of the multiplier effect of risk in the course of development. See Steptoe, A., 
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were struck by these findings, which stood in contrast to the psychoanalytic models of the 
day, in which early psychological risks were privileged as causes almost to the exclusion of 
the wider ecology of a person in the course of their development. They took from Rutter the 
conclusion that ‘risk conditions occur simultaneously’, and their ramification means that the 
accumulation of adversities or gaps in social support result not in an additive, but in a multi-
plying, likelihood of mental health symptoms of one form or another. The same was true of 
other outcomes such as criminal behaviour and substance use. The implication was that ‘out-
comes for most etiologies exist along a continuum’.184
A latent p- factor may find some of its basis, therefore, in the fact that the adversities 
that predispose or maintain mental illness in general can interest and reinforce one an-
other. Fonagy and Higgitt offered the example of the intersection of social disadvantage and 
a very disappointing life event.185 This intersection will create much more risk of various 
forms of mental illness than either of the risks alone, in part because the adversities may hit 
harder, and in part because each may knock out factors that would otherwise buffer the ef-
fects of the other. While individual qualities may offer protection to an extent, Fonagy and 
Higgitt claimed that this protection is always and necessarily lost in the face of accumulating 
risks: ‘we may expect children to be resilient to one or more of such stressors, but as risk 
compounds even the strongest constitutionally must succumb.’ As adversities accumulate 
and supports decrease in the course of development, so too will various mental health symp-
toms. In recent work, Fonagy has highlighted that the association between ramifying devel-
opmental risk factors and later outcomes will have a diversity of mediators.186 Some of the 
effects of adversity and lack of support on mental illness may be mediated by impairments in 
epistemic trust. Some of the effects, however, may be direct or operate through other mech-
anisms. As such, the coincidence of mental symptoms may in part reflect impairment of 
epistemic trust, but may also in part reflect the intersection and mutual reinforcement of 
adversities and gaps in social support.
A third reason that mental health symptoms may form a general latent factor can be 
extrapolated from the discussion of attachment and adaptation earlier in this chapter. 
Proposals by attachment researchers suggested to Fonagy and colleagues that human evolu-
tion may have pre- primed a repertoire of strategies and dispositions, which respond to escal-
ating adversities and lack of support with coping strategies with the predictable outcome of 
short- term pay- offs but with a long- term price. Crittenden argued that humans have evolved 
to respond to dangerous and adverse circumstances with forms of perception and behav-
iour that exclude information about relationships that would hinder coping. In one class 
of response, individuals exclude emotional information prompted within relationships, 
because this information is regarded as disrupting the capacity to soldier on. In the other 
class of response, individuals exclude information about the temporal and causal sequen-
cing of others’ availability, permitting the maintenance of vigilance. In both cases, however, 
Marteau, T., Fonagy, P., and Abel, K. (2019). ‘ACEs: Evidence, Gaps, Evaluation and Future Priorities’. Social Policy 
and Society, 18(3): 415– 424.
 184 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2000). ‘Early Influences on Development and Social Inequalities: An Attachment 
Theory Perspective’, in A. R. Tarlov and R. F. S. Peter (eds), The Society and Population Health Reader, Volume 2: A 
State and Community Perspective, New York: New Press, pp. 104– 130, p. 104.
 185 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The Early Social and Emotional Determinants of Inequalities in Health’, 
in G. Baruch, P. Fonagy, and D. Robins (eds), Reaching the Hard to Reach: Evidence- Based Funding Priorities for 
Intervention and Research, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3– 34, pp. 6– 7.
 186 E.g. Steptoe, A., Marteau, T., Fonagy, P., and Abel, K. (2019). ‘ACEs: Evidence, Gaps, Evaluation and Future 
Priorities’. Social Policy and Society, 18(3): 415– 424.
Symptom contexts and networks 211
Crittenden theorized a spectrum of transformations of information about relationships, ran-
ging through truth, error, omission, distortion, and deception. She held that diverse forms of 
mental health symptoms will increase, the further along this spectrum one goes. Reflecting 
on Crittenden’s work, Fonagy reinterpreted this dimension as ‘congruent’ with a spectrum 
of epistemic mistrust.187 Certainly, both models are centrally concerned with the extent to 
which information in relationships is processed accurately and experienced as relevant to 
the self. Nonetheless, it is not clear that all coping strategies accepting long- term costs for 
short- term pay- offs solely reflect epistemic trust.
Another attachment theorist who, as we saw, has thought about attachment in terms of 
strategies and long- term/ short- term transactions is Belsky. As we saw adaptation and attach-
ment, Belsky identified that insecure infant attachment is associated with early menarche 
and with more risk- taking behaviours. This offers support for his theory that evolution has 
primed humans to treat adverse early experience as a prime for biological and behavioural 
responses that prioritize short- term survival and reproduction, even if this may come with a 
long- term price. A portion of this price may be physiological, in terms of health implications. 
However, other aspects may register as mental health symptoms, such as anxiety, attentional 
problems, impulsivity, and conduct problems. The idea of strategies with expectable short- 
term benefits but long- term disadvantages may in some regards align with the concept of 
epistemic trust, in the proposal that human evolution has offered various ways that, even 
without the conscious intention of the individual, we may be disposed to respond to devel-
opmental adversity with less faith that all will work out. However, it does not seem likely 
that all the features of a life history strategy focused on short- term pay- off can be reduced to 
epistemic mistrust. The metabolic, social, and psychological strain and ramifications of this 
strategy may be regarded as another reason why symptoms may form a latent p- factor.188
A fourth contributor to the p- factor as a latent dimension may stem from symptoms that 
arise to mitigate other symptoms, and so predictably co- vary. This was a classic argument of 
Winnicott’s, who argued that some symptoms— such as depression— should be examined 
carefully to see whether they counterbalance other symptoms and result, overall, in greater 
psychological health than if they had been absent.189 Though Fonagy and colleagues have 
not tended to follow Winnicott in this interpretation of depression, they have agreed on the 
general point. The example most often discussed by Luyten, Fonagy, and their collaborators 
is that overeating may function as a self- soothing or self- medicating strategy as a response to 
felt distress or emptiness. Prospective research has documented a sharp dose– response rela-
tionship between an individual’s exposure to various adversities and their likelihood of dis-
ordered overeating.190 This relationship may be underpinned in part by the role of serotonin 
and dopamine in both food and mood, but there is also clearly a wider context implicating 
 187 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘The Role of Attachment, Epistemic Trust and Resilience in Personality Disorder: A Trans- 
Theoretical Reformulation’. DMM News, 26 September. Accessed at: http:// www.iasa- dmm.org/ images/ uploads/ 
DMM%20%2322%20Sept%2016%20English.pdf.
 188 The idea that sustained states of arousal may contribute to somatic symptoms without the involvement of 
epistemic mistrust is implied in Luyten, P., van Houdenhove, B., Lemma, A., Target, M., and Fonagy, P. (2012). 
‘A Mentalization- Based Approach to the Understanding and Treatment of Functional Somatic Disorders’. 
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 26(2): 121– 140, though no doubt epistemic mistrust may have a powerful role in 
sustaining these symptoms. Somatic symptoms load strongly with the p- factor in most factor analytic studies of 
symptoms.
 189 E.g. Winnicott, D. W. (1955). ‘The Depressive Position in Normal Emotional Development’. British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 28(2– 3): 89– 100.
 190 E.g. Kubzansky, L. D., Bordelois, P., Jun, H. J., Roberts, A. L., Cerda, M., Bluestone, N., and Koenen, K. C. 
(2014). ‘The Weight of Traumatic Stress: A Prospective Study of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms and 
Weight Status in Women’. JAMA Psychiatry, 71(1): 44– 51.
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attempts to regulate self– other relationships, feelings of privacy and self- ownership, as well as 
the cultural meanings of embodiment.191 Skårderud and Fonagy have argued that the symp-
toms of disordered eating should be regarded as stemming from a ‘need to drown out painful 
self- states’, and therefore ‘as attempts at recovering cohesion, vitality and self- regulation’.192 
Equivalent arguments may be made for hypersomnia and insomnia, both of which may be 
initiated or sustained as a means to mitigate other mental health symptoms, and so will pre-
dictably co- occur with them.193 Likewise, worry may develop as a response to other symp-
toms, as a preoccupation with attempting to resolve them. In fact, Fonagy and colleagues 
have identified that the absence of worry in the context of other mental health symptoms 
may come with its own problems, such as maintenance of risky behaviour without concern 
for possible consequences.194 This aligns with the findings of anxiety as a positive prognostic 
sign in the Anna Freud Centre retrospective study (see Chapter 2).
A fifth contribution to the p- factor as a latent dimension may lie in reciprocally reinfor-
cing relationships between mental health symptoms. The most salient of these for Fonagy 
and colleagues are the reciprocal relationships between problems in affect modulation, at-
tentional difficulties, non- mentalizing, and a paucity of stable social relationships. In fact, 
Bateman and Fonagy observed that these are abstractions, and in reality each is likely a com-
ponent of the others, with blurred lines between them. It is often the case that ‘one may end up 
triggering another’, especially towards the more severe end of mental illness.195 Reinforcing 
and intensifying interactions may in fact occur between symptoms that were initiated as 
attempts at coping. For instance over- or under- eating may begin as a coping strategy for 
mitigating rumination or feeling low, only to develop over time into a set of symptoms dom-
inating the individual’s experience of food, or even of social interactions.196 To take another 
example, reduced hours of sleep may have developed as a tactic to mitigate rumination or 
low mood that would otherwise occur during attempts to sleep. However, insufficient sleep 
is likely to contribute further over time to both symptoms. In fact, Patalay, Fonagy, and col-
leagues found that poor sleep was the single strongest loading on the p- factor of any mental 
health symptom, higher even than distress or anger.197
Another set of reinforcing and intensifying relationships between symptoms have been 
discussed by Luyten, Fonagy, and colleagues in relation to severely depressed states. Severely 
depressed states may deplete the attentional focus required to clearly conceive of or recon-
sider the thoughts and feelings of oneself or others. This may prompt entry into a state of 
 191 Duschinsky, R., Reisz, S., and Messina, S. (2019). ‘“Pulling the World in and Pushing it Away”: Participating 
Bodies and the Concept of Coping’. Medical Humanities, 45(2): 124– 130.
 192 Skårderud, F. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Eating Disorders’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 347– 384, p. 352.
 193 Blatt, S. J. and Luyten, P. (2009). ‘Depression as an Evolutionarily Conserved Mechanism to Terminate 
Separation Distress: Only Part of the Biopsychosocial Story?’. Neuropsychoanalysis, 11(1): 52– 61, pp. 54– 55.
 194 St Clair, M. C., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Fonagy, P., Bullmore, E. T., Dolan, R. J., . . . and Goodyer, I. M. (2017). 
‘Characterising the Latent Structure and Organisation of Self- Reported Thoughts, Feelings and Behaviours in 
Adolescents and Young Adults’. PloS One, 12(4): e0175381.
 195 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 41.
 196 Luyten, P., Van Assche, L., Kadriu, F., Krans, J., Claes, L., and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Other Disorders often 
Associated with Psychological Trauma’, in C. Dalenberg, S. Gold, and J. Cook (eds), APA Handbook of Trauma 
Psychology. Volume 1: Foundations in Knowledge, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 
261– 262.
 197 Patalay, P., Fonagy, P., Deighton, J., Belsky, J., Vostanis, P., and Wolpert, M. (2015). ‘A General Psychopathology 
Factor in Early Adolescence’. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 207(1): 15– 22: ‘Sleep disturbance emerges as a poor 
indicator of internalising problems and might be better conceived of as a generic indicator of vulnerability to psy-
chiatric disorder’ (p. 19).
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psychic equivalence, in which feeling low defines reality.198 Or even when mental states are 
considered, in a state of affective hypoactivation use of reflections to account for and ex-
plain behaviour or experiences may be felt as futile.199 In turn, modes of non- mentalizing 
will contribute to states of extreme certainty or extreme doubt about the meaning of rela-
tionships with other people or aspects of the self- representation relevant to action. This can 
directly prompt further feelings of depression, as well as responses such as social withdrawal 
that reinforce these symptoms and that hinder future mentalizing. Luyten, Fonagy, and col-
leagues have referred to such patterns as ‘dysfunctional interpersonal transaction cycles’.200 
However, they reported empirical findings that scores on the reflective function scale are not 
associated with depression scores among patients with severe depression. Instead, reflective 
function was negatively associated with the chronicity of depression and the likelihood of 
inpatient admission.201 Such findings suggest that non- mentalizing may sustain depression, 
and mediate interpersonal transaction cycles, but is not itself its initial basis.202 In the model 
proposed by Bateman and Fonagy, difficulties in forming and making use of relationships 
prompts feeling low, which in turn takes mentalizing offline and reinforces epistemic vigi-
lance.203 This cascade hinders recovery from depression and increases the risk of relapse 
following recovery.
To take another example of disadvantageous interpersonal transaction cycles: Luyten, 
Fonagy, and colleagues have also proposed that substance and alcohol use may begin as a 
‘means of silencing painful thoughts’.204 However, in serving this function, and especially 
when drug and alcohol use are one of the few available tactics at the disposal of the indi-
vidual for achieving short- term regulation, they may contribute over time to reciprocal 
relationships between problems with affect modulation, attentional difficulties, use of non- 
mentalizing modes, and a paucity of stable social relationships. St Clair and colleagues 
 198 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). ‘Being Mindful of Minds: A Homage to the Contributions of a Child- 
Analytic Genius’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 58(1): 307– 321: ‘Depression entails an over involve-
ment with and concretisation of mood related ideation’ (p. 319); Luyten, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2019). 
‘Depression’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 387– 401.
 199 Bateman and Fonagy describe how ‘absence of arousal prevents the development of attachment- based affect, 
which is the area of sensitivity in interpersonal interactions for people with BPD. Treatment becomes cognitively 
organized and the patient is detached from relational process. Pretend mode is often associated with absence of 
affect and may become persistent. Working on areas of interpersonal sensitivity that lead to loss of mentalising be-
comes impossible because interpersonal meaning is absent.’ Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- 
Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 212.
 200 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 385– 
418, p. 407.
 201 Fischer- Kern, M., Fonagy, P., Kapusta, N. D., Luyten, P., Boss, S., Naderer, A., . . . and Leithner, K. (2013). 
‘Mentalizing in Female Inpatients with Major Depressive Disorder’. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 
201(3): 202– 207.
 202 See also Ensink, K., Bégin, M., Normandin, L., and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Maternal and Child Reflective 
Functioning in the Context of Child Sexual Abuse: Pathways to Depression and Externalising Difficulties’. European 
Journal of Psychotraumatology, 7(1): 30611. Recent work has suggested qualifications to the Fischer- Kern study, in 
showing that distinct forms of depression may have different trajectories and correlates. Rost, F., Luyten, P., and 
Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘The Anaclitic– Introjective Depression Assessment: Development and Preliminary Validity of 
an Observer‐Rated Measure. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 25(2): 195– 209.
 203 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 335– 336.
 204 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 385– 
418, p. 400. See also Arefjord, N., Morken, K., and Lossius, K. (2019). ‘Comorbid Substance Use Disorder and 
Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health 
Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 403– 416.
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examined associations between drug and alcohol use with the p- factor. Daily alcohol use was 
positively associated with the p- factor, but weakly (r = .18). Frequent alcohol consumption 
is normative in England, which may mask associations between the p- factor and drinking 
to silence painful thoughts (and perhaps feelings) in a brief self- report measure. Or painful 
thoughts and feelings may prompt alcohol use in the general population without contrib-
uting to the p- factor.
By contrast, the association between the p- factor and various forms of substance use was 
much more substantial (r = .34 for cannabis and .37 for other illegal drugs).205 Skårderud and 
Fonagy have described the ‘polysemy’ of behaviour, its embeddedness in multiple systems 
of causation and potential meaning- making. They used this idea to argue against interpret-
ations of particular mental health symptoms as having any ‘one’ meaning.206 In this light, 
there may be such polysemy in why substance use is associated with other mental health 
problems:
 • Epistemic mistrust may contribute to a sense of risks as irrelevant, credulity towards 
peer norms, difficulties learning lessons for future behaviour from experiences with 
negative consequences, and difficulties in seeking or making use of social or medical 
support for substance addiction.
 • The multiplier effect of risk may contribute to the availability of substances, the pres-
ence of substance- using peers, and contexts in which drug use is frequent.
 • Life histories primed for short- term benefits may contribute to substance use through 
impulsivity, feelings of urgency in response to distress, and intensified neuroendocrinal 
rewards.
 • Substance use may offer significant short- term benefits in self- medicating for other 
symptoms such as distress or rumination
 • Substance use may also contribute to the cause or maintenance of other mental health 
problems, as well as reducing the effectiveness of protective factors— for instance, by 
hindering mentalising.
As the illustration of substance use suggests, there may be a variety of processes that con-
tribute to the existence of a general latent dimension for mental health symptoms. The claim 
by Fonagy and Campbell that the ‘the p factor is a measurement of epistemic trust’207 is over- 
strong. Evidence in favour of a link between the two is still emerging, and there seem to be 
a variety of other processes in play. However, the considerations elsewhere in the work of 
these researchers and their collaborators offer the basis for an account of symptom contexts 
and networks in clustering mental health symptoms together into a latent dimension. The 
ideas present in the work of Fonagy and colleagues includes insights from cognitive and 
 205 St Clair, M. C., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Fonagy, P., Bullmore, E. T., Dolan, R. J., . . . and Goodyer, I. M. (2017). 
‘Characterising the Latent Structure and Organisation of Self- Reported Thoughts, Feelings and Behaviours in 
Adolescents and Young Adults’. PloS One, 12(4): e0175381. The strength and direction of this association may well 
be influenced by cultural factors, though see also Handeland, T. B., Kristiansen, V. R., Lau, B., Håkansson, U., and 
Øie, M. G. (2019). ‘High Degree of Uncertain Reflective Functioning in Mothers with Substance Use Disorder’. 
Addictive Behaviors Reports, 10: 100193.
 206 Skårderud, F. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Eating Disorders’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 347– 384, p. 356.
 207 Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2015). ‘Bad Blood Revisited: Attachment and Psychoanalysis, 2015’. British 
Journal of Psychotherapy, 31(2): 229– 250, p. 243.
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information processing (epistemic mistrust), developmental psychopathology (multiplier 
effect of risk), evolutionary socio- biology (life history theory), strengths- based approaches 
(self- medication) as well as network approaches (reciprocal instigation and reinforcement). 
All these processes may also be relevant to how amenable symptoms are to mental health 
intervention. The work by Fonagy and colleagues to apply their ideas to therapeutic practice 




From early in his career, Fonagy was adamant that ‘it is inconceivable’ that ‘if the ideas pro-
posed by the group have substance’, that they would have no implications for the technical 
priorities of therapeutic work with patients.1 As we saw in Chapter 1, Fonagy’s clinical work 
in the 1980s with patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD) played an 
important role in the development of his thinking. Clinical work as a psychoanalyst working 
with adults and children directly informed his concern with mentalizing, which grew out of 
technical innovations in ‘developmental help’ offered at the Anna Freud Centre. In turn, the 
theory developed by Fonagy and colleagues fed into the emergence of mentalization- based 
therapy (MBT) as a treatment modality. Initially, in the 1990s, the target of this intervention 
was patients with BPD, a group who were often regarded as ‘untreatable’. However, MBT has 
subsequently been used with patients facing a variety of mental health symptoms, including 
common symptoms like anxiety and depression. In this chapter, we will describe the devel-
opment of MBT over time, including variants such as dynamic interpersonal therapy. We 
will also consider some remaining questions about MBT, including the potential for MBT to 
harm particular groups of patients.
The development of mentalization- based therapy
Fonagy has recalled the origin of MBT in clinical discussions with George Moran in the late 
1980s. Moran was the charismatic director of the Anna Freud Centre, and had a practice 
with adolescents with poor control of their diabetes. Fonagy and Moran used to meet on 
Saturdays to discuss and seek advice on their adolescent clinical cases: ‘We gradually realized 
that all the interpretations we were giving didn’t make any difference to these young people. 
But once we started talking to them about their lives and what their thoughts and feelings 
were in very simple language— their minds changed and their diabetic control got better.’2 
Moran’s approach aligned with aspects of Hurry’s own clinical technique in her analysis of 
 1 Fonagy, P. (1998). ‘Moments of Change in Psychoanalytic Theory: Discussion of a New Theory of Psychic 
Change’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 19(3): 346– 353, pp. 351– 352.
 2 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’, Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899. Another retro-
spective account is offered by Fonagy and colleagues in their REF 2014 Impact Case Study: ‘The research originated 
in the 1990s when Fonagy and colleagues discovered that juvenile diabetics with poor insulin control struggled to 
depict their social experiences accurately in mental state terms and that this lack of “mentalising” capacity meant 
they often could not predict the consequences of their own and others’ actions. Listening to them talk about their 
feelings and their understanding of feelings dramatically improved their diabetic control (measured through 
glycosylated haemoglobin levels). Clinical work both with these young people and BPD patients suggested that 
failure of mentalising often followed a combination of early neglect and childhood trauma.’ University College 
London (2014). ‘REF 2014: Psychology, Psychiatry and Neuroscience Impact Case Study’. Accessed at: https:// re-
sults.ref.ac.uk/ (S(jj2mvvb3fbee3zpqb1artx2d))/ DownloadFile/ ImpactCaseStudy/ pdf?caseStudyId=44202.
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Fonagy as an adolescent, and with Fonagy’s thinking about adult patients such as Mr S. (see 
Chapter 1). These experiences revealed the potential benefits, including relief of symptoms, 
that seemed to stem from patients’ gaining perspective on the sources and scope of their feel-
ings and thoughts.3
In the early 1990s, Fonagy had become convinced of the value of manualized approaches 
to therapeutic intervention: for the sake of conducting research evaluation; to facilitate 
transparency to stakeholders and commissioners of services; in order to establish an explicit 
model for teaching and further improvement; and to help buffer the effects of clinicians’ own 
anxieties and the interpersonal pressures generated in the consulting room.4 He perceived a 
gap in available treatment modalities for BPD. The condition was regarded by many as un-
treatable.5 And cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), otherwise the dominant approach in 
UK mental health services, was struggling to demonstrate effectiveness with this group of 
patients.6 Bateman and Fonagy regarded mentalization as the ingredient within the psycho-
analytic approach central to its treatment efficacy. Psychoanalytic therapies are especially 
concerned with exploring thoughts and feelings, comparing experiences in the present with 
constructions about the past, and reducing the potential for overwhelming experiences that 
might put at risk the capacity to reflect— for instance, through use of the couch.7 However, 
the mentalization- focused elements of psychoanalytic therapies could be refined, and also 
extracted from those elements that distract from or hinder mentalizing. As discussed in pre-
vious chapters, these latter include the use of speculative interpretations, use of sexuality as 
a metaphor for other challenges and conflicts, and clinicians’ opacity and reticence with the 
patient.
In a study published in 1999, Bateman and Fonagy compared the outcomes for 19 patients 
with BPD treated with an early version of MBT, and 19 matched controls who received treat-
ment as usual under the NHS. The key elements of the treatment were weekly individual 
MBT and thrice- weekly group analytic psychotherapy. At both 6 months and 18 months after 
the end of treatment, the patients who received the new therapy had fewer depressive symp-
toms, engaged in fewer suicidal and self- harming acts, spent fewer days as inpatients, and 
reported better social and interpersonal functioning.8 In fact, the patients who had received 
MBT continued to improve over time, whereas the controls did not.9 Though the early ver-
sion of MBT was initially more expensive, this money was ultimately recouped by follow- up 
 3 For recent evidence supporting Moran’s findings with patients with brittle diabetes, see Costa- Cordella, S., 
Luyten, P., Cohen, D., Mena, F., and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Mentalizing in Mothers and Children with Type 1 diabetes’. 
Development and Psychopathology, Early View.
 4 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1996). ‘Should we Allow Psychotherapy Research to Determine Clinical Practice? 
Comments on Sol J. Garfield: “Some Problems Associated with “Validated” Forms Of Psychotherapy”’. Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 3: 245– 250; Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Achieving Evidence- Based Psychotherapy 
Practice: A Psychodynamic Perspective on the General Acceptance of Treatment Manuals’. Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 6(4): 442– 444.
 5 In some quarters, these attitudes towards personality disorder have continued. See e.g. Chartonas, D., 
Kyratsous, M., Dracass, S., Lee, T., and Bhui, K. (2017). ‘Personality Disorder: Still the Patients Psychiatrists 
Dislike?’. BJPsych Bulletin, 41(1): 12– 17; Beryl, R. and Völlm, B. (2018). ‘Attitudes to Personality Disorder of Staff 
Working in High‐Security and Medium‐Security Hospitals’. Personality and Mental Health, 12(1): 25– 37.
 6 Leichsenring, F. and Leibing, E. (2003). ‘The Effectiveness of Psychodynamic Therapy and Cognitive 
Behavior Therapy in the Treatment of Personality Disorders: A Meta- Analysis’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
160: 1223– 1232.
 7 For further discussion of the mentalizing elements of psychoanalysis, see especially Fonagy, P. and Adshead, G. 
(2012). ‘How Mentalisation Changes the Mind’. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 18(5): 353– 362.
 8 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Effectiveness of Partial Hospitalization in the Treatment of Borderline 
Personality Disorder— A Randomized Controlled Trial’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 156: 1563– 1569.
 9 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2001). ‘Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder with Psychoanalytically 
Oriented Partial Hospitalization: An 18- Month Follow- Up’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158: 36– 42.
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in terms of a large reduction in the patients’ use of community and hospital services.10 Even 
eight years after the initial intervention, the researchers found that the patients who received 
MBT showed fewer symptoms, less suicidality, and were more likely to be in employment 
or education. They had less crisis service use, less use of long- term outpatient mental health 
services, and were less likely to have social services involvement.11 Many patients who re-
ceived MBT still faced substantial difficulties requiring forms of professional support, but 
this was at a lower frequency and over shorter duration than for control participants.
In the early 2000s, Bateman and Fonagy developed a manualized MBT approach, pub-
lished as a book in 2004.12 The process by which this manual was developed is relatively 
opaque.13 However, in texts from the period, Bateman and Fonagy reflected that ‘the overall 
goals of treatment are to stabilize the self- structure through the development of stable in-
ternal representations, formation of a coherent sense of self, and capacity to form secure 
relationships. But the self- structure is destabilized in the context of emotional turmoil and 
so a further goal is identification and appropriate expression of affect.’14 These goals were 
sought in the new modality by carefully supporting patients to articulate and consider their 
thoughts and feelings and those of others, without becoming overwhelmed, impatient, or 
entering into pretend mode.
In general terms, psychoanalytic approaches to therapy often centre attention on un-
conscious conflicts and fantasies, and the role of defences in holding disturbing thoughts 
or feelings out of consciousness. By contrast, MBT prioritizes present- day experience and 
near- conscious thoughts and feelings that can, perhaps with help, be identified by the patient 
themselves and considered together with other experiences.15 The training requirements for 
an MBT therapist are very modest compared with psychoanalytic training, contributing to 
greater scalability.16 And whereas classical psychoanalytic technique encouraged reticence, 
 10 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Health Service Utilization Costs for Borderline Personality Disorder 
Patients Treated with Psychoanalytically Oriented Partial Hospitalization versus General Psychiatric Care’. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 160(1): 169– 171.
 11 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘8- Year Follow- Up of Patients Treated for Borderline Personality 
Disorder: Mentalization- Based Treatment Versus Treatment As Usual’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 
165(5): 631– 638; Bateman, A., Constantinou, M. P., Fonagy, P., and Holzer, S. (2020). ‘Eight- Year Prospective 
Follow- Up of Mentalization- Based Treatment versus Structured Clinical Management for People with Borderline 
Personality Disorder.’ Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment., Early View. A first empirical study 
of the role of mentalization within treatment was conducted by Chiesa and Fonagy, who studied 300 patients 
in personality disorder services: from the Cassel Hospital Residential inpatient programme; from a therapeutic 
outpatient programme; and management as usual by the Devon personality disorder services. None of these ser-
vices were mentalization- based treatments. However, Chiesa and Fonagy found that patient reflective functioning 
on the Adult Attachment Interview was improved by the outpatient programme, which also had the best patient 
outcomes by a six- year follow- up. By this point, 62% of patients in the outpatients intervention were below the 
clinical cut- point for a personality disorder, compared with 26% for the inpatient intervention and 13% in treat-
ment as usual. Chiesa, M., Fonagy, P., and Holmes, J. (2006). ‘Six- Year Follow- Up of Three Treatment Programs to 
Personality Disorder’. Journal of Personality Disorders, 20(5): 493– 509.
 12 Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorder: Mentalization- Based 
Treatment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 13 Some historical remarks are presented in Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2009). ‘A Brief History of Mentalisation- 
Based Treatment and its Roots in Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice’, in M. Brownescombe Heller and S. Pollet, 
(eds), The Work of Psychoanalysts in the Public Health Sector, London: Routledge, pp. 156– 176.
 14 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Development of an Attachment- Based Treatment Program for 
Borderline Personality Disorder’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 187– 211, p. 195.
 15 Sandler can be regarded as an intermediary figure here, because his account has elements that correspond 
much more to a classic psychoanalytic account (e.g. drives, discussion of the ego), and some elements that seem 
to presage MBT, such as his central concern with the preconscious. Fonagy, P. (2005). ‘An Overview of Joseph 
Sandler’s Key Contributions to Theoretical and Clinical Psychoanalysis’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 25(2): 120– 147.
 16 This may be one contributing reason why the British Psychoanalytic Council have treated Fonagy’s research 
and teaching on MBT as invalid activity for the purposes of continuing professional development as a psycho-
analyst: despite many points of commonality, MBT is not framed as operating on the same epistemic object as 
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MBT adopted a more collaborative relationship between therapist and patient, with greater 
attempt by the therapist to make his or her thoughts and feelings legible for discussion and 
consideration. This collaboration is initiated through active pursuit of the inquisitive stance, 
expressions of curiosity, and the elicitation of detailed descriptive accounts by the patient of 
their experiences. The tone of interactions should aim to support the patient in achieving 
some degree of emotional equilibrium— sufficient to find the therapeutic encounter safe 
enough to consider thoughts and feelings.
Bateman and Fonagy argued that consideration of thoughts and feelings should place them 
as fully as possible in context, in order to understand their applicability in accounting for the 
patient’s behaviour and experience, as well as the behaviour and experience of others. Together, 
the patient and therapist attempt to elaborate upon descriptions, identifying causal sequences 
and the role played by thoughts and feelings within them. Within this process, ‘simply looking 
at a feeling and its antecedents and consequences is not enough. The patient must be helped to 
consider who engendered the feeling and how, to explore whether the feelings have occurred or 
are connected to events either in the recent or longer- term past, to assess the appropriateness of 
the feeling to any given situation in terms of others’ understanding of the patient, and to estab-
lish the appropriate locus of these feelings within current relationships, either past or present.’17 
As part of this process, patients are asked to compare their thoughts and feelings at different 
times, as a step towards recognizing their causes and consequences.
In the course of therapy, the patient should be supported to articulate and consider mental 
states— even when, and especially when, intense emotions are aroused. This is part of the 
specific importance attributed to group- based aspects of MBT, because group conditions 
arouse strong emotions for patients and provide a supported opportunity to attend to their 
own and others’ mental states. Likewise, the relationship with the therapist is also used as 
a prompt for patients to identify and examine their thoughts and feelings, especially in the 
context of considering their assumptions about other people and characteristic patterns 
of relating to them. Patients’ experiences of the group and of the therapist should first be 
validated, then explored and elaborated further in collaboration. Alternative or additional 
accounts can then be considered, as well as the patient’s reaction to these perspectives.
Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy
In the late 2000s, opportunities arose for embedding psychotherapies within primary care in 
the UK, thanks to the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies initiative.18 This led to a 
large expansion of the availability of low- intensity CBT. Several psychodynamically inspired 
approaches also sought to be adopted within UK primary care. This included cognitive ana-
lytic therapy (CAT),19 and the Tavistock model.20 Fonagy and colleagues saw an opportunity 
psychoanalytic approaches. Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2016). ‘Commentary on Kernberg and Michels’. Journal of 
the American Psychoanalytic Association, 64(3): 495– 500.
 17 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Development of an Attachment- Based Treatment Program for 
Borderline Personality Disorder’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 187– 211, pp. 196– 197.
 18 Clark, D. M. (2018). ‘Realizing the Mass Public Benefit of Evidence- Based Psychological Therapies: The IAPT 
Program’. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 14.
 19 Ryle, A. and Kerr, I. B. (2003). Introducing Cognitive Analytic Therapy: Principles and Practice, John Wiley 
& Sons.
 20 Malan, D. and Della Selva, P. C. (2007). Lives Transformed: A Revolutionary Method of Dynamic Psychotherapy, 
Karnac Books.
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for MBT, if it could be successfully adapted for delivery in primary care. In 2011, Lemma, 
Target, and Fonagy published the manual for a brief form of MBT, focused specifically on 
depression and on ‘anxiety with low mood’.21 They termed this approach ‘dynamic interper-
sonal therapy’ (DIT). In the model of clinical action underpinning DIT, depression and ‘anx-
iety with low mood’ are prompted by problems in current close relationships.22 In particular, 
experiences of impending or actual separation, rejection, loss, or failure were identified as 
particularly important threats to close relationships if they hinder the capacity of an indi-
vidual to use those relationships as a secure base and safe haven. The interaction of relation-
ship problems and negative affect may also prompt use of non- mentalizing modes— though 
generally not to the same degree or pervasiveness as in personality disorders:
DIT’s starting point is rooted in the common clinical observation that patients who pre-
sent as depressed and/ or anxious almost invariably also present with difficulties and dis-
tress about their relationships. Although the patient may well experience his problem as ‘I 
cannot sleep or concentrate’ or ‘I can’t face going into crowded places, or going to work’, the 
DIT therapist reframes such symptoms of anxiety and depressions as manifestations of a 
relational disturbance, which the patient cannot understand, or understands in a maladap-
tive way, attributing to himself or others motivations which are unlikely or unhelpful. Once 
the patient is helped to make some changes in the way he approaches relationship difficul-
ties, depressive and anxious symptoms are typically alleviated.23
DIT does not attempt to improve all aspects of mentalizing. The focus is on the patient’s cap-
acity to conceive of and reconsider the thoughts and feelings implicated in their present- day 
perceptual experience and social behaviour. As a brief treatment, the intervention focuses 
on improving ‘the patient’s capacity to reflect on his own states of mind’, and the patient’s 
understanding of ‘the connection between his presenting symptoms and what is happening 
in his relationships’.24 This is achieved over five steps. In the first step, the patient and the 
therapist identify a problem in one or more of the patient’s relationships, perceived as con-
tributing to depression and/ or anxiety. By the end of the early sessions of therapy, the ther-
apist and patient should have at least a tentative understanding of the kinds of relationship 
the patient tends to create and how this relates to their presenting symptoms. In the second 
step, the therapist works collaboratively with the patient to create a picture of the thoughts 
and feelings raised by the problem. In the third step, the therapist encourages the patient to 
explore alternative ways of considering these thoughts and feelings. The patient– therapist 
relationship is utilized to help the patient identify their characteristic assumptions about 
relationships, and ways of responding to others. Fourth, the therapist supports the patient 
to reconsider these assumptions, and their associated thoughts and feelings. Finally, the 
 21 Lemma, A., Target, M., and Fonagy, P. (2011). Brief Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy: A Clinician’s Guide, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 22 See also Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 
385– 418: ‘The basic assumption of the mentalisation- based approach to depression is that depressive symptoms 
reflect responses to threats to attachment relations, and thus threats to the self, either because of (impending) 
separation, rejection or loss; (impending) failure experiences; or a combination of both . . . Moreover depressed 
mood leads to further increases in arousal and stress levels, resulting in further impairments and distortions in 
mentalisation, which in turn lead to a loss of resilience’ (p. 389).
 23 Lemma, A., Target, M., and Fonagy, P. (2011). Brief Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy: A Clinician’s Guide, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 52.
 24 Ibid. 63.
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therapist presents the patient with a written summary of the collaboratively held view of the 
shift in perspective achieved over the previous sessions.
Lemma, Target, and Fonagy gave self- representations (see Chapter 6) a fundamental 
place in DIT. They proposed that short- term work with patients should be oriented by an 
‘interpersonal and affective focus’.25 This focus comprises some representation about the self, 
some representation about others, the emotion that links them, and the psychological func-
tion of the configuration. So, for instance, a relevant self- representation may be the feeling 
that ‘I always ask for too much’. The representation of others may be ‘They are not there when 
I need them’. The linking emotion may be worry about abandonment. And the psychological 
function of the configuration may be a pre- emptive rejection of and distrust in others, which 
protects the individual from hurt and also expresses frustration with others, while also itself 
contributing to the frustration- evoking situation.
The DIT therapist should not take as their direct aim to improve the accuracy, coher-
ence, or consistency of the patient’s self- representation— for instance, by helping the patient 
calibrate how much exactly they should ask for from others. Instead, the therapist should 
begin by asking the patient to describe and characterize the representation of self and other 
in detail, to produce a shared vocabulary for talking about these.26 For Lemma, Target, and 
Fonagy, the ‘self ’ of the patient is not treated as the primary target of therapeutic interven-
tion. Nonetheless, representations of the self are considered for the contribution they make 
to characteristic forms of relating, the individual’s perceptual experience is taken as a key 
object for reflection, and support for mentalizing seeks to sustain the patient’s capacity for 
attention to their own thoughts, feelings, and/ or intentions.
DIT is in several regards closer to cognitive behavioural therapy or cognitive analytic 
therapy than to MBT.27 This reflects its development for use in primary care mental health 
delivery and patient groups. Four particular contrasts can be drawn between MBT and DIT. 
In DIT, the focus of the work is localized to depression or anxiety with low mood; therapy 
is always provided individually rather than sometimes using a combination of individual 
and group work; the focus is on mentalizing the self and there is, in principle, little explicit 
focus on supporting the patient to mentalize the thoughts and feelings of others; and the 
therapeutic work is less concerned with managing the potential for outbursts and lability of 
sadness and anger, or helping the patient mentalize in the context of distress. Nonetheless, 
Fonagy has argued that DIT still bears the defining marks of a mentalization- based therapy:28
 1) Maintain and, when it is lost, regain mentalizing (in both parties).
 2) Active, curious, inquisitive; don’t feign understanding.
 3) Direct joint attention to mental states.
 4) Ordinary/ non- expert: avoid guise of privileged knowledge about patients’ mind.
 25 Ibid. 107– 108.
 26 Ibid. 116.
 27 Bateman and Fonagy argue that CAT, unlike MBT, lacks a developmental perspective and does not use 
psychoanalytic interpretations. These criticisms seem arguable as grounds of contrast, both for MBT and DIT. 
Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorders: Mentalization Based 
Treatment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129– 132. In recent years, there has been some mention of cog-
nitive mentalising therapy, as an explicit attempt to blend MBT and CBT. However, references have generally 
been passing, and there has been no justification offered regarding the intended benefits of cognitive mentalising 
therapy compared with its parent modalities. The fullest description to date appears in Bales, D. L. and Bateman, 
A. W. (2012). ‘Partial Hospitalization Settings’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in 
Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 197– 227.
 28 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Antisocial PD and Mentalisation Based Treatment.’ Paper presented on 3 July to the 
International Congress of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, London.
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 5) Emphasis on perspective- taking and marking discrepancies between perspectives 
(and exploring their sources).
 6) ‘Not knowing’ stance: eschew certainty, mark what is not obvious but is presented 
that way, mark when you do suspect you know.
 7) Model active, intentional effort to find out about opaque mental life.
 8) Humility— acknowledge one’s own non- mentalizing errors, model interest in being 
corrected and having one’s mind changed.
 9) Doggedness around exploring misunderstandings.
 10) Transparency and authenticity about confusion, puzzlement, and self- reflection.
Many of these are generic aspects of relational psychotherapy, as Fonagy and colleagues have 
readily acknowledged. To the extent that there is a distinctively MBT quality to DIT, it per-
haps can be identified in the proposed focus on sustaining and modelling generative doubt 
and the inquisitive stance, and avoidance of certainties that can inhibit these. This includes 
certainties prompted by holding one perspective to the exclusion of others. It also includes 
certainties prompted by the status of the therapist, and the assumption that he or she has 
privileged knowledge. The clinician’s mental processes, in their potential wildness, are not 
made wholly transparent to the patient. However, the clinician does seek to articulate experi-
ences of generative doubt and reconsideration so that the patient can see how this works and 
why it may be valued.
Though CBT remains the dominant approach, DIT has become a widely adopted treat-
ment modality within UK primary care, as have some other low- intensity psychodynamic 
therapies such as CAT. Whether the focus on sustaining and modelling generative doubt, 
which could be argued to distinguish DIT at a theoretical level, leads to actual differences in 
clinical practice between DIT and other low- intensity psychodynamic therapies remains un-
known. Until clear evidence to the contrary is published, we suspect that there is reason for 
gentle scepticism on this front.
Mentalization- Based Therapy today
Over time, MBT has become a widely used treatment modality in the treatment of person-
ality disorders, with DIT capturing a further share of the market for primary care mental 
health services.29 By 2014, over two and a half thousand clinicians had been trained in a 
form of MBT.30 Versions of MBT have been developed and delivered for patients referred on 
the basis of various diagnoses, including eating disorders, depression, conduct disorder, and 
anti- social personality disorder. MBT has also been adapted for delivery with children, and 
as a form of family therapy.31 MBT programmes have become institutionally embedded in 
 29 Work is also underway to elaborate and test a longer version of DIT for chronic depression with attendant 
other mental health symptoms, especially relevant to cases where other treatments have been attempted without 
success: the researchers consider the ‘treatment- resistant features of the complex case of depression to be rooted 
in difficulties with mentalizing and epistemic mistrust’, Rao, A. S., Lemma, A., Fonagy, P., Sosnowska, M., 
Constantinou, M. P., Fijak- Koch, M., and Gelberg, G. (2019). ‘Development of Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy in 
Complex Care (DITCC): A Pilot Study’. Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 33(2): 77– 98, p. 82.
 30 University College London (2014). ‘REF 2014: Psychology, Psychiatry and Neuroscience Impact Case 
Study’. Accessed at: https:// results.ref.ac.uk/ (S(jj2mvvb3fbee3zpqb1artx2d))/ DownloadFile/ ImpactCaseStudy/ 
pdf?caseStudyId=44202.
 31 Midgley, N., Ensink, K., Lindqvist, K., Malberg, N., and Muller, N. (2017). ‘Mentalization- Based Treatment 
for Children: A Time- Limited Approach’. American Psychological Association. Accessed at: https:// doi.org/ 
10.1037/ 0000028- 000; Asen, E. and Midgley, N. (2019). ‘Mentalization- Based Approaches to Working with 
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many services. For instance, an MBT programme for antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) 
has been rolled out across the whole of the Irish prison service.32 Even before the COVID- 
19 pandemic initial attempts had been made to offer MBT via phone or video- link, and in 
general the modality has proved relatively straightforward to adapt for remote delivery. One 
challenge has been that Fonagy and colleagues feel that the pandemic has spurred greater 
epistemic hypervigilance, making it more difficult for many patients to trust and learn from 
encounters with the clinician. Another challenge has been that many of the therapist’s non- 
verbal ostensive cues are hindered or blocked by remote communication. However these 
challenges have been met through an intensified focus on what ostensive cues remain avail-
able for signalling recognition of mental states and modulating the patient’s level of arousal.33
Writing in 2016, Bateman and Fonagy remarked that ‘MBT has been more successful than 
we ever anticipated’.34 They identified several reasons for this growing popularity over the 
past two decades.
One has been that the modality had a research base. The 1999 study by Bateman and 
Fonagy, showing clinical benefits and cost- effectiveness despite its small sample, has proven 
an especially potent resource for the approach over subsequent decades in arguing for use of 
the modality in cash- strapped and hard- pressed services. Later studies have shown aligned 
findings, even if reported effects have been weaker.35 If CBT certainly remains dominant 
within contemporary mental health services, its credentials as an evidence- based treatment 
have helped MBT find several relevant niches. For instance, ‘clinicians find that some fam-
ilies are not able to benefit fully from the strategies they are offered because they do not 
Families’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 136– 149.
 32 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder in Community and Prison 
Settings’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 335– 349, p. 347.
 33 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C., Truscott, A., and Fuggle, P. (2020). ‘Debate: Mentalising remotely– The AFNCCF’s 
adaptations to the coronavirus crisis’. Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 25(3): 178– 179. Ventura Wurman, T., 
Lee, T., Bateman, A., Fonagy, P., and Nolte, T. (2020). ‘Clinical management of common presentations of patients 
diagnosed with BPD during the COVID- 19 pandemic: the contribution of the MBT framework’. Counselling 
Psychology Quarterly, Early View. Fisher, S., Guralnik, T., Fonagy, P., and Zilcha- Mano, S. (2020). ‘Let’s face it: video 
conferencing psychotherapy requires the extensive use of ostensive cues’. Counselling Psychology Quarterly, Early 
View. Lassri, D. and Desatnik, A. (2020). ‘Losing and regaining reflective functioning in the times of COVID- 
19: Clinical risks and opportunities from a mentalizing approach’. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, 
and Policy, 12(S1): S38.
 34 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. v.
 35 The findings from the 1999 study stand out in part against the relatively poor backdrop of services at the 
time. Later trials of MBT have found weaker effects, as have all other trials of treatments for personality disorders. 
Cristea, I. A., Gentili, C., Cotet, C. D., Palomba, D., Barbui, C., and Cuijpers, P. (2017). ‘Efficacy of Psychotherapies 
for Borderline Personality Disorder: A Systematic Review and Meta- Analysis’. JAMA Psychiatry, 74(4): 319– 328. 
The most probable interpretation is that treatment as usual has converged with the components of many of the 
branded therapies, making it more difficult for branded interventions to demonstrate effectiveness, though other 
factors may certainly also be implicated in these declines. Fonagy has also speculated that diagnosis- focused 
and manualized therapies may have also hindered efficacy by reducing attention to the specificities of the pa-
tient and their mental states, perhaps even encouraging entry into teleological mode. Publication bias and se-
lective reporting may also play a role. For discussions, see Young, N. S., Ioannidis, J. P., and Al- Ubaydli, O. 
(2008). ‘Why Current Publication Practices may Distort Science’. PLoS Medicine, 5(10): e201; Fonagy, P., Luyten, 
P., and Bateman, A. (2017). ‘Treating Borderline Personality Disorder with Psychotherapy: Where Do We Go 
From Here?’. JAMA Psychiatry, 74(4): 316– 317; Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things 
Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// 
www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- series- podcast/ ; Weisz, J. R., Kuppens, S., Ng, M. Y., Vaughn- 
Coaxum, R. A., Ugueto, A. M., Eckshtain, D., and Corteselli, K. A. (2019). ‘Are Psychotherapies for Young People 
Growing Stronger? Tracking Trends over Time for Youth Anxiety, Depression, Attention- Deficit/ Hyperactivity 
Disorder, and Conduct Problems’. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(2): 216– 237.
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have, or struggle to maintain, the capacity for reflective function and emotional regulation 
that are a prerequisite for their use’.36 In such contexts, MBT is attractive as an alternative 
evidence- based modality. A second factor identified by Bateman and Fonagy as contributing 
to the popularity of MBT is that MBT overlaps considerably with other treatment modalities 
and does not require a high level of specialism to be delivered in an adherent manner. It re-
quires hard work, skill, and practice for a therapist to deftly check their understanding of the 
patient’s mental state, and whether this corresponds with the patient’s understanding. But it 
is an elaboration of the skills required by ordinary life, and a more sharply developed version 
of skills common to most therapeutic modalities.
A further reason Bateman and Fonagy provided for the popularity of MBT is that ‘clin-
icians easily understand the ideas underpinning the model and recognise that promoting 
mentalising is something they are already doing in their clinical work’. Clinicians appear to 
experience MBT as a ‘map through the woods’, helping clinical problems make sense and 
providing guidance for how to approach them. Though, at the same time, Bateman and 
Fonagy admit that ‘over the past few years it has become apparent that we were not specific 
enough about some of the core components of the model’.37 True, as Sandler observed (see 
Introduction), blurry concepts can be helpful for handling blurry phenomena. Nonetheless, 
there may also be a price in terms of coherence, and articulation of causal processes. Indeed, 
part of the appeal of ‘mentalizing’ may have stemmed from the way that the concept can 
magnetize various investments and meanings, so that the interpretations of different clin-
icians have at most a family resemblance to one another. One clinician may have supported 
patients to conceive of feelings implicated in the motivations and intentions of others; an-
other may have supported patients to reconsider their own thoughts in making sense of their 
past experiences; another may have supported patients to gain skills in reconsidering the ob-
servable social behaviour of others and its possible meanings. Any of these, and many others, 
could legitimately say that they were implementing one of the definitions of mentalizing 
offered by Fonagy and colleagues (see Chapter 4). And any of these, and many others, would 
be judged to be showing fidelity to the modality if assessed by Fonagy’s 10 defining markers. 
Similarly, these different forms of clinical practice would be judged as adherent on the MBT 
Adherence and Competence Scale.38
A final contribution to the popularity of MBT, listed by Bateman and Fonagy, is that the 
approach has broad possible applications because it integrates both developmental psych-
ology and social cognition. Again, though, it should be noted that broad applicability has to 
an extent been purchased at the expense of— mostly inadvertent— construct variance across 
domains. As we saw in the previous chapter, for example, Fonagy’s 2018 model integrated 
developmental psychology and social cognition, but in doing so included the concept of 
epistemic trust twice, and with different meanings on each occasion. So, for instance, one 
clinician may encourage young children to engage in symbolic play and then help the pa-
tient identify feelings implicit in these narratives; another clinician may help adolescents 
re- evaluate their sense of others’ thoughts about them; a third clinician may focus on helping 
 36 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, 
London: Anna Freud Centre.
 37 Ibid.
 38 Karterud, S., Pedersen, G., Engen, M., Johansen, M. S., Johansson, P. N., Schlüter, C., . . . and Bateman, A. 
W. (2013). ‘The MBT Adherence and Competence Scale (MBT- ACS): Development, Structure and Reliability’. 
Psychotherapy Research, 23(6): 705– 717. See also Muñoz Specht, P., Ensink, K., Normandin, L., and Midgley, 
N. (2016). ‘Mentalizing Techniques Used by Psychodynamic Therapists Working with Children and Early 
Adolescents’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 80(4): 281– 315.
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a patient build trust in others in order to facilitate mentalization; a fourth may focus on 
helping a patient reduce non- mentalizing in order to reduce epistemic mistrust. All of these 
can legitimately claim to be mentalization- based approaches to therapy, given that the con-
structs of mentalization and epistemic trust both serve as switch- points for different and 
non- overlapping groups of meanings.
The latest version of the manual for delivering MBT was published in 2016.39 It draws 
on the mature model of mentalizing and non- mentalizing (see Chapters 4 and 5), as well 
as elements of the account of the self (see Chapter 6). The latest manual also shifts from 
a deficit discourse about non- mentalizing towards a greater emphasis on the potentially 
adaptive basis and role of these modes of mental processing in the context of adversities 
(see Chapter 7). MBT now begins with a 10- week group- based programme, which com-
prises psychoeducation about mentalization and support for patients in establishing their 
expectations for therapy. This preliminary psychoeducation programme appears to be 
experienced by many patients as relevant and useful.40 However some individuals do de-
cide at this point to drop out, rather than initiating individual MBT or individual + group 
MBT.41 A recent study by Jørgensen reported that patients with BPD who reported low re-
flective functioning were at increased risk of dropping out of group MBT but not treatment 
as usual.42 Such findings agree with Batemen and Fonagy’s suspicion that MBT, and espe-
cially group MBT, may require some threshold degree of mentalizing skills, and highlights 
the importance of the introductory psychoeducation to the extent that it can lay the ground 
for these skills.
Bateman and Fonagy proposed that individual therapy should begin with an assessment 
of the specific forms of mentalizing that appear to be areas of existing strengths and weak-
nesses, as part of the development of a shared formulation:
The clinician should draw up a mentalising profile. This involves locating the individual’s 
style of mentalising on each of the different dimensions, and then considering the relation-
ship between these different ways of functioning on each dimension: that is, do they cause 
mentalising difficulties to snowball, or do they compensate for each other?43
 39 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 40 Ditlefsen, I. T., Nissen- Lie, H. A., Andenæs, A., Normann- Eide, E., Johansen, M. S., and Kvarstein, E. H. 
(2020). ‘ “Yes, there is actually hope!”— A qualitative investigation of how patients experience mentalization- based 
psychoeducation tailored for borderline personality disorder’. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, Early View.
 41 Barnicot and Crawford report a 64% drop- out rate by the end of the group- based programme. It is not clear 
how representative this is of other implementations of MBT. Barnicot, K. and Crawford, M. (2019). ‘Dialectical 
Behaviour Therapy v. Mentalisation- Based Therapy for Borderline Personality Disorder’. Psychological Medicine, 
49(12): 2060– 2068. Other studies have tended to report attrition once individual MBT begins. When attrition is 
reported at all, rates vary between 7% (Brune, Dimaggio, and Edel, 2013) and 72% (Robinson et al., 2016): Brune, 
M., Dimaggio, G., and Edel, M. A. (2013). ‘Mentalization- Based Group Therapy for Inpatients with Borderline 
Personality Disorder: Preliminary Findings’. Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 10: 196– 201; Robinson, P., Hellier, J., 
Barrett, B., Barzdaitiene, D., Bateman, A., Bogaardt, A., . . . and Kern, N. (2016). ‘The NOURISHED Randomised 
Controlled Trial Comparing Mentalisation- Based Treatment for Eating Disorders (MBT- ED) with Specialist 
Supportive Clinical Management (SSCM- ED) for Patients with Eating Disorders and Symptoms of Borderline 
Personality Disorder’. Trials, 17(1): 549.
 42 Jørgensen, M. S., Bo, S., Vestergaard, M., Storebø, O. J., Sharp, C., and Simonsen, E. (2021). ‘Predictors of 
dropout among adolescents with borderline personality disorder attending mentalization- based group treatment’. 
Psychotherapy Research, Early View. On dropout from MBT, see also Andersen, C. F., Poulsen, S., Fog- Petersen, C., 
Jørgensen, M. S., and Simonsen, E. (2020). ‘Dropout from mentalization- based group treatment for adolescents 
with borderline personality features: A qualitative study’. Psychotherapy Research, Early View.
 43 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 115.
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The weaknesses that should form the particular target of intervention should be those that 
contribute to such snowballing, as well as those that are especially pertinent to the patient, 
contributing to jointly agreed goals for the work together. Existing mentalizing strengths 
can be drawn upon as assets and resources in the therapy, though it should also be con-
sidered how they may be used as substitutes or compensation for aspects of mentalizing that 
have been left underdeveloped. Bateman and Fonagy indicated that mentalization should 
not be taken to be a unitary capacity, and that discrepancies between the different capabil-
ities under the umbrella of mentalization are very much to be expected. A formulation of the 
patient’s strengths and weaknesses in areas of mentalizing, and how these relate to current 
relationships and behaviour, should be written down and shared with the patient. It should 
then be subsequently revised periodically.
If the patient comes to therapy already with a diagnosis assigned to them, whether by 
a clinician or self- ascribed, the therapist should help the patient to specify the particular 
symptoms that cause them trouble, and the history of these symptoms. This will allow 
the therapist and patient to generate a developmental narrative about how the symptoms 
emerged. The diagnosis should not in itself be treated as an account or explanation of mental 
states.44 Building on their recent thinking about adaptation (see Chapter 7), Bateman and 
Fonagy argued that strategic aspects of symptoms should be recognized before seeking 
to effect change, in order to minimize potential iatrogenic effects of intervention. In the 
psychoeducation that begins MBT, patients are taught about the conditional attachment 
strategies, and supported to reflect on the ways in which their behaviour when hurt, anxious, 
or distressed resembles one of these patterns. Patients are told that at times they may use one 
or the other conditional strategy, and sometimes they may feel that they use both together 
in relatively more or less coherent ways. Patients are not taught about the disorganized clas-
sification, though no reason is provided by Bateman and Fonagy for this absence from the 
curriculum. Perhaps they anticipate that the disorganized attachment classification would 
be experienced as disempowering by patients.
Bateman and Fonagy claimed that the key task for the MBT therapist is to help the pa-
tient balance the four poles of mentalizing: internal and external; affective and cognitive; 
self and other; implicit and explicit. But they make little of the need to balance explicit with 
implicit mentalizing, and in fact as we have seen ‘active, intentional effort to find out about 
opaque mental life’ is one of the defining principles of MBT. A balance between internal 
and external, and between self and other, translates primarily into two implications. A first 
is that the clinician should seek to ensure that patients are capable of both. A second is that 
patients should be capable of withdrawing from one to pursue the other as needed. Rather 
than ‘balance’, Bateman and Fonagy seem more concerned with the flexible use of capacities.
By contrast, the issue of balance is more clearly evident in relation to affect and cogni-
tion. This is because the overarching clinical model of Bateman and Fonagy is that reduc-
tions in symptoms arise from supporting patients during clinical sessions to simultaneously 
mentalize and retain emotional equilibrium. Whereas humanistic approaches to therapy 
generally regard expressions of empathy for the patient as beneficial, an MBT perspective 
treats such expressions as appropriate only when they will facilitate mentalization and not 
 44 Addressing mental states merely as effects of diagnoses has been characterized as poor reflective functioning. 
Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H. and Steele, M. (1998). Reflective Functioning Manual, Version 5, London: UCL/ 
Anna Freud Centre: ‘The use of diagnostic terminology, or reference to mental illness, should be considered very 
carefully, and on the whole rated low, if this is the sole explanation offered for the caregiver’s behaviour, and the 
specific mental states of caregiver and other persons affected are not specified’ (p. 21).
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contribute to excess intensity or drama in the therapeutic relationship. In fact, when a pa-
tient is upset and this prompts forms of non- mentalizing, the MBT clinician should pri-
oritize helping the patient regain their calm, so that interest can then be sparked in mental 
states. This is termed a ‘contrary move’. Such a move may entail somewhat matter- of- fact 
responses, a more cognitive angle on the problem, a focus outward to the minds of other 
people, or moving the patient away from his or her current focus:
The clinician moves emotionally closer to the patient during a session only to the point 
at which he/ she judges the patient is on the verge of losing mentalizing. At this point, he/ 
she moves back, distancing him/ herself from the patient, to reduce the level of emotional 
arousal. Here we encounter a clinically significant paradox— just when the clinician would 
naturally move emotionally closer to the patient, we ask that he/ she moves away.45
This stance shapes the MBT approach to trauma. Many psychotherapeutic modalities regard 
discussion of past traumas as essential for increasing insight and present- day functioning. 
Several of Fonagy’s collaborators, such as Jon Allen, have made claims that move in this dir-
ection.46 However, for their part, Bateman and Fonagy have stated that traumatic past ex-
periences are given attention in MBT either only when this will support the patient to gain 
skills in retaining the capacity to mentalize when distressed, or when it will support the de-
velopment of a self- representation facilitative of mentalization.47 Compared with psycho-
dynamic psychotherapy, in MBT ‘there should be . . . an avoidance of extensive discussion of 
past trauma, except in the context of reflecting on current perceptions of the mental states of 
maltreating figures and on changes in mental state from one’s past as a victim to one’s experi-
ence now’.48
Bateman and Fonagy expressed concern that if a story about specific traumatic past ex-
perience is created to make sense of present- day symptoms— for instance, a demanding 
parent as the source of a patient’s contemporary anxiety— this can flatten the complexity of 
both the past and the present.49 The result may stimulate pretend mode for patients, focusing 
attention on an origin myth rather than helping the patient to use attention to mental states 
 45 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 195. On contrary moves, see also Bateman, A. (2019). 
‘Mentalizing, Mentalization- Based Treatment and BPD’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.
borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- series- podcast/ .
 46 Allen, J. G. (2013). Mentalizing in the Development and Treatment of Attachment Trauma, London: Routledge.
 47 Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘Attachment Trauma and Psychoanalysis: Where Psychoanalysis Meets Neuroscience’, in M. 
Leuzinger- Bohleber, J. Canestri, and M. Target (eds). Early Development and its Disturbances: Clinical, Conceptual 
and Empirical Research on ADHD and other Psychopathologies and its Epistemological Reflections, London: Karnac 
Books, pp. 53– 75: ‘I believe that reconstruction is essential to the therapeutic process because: i. it provides a 
means to bring the patient’s mind into contact with what it has previously found intolerable; ii. It provides a place 
where threat to the ego and therapeutic goal are reasonably balanced; iii. It generates a coherent self- narrative as-
suming a historical continuity of self which may itself be of therapeutic value (Holmes 1998; Shafer 1980; Spence 
1994), and iv. Most importantly, it can help in the primary task of the recovery of mentalisation’ (p. 68).
 48 Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., and Luyten, P. (2012). ‘Introduction and Overview’, in A. W. Bateman and P. 
Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing, pp. 3– 42, p. 39.
 49 This clinical recommendation was already put forward by Bion, for whom too central a focus on a past trau-
matic event as the perceived origin of present difficulties ran the risk of ‘saturating’ the situation, blocking op-
portunities for further learning by giving the sense of explanatory satisfaction. Bion, W. R. (1970). Attention and 
Interpretation, London: Karnac Books, p. 29. See also Bion, W. R. ([1973] 1990). Brazilian Lectures, London: Karnac 
Books: ‘We bring into the open certain elements of an analysand’s past, not because we think they are particularly 
valuable, but because they are not valuable for him to have in his luggage. If we bring them to the surface then he 
can forget them. Those memories, past or future, which he does not know seem to have a great deal of power; they 
are what I would call feeble ideas but powerful emotions’ (p. 30).
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to account for observable social behaviour and/ or perceptual experience.50 This is not to say 
that memories of trauma recalled during therapy should be regarded solely as constructions 
or fantasy. As we saw in Chapter 2, child patients whose therapists treated their accounts 
of abuse and neglect as fantasy had especially poor long- term outcomes in the Anna Freud 
Centre Retrospective study.51 Fonagy has reflected that traumas recalled in therapy can also 
serve as important ‘crystallization of an individual’s struggles with his or her circumstances, 
identity, relationships, and life’, and so may have importance for formulation.52 When a pa-
tient experiences something as a felt truth in a therapeutic context— and the impact of a past 
trauma can certainly serve this function— the effect can be to move the patient closer to the 
therapist and increase epistemic trust.53
Nonetheless, too exclusive a focus on identifying or remembering a particular trauma 
as the source of current symptoms can work against the toleration of uncertainty necessary 
for supporting reflection on mental states and the different perspectives they entail.54 More 
generally, Bateman and Fonagy have argued, to inhibit entry into hypermentalizing or other 
forms of pretend mode ‘the clinician should avoid inadvertently creating situations where 
the patient is forced into talking about mental states that they cannot immediately link to 
subjectively felt reality’.55 Instead, the therapist should aim to keep conversations centred 
around whatever is felt to be current and emotionally salient ‘in the patient’s mind, in other 
words, in working memory’.56 As we will see in Chapter 9, Fonagy and colleagues have very 
recently questioned whether an individual’s working memory is the only site of mental states, 
or whether groups or institutions can also have beliefs and atmospheres that can be the target 
of mentalizing. However, in Bateman and Fonagy’s 2016 manual for MBT, it is the individual 
alone who can be the subject of mental states and the target of mentalizing.
One of the essential techniques advocated by Bateman and Fonagy is what they have called 
‘mentalizing functional analysis’. In light of the clinician’s understanding of the patient’s 
strengths and weaknesses, the MBT therapist keeps a look out for times when the patient 
seems to drop out of mentalizing and enter into a non- mentalizing mode of mental pro-
cessing. At that point, the clinician can ask the patient to ‘stop and re- wind’, and narrate the 
 50 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘MBT has never been focused on the past or been insight 
oriented, although it is respectful of past experience and how it affects the present. It is our view that explaining 
a person’s current wish to please in terms of a continuing wish to satisfy a demanding image of a parent is a de-
scriptor masquerading as an explanation. Furthermore, it potentially has the harmful side effect of stimulating 
pretend mode’ (p. 218).
 51 See also Daly, E. (1997). ‘Women from a Broken Home’, Independent, 21 May. Accessed at: http:// www.in-
dependent.co.uk/ life- style/ women- from- a- broken- home- 1262770.html: ‘Bernice Andrews, an undoubted op-
ponent of the Society, believes there is strong evidence— not least from a survey she conducted— that patients 
can recover memories. She also believes some such memories are false. So does Professor Peter Fonagy, who has 
resigned from the advisory board of the British False Memory Society because, he says, “the more recent evidence 
that has been coming through . . . has been somewhat inconsistent with the position of the False Memory Society.” ’
 52 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Ask the Experts: A Conversation with Peter Fonagy’, Trauma Matters, Spring, p. 3. Accessed 
at: https:// docs.wixstatic.com/ ugd/ 8d6d78_ d51caa6cb0554a68bb39e0bca78eaa57.pdf: As a clinician, ‘you will 
inevitably encounter traumatic experiences. What you find there is not necessarily the cause of an individual’s 
problems, but it is inevitably a crystallization of an individual’s struggles with his or her circumstances, identity, 
relationships, and life’ (p. 3).
 53 Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is truth relevant?’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303, p. 294.
 54 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Rejoinder to Harold Blum’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 84(3): 503– 
509: ‘While reconstruction of how things actually were in childhood can significantly contribute to therapeutic 
action, it is the process rather than the outcome of this reconstruction that is therapeutic, due to the opportunity 
thus afforded to rework current experiences in the context of other perspectives.’ (p. 503).
 55 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 208.
 56 Ibid. 218– 219.
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sequence again, so that the clinician and patient can work collaboratively to identify when 
and how mentalizing was lost and non- mentalizing began.57 Special attention is paid to the 
feelings that may stimulate forms of non- mentalizing. The therapist and patient may then 
reflect together about what strategies could be implemented in future to halt the decay of 
mentalizing or the advance of non- mentalizing. Bateman and Fonagy recognized, however, 
that clinicians too may enter non- mentalizing states. For instance, they may find themselves 
just going along with what is being said, having entered into pretend mode. They may find 
themselves caught up in feelings that seem so pressing that new information cannot enter, 
having entered a state of psychic equivalence. They may find their minds dominated by an 
urgent wish do to something constructive, having entered teleological mode.58 When the 
patient or clinician perceives that the clinician has started to non- mentalize, Bateman and 
Fonagy likewise advised use of ‘stop and re- wind’.
‘Stop and re- wind’ was developed as a clinical technique, but it also has theoretical stakes. 
Over the decades, Fonagy and collaborators have given less and less explicit notice to atten-
tional processes in their thinking about mentalization; it seems to have dropped, uncere-
moniously, out of sight.59 Attentional processes are not described by Bateman and Fonagy 
as part of what MBT attempts to change. Nonetheless, ‘stop and re- wind’ can be considered 
above all as a technique for practising both attentional flexibility and attentional focus as 
component parts and contributors to mentalizing.
This is all the more surprising because Fonagy and Gergely both attribute the basis of the 
idea of ‘ostensive cues’ to Sperber and Wilson, for whom such cues are primarily a kind of 
way of directing the attention of a conversation partner. Sperber appears even to somewhat 
regret that in highlighting ostension he appears to have drawn away recognition from the 
direction of others’ attention as the underlying and wider issue.60 In the work of Fonagy and 
colleagues, concern with ostensive cues has rather supplanted the wider question of atten-
tional processes, which they had considered in the 1990s and early 2000s. In the 2016 MBT 
manual, Bateman and Fonagy and colleagues highlighted the importance of ostensive cues 
provided by the therapist to the patient, and of validating the salience and relevance of the 
patient’s perspective as critical to the initiation of any further discussion of that perspective. 
For instance, marked mirroring is a powerful ostensive cue: conveying, in the interplay of 
 57 Ibid. 228.
 58 Ibid. 284.
 59 A study by Perroud and colleagues, including Fonagy, examined self- reported mentalization and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However, this paper addressed attention difficulties solely as an effect of 
mentalization, not as a contributing factor or component of mentalizing, as in Fonagy’s earlier work. Perroud, N., 
Badoud, D., Weibel, S., Nicastro, R., Hasler, R., Küng, A. L., . . . and Prada, P. (2017). ‘Mentalization in Adults with 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: Comparison with Controls and Patients with Borderline Personality 
Disorder’. Psychiatry Research, 256: 334– 341. Curiously, the Swiss authors, in a paper without Fonagy as co- 
author, did later consider attention as a contributor to mentalizing, developing a model of bidirectional influence. 
Badoud, D., Rüfenacht, E., Debbané, M., and Perroud, N. (2018). ‘Mentalization- Based Treatment for Adults with 
Attention- Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder: A Pilot Study’. Research in Psychotherapy: Psychopathology, Process and 
Outcome, 21(3): 149– 154. A concern with attention has been re- integrated with mentalization in the AMAR Model 
proposed by Lecannelier, F. (2019). ‘A Transcultural Model of Attachment and Its Vicissitudes: Interventions 
Based on Mentalization in Chile’. In Clinical Handbook of Transcultural Infant Mental Health. New York: Springer, 
pp. 135– 149.
 60 E.g. Sperber, D. (2019). ‘Personal Notes on a Shared Trajectory’, in Kate Scott, Billy Clark, and Robyn Carston 
(eds), Relevance, Pragmatics and Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 13– 20. See also re-
cent blog posts by Sperber, accessed at http:// cognitionandculture.net. A conceptualization of the direction of at-
tention as fundamental to ostension and to guiding meaning- making appears already in Sperber’s earliest works. 
For instance, Speber, D. (1975). Cultural Symbolism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: ‘cultural symbolism 
focusses the attention of the members of a single society in the same directions, determines parallel evocational 
fields that are structured in the same way, but leaves the individual free to effect an evocation in them as he likes. 
Cultural symbolism creates a community of interest but not of opinion’ (p. 137).
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primary and secondary meanings, both that the therapist acknowledges the patient’s emo-
tion and intentionality, and that the therapist can cope with these responses. Use of these 
techniques is assumed to ‘increase the patient’s epistemic trust and thus acts as a catalyst for 
therapeutic success’.61 While these techniques are common to many therapeutic modalities, 
Fonagy and colleagues anticipated that MBT could give them particular weight. In fact, they 
might even form the basis in the future for forms of MBT delivered over the internet, because 
Fonagy and colleagues regard ostensive cues rather than therapeutic alliance as reigniting 
epistemic trust and the capacity to learn from experience.62
This concern with ostensive cues has also led to theoretical revision. As we saw in the pre-
vious chapter, Fonagy and colleagues had initially described ostensive cues as behaviours 
that acknowledge the i) mental states; ii) intentionality; and iii) individuality of the subject. 
Initially, these properties of ostensive cues were extrapolated from observations of infants to 
later development— for instance, to adult practices that entail mutual recognition of intent. 
However, in a 2019 chapter, Fonagy, Allison, and Campbell have argued that, after infancy, 
the perception of ‘understanding of the individual’s personal narrative by another person 
creates a potential for epistemic trust’.63 Above all, ‘recognition of subdominant narratives is 
a particularly potent way of establishing epistemic trust’.64 They define personal narrative as 
a person’s ‘imagined sense of self ’ at a given moment, and identify that the clarity and specifi-
city of this narrative is in significant part a function of mentalizing of the self.65 The imagined 
sense of self is nonetheless complex and heterogenous, inflected by a person’s develop-
mental history, their cultural context, the pragmatic demands of their immediate circum-
stances, alien intentions from the psychoanalytic unconscious, and sometimes significant 
 61 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9.
 62 Fonagy, P. and Clark, D. M. (2015). ‘Update on the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Programme 
in England: Commentary on . . . Children and Young People’s Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’. 
BJPsych Bulletin, 39(5): 248– 251: ‘The remarkable success of internet- delivered therapies strongly challenges 
the claim that a strong therapeutic alliance is essential’ (p. 249). See also Falconer, C. J., Cutting, P., Davies, E. 
B., Hollis, C., Stallard, P., and Moran, P. (2017). ‘Adjunctive Avatar Therapy for Mentalization- Based Treatment 
of Borderline Personality Disorder: A Mixed- Methods Feasibility Study’. Evidence- Based Mental Health, 
20(4): 123– 127. At best, they regard the concept of ‘therapeutic alliance’ as an umbrella term that points weakly at 
the kinds of interaction facilitative of epistemic trust. Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things 
Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www. 
borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- series- podcast/ .
 63 Fonagy, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77, p. 70.
 64 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C. and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic models’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 171. The turn to attention to narrative may reflect Liz Allison’s particular interests in 
narrative and storytelling. E.g. Allison, E. (2017). ‘Observing the Observer: Freud and the Limits of Empiricism’. 
British Journal of Psychotherapy, 33(1): 93– 104.
 65 Fonagy, P., Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Mentalising, Resilience and Epistemic Trust’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 63– 77, pp. 72 and 74; Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2018). ‘The Origin of 
Human Life: A Psychoanalytic Developmental Perspective’, European Psychoanalytical Federation, 31st Annual 
Conference, 24 March, Warsaw, ‘It is perhaps helpful here to bear in mind a distinction that Sandler made between 
two different levels at which the concept of self- representation could be considered. On the one hand, he thought 
that the self- representation exists as a more or less enduring organization, schema or set of rules that is constructed 
out of a multitude of impressions and exists outside subjective experience even though it is in large part a con-
sequence of subjective experience. On the other hand, there is the level of the phenomenal or experiential self- 
representation, which is “the subjective representation or subjective experience of ourselves that we have, at any 
given moment, in what we can refer to as the experiential realm.” It is this second sense that we wish to capture with 
the term personal narrative.’
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involvement of the primary unconscious (see Chapter 6). There is considerable scope, there-
fore, for subdominant threads that are knowable by an individual and by others, but that 
do not ordinarily feature as part of an individual’s espoused self- representation.66 Epistemic 
trust is facilitated by the felt acuity of the match between some part of our self- representation 
and the account of us offered by another. A lack of clarity and specificity in this narrative will 
render individuals vulnerable to missing accurate matches (epistemic hypervigilance), or in-
correctly identifying accurate matches (epistemic credulity), or both (see Chapter 7).
The characterization of others’ perceived understanding one’s personal narrative as an osten-
sive cue is innovative. It is not implied by the previous concept of ostensive cues as behaviours 
that acknowledge the i) mental states; ii) intentionality; and iii) individuality of a subject. The 
‘imagined sense of self ’ depicted by a personal narrative is not the sum of thoughts and feelings, 
though it plays a role in generating them and partly takes its content from them. Nor is it merely 
the intentionality of the subject, though this may play a part. The claim that epistemic trust is 
generated by recognition of personal narrative rather than acknowledgement of mental states 
and intentionality appear to signal a wish by Fonagy and colleagues, not as yet fully pursued, 
to bring to bear more of the complex account of the self on matters of clinical technique. Given 
Fonagy’s criticisms of the Bakhtin- inspired model of dominant and subdominant personal nar-
ratives in CAT in the 1990s (see Chapter 6), it would be interesting to see how Fonagy and col-
leagues would now regard this model of personal narratives and their role in clinical technique.67 
This would be of particular note given Fonagy and colleagues’ growing interests in culture. The 
Bakhtinian approach in CAT holds that personal narrative is woven out of cultural resources. 
From a mentalizing perspective, such resources may suggest or impose codes that relatively 
hinder or facilitate the construction, identification, modulation, and expression of mental states.
Fonagy and colleagues have been continually active in evolving and developing MBT. 
Meanwhile, trials have been accumulating that have assessed the effectiveness of the mo-
dality in its different incarnations. Most of these, though certainly not exclusively, have 
focused on its application with adult patients with BPD. True, the relationship between 
mentalizing difficulties and BPD may be less tight than initially anticipated by Fonagy. For 
instance, Bouchard, Target, Lecours, Fonagy, and colleagues have found only an association 
of r = - .24 between symptoms of personality disorder and reflective function scored on the 
Adult Attachment Interview.68 Nonetheless, the importance of mentalizing difficulties has 
 66 Horne, among others, has previously criticized the tendency of Fonagy and colleagues to give insufficient 
attention to subdominant narratives. Horne, M. (2004). ‘The Universe of Our Concerns: The Human as Person in 
the Praxis of Analysis’. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 49(1): 33– 48. There are some points of similarity between 
these recent remarks by Fonagy, Allison, and Campbell on acknowledgement of subdominant narratives as an 
ostensive cue, and earlier work by Feldman, M. (2007). ‘Addressing Parts of the Self ’. The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 88(2): 371– 386. Though, unlike Fonagy and colleagues, Feldman also considers how recognition of 
subdominant narratives may precisely disturb epistemic trust, through being experienced as an intrusion or threat 
to the dominant self- representation.
 67 Pollard, R. (2008). Dialogue and Desire: Mikhail Bakhtin and the Linguistic Turn in Psychotherapy, 
London: Karnac Books. It may also provide impetus for Fonagy and colleagues to clarify whether they regard 
‘thinking’ as necessarily verbal- discursive, and more generally help situate the boundaries of what is meant by 
‘thought’ as a ‘mental state’ compared with the building blocks of thoughts.
 68 Bouchard, M. A., Target, M., Lecours, S., Fonagy, P., Tremblay, L. M., Schachter, A., and Stein, H. (2008). 
‘Mentalization in Adult Attachment Narratives: Reflective Functioning, Mental States, and Affect Elaboration 
Compared’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 25(1): 47– 66. Another study found no association between reflective 
function and the severity of personality disorder symptoms. Fischer- kern, M., Schuster, P., Kapusta, N. D., Tmej, 
A., Buchheim, A., Rentrop, M., . . . and Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘The Relationship between Personality Organization, 
Reflective Functioning, and Psychiatric Classification in Borderline Personality Disorder’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 27(4): 395– 409. Researchers have also found a very weak (r = - .11) association between Theory of 
Mind and BPD symptoms. Belsky, D. W., Caspi, A., Arseneault, L., Bleidorn, W., Fonagy, P., Goodman, M., . . . and 
Moffitt, T. E. (2012). ‘Etiological Features of Borderline Personality Related Characteristics in a Birth Cohort 
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been indicated by the finding that, in the large majority of studies, patients with personality 
disorders benefit from MBT and show fewer symptoms and better day- to- day functioning 
by the end of the trial. The same is also generally true of other comparison interventions 
when patients have BPD alone, without other conditions. Fonagy and colleagues have inter-
preted this finding with a speculative proposal: that even if the models are different, the use 
of any evidence- based model by therapists gives coherence to the way the patient is recog-
nized as an intentional agent by the therapist, which serves as an ostensive cue and facilitates 
epistemic trust.69
However, for patients with complex personality disorders, MBT has proven the most ef-
fective psychological modality.70 This may imply that the difficulties with mentalizing iden-
tified initially by Fonagy and colleagues as especially characteristic of BPD are in fact less 
specific. This would seem supported by the Sharp and colleagues’ study from 2015 men-
tioned in the previous chapter, in which BDP loaded with the general p- factor. To untangle 
these questions, it would be necessary to understand the relative role of mentalization in 
mediating clinical and functional outcomes for patients, and whether this differs between 
treatment modality. Fonagy and colleagues have argued that mentalization is improved 
by many talking therapies, and should be treated as the central target for effecting thera-
peutic change. In support for this claim, De Meulemeester found that improvement on the 
Reflective Functioning Questionnaire scale for indiscriminate uncertainty (RFQu) among 
patients receiving hospital- based psychoanalytic treatment was associated to the highest de-
gree with relief from symptoms (r = .89).71 The remarkable strength of this association is 
such that, if replicated, it suggests that RFQu and relief from symptoms may even be part 
of 12- Year- Old Children’. Development and Psychopathology, 24(1): 251– 265, Figure 1a. On the interpretation 
of effect sizes in psychology, see Funder, D. C. and Ozer, D. J. (2019). ‘Evaluating Effect Size in Psychological 
Research: Sense and Nonsense’. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 2(2): 156– 168.
 69 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9. In fact, this claim warrants significant fur-
ther scrutiny. Is it the accuracy of the model that is contributing to the patient’s sense of feeling recognized? Or 
the clinician’s confidence in the model? Or the coherence of the narrative the model permits the therapist and/ or 
permits the patient? It does not seem fully plausible that Kleinian psychoanalysis and exposure therapy, though 
both could claim to have supporting evidence, have the same approach to recognizing the patient as an intentional 
agent. Or if recognition is achieved by both through some generic process (e.g. therapist belief that the patient has 
intentions and mental states; use of ostensive cues; adequate professional boundaries), why this recognition would 
not be achieved by non- evidence- based therapies.
 70 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., and Bateman, A. (2017). ‘Treating Borderline Personality Disorder with 
Psychotherapy: Where Do We Go From Here?’. JAMA Psychiatry, 74(4): 316– 317. ‘The various evidence- 
based treatments included in the present meta- analysis may have studied different populations and thus may 
be differentially effective in different subtypes of BPD. For example, mentalization- based therapy was superior 
over control (structured clinical management) only in patients with BPD with multiple Axis II diagnoses’ 
(p. 317). See also Volkert, J., Hauschild, S., and Taubner, S. (2019). ‘Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality 
Disorders: Efficacy, Effectiveness, and New Developments’. Current Psychiatry Reports, 21(4): 25; Kvarstein, E. H., 
Pedersen, G., Folmo, E., Urnes, Ø., Johansen, M. S., Hummelen, B., . . . and Karterud, S. (2019). ‘Mentalization‐
Based Treatment or Psychodynamic Treatment Programmes for Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder— 
The Impact of Clinical Severity’. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 92(1): 91– 111.
 71 De Meulemeester, C., Vansteelandt, K., Luyten, P., and Lowyck, B. (2018). ‘Mentalizing as a Mechanism of 
Change in the Treatment of Patients with Borderline Personality Disorder: A Parallel Process Growth Modeling 
Approach’. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 9(1): 22. Though not an intervention study, 
Morosan documented in a community- based cohort study of adolescents that self- reported indiscriminate un-
certainty about mental states (RFQu) was associated with more externalizing behaviours at the start of the study; 
reductions in self- reported certainty about mental states (RFQc) was associated with sharper declines in exter-
nalizing behaviours over time. Morosan, L., Ghisletta, P., Badoud, D., Toffel, E., Eliez, S., and Debbané, M. (2019). 
‘Longitudinal Relationships between Reflective Functioning, Empathy, and Externalizing Behaviors During 
Adolescence and Young Adulthood’. Child Psychiatry & Human Development, 51: 59– 70 .
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of the same underlying construct. However, to the surprise of the researchers, there was no 
link with the RFQ certainty scale, though, in general, the RFQc scale has not performed as 
anticipated across several studies (see Chapter 7). It is also notable that a major recent meta- 
analysis found that mentalization- based parenting interventions result in little change in re-
flective functioning.72 Such findings raise the question of the extent to which mentalization 
in general is indeed the mechanism of change as anticipated by Fonagy, or whether further 
refinement might be needed in specifying and measuring how MBT is anticipated to work, 
perhaps with greater focus on indiscriminate uncertainty about mental states.
As evidence that the effectiveness of MBT is mediated by mentalization, Fonagy and col-
leagues have frequently referred to a trial of MBT for self- harming adolescents by Rossouw.73 
To measure mentalization, Rossouw and Fonagy used the ‘How I Feel’ Questionnaire, which 
is a self- report assessment of emotion regulation. Participants report on the frequency, inten-
sity, and control of feelings such as sadness, fear, and anger. It would be expectable that there 
would be shared variance between the ‘How I Feel’ Questionnaire with self- reported self- 
harm. For self- reported emotion regulation to partially mediate associations between treat-
ment and self- reported self- harm cannot be regarded as proof that mentalization mediated 
the effectiveness of the intervention. Furthermore, the model tested included self- reported 
attachment avoidance as an additional mediator, making the mediation by self- reported 
emotion regulation difficult to interpret with confidence. The researchers did not report 
whether scores on How I Feel mediated effects of the intervention on symptoms of BPD or 
on depression, though both were measured, and such tests were indicated by Rossouw’s own 
developmental model of mediating factors.74 The Rossouw study also has among the highest 
attrition rates of any trial of MBT published to date, and no assessment was made of whether 
participants who left the study differed from participants who remained in therapy to com-
pletion. Overall, the Rossouw study cannot be treated as evidence of the role of mentalizing 
in mediating the effects of MBT on outcomes. This should be regarded as still yet to be tested.
The potential for harm
One outstanding question faced by MBT is the potential for harm to patients stemming 
from the therapy— iatrogenesis. Fonagy and colleagues have been vocal about the potential 
for other treatment modalities to cause harm to patients. As we saw in Chapter 1, Fonagy 
had particular concern with the ways that classical psychoanalytic technique may at times 
actively contribute to problems with emotion modulation for patients with mentalizing 
difficulties.75 Fonagy and colleagues have in principle acknowledged the potential for iatro-
genesis in mentalization- based therapies. But this has generally been only with passing ref-
erences, and they have not developed these reflections into hypotheses for testing.76 The 
 72 Lo, C. K. and Wong, S. Y. (2020). ‘The effectiveness of parenting programs in regard to improving parental re-
flective functioning: A meta- analysis’. Attachment & Human Development, Early View.
 73 Rossouw, T. I. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization- Based Treatment for Self- Harm in 
Adolescents: A Randomized Controlled Trial’. Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 
51(12): 1304– 1313.
 74 Rossouw, T. I. (2012). Self- Harm in Young People: Randomised Control Trial Testing Mentalisation Based 
Treatment against Treatment As Usual. Unpublished MD thesis, London: University College London. Diagram 
2, p. 34.
 75 E.g. Fonagy, P. and Bateman, A. (2006). ‘Progress in the Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 188: 1– 3, p. 1.
 76 In papers from 1992 and 1994, Fonagy and colleagues acknowledged that improved capacities for mentalizing 
will allow an individual to ‘conceive of his world in new, sometimes sadder and sometimes happier ways’. Fonagy, 
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sole apparent exception to the lack of explicit hypothesis generation about the potential for 
iatrogenesis from MBT is a proposal from 2005 by Fonagy and Target. They stated that de-
clines in use of psychic equivalence lead to an ‘almost inevitable worsening of the patient’s 
symptoms’ so long as mentalizing skills remain weak, because the experience of personal co-
herence permitted by psychic equivalence is initially undermined.77 However, this hypoth-
esis has not been operationalized and tested, or even revisited. In part, this is likely to have 
been due to the available measures, which generally treat non- mentalizing as the opposite of 
mentalizing, and so are not able to characterize a state in which i) non- mentalizing has de-
clined but ii) mentalizing has yet to increase.78
Moving from consideration of theory to research findings, one empirical report sug-
gesting a price attached to mentalizing appeared in the Anna Freud Centre retrospective 
study (Chapter 2). Using the Adult Attachment Interview, the researchers found that ‘earned 
secure people may be reflective and functional, but they tend to be somewhat more vulnerable 
to depression than their unearned secure peers. The children who are most reflective about 
their families are also more worried about them.’79 Other results suggestive of iatrogenesis 
have started to accumulate. For instance, Suchman and colleagues found that strengths in 
mentalizing the self in substance- using mothers were positively associated with depression 
(r = .41). Strengths in mentalizing their child (r = .25) were also associated with depression.80 
The study was cross- sectional so it is difficult to interpret causality, but it may be hypothe-
sized that greater awareness of mental states is painful for substance- using parents. In an-
other study, Stacks and colleagues likewise found a positive association between mentalizing 
P., Moran, G. S., and Target, M. (1992). ‘Aggression and the Psychological Self ’. Bulletin of the Anna Freud Centre, 
15: 269– 284, p. 282. Repeated in Fonagy, P., Steele, M., Steele, H., Higgitt, A., and Target, M. (1994). ‘The Emanuel 
Miller Memorial Lecture 1992: The Theory and Practice of Resilience’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 
35(2): 231– 257, p. 251. Likewise, the phrase ‘mind reading may not be an unequivocally positive experience’ first 
appeared in Fonagy, P., Steele, H., Steele, M. and Holder, J. (1997). ‘Attachment and Theory of Mind: Overlapping 
Constructs?’. Association for Child Psychology and Psychiatry Occasional Papers, 14: 31– 40, p. 37. It then appeared 
in several subsequent papers. However, in none of these cases was the passing phrase elaborated. In a recent paper, 
Barbara Castro Batic and Daniel Hayes at UCL/ Anna Freud Centre have developed hypotheses for testing re-
garding potential mechanisms through which harm can occur to patients in talking therapies. However they do not 
attend to MBT specifically. Castro Batic, B., and Hayes, D. (2020). ‘Exploring harm in psychotherapy: Perspectives 
of clinicians working with children and young people’. Counselling and Psychotherapy Research, 20(4): 647– 656.
 77 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2005). ‘Some Reflections on the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalytic Therapy’, in J. 
Auerbach, K. Levy, and C. E. Shaffer (eds), Relatedness, Self- Definition and Mental Representation: Essays in Honor 
of Sidney J. Blatt, New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 191– 212, p. 207.
 78 A new measure would be able to test this hypothesis: Gagliardini, G., and Colli, A. (2019). ‘Assessing 
Mentalization: Development and Preliminary Validation of the Modes of Mentalization Scale’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 36(3): 249– 258.
 79 Target, M. (2008). ‘Commentary’, in F. N. Busch (ed.), Mentalization: Theoretical Considerations, Research 
Findings, and Clinical Implications (Psychoanalytic Inquiry Book Series, Volume 29), New York: Analytic Press, pp. 
261– 279, p. 277. See also Mark, I. L., IJzendoorn, M. H. V., and Bakermans‐Kranenburg, M. J. (2002). ‘Development 
of Empathy in Girls during the Second Year of Life: Associations with Parenting, Attachment, and Temperament’. 
Social Development, 11(4): 451– 468: ‘Radke- Yarrow et al. (Radke- Yarrow, Zahn- Waxler, Richardson, Susman, and 
Martinez, 1994) emphasized the importance of recognizing interacting influences of both parent and child. The re-
sults of their study with 24– 48- month- old children showed how important these interactions may be. The highest 
frequencies of empathic responses were from children with severely depressed mothers, problems of affect regu-
lation, and a secure attachment relationship with their mother, whereas children of well or less severely depressed 
mothers with secure attachment relationships and without problems of affect regulation scored neither extremely 
high nor extremely low. It might be that these middle scores were actually the more optimal scores, and that the 
very high scores of the children of severely depressed mothers reflected the caregiving behavior that children with 
disorganized attachments display as toddlers’ (p. 453).
 80 Suchman, N. E., DeCoste, C., Leigh, D., and Borelli, J. (2010). ‘Reflective Functioning in Mothers with 
Drug Use Disorders: Implications for Dyadic Interactions with Infants And Toddlers’. Attachment & Human 
Development, 12: 567– 585.
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scores and symptoms of depression among mothers with childhood maltreatment histories 
(r = .29).81 Such findings raise questions about whether MBT has the potential for iatrogenesis 
related to depression for patients with historic or concurrent vulnerabilities.
An obstacle to understanding the potential for iatrogenesis from MBT has been the mul-
tiple and diffuse ways in which the term ‘mentalizing’ has been used by Fonagy and col-
leagues. In light of the specifications in Chapter 4, passing remarks by Fonagy and colleagues 
may be drawn together to suggest that MBT has three potential bases for iatrogenesis. A first 
is the potential for mentalization to make individuals more open and vulnerable to harmful 
environments. This will be dealt with at length in the next chapter. A second potential basis 
for iatrogenesis has been the particular concern of Target, perhaps stemming from her re-
flections on the Anna Freud Centre Retrospective Study. For instance, Rizq and Target have 
expressed concern that ‘where high levels of RF [reflective functioning] tip over into anxious 
and depressive ruminations, they may unhelpfully sustain a preoccupation with the self, ra-
ther than with another’s experience and needs’. This ‘suggests that personal therapy for some 
may sponsor an unhelpful dwelling on inter and intra- personal dynamics.’82 Fonagy has 
agreed: ‘The idea of long- term deep introspection, of really studying your own mind, might 
be good for the training of therapists. Is it helpful for people with mental health problems? 
I think it probably does harm.’83 The notion of mentalization as a ‘focus’ on mental states ap-
pears in some definitions, particularly towards the end of the 2000s.84 However, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, focus on mental states— mind- mindedness— is perhaps best regarded as a poten-
tial correlate of mentalization, rather than a necessary element.
Fonagy and colleagues have acknowledged that mind- mindedness ‘is likely to be one of 
those parental attributes that is most adaptive in moderation’.85 The potential for improved 
mentalizing may prompt anxious and depressive ruminations, whether about the self or 
about others. This may be in the form of hypermentalization, in which the content of the 
ruminations is speculative. However, the rumination could just as well be grounded in ac-
curate attention to the specifics of present or past perceptual experience.86 The problem lies 
 81 Stacks, A. M., Muzik, M., Wong, K., Beeghly, M., Huth‐Bocks, A., Irwin, J. L., and Rosenblum, K. L. (2014). 
‘Maternal Reflective Functioning among Mothers with Childhood Maltreatment Histories: Links to Sensitive 
Parenting and Infant Attachment Security’. Attachment & Human Development, 16: 515– 533.
 82 Rizq, R. and Target, M. (2010). ‘If that’s what I need, it could be what someone else needs.’ Exploring the role 
of attachment and reflective function in counselling psychologists’ accounts of how they use personal therapy in 
clinical practice: a mixed methods study’. British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 38(4): 459– 481, p. 475.
 83 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy on Psychoanalysis and IAPT.’ The History of Emotions Blog, posted on 14 May 
by Jules Evans. Accessed at: https:// emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/ 2015/ 05/ peter- fonagy- on- psychoanalysis- 
and- iapt. See also Lucassen, N., Tharner, A., Prinzie, P., Verhulst, F. C., Jongerling, J., Bakermans‐Kranenburg, M. 
J., . . . and Tiemeier, H. (2018). ‘Paternal History of Depression or Anxiety Disorder and Infant– Father Attachment’. 
Infant and Child Development, 27(2): e2070: ‘Father’s history of depression or anxiety disorder was not signifi-
cantly related to infant– father attachment security in the total sample. Interestingly, daughters of fathers with a 
history of depression or anxiety had higher scores on attachment security than daughters of fathers without this 
diagnosis’ (p. 1); ‘A potential explanation for the unexpected direction of this effect is that fathers with a history of 
depression or anxiety might have developed better mentalizing capacities and are therefore better able to “read” 
their child’, potentially increased by experiences of psychotherapy’ (p. 7).
 84 E.g. Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2008). ‘Comorbid Antisocial and Borderline Personality 
Disorders: Mentalization‐Based Treatment’. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 64(2): 181– 194: ‘Mentalizing simply 
implies a focus on mental states in oneself or in others, particularly in explanations of behaviour’ (p. 182).
 85 Fonagy, P., Bateman, A. W., and Luyten, P. (2012). ‘Introduction and Overview’, in A. W. Bateman and P. 
Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Publishing, pp. 3– 42, p. 12.
 86 See e.g. Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, 
pp. 385– 418: ‘Alongside the major evolutionary advantages, there is a potential shadow side to mentalisation. 
First, self- awareness and self- consciousness bring with them social emotions such as embarrassment, shame, and 
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not in the inaccuracy of the mind- mindedness, but in the lack of the qualities of tentative-
ness and generative uncertainty, and in the ability to use mentalizing as a capacity, i.e. to turn 
it to simmer when it is not helpful.87 Within publications associated with MBT, Fonagy and 
colleagues offer guidance for responding to hypermentalizing and promoting mentalization. 
However, they do not attend to the potential for the mind- mindedness prompted by 
mentalization to contribute to realistic forms of rumination.
A third particular threat for iatrogenesis lies in the multiple uses of insight into motiv-
ations and intentions. In the early 2000s, Judy Dunn and colleagues had found that skills 
in social cognition were associated with heightened sensitivity to criticism among young 
children. Sutton and colleagues also documented strengths in social cognition among ring-
leader bullies.88 Citing these findings in a paper from 2006, Fonagy and Target observed that 
‘the possession of the capacity to mentalize is neither a guarantee that it will be used to serve 
pro- social ends, nor a guarantee of protection from malign interpersonal influence. The ac-
quisition of the capacity to mentalize may, for example, open the door to more malicious 
teasing, increase the individual’s sensitivity to relational aggression, or even mean that they 
take a lead in bullying others.’89 Though Fonagy and Target framed this as a concern about 
acquisition of the capacity to mentalize in general, in fact the research they are citing is about 
social cognition and theory of mind. The problem would appear to lie, not in mentalization 
in general, but specifically in the multiple uses of skills in interpreting the thoughts and feel-
ings of others.
Bateman and Fonagy reflected further on these matters in thinking about the delivery of 
MBT for patients with ASPD. They observed that ASPD can be associated with strengths in 
understanding the thoughts and motivations of others, despite difficulties in mentalizing 
the self, and particularly their own feelings.90 Bateman and Fonagy offered the conjecture 
that ‘the sacrifice of certain types of mentalizing frees up capacity for other domains to de-
velop’.91 This potential for trade- offs between cultivations of kinds of mentalization is im-
portant, though it has been masked by reification of mentalization as a unitary process, 
and inattention to the kinds of motivation and fantasy that prompt forms of mentalizing 
and non- mentalizing. Bateman and Fonagy encouraged the rebalancing of mentalization 
in cases where there have been trade- offs, but do not consider the specific potential for 
iatrogenesis when rebalancing proves challenging. They also do not consider the role of 
guilt . . . awareness of being unable to achieve one’s aspirations may lead to feelings of depression, loss, pain and fa-
tigue’ (p. 396).
 87 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Mentalizing Family Violence. Part 2: Techniques and Interventions’. Family 
Process, 56(1): 22– 44: ‘ “Effective” mentalizing is not the uninterrupted capacity to be reflective and to mentalize 
explicitly at all times: This would not only be completely unsustainable, but would also kill spontaneity. Instead, the 
aim of therapy is to establish mentalizing in a balanced way which involves all family members and adapts flexibly 
and creatively to the context as and when needed’ (p. 27).
 88 Cutting, A. L. and Dunn, J. (2002). ‘The Cost of Understanding Other People: Social Cognition Predicts 
Young Children’s Sensitivity to Criticism’. Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 43: 849– 860. Sutton, J., Smith, 
P. K., and Swettenham, J. (1999). ‘Social Cognition and Bullying: Social Inadequacy or Skilled Manipulation?’. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 17(3): 435– 450.
 89 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach to Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576, p. 559. The passage is then repeated in Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., and Target, M. 
(2007). ‘The Parent– Infant Dyad and the Construction of the Subjective Self ’. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 48(3– 4): 288– 328, p. 307.
 90 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 56.
 91 Ibid. 59.
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uncivilized motivations and fantasies in prompting mentalizing, and of beneficent motiv-
ations in prompting non- mentalizing.
There can be cases, then, where MBT may primarily serve to further facilitate under-
standing of the thoughts and motivations of others, honing existing skills in relational ag-
gression. A recent study by Gillespie, Kongerslev, Sharp, and colleagues has followed up 
on this concern. This work builds from Sharp’s previous collaboration with Fonagy on 
hypermentalizing in adolescents with BPD. Gillespie and colleagues conducted a study 
with 80 male adolescents incarcerated mostly for violent offences. They assessed partici-
pants’ ability to recognize emotions in others based on images of the eye region, intended 
as a measure of skills in mentalizing their display of feelings. Participants also completed 
questionnaire measures of aggression, psychopathic tendencies, and personality disorder. 
Success in identifying emotions from just the images of the eye region was associated with 
self- reported proactive aggression against others— but not reactive aggression— even con-
trolling for psychopathic tendencies. The authors theorized that, when an individual has 
weak access to, and knowledge of, their own feelings, they are likely to also ‘show problems 
in emotional resonance, that is, the ability to feel what another is feeling.’92 Despite previous 
reservations about the word (see Chapter 3), this capacity has recently been described by 
Bateman, Fonagy, and Campbell as ‘empathy’.93 Gillespie and colleagues argued that know-
ledge of the feelings of others can be used as a resource for relational aggression. The authors 
urged recognition that MBT may be actively harmful for patients with both conduct prob-
lems and psychopathic tendencies.94 A similar concern has been raised about MBT by other 
commentators, such as Crittenden and Landini.95
 92 Gillespie, S. M., Kongerslev, M. T., Sharp, C., Bo, S., and Abu- Akel, A. M. (2018). ‘Does Affective Theory of 
Mind Contribute to Proactive Aggression in Boys with Conduct Problems and Psychopathic Tendencies?’. Child 
Psychiatry & Human Development, 49(6): 906– 916, p. 912. cf. Davidsen, A. S. and Fosgerau, C. F. (2015). ‘Grasping 
the Process of Implicit Mentalization’. Theory & Psychology, 25(4): 434– 454.
 93 Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 323– 334, p. 337. For a valuable recent contribution to specifying the relationship be-
tween RF and empathy, see Borelli, J. L., Stern, J. A., Marvin, M. J., Smiley, P. A., Pettit, C., and Samudio, M. (2020). 
‘Reflective Functioning and Empathy among Mothers of School- Aged Children: Charting the Space between’. 
Emotion, Early View.
 94 The Gillespie paper, and other such efforts to address the potential harm of MBT with patients with his-
tories of relational aggression, remain hindered by problems in the conceptualization of affect within accounts 
of mentalizing. In particular, it remains unclear whether affective mentalizing refers to efforts to mentalize feel-
ings or the use of feelings in mentalizing. Additionally, the definitions of mentalizing considered in Chapter 4 
would appear— perhaps inadvertently— to exclude the use of feelings from the definition of mentalizing except 
insofar as they help individuals deploy, conceive of, or reconsider mental states; the use of emotional resonance to 
make sense of mental states is, currently, technically outside of the definition of mentalizing. An exception is the 
encompassing definition from Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘The Significance of the Development of Metacognitive Control 
over Mental Representations in Parenting and Infant Development’. Journal of Clinical Psychoanalysis, 5(1): 67– 
86: ‘The psychological processes underpinning the view of oneself and others as motivated by mental states’ (p. 74). 
However, what this definition gains in inclusiveness, it loses in precision, which is no doubt part of the reason it has 
been superseded over the decades.
 95 Crittenden, P. M. and Landini, A. (2011). Assessing Adult Attachment: A Dynamic- Maturational Approach to 
Discourse Analysis, New York: W. W. Norton & Company: ‘we are wary of encouraging very disturbed individuals 
[to] use mentalization for self- protective functions because this may concurrently endanger others’ (p. 39).
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Introduction
In the previous chapter, we described developments in mentalization- based therapy (MBT), 
as well as a few of its current attributes and salient outstanding questions. One set of ques-
tions that was left for this chapter was the relationship between individual mentalizing— and 
mentalizing- focused intervention— and the individual’s wider social and cultural ecology. 
This includes the matter of whether, in certain kinds of environment, improvement in 
mentalizing and/ or epistemic trust may be harmful. On a wider scale, critics have alleged 
that, in attempting to adapt to the individual- centric environment of contemporary health 
provision, MBT itself has been complicit with the atomization of society.1 Yet, in recent 
years, Fonagy and his collaborators have become increasingly critical of individual- centric 
modes of explanation, placing greater emphasis on the wider social system and the role of 
human interdependence in facilitating or hindering mentalization and mental health. These 
themes have been especially at the forefront recently during the 2020 and 2021 COVID- 19 
lockdowns.2 Fonagy has advocated specifically that ‘we must use the health catastrophe to 
drive social change’.3
The chapter begins by examining the growing attention to the social environment shown 
by Fonagy and colleagues, and especially their exploration of the role of friends and friend-
ships for mentalization and epistemic trust. We will then examine the reflections and 
research by Fonagy and collaborators on public mental health. The researchers’ hopes re-
garding school- based prevention will be given particular attention, and the chapter will 
also show how this work has shaped Fonagy’s efforts as a policy influencer. Finally, the 
chapter will appraise the considerations offered by Fonagy and colleagues of the role of cul-
ture, in particular the issue of whether attention to cultural processes should be regarded as 
mentalizing, non- mentalizing or as not mentalizing, and whether organizations and soci-
eties can themselves be said to institutionalize cultures of mentalizing or non- mentalizing.
Reflecting on his own autobiography, Fonagy has acknowledged that he would likely have 
committed suicide as an adolescent had it not been for the intervention of his neighbour, 
who helped him receive treatment from Anne Hurry (see Chapter 2). Conversations with 
his colleagues Peter Fuggle and Dickon Bevington at the Anna Freud Centre have also had 
a profound role in highlighting to Fonagy the importance of the wider social system around 
the individual. Fuggle and Bevington pioneered Adaptive Mentalization- Based Integrative 
Treatment (AMBIT), an approach to the delivery of supportive services concerned to 
 1 E.g. Rustin, M. (2015). ‘Psychotherapy in a Neoliberal World’. European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 
17(3): 225– 239.
 2 See Allison, L. (2020). ‘On Learning from Loss: Rereading ‘Mourning and Melancholia’. Accessed at: https:// 
www.ucl.ac.uk/ psychoanalysis/ learning- loss- rereading- mourning- and- melancholia; Fonagy, P. (2020). Tweet, 22 
March. Accessed at: https:// twitter.com/ peterfonagy/ status/ 1241676565387382786?s=11: ‘Current crisis shows 
just how dependent we are on each other.’
 3 Accessed at: https:// twitter.com/ peterfonagy/ status/ 1340576679077552129?s=11
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nurture the capacity of these services to sustain mentalizing and epistemic trust.4 The em-
phasis of Fuggle and Bevington on the organizational context of mentalizing has helped 
Fonagy to see that ‘mental health is a community responsibility’.5 In the 2019 edition of the 
Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Bateman and Fonagy have expressed 
their wish to ‘improve long- term outcomes in interpersonal function, a domain known to 
have only moderately good outcomes following MBT for BPD [borderline personality dis-
order]’.6 Elsewhere in the Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Fonagy and 
colleagues urged colleagues to recognize ‘the value of thinking about ways in which a social 
climate can be encouraged to become more mentalising’.7 And they closed their introduc-
tion to the volume by stating that ‘it is this wider social context of mentalising, and our 
human collective responsibility to support it, that will be at the core of mentalising endeav-
ours in the future’.8 Bevington and Fuggle have observed a coming transformation in the 
very conceptualization of mentalising, because ‘mentalising is increasingly understood less 
as an individual power or even as a dyadic transaction, and more as a social and contextually 
determined activity’.9 This transition in conceptualizing mentalizing may be supported by 
the Covid pandemic and lockdowns, which have highlighted the fundamental contribution 
of threats and supports in the social environment to mentalizing capacities.10
The social environment
In individual therapy, the patient may learn to drop epistemic vigilance and consider the 
personal relevance of interactions with the therapist. Fonagy and colleagues perceive that 
doing so is relatively unlikely to be harmful, because the therapist’s intentions are largely be-
nign and dependable, for all that the psychoanalytic unconscious may convey countervailing 
harmonics. The MBT therapist ‘consistently recognises the patient’s agency, focuses on the 
patient as an actor, and negotiates from the perspective of the patient’s self ’.11
 4 Bevington, D. and Fuggle, P. (2019). ‘AMBIT: Engaging the Client and Community of Minds’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: 
American Psychiatric Association, pp. 211– 228.
 5 Kirby, T. (2019). ‘Peter Fonagy— battling the enemy of loneliness’. The Lancet Psychiatry, 6(12): 987.
 6 Bateman, A., Unruh, B. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Individual Therapy Techniques’, in Anthony Bateman and 
Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 103– 116, p. 108.
 7 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C. and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 178.
 8 Bateman, A. and Fonagy. P. (2019). ‘Introduction’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 3– 20, 
p. 18. See also Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre: ‘When we consider the extensive evidence of the impact of parents’ 
and carers’ mental health on the mental health and wellbeing of children and young people and the influence of 
community and neighbourhood on both children and families, the narrow focus of most treatment approaches on 
individual dysfunction is surprising.’
 9 Bevington, D. and Fuggle, P. (2019). ‘AMBIT: Engaging the Client and Community of Minds’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: 
American Psychiatric Association, pp. 211– 228, p. 221. See also Jurist, E. and Sosa, M. P. (2019). ‘Commentary on 
Mentalization and Culture’. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 26(4): e12302 .
 10 Lassri, D. and Desatnik, A. (2020). ‘Losing and regaining reflective functioning in the times of COVID- 19: 
Clinical risks and opportunities from a mentalizing approach’. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, 
and Policy, 12(S1): S38.
 11 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C. and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 175.
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In group therapy, this is more challenging as the wishes and plans of others may not be 
benign or dependable, and individuals may feel unsafe with the group. This has been re-
ported as the most serious concern of patients undergoing MBT, especially those who at-
tended groups with rolling membership.12 Bateman and Fonagy have presumed that, if well 
handled by the therapist, vulnerability and willingness to learn in the group context should 
not be harmful. In fact, they have argued that overcoming the challenges to mentalizing and 
epistemic trust in this potentially turbulent context will have additional benefit beyond that 
available from individual therapy: ‘the power of group therapy [lies in its potential] to stimu-
late the capacity of the patient to manage anxiety within highly charged circumstances while 
maintaining mentalising. It is in the group that patients can truly balance emotional states 
evoked in a complex situation and their ability to continue mentalising.’13 However, the dif-
ference in efficacy between individual and individual + group MBT has yet to be tested, 
and some patients report that they regard the group therapy as lacking benefit for them.14 
Inderhaug and Karterud, and Folmo and colleagues, have also cautioned that Bateman and 
Fonagy may be over- optimistic about the capacity of the group therapist to achieve a safe and 
constructive group atmosphere.15 Karterud has reported findings that patients who began 
MBT with low reflective functioning scores on the Adult Attachment Interview responded 
especially well to individual therapy and especially poorly to group- based therapy.16
In contrast to both individual and (perhaps) group therapy, in which a certain safety can 
be ensured, Bateman and Fonagy acknowledged that the patient’s wider life outside therapy 
may well be characterized by danger and chaos— and is very likely to remain so at the end 
of MBT.17 This may include interactions with state services in which professionals appear 
far from benign or dependable.18 Allison has described how this may play out in the case of 
homelessness:
Many people who have chronic or repeat experiences of homelessness report traumatic 
childhood experiences such as abuse, neglect, bullying, witnessing alcoholism, or domestic 
violence. These difficult beginnings can leave them profoundly mistrustful of others. Not 
surprisingly, then, they are also often mistrustful of services and may refuse to engage or 
struggle to remain engaged, especially if the help on offer comes with rigid conditions 
 12 Lonargáin, D. Ó., Hodge, S., and Line, R. (2017). ‘Service User Experiences of Mentalisation- Based Treatment 
for Borderline Personality Disorder’. Mental Health Review Journal, 22(1): 16– 27.
 13 E.g. Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A 
Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 156.
 14 Lonargáin, D. Ó., Hodge, S., and Line, R. (2017). ‘Service User Experiences of Mentalisation- Based Treatment 
for Borderline Personality Disorder’. Mental Health Review Journal, 22(1): 16– 27: ‘Most participants described 
wanting individual sessions only and some did not see the purpose of group MBT’ (p. 19).
 15 Inderhaug, T. S. and Karterud, S. (2015). ‘A Qualitative Study of a Mentalization- Based Group for Borderline 
Patients’. Group Analysis, 48(2): 150– 163. See also Folmo, E. J., Karterud, S. W., Kongerslev, M. T., Kvarstein, E. H., 
and Stänicke, E. (2019). ‘Battles of the Comfort Zone: Modelling Therapeutic Strategy, Alliance, and Epistemic 
Trust— A Qualitative Study of Mentalization- Based Therapy for Borderline Personality Disorder’. Journal of 
Contemporary Psychotherapy, 49(3): 141– 151.
 16 Karterud, S. (2011). ‘Constructing and Mentalizing the Matrix’. Group Analysis, 44(4): 357– 373, p. 383.
 17 Allison and Campbell warn against any assumption that socio- economic adversity will necessarily entail 
benefits to epistemic distrust. Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of 
Sustainable Development, London: Anna Freud Centre: ‘it is important not to make simplistic assumptions about 
the quality of relationships implied by socio economic disadvantage. There is evidence that individuals who are 
less socio economically privileged tend to behave in more community and socially oriented ways in interper-
sonal trust experiments than more affluent individuals (Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015)’, citing Dubois, D., 
Rucker, D. D., and Galinsky, A. D. (2015). ‘Social Class, Power, and Selfishness: When and Why Upper and Lower 
Class Individuals Behave Unethically’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108(3): 436– 449.
 18 Mason, C., Taggart, D., and Broadhurst, K. (2020). ‘Parental Non- Engagement within Child Protection 
Services— How Can Understandings of Complex Trauma and Epistemic Trust Help?’. Societies, 10(4): 93.
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attached. When they do try to get help and the attempt backfires, this further undermines 
their trust in the people around them.19
In fact, the interaction between current adversities and mentalizing difficulties may be suffi-
ciently intense that this intrudes on psychotherapy. Therapists may be drawn in to the non- 
mentalizing dynamics of the wider social system, even as they try their best to help: ‘the 
practitioner becomes embedded within the client’s social survival mechanism and this sur-
vival mechanism tends to work to destroy balanced mentalizing’.20
Fonagy and colleagues fully accept that in an environment where others’ wishes and plans 
are not benign or dependable, epistemic vigilance is entirely appropriate.21 When therapy 
leads epistemic vigilance to be lowered without discrimination, a deterioration in the 
patient’s mental health can be expected.22 The idea that a patient’s capacity and willingness 
to learn from experience is responsive to the qualities and dependability of their social en-
vironment had been a long- standing tenant of the Anna Freudian tradition for child psycho-
analysis (see Chapter 7). It was anticipated that psychoanalysts would work collaboratively 
with parents to make the child’s home environment feel secure and safe enough to facilitate 
the adoption by the child of new forms of adaptation.23 As a rule, children are generally 
more responsive to social environments than adults.24 Nonetheless, Fonagy and colleagues 
have increasingly perceived that for adults, too, the environment needs to be secure and safe 
enough for epistemic trust to be appropriate.
This was, in fact, already recognized by Fonagy back in 2003: ‘individual therapy, while 
prototypical of the process of rekindling mentalization, may not cut it on its own. It is in 
the shared communally constructed creation of mind, in the patient- therapist dyad, in the 
family, in the psychotherapy group, in the multidisciplinary team, or in the organization of 
the entire treatment.’25 However, in the early 2000s, Fonagy had no conceptual model avail-
able for thinking about the communally constructed creation of mind, so this point was not 
elaborated. In recent years, though, the concept of epistemic trust has been drawn upon for 
considering how an individual can benefit from their communities. Fonagy and colleagues 
 19 Allison, E. (2015). ‘Epistemic Trust: A New Perspective on the Barriers to Change in Chronic and Repeat 
Homelessness’, in What Works: Rethinking Hopelessness, Cobham, UK: Berkeley Foundation, p. 9. Accessed 
at: https:// www.berkeleyfoundation.org.uk/ media/ pdf/ r/ r/ Rethinking_ Homelessness.pdf. Some analogues can 
be drawn, in some cases, with the experiences of state services among refugees. See the remarks by Fonagy in 
Novikova, M. (2019). ‘Can a Form of Therapy Focused on Understanding the Mental State of Others Help Refugees 
in the UK?’, Guardian, 21 June. Accessed at: https:// www.theguardian.com/ the- guardian- foundation/ 2019/ jun/ 
21/ how- to- make- integration- mutual.
 20 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, 
London: Anna Freud Centre.
 21 See also Sperber, D., Clément, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., and Wilson, D. (2010). 
‘Epistemic Vigilance’. Mind & Language, 25(4): 359– 393.
 22 Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is Truth Relevant?’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303: ‘If the 
truth that the lifting of epistemic hypervigilance uncovers is unremitting hostility and the absence of benign influ-
ence, the recovery of epistemic trust through therapy will generate no lasting improvement and may even lead to 
deterioration’ (p. 295).
 23 Fonagy, P., Bleiberg, E., and Target, M. (1997). ‘Child Psychoanalysis: Critical Overview and a Proposed 
Reconsideration’. Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 6: 1– 38.
 24 Fonagy, P. and Sharp, C. (2008). ‘Treatment Outcome of Childhood Disorders: The Perspective of Social 
Cognition’, in C. Sharp, P. Fonagy, and I. Goodyer (eds), Social Cognition and Developmental Psychopathology, 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 411– 470: ‘Interventions in young children draw their effectiveness from 
the parent’s influence on social cognition, while in middle childhood a combination of problem- solving and 
parent training might be most effective. By adolescence, social cognitive patterns are so well established that only a 
combination of a number of systems is likely to shift the young person’s social cognitive stance’ (p. 446).
 25 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Clinical Implications of Attachment and Mentalization: Efforts to Preserve the Mind in 
Contemporary treatment. Epilogue’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 67: 271– 280, p. 277.
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have claimed that epistemic trust will have most benefit for patients if it is accompanied by 
the capacity to form and make use of stable relationships beyond therapy. And vice versa. 
Allison and Fonagy have concluded that, in successful MBT, it is the ‘evolutionary capacity 
for learning from a social situation that is rekindled’, and within this, ‘learning who one can be 
friends with is key’.26 Or, as Fonagy, Luyten, Allison, and Campbell have argued: ‘Enhanced 
mentalizing allows the patient to achieve improved social relationships and recognize who 
is a reliable and trustworthy source of information— that is, who one can “be friends with”.27 
Signalling its importance, this phrase is repeated verbatim in the Handbook of Mentalising in 
Mental Health Practice.28
The concept of the ‘friend’ is a long- standing, if subtextual, concern in Fonagy’s writings. As 
we saw in Chapter 1, he has repeatedly recalled the importance of a lack of any friends among 
the conditions that contributed to his feelings of depression and suicidality as an adolescent, 
and that led him into therapy with Anne Hurry. The theme of the ‘friend’ in Fonagy’s academic 
writings first appeared in his 1992 tribute to George Moran, where he described how much of 
both personal and professional relevance he had gained from the friendship.29 The friendship 
was deeply felt: when Moran was dying, Fonagy took sabbatical leave from work to provide care 
and support.30 On assuming the position of director of the Anna Freud Centre, Fonagy empha-
sized the influence on his work of his ‘very special friendship’ with Moran.31 Fonagy’s descrip-
tions of the intellectual aspects of the friendship resonate with the ideas of the anthropologist Ed 
Hutchins regarding ‘distributed cognition’ (see Chapter 7), in which certain thoughts or insights 
are possible thanks to the properties emergent within an interaction, rather than solely as the 
sum of the cognitive properties of the members of that interaction. For Fonagy, his weekly con-
versations with Moran about their clinical work, which they called the ‘Saturday club’, provided 
scaffolding for reflection.32 The conversations brought together the tradition of Anna Freudian 
psychoanalysis, the problem of insulin control of diabetic patients, the expectation of regular fu-
ture conversation— among other factors— to form a semi- autonomous ecology for supporting 
thinking that could not have been achieved individually.
In Fonagy’s subsequent thinking, friendships were treated as something rather special. 
Even when other relationships lack the potential for playfulness, or are hindered by conflict 
or forms of non- mentalizing interaction, friendships carve out space for their own semi- 
autonomous functioning.33 Indeed, Fonagy has collaborated on innovative longitudinal 
 26 Allison, E. and Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘When is Truth Relevant?’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 85(2): 275– 303, pp. 
295– 296.
 27 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9. Bateman and Fonagy have also proposed that 
‘perhaps the most important factor’ holding back temporary failures of mentalizing from doing harm are ‘the nor-
mally corrective response of the other person with whom one is interacting’. Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). 
Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 125.
 28 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C. and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 176.
 29 Fonagy, P., Moran, G. S., and Target, M. (1992). ‘Aggression and the Psychological Self ’. Bulletin of the Anna 
Freud Centre, 15: 269– 284, p. 269.
 30 Personal communication, Peter Fonagy, December 2019.
 31 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Anna Freud Centre: About the Directors’. Originally at https:// www.annafreudcentre.
org/ fonagy.htm. Accessed at: https:// web.archive.org/ web/ 20060925220711/ .
 32 Ezrati, O. (2014). ‘Freud Off: Giving New Meaning to Psychoanalysis’. Haaretz, 5 April. Accessed at: https:// 
www.haaretz.com/ life/ books/ .premium- giving- new- meaning- to- psychoanalysis- 1.5243899.
 33 A few years later, in 1997, Fonagy highlighted Dunn’s findings that ‘individual differences found in pre-
tend play, management of conflict, and talking about mental states are not correlated between social situations 
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work led by van Harmelen examining longitudinal predictors of the degree to which an in-
dividual functions better or worse than expected in adulthood, given their early childhood 
family experiences. Van Harmelen and colleagues found that, in the context of adverse ex-
periences of early care, positive adolescent friendships predict resilience in adulthood better 
than do positive family relationships in adolescence.34 Fonagy has elsewhere also acknow-
ledged that the capacity to trust in friendships in adolescence and afterwards is certainly 
shaped by family relationships.35 Nonetheless, for Fonagy, the true friend is someone who 
creates a social environment within which epistemic vigilance can be dropped, even if epi-
stemic vigilance must be retained in other contexts. This can entail shared non- mentalizing, 
as in shared pretend mode with its attendant potential benefits and problems. However, the 
fall of epistemic vigilance can also make possible access to the minds of others as a source of 
personal learning and development, in acknowledgement of the limits of our current under-
standing of ourselves and the world.36
Fonagy’s awareness of the debt we can have to friends for learning and development, as 
well as for remaining mentally well, has perhaps shaped his unusual diligence in writing de-
tailed, loving obituaries and tributes for late friends and colleagues over his career. It is diffi-
cult to think of any other major research psychologist who, across their career and not just in 
retirement, has written so many obituaries. Fonagy has also frequently described the benefit 
and pleasure he has gained from thinking and writing with academic friends in pursuing 
collaborative work.37 At a more general level, Fonagy and colleagues have repeatedly stated, 
based on their experiences, that a clinician’s capacity to mentalize is sustained or under-
mined by the support they receive to do so from supervision, colleagues, and from wider 
(mother, siblings, close friend)’. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (1997). ‘Attachment and Reflective Function: Their Role 
in Self- Organization’. Development and Psychopathology, 9(4): 679– 700, p. 689. The implication is that the rela-
tional supports for mentalizing are relatively independent across these different relational forms. See also Chefetz, 
R. A. (2013). ‘A Fluctuating Capacity to Mentalize: Affect Scripts and Self- State Systems as (not so) “Strange 
Attractors”: A Discussion of Margy Sperry’s “Putting our Heads Together: Mentalizing Systems”’. Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, 23(6): 708– 714.
 34 Van Harmelen, A. L., Kievit, R. A., Ioannidis, K., Neufeld, S., Jones, P. B., Bullmore, E., . . . and NSPN 
Consortium. (2017). ‘Adolescent Friendships Predict Later Resilient Functioning across Psychosocial Domains in 
a Healthy Community Cohort’. Psychological Medicine, 47(13): 2312– 2322.
 35 E.g. Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘The Future Prospects of Mentalization Based Therapies’, 5th International Congress 
of Mentalisation Based Treatments, Haarlem, The Netherlands, 22 November: ‘Close family networks are max-
imally beneficial in childhood but only if they later transition to more diverse varied (large) or family and friend 
(mixed) networks. Supportive family relationships in childhood provide a secure base from which to later diversify 
social networks’, citing Manalel, J. A. and Antonucci, T. C. (2020). ‘Beyond the Nuclear Family: Children’s Social 
Networks and Depressive Symptomology’. Child Development, 91(4): 1302– 1316. See also Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘The 
Transgenerational Transmission of Holocaust Trauma’. Attachment & Human Development, 1(1): 92– 114: ‘Glen’s 
material contained many ideas from the Holocaust; he appeared to experience these as his own, notwithstanding 
the distance of two generations. We have noted the profound impact of the film Schindler’s List on his fantasies, as 
well as his paranoid anxieties of persecution. Perhaps even more relevant, his thinking was permeated by specific 
images which we can trace to his grandmother’s experiences, as probably imagined by his mother. In this category 
I would include: his cruel work regime, used to obliterate psychic reality; his terror of being mocked or humiliated 
by those he considered his friends’ (p. 105).
 36 There are significant alignments between Fonagy’s discussion of the figure of the friend and the proposals 
of Gadamer. See Gadamer, H. G. ([1985] 1999). ‘Friendship and Self- Knowledge: Reflections on the Role of 
Friendship in Greek Ethics’, in Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics, trans. Joel Weinsheimer, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
 37 E.g. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2006). ‘The Mentalization- Focused Approach to Self Pathology’. Journal of 
Personality Disorders, 20: 544– 576: ‘The work summarised in this paper is the result of a collaborative effort of a 
group of wonderfully talented individuals who have honoured the author with their friendship over the past years.’ 
George Moran, György Gergely, Miriam and Howard Steele, Helen Stein, John Allen, Efrain Bleiberg, Anthony 
Bateman, and Liz Allison are listed (p. 544).
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institution systems and their organizational cultures.38 The clinician needs support if he or 
she is to face down the ‘hours of sometimes immensely painful analytic listening, toleration 
of distress and uncertainty, and moments of almost indescribable emptiness’.39
Fonagy and colleagues have highlighted the contribution of friends to emotion regulation 
and mentalizing, for good or for ill. For instance, Fonagy and Luyten have drawn attention 
to a prospective study by Crick and colleagues that showed that ‘the best predictors of BPD 
features from fourth to sixth grade were indicators of social dysfunction such as friend exclu-
sivity (overly close relationship with friend), relational aggression (impulsivity), and cognitive 
sensitivity (hostile, untrusting paranoid world view).’40 Fonagy and Luyten theorized that dif-
ficulties in social relationships can set off cascades of contributors to mental health difficulties, 
such as reciprocal relationships between non- mentalizing and difficulties with affect modula-
tion.41 By contrast, more positively, Twemlow, Fonagy, and colleagues were interested that their 
mentalization- based intervention in schools (see below) had a very large effect on children’s 
reports of being able to form and make use of school- based friendships. The number of chil-
dren who said that they found making friends easy doubled following the intervention, from 
30% to 60% of pupils; the number willing and able to make friends with pupils of a different 
race increased from 30% to 50%.42 Such findings suggest important links between friendships 
and epistemic trust. Yet a concern with these two matters is not currently a priority in many 
therapeutic modalities. For instance, neither is a special priority within child psychoanalysis. 
In the Anna Freud Centre retrospective study follow- up, Fonagy and Target found that former 
patients at the Centre reported more difficulties forming and making use of friendships than 
their non- treated siblings.43 Fonagy and colleagues have also criticized the excessive focus on 
clinical indicators in evaluating the effectiveness of mental health interventions, to the neglect 
of day- to- day functioning and the capacity to form supportive friendships.44 This is contrary to 
research on what patients themselves report wanting from therapy.45
 38 E.g. Bevington, D., Fuggle, P., Cracknell, L. and Fonagy, P. (2017). Adaptive Mentalisation- Based Integrative 
Treatment: A Guide for Teams to Develop Systems of Care, Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Helping interventions 
(of whatever orientation or model) are situated within at least three interconnected systems: the family/ care set-
ting, the intervening team, and the wider welfare and educational network. For the worker, one key challenge is to 
continue working effectively when the interconnected systems create unintended contradictions or negative feed-
back patterns (what we describe as “dis- integration”)’ (p. 23).
 39 Fonagy, P. (1996). ‘Commentaries’. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 44: 404– 422, p. 408.
 40 Fonagy, P. and Luyten, P. (2009). ‘A Developmental, Mentalization- Based Approach to the Understanding 
and Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder’. Development and Psychopathology, 21(4): 1355– 1381, p. 1356. 
Discussing Crick, N. R., Murray- Close, D., and Woods, K. (2005). ‘Borderline Personality Features in Childhood: A 
Short- Term Longitudinal Study’. Development and Psychopathology, 17(4): 1051– 1070.
 41 Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lemma, A., and Target, M. (2012). ‘Depression’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), 
Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 385– 
418, p. 402.
 42 Twemlow, S. W., Fonagy, P., Sacco, F. C., Vernberg, E., and Malcom, J. M. (2011). ‘Reducing Violence and 
Prejudice in a Jamaican All Age School Using Attachment and Mentalization Theory’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 
28: 497– 511, p. 508.
 43 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘The History and Current Status of Outcome Research at the Anna Freud 
Centre’. The Psychoanalytic Study of The Child, 57(1): 27– 60, p. 48.
 44 E.g. Barlow, J., Barnes, J., Sylva, K., Fonagy, P., and Fearon, P. (2016). ‘Questioning the Outcome of the Building 
Blocks Trial’. Lancet, 387(10028): 1615– 1616.
 45 E.g. Katsakou, C., Marougka, S., Barnicot, K., Savill, M., White, H., Lockwood, K., and Priebe, S. (2012). 
‘Recovery in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD): A Qualitative Study of Service Users’ Perspectives’. PloS One, 
7(5): e36517; Katsakou, C. and Pistrang, N. (2018). ‘Clients’ Experiences of Treatment and Recovery in Borderline 
Personality Disorder: A Meta- Synthesis of Qualitative Studies’. Psychotherapy Research, 28(6): 940– 957. See also 
Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘The Changing Shape of Clinical Practice: Driven by Science or by Pragmatics?’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy, 24(1): 22– 43: ‘From a professional’s standpoint, as from that of the ordinary member of the public, 
physical role limitation, physical function and pain have high priority, while those suffering disorders rate dig-
nity and general wellbeing (mood, global assessment of life, having a partner, job, lots of social contact) as more 
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Fonagy has stated that he has often reflected on what constitutes the difference between 
a professional and a friend, reflections that appear to have influenced the injunction in 
the manual that the therapist should avoid posturing in ways that signal their expertise.46 
Bateman and Fonagy have argued that an MBT therapist should ‘first engage in the process 
of “being ordinary” . . . If in doubt, say to the patient what you would say to a good friend 
if he/ she was telling you the same story while sitting in a cafe and you wanted to transmit 
a sense that you were “getting” their emotional state.’47 The relationship with the therapist 
models the ordinary opportunities friendships provide for recognizing ostensive cues, and 
for gaining skills and confidence in deploying mentalizing and epistemic trust:
Meaningful change is thus possible only if the person can use their social environment 
in a positive way (and if the social environment is sufficiently supportive to allow this to 
happen). For this to happen, recognition of self- agency is key, and this recognition is best 
achieved through the ostensive cues that are provided by feeling appropriately mentalised 
by another person.48
However, the therapeutic context is not only a model for forming and making good use of 
friendships. It also provides a space in which the patient can reflect on and appraise their 
social interactions. It seeks to help the patient consider how to use mentalization and drop 
epistemic vigilance in discriminate ways, appropriate to the opportunities and threats of the 
environment.49 The most effective treatment, Fonagy has argued, is one that ‘enables the in-
dividual to access and support, find inspiration and consolation, from a whole range of other 
people’.50 However, both inspiration and consolation entail the discrimination of appropriate 
occasions for mentalization and epistemic trust.
In the 2016 MBT manual, Bateman and Fonagy encouraged therapists to act as an advo-
cate for the patient with other services: ‘MBT recommends that early in therapy the patient’s 
social context is stabilized. Change will be impossible if housing, financial, employment, 
important. Wellbeing should feature at least alongside, if not in place of, lists of symptoms in outcome studies 
(Pressman and Cohen, 2005)’ (p. 34).
 46 Fonagy, P. (1998). ‘Prevention, the Appropriate Target of Infant Psychotherapy’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 
19(2): 124– 150: ‘On a personal note, I have to confess to having often felt uneasy about the mixture of roles and 
moralities involved in a psychotherapeutic relationship (friend and helper on the one hand, professional and ex-
pert on the other)’ (p. 131).
 47 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 242. This prioritization of ordinariness follows very much 
along the same lines as Bion, who would tell patients at the start of therapy, ‘this is just an ordinary conversa-
tion about a very delimited range of experience— namely your emotional experience— and what happens to you 
if you cannot have emotional experience’. Culbert‐Koehn, J. (2011). ‘An Analysis with Bion: An Interview with 
James Gooch’. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 56(1): 76– 91, p. 82. On the ‘ordinary’ as a rich and complex re-
source for interaction, see Cavell, S. (1994). In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 48 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 35.
 49 Ibid.: ‘We suggest that successful treatments all involve three essential systems of communication relating to 
epistemic trust . . . Communication system 1: communication of therapeutic model- based content . . . Serves as an 
ostensive cue that increases the patient’s epistemic trust and thus acts as a catalyst for therapeutic success (“thera-
peutic alliance by any other name”). Communication system 2: mentalising as a common factor: the therapeutic 
setting serves to increase the patient’s mentalising. Communication system 3: social learning in the context of epi-
stemic trust: The patient applies his/ her restored mentalising in the wider (social) environment, which reinforces 
and builds upon what he/ she has learned in therapy’ (p. 28).
 50 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘We have Hard Choices to Make on Children’s Mental Health’. Huffington Post, 10 October. 
Accessed at: http:// www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ peter- fonagy/ world- mental- health- day_ b_ 12429138.html.
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probation and other stresses are dominant. The MBT clinician is an active advocate for the 
patient’s link to the wider social system.’51 There seems a clear turn in the past few years 
in accounts of MBT towards depictions of an active role of the clinician in supporting the 
patient to end harmful relationships, build on and nurture friendships that appear more 
beneficial, stabilize their living conditions, and other strategies to improve the social envir-
onment outside of therapy.52 Fonagy and Allison have put forward the empirical prediction 
that ‘psychotherapy for BPD is much more likely to succeed if the individual’s social environ-
ment at the time of treatment is largely benign. Although we do not know of any systematic 
studies that have explored this moderator.’53 They have urged further work to address this 
question.54
Prevention and public mental health
One way in which the importance of social context has been registered in the work of 
Fonagy and colleagues over the years has been in their considerations of prevention and 
public mental health. The role of poverty, discrimination, and other social adversities and 
forms of oppression have long been registered as powerful contributors to mental illness.55 
However, through the 1990s and early 2000s, the primary answer Fonagy and collaborators 
offered to these factors was to situate individual regulatory capacities as potential buffers 
for the effects of adversity. This reflected and responded to the growing focus on individual 
self- management, rather than collective solutions to social problems, in culture and policy 
more generally in these decades (Chapter 2). In their 2002 paper, ‘Early Intervention and 
the Development of Self- Regulation’, Fonagy and Target offered their view that there were 
no ‘effective models of intervention’ to address these society- wide factors. In the context of 
apparent fatalism about social change, they instead advocated a ‘move toward person vari-
ables that were of particular importance in making an individual vulnerable to risk’. A survey 
of such potential variables led them to conclude that ‘self- regulation is currently the most 
promising candidate’.56 Fonagy and Higgitt would later re- state the point, emphasizing the 
importance of childhood as a period in which self- regulation capacities are developed:
It does not necessarily follow that social causes have social solutions; aspirin will relieve 
a headache even if the cause is poverty. Thus, it is likely that an understanding of the 
 51 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical 
Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 34.
 52 E.g. Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder in Community and 
Prison Settings’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice 
(2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 335– 349.
 53 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2014). ‘The Role of Mentalizing and Epistemic Trust in the Therapeutic 
Relationship’. Psychotherapy, 51(3): 372– 380, p. 379.
 54 One step in this direction was undertaken by Bateman and Fonagy who developed a mentalisation- based 
intervention for families of people with BPD. Bateman, A. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘A Randomized Controlled Trial 
of a Mentalization- Based Intervention (MBT- FACTS) for Families of People with Borderline Personality Disorder’. 
Personality Disorders, 10(1): 70– 79.
 55 E.g. Fonagy, P., and Higgitt, A. (2000). ‘Early Influences on Development and Social Inequalities: An 
Attachment Theory Perspective’, in A. R. Tarlov and R. F. S. Peter (eds.), The Society and Population Health Reader, 
Volume 2: A state and community perspective, New York: New Press, pp. 104– 130; Murphy, M. and Fonagy, P. 
(2013). ‘Mental Health Problems in Children and Young People’, in Department of Health, Our Children Deserve 
Better, Prevention Pays: Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer (Chapter 10), London: Department of Health.
 56 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘Early Intervention and the Development of Self- Regulation’. Psychoanalytic 
Inquiry, 22(3): 307– 335, pp. 312– 313.
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pathways of health inequalities will offer the possibility of policies that might directly con-
tribute to addressing social inequalities in health. Social engineering is unlikely to be a vi-
able way to address the social gradient problem. The essence of prevention is to find a point 
along a causal path that allows the possibility of cost- effective psychosocial manipulation 
and intervention. This implies intervention in childhood and finding those who are ‘hard 
to reach’.57
In a pair of papers from 2004, Fonagy argued that public resources are limited, and so need 
to be targeted carefully. He argued in favour of directing resources towards prevention, espe-
cially towards support for families with young children— for instance, through intensive pre- 
natal mental health screening.58 When prevention fails, he proposed that services should 
prioritize those with biomarkers and family history suggestive of risk of mental health issues. 
This would include even the use of biomarkers rather than children’s behaviour in screening 
for child abuse, and the targeting of interventions for child maltreatment to those children 
with biomarkers indicative of greater responsiveness to intervention.59 Yet, over the past 
15 years, it would appear that Fonagy’s stance has shifted. He has argued against his earlier 
stance that resources, and even child protection services, should be targeted on the basis of 
biomarkers and family history, perhaps due to reservations about the moral implications of 
such a position. Instead, he has proposed that differences in biomarkers and family history— 
much like differences in symptom profiles— may indicate groups who would benefit from 
different kinds of intervention when they show poor mental health and seek help.60
Fonagy has also qualified his earlier rather exclusive focus on individual self- regulation 
as the point that permits cost- effective psychosocial manipulation and intervention. He has 
stated in interview his view that ‘We should be looking at how we can work toward a more 
equal distribution of wealth, and in some ways try to prevent the extant inequalities from 
affecting future generations’61— but he has not advocated this position loudly or promin-
ently. There is a sense in which Fonagy appears to remain pessimistic about the possibilities 
of social change, and of the evidence base for society- level interventions. This may be linked 
to the realist thread in his theorizing, which sees little value in optimism that change will be 
successful in the absence of supporting evidence and a practical delineation of intervention 
 57 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The Early Social and Emotional Determinants of Inequalities in Health’, 
in G. Baruch, P. Fonagy, and D. Robins (eds), Reaching the Hard to Reach: Evidence- Based Funding Priorities for 
Intervention and Research, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3– 34, p. 4.
 58 Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2004). ‘Early Mental Health Intervention and Prevention: The Implications for 
Government and the Wider Community’, in B. Sklarew, S. W. Twemlow, and S. M. Wilkinson (eds), Analysts in the 
Trenches: Streets, Schools, War Zones, Mahwah, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 257– 309.: ‘Prenatal screening should in-
clude a prenatal assessment of mental health so that appropriate psychological or medical interventions can begin 
at this time’ (p. 267).
 59 Fonagy, P. (2004). ‘Psychotherapy Meets Neuroscience: A More Focused Future for Psychotherapy Research’. 
The Psychiatrist, 28(10): 357– 359: ‘Knowing that in individuals with the S/ S genotype severe maltreatment doubles 
the probability of major depressive disorder (to over 60% from 30% for those with the genotype) helps us to focus 
interventions on childhood maltreatment for the first group to a greater extent than for the L/ L group’ (p. 358). 
Fonagy, P. (2007). ‘My Brain Mapper’. Accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ news/ 2007/ may/ ucl- news- my- brain- 
mapper: ‘By using brain scans, rather than studying how children behave, we will be able to spot those who are in 
greatest need of intervention.’
 60 Fonagy, P. (2010). ‘The Changing Shape of Clinical Practice: Driven by Science or by Pragmatics?’. 
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 24(1): 22– 43: ‘The moral here is not that psychotherapy should not be offered 
to people without this or that allele, but rather that the mechanism by which therapy achieves its effect may be 
quite different for these constitutionally distinguishable groups of individuals’ (pp. 37– 38). See also Bakermans- 
Kranenburg, M. J., and van Ijzendoorn, M. H. (2011). ‘Differential Susceptibility to Rearing Environment 
Depending on Dopamine- Related Genes: New Evidence and a Meta- Analysis’. Development and Psychopathology, 
23(1): 39– 52.
 61 Jurist, E. L. (2010). ‘Elliot Jurist Interviews Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 27(1): 2– 7: p. 5.
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mechanisms (see Chapter 1). It may reflect Fonagy’s decades of work as a psychoanalyst. 
Fonagy has himself acknowledged that the consulting room context of individual analysis 
can contribute to making individual problems and individual solutions most salient.62 The 
consulting room is a sequestered space a): in which the therapist and client can be concerned 
with mental states, b) in which the practical fall- out of mistakes about mental states is con-
strained and not fatal for the interaction, and c) such mistakes can themselves be attended 
to. Originally psychoanalysis, and subsequently MBT, have been facilitated by the consulting 
room as this sequestered space.63 Indeed, it facilitates the claim that mentalization is the ac-
tive ingredient in all good therapy, and as ‘common ground’ between modalities.64 However, 
the sequestration also has consequences for what thoughts or feelings seem salient.
Fonagy’s continued pessimism regarding social change may also, following Bollas, be re-
garded as influenced by the wider societal focus on individual responsibility for thoughts 
and feelings, which to a certain extent Fonagy’s work reflects and to which it responds (see 
Chapter 2). It should be emphasized, however, that there is no intrinsic link between the 
theory of mentalization and a focus on individual solutions to social problems or fatalism re-
garding social change. For instance, Dickon Bevington, medical director at the Anna Freud 
Centre, is politically outspoken on issues of social justice.65
By contrast, an increasing attention to the social context has led Fonagy to seek to examine 
how ‘socially excluded groups such as LGBT individuals, asylum seekers, and those from 
poorer backgrounds’ might be supported in their individual self- regulatory efforts.66
In response to the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer, and subsequent 
civil protests, Fonagy recently publicly reflected on his stance. In the past, he has generally 
 62 Interview with Peter Fonagy, cited in Maddox, L. (2018). Blueprint: How Our Childhood Makes Us Who We 
Are, London: Robinson, Chapter 7. See also Lee, N. N. (2014). ‘Sublimated or Castrated Psychoanalysis? Adorno’s 
Critique of the Revisionist Psychoanalysis: An Introduction to “The Revisionist Psychoanalysis”’. Philosophy & 
Social Criticism, 40(3): 309– 338. There have been schools of therapy that give comparatively more weight to social 
and political context. However, the Anna Freudian tradition within which Fonagy trained was not one of them. 
Cf. Parker, I. (2011). Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Revolutions in Subjectivity, London: Routledge; Chancer, L. and 
Andrews, J. (2013). The Unhappy Divorce of Sociology and Psychoanalysis: Diverse Perspectives on the Psychosocial, 
London: Palgrave; Frosh, S. (2014). ‘Psychoanalysis as Political Psychology’, in P. Nesbitt- Larking, C. Kinnvall, 
and T. Capelos with H. Dekker (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Political Psychology, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 
55– 71; Cushman, P. (2015). ‘Relational Psychoanalysis as Political Resistance’. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 
51(3): 423– 459.
 63 Shapiro, S. A. (1996). ‘The Embodied Analyst in the Victorian Consulting Room’. Gender and Psychoanalysis, 
1(3): 297– 322; Callard, F. (2014). ‘Consulting Rooms: Notes towards a Historical Geography of the Psychoanalytic 
Setting’, in P. Kingsbury and S. Pile, (eds), Psychoanalytic Geographies, Farnham, Ashgate, pp. 73– 88. A difference 
between psychoanalysis and MBT here is materially signified by the couch, which helps focus the setting on the 
mental states of the patient, rather than the potential for negotiated identification of mental states and mistakes 
in both parties, as in MBT. Cf. Skolnick, N. J. (2015). ‘Rethinking the Use of the Couch: A Relational Perspective’. 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 51(4): 624– 648.
 64 Munich, R. L. (2006). ‘Integrating Mentalization- Based Treatment and Traditional Psychotherapy to 
Cultivate Common Ground and Promote Agency’, in J. Allen and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalization- 
Based Therapy, London: Wiley, pp. 143– 156.
 65 It may also be noted that the ‘On My Mind’ resources on the Anna Freud Centre website include guidance for 
young people on activism as a form of individual self- care. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ on- my- mind/ 
self- care/ activism: ‘Not only does activism give you distraction from your own life, but it also allows you to stop 
others being distracted from important issues. You get to give back to a cause that you are passionate about, whilst 
also gaining self- gratification in return. Taking part in group campaigns can also be a great way of meeting others 
who share your views.’
 66 Fonagy, P., Hayes, D. and Stapley, E. (2019). ‘Understanding and Facilitating Self- Management in Child and 
Youth Mental Health for Socially Excluded Populations’. Accessed at: https:// clahrc- norththames.nihr.ac.uk/ 
nihr- clahrc_ north- thames- academy/ self- management- child- youth- mental- health/ . A recent pioneering effort to 
consider mentalizing stigma also took the ‘intrapsychic filtering system’ of gender- nonconforming individuals as 
their focus: Scandurra, C., Dolce, P., Vitelli, R., Esposito, G., Testa, R. J., Balsam, K. F., and Bochicchio, V. (2020). 
‘Mentalizing Stigma: Reflective Functioning as a Protective Factor against Depression and Anxiety in Transgender 
and Gender‐Nonconforming People’. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 76(9): 1613– 1630 .
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regarded social justice and mental health as distinct matters, making him hesitant to com-
ment on issues of social justice as outside his expertise. However, he acknowledged that the 
#BlackLivesMatter campaign had brought him to re- evaluate this position: ‘seeing humanity 
denied changes the way we all think’.67 He subsequently issued a public statement: ‘To pre-
tend that the problems of disadvantage, of racism and of difference belongs to others is to 
allow them to continue unchallenged. Discrimination is totally antithetical to the core values 
of the Anna Freud Centre and we pledge our solidarity with our BAME colleagues, clients 
and students. As an organisation committed to ensuring that all infants, children and young 
people achieve their potential, we must address inequality based on ethnicity and offer 
support.’68 It will be interesting to see what further ramifications may stem from Fonagy’s 
reevaluation of the relevance of social criticism over the coming years.69
To date, however, by far the primary intersection between the individual and society ad-
dressed by Fonagy and colleagues has been schools: ‘we have focused on the question of 
how we can influence the environments that children inhabit. And of course, the crucial 
environment that comes to mind is the school setting.’70 As we saw in Chapter 2, in Fonagy’s 
biography, experiences of being bullied in secondary school was an important contributor to 
his depression, after he had been sent away by his parents to live in London; by contrast, ex-
periences of validation and self- actualization in higher education helped reduce feelings of 
depression and suicidality. Another tributary to an interest in schools in buffering adversity 
likely stemmed also from the Anna Freudian tradition. Allison and Campbell observe that 
the concern of Fonagy and colleagues for education and mental health is ‘in keeping with 
the tradition Anna Freud established of creating settings— such as the Matchbox School in 
Vienna in the 1920s and nursery schools or residential homes in the UK— whose ecology is 
conducive to growth and psychological development’.71 A further background influence has 
subsequently been identified by Fonagy, who has noted that his own attention to schools has 
occurred in the context of the growing sociological importance of schools in the late twen-
tieth century, as children spend less and less time with their parents and more with their 
peers, so that ‘children have become socialising agents for other children’.72 This is a role 
 67 Fonagy, P. (2020). Tweet, 3 June. Accessed at: https:// twitter.com/ peterfonagy/ status/ 1268186685965242368?s=11: 
‘It should not “just be victims of injustice and dehumanization who bear responsibility of continuing to mentalize”.’
 68 Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Statement from Peter Fonagy on the Murder of George Floyd’. Accessed at: https:// www.
annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2020/ 06/ statement- from- peter- fonagy- on- the- murder- of- george- floyd/ .
 69 Already a few weeks later, in a virtual talk, Fonagy offered reflections on the danger of collective hypervigilance 
resulting from ‘cultures of competition’— for instance, in the academic sphere in which individuals often receive 
rewards rather than teams, but also more widely in education and society. He explicitly advocated that such a shift 
in culture requires social and policy change, not solely adaptations in individual mentalizing. Fonagy, P. (2020). 
‘Trust and Interdependence: Lessons from the Study of Human Attachments’, UCL Minds Event, virtual talk, 
25 June.
 70 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, 
London: Anna Freud Centre. See also Young- Bruehl, E. (2008). Anna Freud: A Biography, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. Emphasis on schools has been the most long- standing and significant area of focus beyond 
the individual for Fonagy and colleagues, with the exception of the family. However, in recent years, Fonagy has 
increasingly acknowledged the potential contribution of other institutions in prevention. Interview with Peter 
Fonagy cited in Maddox, L. (2018). Blueprint: How Our Childhood Makes Us Who We Are, London: Robinson, 
Chapter 7: ‘I think mental health is inappropriately and inaccurately seen as just a subjective process, and I think 
making schools more mentalising, making workplaces more mentalising, making families more mentalising, 
making pubs more mentalising. I think this is where it’s at.’
 71 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, 
London: Anna Freud Centre.
 72 Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Peter Fonagy: Combating a Mental Health Crisis’. Accessed at: https:// www.goldmansachs.
com/ insights/ talks- at- gs/ peter- fonagy.html: ‘Since the second world war, since secondary education became uni-
versal, children are being educated in very large classrooms, in very large schools. This has had all kinds of ad-
vantages. But one of the things that it led to is that the number of hours of contact between adults and children 
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that Fonagy feels has been increasingly recognized during the COVID- 19 pandemic during 
periods when children have not been able to access schools except remotely.73
More proximally, for Fonagy the perception of schools as a critical site of preventative 
intervention appears to have stemmed from his collaboration with Stuart Twemlow in the 
early 2000s on the Peaceful Schools Project.74 Twemlow, Fonagy, and colleagues began by 
thinking about secure, avoidant, and anxious/ ambivalent school social systems.75 These 
schools might look much the same when things are calm. But when an external or in-
ternal event presents a challenge to the school, this challenge is handled quite differently. 
In a secure school, the challenge is neither exaggerated nor minimized. There is collabor-
ation in approaching the problem, making space for both individual feelings and evaluations 
of the situation on the way towards a well- coordinated collective response. In an avoidant 
school, the primary response to the challenge is denial and a sense of false bravado. The 
problem cannot be communicated about; instead, individuals in the school seem preoccu-
pied with other tasks or difficulties they face. In an ambivalent/ resistant school, challenges 
prompt a sense of ready panic, but without clear lines of communication for responding to 
the problem collectively or constructively. What hierarchy there is in the school tends not to 
be functional, and individuals may even undermine it further in their attempts to have their 
concerns heard. The school is also characterized by confusion between discipline and other 
domains such as relationships and safety, making it difficult to distinguish between more or 
less serious challenges, or how to judge a measured response to them. The result is a school in 
which there is a high level of expressed affect at the slightest provocation.
The extrapolation of the Ainsworth attachment classifications to the social system of 
the school by Twemlow, Fonagy, and colleagues entailed identification of common elem-
ents. Like the infant of a secure dyad in the Strange Situation, in the secure school there is 
room for expressions of distress, which are not transformed by minimizing or maximizing 
strategies, and the expectation of collaboration to resolve the problem. Like the infant of 
an insecure dyad in the Strange Situation, in the insecure school there is a transformation 
of information about the problem, so that it either may not be acknowledged as a source 
of concern or becomes a preoccupation to the exclusion of other kinds of priorities.76 The 
innovative aspect of this picture was that a secure school was not conceptualized merely as 
the aggregate of secure or insecure individuals. Instead, the school was envisaged as having 
has actually dropped. So children have become socialising agents for other children, and that’s not how we were 
designed by evolution. We were designed by evolution to be looked after by people wiser than ourselves.’
 73 Fonagy, P. and Smith, J. (2020). ‘Wellbeing: The Impact of the Pandemic and what Schools can 
do to Support Mental Health’. Trust, December 2020, https:// trust- journal.org.uk/ current- edition/ 
wellbeing- the- impact- of- the- pandemic- and- what- schools- can- do- to- support- mental- health/ 
 74 This work can be seen in the context of a more general policy and research trend towards concern with the role 
of schools in mental health promotion. Durlak, J., Weissberg, R. P., Dymnicki, A. B., Taylor, R. D., and Schellinger, 
K. B. (2011). ‘The Impact of Enhancing Students’ Social and Emotional Learning: A Meta- Analysis of School- 
Based Universal Interventions’. Child Development, 82: 405– 432; Weare, K. and Nind, M. (2011). ‘Mental Health 
Promotion and Problem Prevention in Schools: What Does the Evidence Say?’. Health Promotion International, 
26: 29– 69.
 75 Twemlow, S. W., Fonagy, P., and Sacco, F. C. (2002). ‘Feeling Safe in School’. Smith College Studies in Social 
Work, 72: 303– 326.
 76 Due to a common basis in an information- processing model, there are significant analogies here to 
Hinshelwood’s characterization of three kinds of group culture based on three kinds of relationship with the 
truth: the flexible, the rigid, and the fragmented. Hinshelwood, R. D. (1994). ‘Attacks on the Reflective Space’, in V. 
Shermer and M. Pines (eds), Ring of Fire: Containing Primitive Emotional States, London: Routledge, pp. 86– 106. 
There is no indication that Twemlow and Fonagy knew of Hinshelwood’s prior work.
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dynamic properties at the level of the social system characteristic of security or insecurity.77 
Building on certain threads in the ideas of Main and Crittenden, security was elaborated 
as a state of non- distortion of information about threat and protection, whereas insecurity 
reflected certain transformations of this information (see Chapter 7). In general, Fonagy the-
orized that ‘in secure organizations social influence is exercised in a framework dominated 
by an awareness of the mental states, concerns, thoughts, and feelings of individuals within 
the system’.78 He also saw that in other organizations, too, the dynamics characteristic of in-
security could be seen. In fact, he remarked that ‘many of us work in organizations where 
bullying is as, if not more, pervasive than at the average elementary school’.79 An individual 
may have a secure or insecure attachment to individual caregivers, but Fonagy has argued 
that ‘being responded to sensitively most of the time by many people fosters trust in the 
availability of the entire network’, and that in such contexts, ‘secure attachment is to a system 
rather than an individual’.80 The idea of the externalization of the alien self was not invoked 
in conceptualizing these dynamics. This may reflect that the target audience for the work by 
Fonagy, Twemlow, and colleagues, likely educationalists and policy makers, may have been 
sceptical of this rather speculative and unobservable mechanism. However, it also perhaps 
reflects a decline in the frequency of appeal to the concept of the ‘alien self ’ over the course 
of the 2000s. 81
In 2009, Fonagy, Twemlow, and colleagues reported from a cluster randomized con-
trol trial of a mentalization- based intervention with school communities compared with 
pastoral– therapeutic interventions solely offered to disruptive students. The mentalization- 
based intervention had four major components. A first was use of reflective classroom dis-
cussions. For instance, 15 minutes were set aside at the end of each day for classes to reflect 
together on bully– victim– bystander relationships according to a structured format. Poster 
campaigns, stickers, and badges were used ‘to create a climate where feelings were labelled 
and distress was acknowledged as legitimate’.82 A second component was a classroom man-
agement plan, which supported teachers in understanding and correcting problems at 
the root in the social system of the classroom, rather than punishing individual children 
who misbehave. Consideration of role of bystanders in the facilitation or inhibiting of 
bullying was especially integral to the programme. A third component was teaching pupils 
 77 See also the discussion of social cohesion as a property of secure communities irreducible to the properties of 
the individuals that constitute it in Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The Early Social and Emotional Determinants 
of Inequalities in Health’, in G. Baruch, P. Fonagy, and D. Robins (eds), Reaching the Hard to Reach: Evidence- Based 
Funding Priorities for Intervention and Research, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3– 34, p. 23.
 78 Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Violence in our Schools: What can a Psychoanalytically Informed Approach 
Contribute?’. Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 5(2): 223– 238, p.223.
 79 Ibid. 225. Fonagy has been at University College London straight through from his undergraduate degree, 
so he may be referring to the way that this university operates at times. However, remarks elsewhere lead to the 
suspicion that he is referring more to the Institute of Psychoanalysis, e.g. Fonagy, P. (2009). ‘When analysts need 
to retire: The taboo of ageing in psychoanalysis’, in B. Willock, R. Curtis, and L. Bohm (eds), Taboo or not Taboo? 
Forbidden Thoughts, Forbidden Acts in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, London: Karnac Books, pp. 209– 227.
 80 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from 
Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- 
series- podcast; Slides. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 02/ 
Podcast- 2.24.19- compressed.pdf.
 81 The concept of projective identification is used by Twemlow when writing for a psychoanalytic audience at 
the start of the decade. Twemlow, S. W. (2000). ‘The Roots of Violence: Converging Psychoanalytic Explanatory 
Models for Power Struggles and Violence in Schools’. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 69(4): 741– 785.
 82 Fonagy, P., Twemlow, S. W., Vernberg, E. M., Nelson, J. M., Dill, E. J., Little, T. D., and Sargent, J. A. (2009). ‘A 
Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial of Child‐Focused Psychiatric Consultation and a School Systems‐Focused 
Intervention to Reduce Aggression’. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 50(5): 607– 616, supplemental 
materials.
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nonaggressive physical and cognitive strategies for when they find themselves a bystander 
or a victim of bullying. Role play was used to help pupils see that these were structural roles, 
and could in principle be populated by anyone, but that the roles could be handled in various 
ways. A fourth component was the introduction of a peer mentoring system.
Both the mentalization- based intervention and the intervention focused on disruptive 
students were greeted enthusiastically by teachers. However, only the mentalization- based 
intervention proved effective. There were reductions in peer- reported aggression, peer- 
reported victimization, support by bystanders for aggressive behaviour, and an increase 
in concern about the experiences of victims of bullying. In the classroom, the schools that 
implemented the mentalization- based approach saw medium to large reductions in pupils 
off- task and disruptive behaviour by children as measured by researchers’ observations. 
Fonagy, Twemlow, and colleagues observed, from a review of the literature, that these be-
havioural changes were the largest seen to date in any randomized trial of a school- based 
intervention.83
The collaboration with Twemlow and related thinking about schools as social systems 
led Fonagy and colleagues to quite a distinctive position on the role of schools in society. 
This was reflected in the influential THRIVE model developed by Wolpert, Fonagy, and 
colleagues for the provision of child and adolescent mental health.84 THRIVE is the oper-
ating model used for 47% of the 0– 18 population in England, and is recommended in the 
NHS Long Term Plan.85 Wolpert, Fonagy, and colleagues divided provision into distinct 
categories, with characteristic providers, goals, and discourses. Their goal was to structure 
services around the different strategies for providing help, rather than severity of need or 
diagnosis. This aimed to help facilitate shared decision making with young people about 
what strategies they think will be most relevant and useful. A first level of support was to help 
young people cope and to foster their resilience to challenges. It was argued that ‘wherever 
possible, this provision should be provided within education or community settings, with 
education often (though not always) the lead provider and educational language (a language 
of wellness) as the key language used’.86 A further level of support offered children help with 
mental health difficulties: ‘provision for this group should be provided with health as the 
lead provider and using a health language (a language of treatment and health outcomes)’. 
A distinctive aspect of the THRIVE approach to help was that ‘treatment would involve ex-
plicit agreement at the outset as to what a successful outcome would look like, how likely this 
was to occur by a specific date, and what would happen if this was not achieved in a reason-
able timeframe’.87
Support for coping and help with mental health difficulties were contrasted by Wolpert, 
Fonagy, and colleagues with risk support. Here ‘social care may often be the lead agency and 
 83 Ibid.: ‘Medium to strong effects for classroom observations (mean ES = .97, range: .84– 1.1). Past research on 
school- wide multimodal interventions has only demonstrated modest effects on aggression against TAU [treat-
ment as usual] (Wilson et al., 2003). Medium effect sizes are normally only associated with intense studies with 
small samples (Wilson et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2003). CAPSLE produced a number of modest and some large 
effect sizes, particularly with behavioral measures. The findings are also notable because the sample was not par-
ticularly high- risk and high- risk samples normally generate larger effects. (Mytton et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2001, 
2003)’ (p. 614).
 84 Wolpert, M., Harris, R., Jones, M., . . . Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘THRIVE The AFC– Tavistock Model for CAMHS’. 
Accessed at: http:// www.annafreud.org/ media/ 2552/ thrive- booklet_ march- 15.pdf.
 85 National Health Service (2019). The NHS Long Term Plan. Accessed at: https:// www.longtermplan.nhs.uk/ 
wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 08/ nhs- long- term- plan- version- 1.2.pdf.
 86 Wolpert, M., Harris, R., Jones, M., . . . Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘THRIVE The AFC– Tavistock Model for CAMHS’. 
Accessed at: http:// www.annafreud.org/ media/ 2552/ thrive- booklet_ march- 15.pdf.
 87 Ibid.
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the language of social care (risk and support) is likely to be dominant’. The authors acknow-
ledged that ‘perhaps the most contentious aspect of the THRIVE model’ is that services should 
acknowledge that not every child can be helped through mental health provision, and that only 
risk management rather than mental health treatment should be provided if there is reason 
to believe that mental health treatment would be ineffective. The goal of support for coping 
should be to improve young people’s resilience; the goal of help should be to reduce specific 
identified symptoms; and the goal of risk support should be to reduce young people’s risk of 
harm to themselves or others. In the THRIVE model, then, schools are given a critical role. 
When more complex needs emerge, specialist mental health services and/ or social care might 
become involved. But schools are depicted by THRIVE as holding fundamental responsi-
bility as the locus of primary support for young people by social systems beyond their fam-
ilies. Rather than prioritizing the expansion of specialist mental health provision, the THRIVE 
model suggests taking the school community as the fundamental target for intervention.
Fonagy and colleagues provide the example of the approach they would ideally like to see 
for ‘Billy’, an 11- year- old frequently found by his teacher ‘Ms. Jones’ to be disruptive in class, 
and to engage in power- struggles and bullying towards other students:
Would Billy benefit from individual therapy? Experience shows that boys like Billy re-
spond poorly to such efforts, however skilled, if they do not take place in the context of 
concurrent family and social interventions. We feel that disrupting the vicious cycle that 
a child such as Billy finds himself in should be undertaken in school. Furthermore, it may 
be best, given Billy’s sensitivity to humiliation, if the intervention does not directly con-
cern Billy at all but, rather, the whole class . . . The procedure in the context of our program 
would have been for Ms. Jones to stop the class immediately after Billy started creating a 
commotion, and mark some space for reflection on what was happening. In other words, 
she would recognise the assault on her own mentalising that she was experiencing . . . in the 
process seek to draw upon the collective mentalising capacity of her classroom to create an 
environment in which Billy’s arousal could reduce.88
There appears to have been a reciprocal support between Fonagy’s interest in schools and 
his growing attention to epistemic trust and learning. On the one hand, the idea of epistemic 
trust as an openness to learning from others is well encapsulated by the school context.89 On 
the other hand, the increased focus on epistemic trust has further solidified the conviction 
of Fonagy and colleagues that schools are a privileged locus for preventative work in public 
mental health, especially where teachers can mentalize and offer ostensive cues to pupils.90 
 88 This passage appears in Twemlow, S. W., Fonagy, P., and Sacco, F. C. (2005). ‘A Developmental Approach to 
Mentalizing Communities: I. The Peaceful Schools Experiment’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 69(4): 282– 304, 
p. 289; and is repeated in Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality 
Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 447– 448. It might be argued that this 
strategy places Billy’s mentalizing and learning above the curricular learning of the class as a whole, whose lesson 
has to be paused to reflect on Billy’s feelings. It can be anticipated that Fonagy and colleagues would counter that 
Billy’s behaviour is already disrupting class learning, and that the opportunity for the class to use and develop col-
lective mentalizing capacity will benefit their well- being, and— possibly— their future curricular learning. It is to 
be hoped that mentalization- based interventions in schools may be able to explore such questions.
 89 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9. See also Lane, J. D. and Harris, P. L. (2015). ‘The 
Roles of Intuition and Informants’ Expertise in Children’s Epistemic Trust’. Child Development, 86(3): 919– 926.
 90 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Attachment- Aware Teaching with Peter Fonagy’. Podogogy, 7(5): https:// play.acast.com/ 
s/ tes- the- education- podcast/ 32054866- 4898- 47ce- b70d- 3995276773a9; Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Keynote Address’. 
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Furthermore, the growing momentum at the Anna Freud Centre around using schools as a 
site for scalable public mental health intervention has led to major ongoing trials of various 
interventions, led by the UCL- Anna Freud Evidence- Based Practice Unit.91 This includes 
the ‘Education for Wellbeing’ trial, which will recruit 26,000 pupils across England to as-
sess the relative effectiveness of five different school- based interventions.92 The Anna Freud 
Centre has also pursued research on strategies to support the mental health well- being of 
school staff, as part of facilitating mental health within schools.93
In recent years especially, Fonagy has been proactive in advocating to policy makers re-
garding individual self- regulation and schools as potential sites for public mental health pre-
ventative work.94 In relation to individual self- regulation, Fonagy has been critical of the 
effectiveness of specialist mental health services, both in terms of reach and in terms of ag-
gregate clinical impact.95 So, instead of advocating for the resourcing of specialist mental 
health services, he has been a national policy leader in the expansion of primary care mental 
health services for children and adolescents, within the ‘Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies’ framework. This included various provisions that could be delivered within a pri-
mary care setting, such as brief psychological therapies for anxiety and depression for chil-
dren, and parenting classes when young children have conduct problems.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, Psychosomatik und Nervenheilkundei, 24 November, 
Berlin. Accessed at: https:// twitter.com/ TheLancetPsych/ status/ 801813352515272705
 91 E.g. Wolpert, M., Humphrey, N., Deighton, J., Patalay, P., Fugard, A. J., Fonagy, P., . . . and Panos, V. (2015). ‘An 
Evaluation of the Implementation and Impact of England’s Mandated School- Based Mental Health Initiative in 
Elementary Schools’. School Psychology Review, 44(1): 117– 138.
 92 The five school- based interventions are:
 1. ‘A set of five lessons for Y9 that use role play designed to improve pupils’ understanding of mental 
health and reduce suicide rates. Developed in Sweden and America, Youth Aware Mental Health 
(YAM) encourages pupils to share their own ideas about how to maintain good mental health and 
how to help each other to find ways to resolve everyday dilemmas
 2. A teacher training programme developed in Canada called The Guide. Adapted for England for the 
study, it develops teachers’ understanding of mental health, trains them on how to teach their pupils 
about it and addresses stigma
 3. A series of eight lessons designed to increase young people’s skills around personal safety and man-
aging their mental health, as well as helping them to identify their support networks
 4. Training pupils in relaxation techniques embedded into the school day, every day for five minutes
 5. Training pupils in mindfulness embedded into the school day, every day for five minutes.’
Accessed at: https:// www.ucl.ac.uk/ evidence- based- practice- unit/ research/ research- projects.
 93 Garland, L., Linehan, T., Merrett, N., Smith, J. and Payne, C. (2018). Ten Steps Towards School Staff Wellbeing. 
London: Anna Freud Centre. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ media/ 8506/ school- staff- wellbeing- report- 
final- corrected- 512.pdf.
 94 Fonagy, P., and Higgitt, A. (2004). ‘Early Mental Health Intervention and Prevention: The Implications for 
Government and the Wider Community’, in B. Sklarew, S. W. Twemlow, and S. M. Wilkinson (eds), Analysts in the 
Trenches: Streets, Schools, War Zones, Mahwah, NJ: Analytic Press, pp. 257– 309.: ‘Psychoanalysts have shrunk from 
involvement with public policy. The nature of a psychoanalyst’s commitment to an individual, the intensely per-
sonal nature of the interaction, which sustains the “no holds barred” study of subjectivity, is experienced by most 
analysts as incompatible with commitment to populations, institutions, organisations and other faceless systems. 
This attitude, of course, is illogical’ (p. 257). On schools as a locus for intervention, see Gee, B., Wilson, J., Clarke, 
T., Farthing, S., Carroll, B., Jackson, C., . . . and Notley, C. (2020). ‘Delivering Mental Health Support within Schools 
and Colleges— A Thematic Synthesis of Barriers and Facilitators to Implementation of Indicated Psychological 
Interventions for Adolescents’. Child and Adolescent Mental Health, 26(1): 34– 46.
 95 Fonagy, P. and Clark, D. M. (2015). ‘Update on the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Programme 
in England: Commentary on . . . Children and Young People’s Improving Access to Psychological Therapies’. 
BJPsych Bulletin, 39(5): 248– 251, citing Warren, J., Nelson, P., Mondragon, S., Baldwin, S., and Burlingame, G. 
(2010). ‘Youth Psychotherapy Change Trajectories and Outcomes in Usual Care’. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 78(2): 144– 155; Fonagy, P., Pugh, K., and O’Herlihy, A. (2017). ‘The Children and Young People’s 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (CYP IAPT) Programme in England’, in D. Skuse, H. Bruce, and 
L. Dowdney (eds), Child Psychology and Psychiatry: Frameworks for Clinical Training and Practice (3rd edn), 
Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 429– 435.
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The exact nature of Fonagy’s policy work is difficult to document, because there is not 
much information in the public domain. In the context of major cuts to mental health ser-
vices since 2011, as part of the government’s austerity agenda, Fonagy reports his sense that 
his policy engagement has contributed towards the direction of public resources towards 
child and adolescent mental health:
I think it’s the thing I’ve done that I’m most proud of. The service was not fit for purpose. In 
many parts it may still not be. In a situation where [mental health services for children and 
adolescents] suffered a financial penalty greater than at any time in its history, it has not 
collapsed . . . in the last budget of this government, £1.25 billion was set aside for children’s 
mental health— £250 million a year over the next five years. That’s getting back to the level 
it was at before the cuts began.96
Under the coalition government, Fonagy served as an academic adviser to Paul Burstow and 
Norman Lamb, Ministers of State for Care.97 In 2013, his work at the research– policy inter-
face led to the award of an OBE by the Queen. And he was singled out by the Children’s 
Minister in 2014 for praise for his achievements in policy- relevant research.98
In 2017, Fonagy and colleagues were asked by the Department of Health to conduct a ‘sys-
tematic review of the evidence relating to the mental health of children and young people’. 
The systematic review and its conclusions have not been published, though future publi-
cation has been promised.99 However, the Department of Health Green Paper stated that 
Fonagy and colleagues had advocated for greater use of schools for preventing, identifying, 
and responding to mental health issues:
The school environment is well suited to a graduated approach to children’s mental health, 
where children at risk can be identified and interventions can be offered to address prob-
lems. As the school environment can present triggers for many difficulties (such as social 
anxiety), it is therefore also a good place to find support to manage them.100
The central innovation in the Green Paper was the creation of new Mental Health Support 
Teams attached to schools, with around 8,000 staff. This would be larger than the whole of 
the existing children and young people’s mental health services workforce in the NHS. It was 
 96 Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘Peter Fonagy on Psychoanalysis and IAPT.’ The History of Emotions Blog, posted 
on 14 May by Jules Evans. Accessed at: https:// emotionsblog.history.qmul.ac.uk/ 2015/ 05/ peter- fonagy- 
on- psychoanalysis- and- iapt/ . See also Pickersgill, M. (2019). ‘Access, Accountability, and the Proliferation 
of Psychological Therapy: On the Introduction of the IAPT Initiative and the Transformation of Mental 
Healthcare’. Social Studies of Science, 49(4): 627– 650. More recently, Fonagy has also collaborated on an open 
letter to the government, advocating for greater allocation of funding for children’s well- being and mental health 
in the context of COVID- 19. Bajawa, S., Thomas, E., Fonagy, P. et al. (2020). ‘Open Letter to Government on 
Young People’s Mental Health During Lockdown’. Accessed at: https:// www.bps.org.uk/ news- and- policy/ 
open- letter- government- young- peoples- mental- health- during- lockdown.
 97 University College London (2014) REF 2014, Psychology, Psychiatry, and Neuroscience: Environ-
ment Statement. Accessed at: https:// results.ref.ac.uk/ (S(jj2mvvb3fbee3zpqb1artx2d))/ DownloadFile/ 
EnvironmentTemplate/ PDF?subId=1075.
 98 https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ speeches/ edward- timpson- on- better- support- for- vulnerable- adolescents.
 99 Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and the Secretary of State for Education (2018). ‘Government 
Response to the First Joint Report of the Education and Health and Social Care Committees of Session 2017- 19 on 
Transforming Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision: A Green Paper’, p. 10. Accessed at: https:// as-
sets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 728902/ HESC_ Print_ 
_ 3_ .pdf.
 100 Department of Health (2017). Transforming Children and Young People’s Mental Health Provision: A Green 
Paper, London: HMSO, p. 10.
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also expected that schools would liaise more regularly with mental health services. The Anna 
Freud Centre would contribute to the training of this workforce through a new Diploma 
for Mental Health Practitioners in Schools. Fonagy has worked with the Secretary of State 
for Health, Jeremy Hunt, to argue publicly for the benefits of a school- focused approach to 
improving young people’s mental health.101 The Education and Health Select Committees 
have criticized the Green Paper, alleging that it passes responsibility for children’s mental 
health to schools, rather than offering either adequate resources to individual mental health 
provision or social change to address the factors at the root of young people’s suffering.102 
The Committees also expressed concern that young people with potential additional mental 
health needs, such as those in care or on the edge of care, are given insufficient priority in the 
reforms. No doubt Fonagy would have wished that more resources were available. However, 
for decades he has consistently assumed public resources to be limited, and on this basis 
argued for a prioritization of primary prevention in schools, and a comparatively reduced 
prioritization of secondary mental health care. He has also been a consistent advocate for 
greater interagency working between sectors.103
Collective mentalizing capacity
In 2017, Di Stefano and colleagues alleged that it ‘seems that Fonagy and colleagues have 
paid little attention to the context in which the relational, mental, and affective experiences 
of the individuals originate and consolidate’. In doing so, Fonagy and colleagues fail to con-
sider the ‘rules, meanings, and shared models of behavior that produce relationships and 
social exchanges capable of supporting or, on the contrary, hindering processes of explor-
ation and meaning that individuals attribute to their own (and others) actions’.104 As we saw 
in Chapter 3, when Fonagy was initially elaborating the concept of mentalization in the early 
1990s on the basis of existing work in social cognition, he included some elements of social 
cognition and not others. An important exclusion was that cognition about social norms 
was not taken up as part of the concept of mentalizing. In contrast to social cognition, then, 
mentalization was not concerned with norms about inequality, hierarchy, and intrinsic dif-
ferences between groups that may play a significant role in oppression. Fonagy’s assumption 
 101 Department of Health and Social Care (2018). ‘Children and Young People’s Mental Health Green 
Paper’: webcast with Jeremy Hunt. Accessed at: https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=j4gAI402ndM. Fonagy is also 
co- signatory on a public letter advocating that assessment of schools should include appraisal of their provision 
for mental health. See Turner, C. (2018). ‘Ofsted is Considering New Assessment to Ensure Schools Look after 
Pupils’ Mental Health and Wellbeing’, 22 December. Accessed at: https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/ education/ 2018/ 12/ 
22/ ofsted- considering- new- assessment- ensure- schools- look- pupils/ .
 102 Education and Health Select Committees (2018). The Government’s Green Paper on Mental Health: Failing a 
Generation, London: HMSO.
 103 The Anna Freud Centre has been funded to evaluate aspects of the new approach. This work is largely still 
ongoing, but in an early pilot of the new approach mental health leads from 255 schools took part in two- day work-
shops focused on interagency working. A study conducted by Cortina and colleagues at the Anna Freud Centre 
found that 55% of school mental health leads reported being in ‘monthly’ or ‘continuous’ contact with mental 
health services at follow- up, compared with a quarter at baseline. Limitations of the study should be noted: the data 
comes from self- report, and less than a third of participants completed the survey at both time points. Cortina, 
M. A., Shipman, J., Saunders, F., Day, L., Blades, R., Smith, J., and Wolpert, M. (2019). ‘Embedding Interagency 
Working between Schools and Mental Health Specialists: A Service Evaluation of the Mental Health Services and 
Schools and Colleges Link Programme Workshops’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 24(4): 906– 920 .
 104 Di Stefano, G., Piacentino, B., and Ruvolo, G. (2017). ‘Mentalizing in Organizations: A Psychodynamic 
Model for an Understanding of Well- Being and Suffering in the Work Contexts’. World Futures, 73(4– 5): 216– 
223, p. 218– 219. See also Sperry, M. (2013). ‘Putting our Heads Together: Mentalizing Systems’. Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, 23(6): 683– 699.
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in the early 1990s appears to have been that the key concerns of mentalisation— intentions, 
beliefs, affects— can only belong to individual subjects, and cannot belong to groups.
Later in the 1990s, when working on the reflective functioning scale with Howard and 
Miriam Steele and Anna Higgitt, Fonagy treated sociological discussions that place attach-
ment figures in their cultural and historical context not simply as irrelevant to mentalizing, 
but specifically as bad mentalizing: ‘Passages rated as “1” may be sociological, excessively 
generalised, concrete or overwhelmingly egocentric.’105 They also advised coders to give low 
scores to accounts of mental states that seemed drawn from ‘shared culture’. It was assumed 
that ‘shared culture’ was opposed to the individual’s own sense of mental states as ‘personally 
significant and meaningful’.106 Across the reflective functioning scale manual, what refer-
ences to social and cultural factors occur seem premised on the expectation of a trade- off 
between psychological- mindedness and sociological- or group- mindedness.107 This was 
a tendency supported by the poorly articulated distinction between ‘not mentalizing’ and 
‘non- mentalizing’, sometimes leading one to be mistaken for the other. It may also have been 
supported by Fonagy’s distrust of the dynamics of large groups, which he regarded as tending 
away from acknowledgement of individual experiences.108 In the 2000s, Fonagy allowed that 
it would be possible to mentalize non- corporeal individuals, such as ‘explicating the mental 
states of story characters’ or the intentions of divine beings.109 However, groups were beyond 
the pale.110
 105 Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, H., and Steele, M. (1998). Reflective Functioning Manual, Version 5, London:  
UCL/ Anna Freud Centre, p. 28.
 106 Ibid.: ‘The passage may be “marked” in reflective- functioning because the view of mental states presented 
by the subject is unusual and surprising to the rater. Passages which cast an original perspective, which neverthe-
less is readily understandable to the rater, reflect mentalization on the part of the subject. Raters should however 
be aware of the possibility of “borrowed” reflective- functioning, where the subject is repeating ideas presented to 
him/ her in other contexts. In such instances a rating of “3” would probably be more appropriate’ (p. 29); ‘the pas-
sage must contain sufficient “surprise” and coherence for the rater to feel it is unlikely to have come from contam-
inating sources. The passage should therefore have a personal character, i.e., experienced as personally significant 
and meaningful, and may seem to be developing further during the interview itself ’ (p. 30); ‘In contrast to inter-
views rated “0”– “4”, interviews rated “5” give convincing indications to the rater that speakers have some kind of 
a model of the mind of attachment figures as well as a model of their own mind which is relatively coherent even if 
it is simple, and is unlikely to have been solely derived from shared culture rather than from personal experience’ 
(p. 34).
 107 To take another example of this assumption: Luyten, P., Fonagy, P., Lowyck, B., and Vermote, R. (2012). 
‘The Assessment of Mentalization’, in A. W. Bateman and P. Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalizing in Mental 
Health Practice, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing, pp. 43– 66: ‘What does bad mentalisation look 
like? . . . Focus on external factors (e.g. government, school, colleagues, neighbors)’ (p. 59).
 108 E.g. Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘The Violence in our Schools: What can a Psychoanalytically Informed Approach 
Contribute?’. Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 5(2): 223– 238: ‘Coercion is the rule within most social 
systems.’ Ratner, R. H. (2014). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in Borderline. Master of Fine Arts, The University 
of Texas at Austin. Accessed at: https:// repositories.lib.utexas.edu/ bitstream/ handle/ 2152/ 28667/ RATNER- 
MASTERSREPORT- 2014.pdf?sequence=1. From interview with Fonagy: ’Mentalization is one of best established 
of human capacities, can break in all of us. It is fairly predictable when it can break: large groups (hard to mentalize 
when we’re in a large crowd, as a consequence, large crowds are dangerous, you can forget what someone is feeling 
hence can perform atrocities‘ (p. 123).
 109 E.g. Fonagy, P., Target, M., Gergely, G., Allen, J. G., and Bateman, A. W. (2003). ‘The Developmental 
Roots of Borderline Personality Disorder in Early Attachment Relationships: A Theory and Some Evidence’. 
Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 23(3): 412– 459, p. 433; Fonagy, P. (2009). ‘Commentary on “Forgiveness”’, in S. Akhtar 
(ed.), Good Feelings: Psychoanalytic Reflections on Positive Emotions and Attitudes, London: Karnac/ International 
Psychoanalytic Association, pp. 411– 452, p. 423. Fonagy would later contribute to work in which the capacity to 
consider the mental states of fictional individuals was specifically used to operationalize mentalizing. See Fossati, 
A., Borroni, S., Dziobek, I., Fonagy, P., and Somma, A. (2018). ‘Thinking about Assessment: Further Evidence of the 
Validity of the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition as a Measure of Mentalistic Abilities’. Psychoanalytic 
Psychology, 35(1): 127– 141.
 110 This may have been reinforced by Gergely’s account of marked mirroring and ostensive cues as conveying 
acknowledgement of individual agency, a property that may have been assumed to only characterize individuals.
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Fonagy and Target have subsequently regretted their early rejection of sociological and 
group- focused thinking. In fact, Target has substantially redirected her approach over the past 
15 years towards greater engagement with sociological theory and methods.111 Fonagy and 
Target have recognized that ‘every patient comes to an assessment with his own language and 
frame of reference for emotional distress, with his own theories consonant with cultural idioms 
for the expression of emotional distress’.112 In the landmark ‘What We have Changed our Minds 
About’ paper from 2017, Fonagy and colleagues stated that they had changed their minds ‘about 
the relationship between the individual and culture’, seeing the need for a ‘more systemic, less 
intrapsychic approach’.113
As we saw above, in the 2000s, Fonagy, Twemlow, and colleagues struggled to explicitly work 
out a basis for extrapolating mentalization from interpersonal processes to social systems, as 
they had with security and insecurity. Mostly, they seem to have assumed that a capacity to 
conceive of and reconsider thoughts and feelings could only be a property of individuals, and 
could only take as its target other individuals: ‘Culture is the product of individual minds. It’s an 
aggregate. It is whatever comes through from what lots of minds have in common.’114 In such 
statements, no autonomy was ascribed to social systems as more than the aggregate of individ-
uals. However, as we saw social environment, there were other times when Fonagy, especially in 
work with Twemlow, moved towards an account in which the properties of a community itself 
could i) be considered to facilitate mentalization, or ii) be taken as the target of mentalization 
by individuals concerned with perspectives and affects circulating in a social system.115 Both 
were reflected in the first two components of their Peaceful Schools intervention. The class as a 
whole were asked to reflect together on bully– victim– bystander relationships, supported by the 
teacher’s understanding of and attention to these systemic dynamics. Teachers were encouraged 
to ‘draw upon the collective mentalising capacity of [the] classroom’.116
What could the collective mentalizing capacity of the classroom be? The nature of the 
Peaceful Schools intervention implicitly suggests some aspects. One is dedicated time. The 
collective expectation of time to reflect at the end of the day might be part of the collective 
mentalizing capacity, alongside the accumulation of previous successful discussions as a 
 111 Target, M., and Fonagy, P. (2003). ‘Attachment Theory and Long- Term Psychoanalytic Outcome: Are 
Insecure Attachment Narratives Less Accurate?’, in M. Leuzinger- Bohleber, A. U. Dreher, and J. Canestri (eds), 
Pluralism and Unity? Methods of Research in Psychoanalysis, London: International Psychoanalytical Association, 
pp. 149– 167: ‘We are gradually trying to feel our way towards an application of qualitative methodology from soci-
ology’ (p. 165).
 112 Lemma, A., Target, M., and Fonagy, P. (2011). Brief Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy: A Clinician’s Guide, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 57.
 113 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9.
 114 See also Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in 
Practice: A Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98, p. 83.
 115 Though not a discussion of the community as a target for mentalizing, a reflection on the community as a po-
tential target for attachment (i.e. secure base/ safe haven dynamics) was offered in Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, M., 
Steele, H., Leigh, T., Levinson, A., et al. (1997). ‘Morality, Disruptive Behavior, Borderline Personality Disorder, 
Crime, and their Relationships to Security of Attachment’, in L. Atkinson and K. J. Zucker (eds), Attachment 
and Psychopathology, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 223– 274, p. 224: ‘Unstable attachment histories [are] more 
common in these [dangerous] neighbourhoods, thus reducing the overall likelihood of strong attachments to the 
community’ (p. 231).
 116 This passage appears in Twemlow, S. W., Fonagy, P., and Sacco, F. C. (2005). ‘A Developmental Approach to 
Mentalizing Communities: II. The Peaceful Schools Experiment’. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 69(4): 282– 304, 
p. 289; and is repeated in Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality 
Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 447– 448.
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collective reference point.117 Another part of the scaffolding of collective mentalizing cap-
acity may be space. That the daily discussions took place in a familiar classroom may suggest 
the physical space as a potential contributory to collective mentalizing capacity, as a secure 
base.118 The collective mentalizing capacity may encompass the circulation of images that 
make acknowledgement of feelings a taken- for- granted part of the institutional climate of 
the wider school. The school’s coordination and coherence of approach to discipline might 
also be part of its collective mentalizing capacity. No doubt the safety of the school environ-
ment would also be a relevant collective resource for facilitating mentalizing. None of these 
features seem readily reducible to merely the aggregate of the mentalizing capacities of the 
school’s members.
Nonetheless, the concept of a ‘collective mentalizing capacity’ remained underdeveloped, 
with three subterranean and partial exceptions. One partial exception has been thinking in 
the development and running of the Pears Family School within the Anna Freud Centre, 
founded in 2014. The school takes pupils excluded from or unable to cope with mainstream 
education. A requirement is that parents are willing to join a parent group and participate 
in the life of the school. The founding vision was for a community with ‘many of the fea-
tures of a mainstream school alongside the non- institutionalized values of a family environ-
ment’.119 It is the ambition that each child returns to mainstream education after receiving 
sufficient benefit from the Family School, and to date this has been the case for the majority 
of children.120 Descriptions of the school do not make explicit mention of the collective 
mentalizing capacity institutionalized in the Pears Family School. However, at times, there 
seems implicit acknowledgement that mentalizing and epistemic trust in the school is more 
than the sum of these qualities in its members. One example is Fonagy’s response when the 
Pears Family School and Anna Freud Centre won the Grand Prix Design Award in 2019: ‘The 
space we have is one for bringing people together, and the environment encourages collab-
oration, creativity, and inclusivity.’121 This suggests acknowledgement of the role of physical 
space as a resource towards collective mentalizing capacity. Another example of implicit ac-
knowledgement of collective mentalizing capacity is in a remark by Allison and Campbell 
about the ambitions of the school, that ‘the work of building a community at the school and 
ensuring that it functions as a mentalizing environment is a critical part of its therapeutic 
 117 On how the benefits of group- level processes for reconsideration of thoughts may be frequently underesti-
mated, see Mercier, H., Trouche, E., Yama, H., Heintz, C., and Girotto, V. (2015). ‘Experts and Laymen Grossly 
Underestimate the Benefits of Argumentation for Reasoning’. Thinking & Reasoning, 21(3): 341– 355. Mercier has 
also identified that the experience of a group majority is not reducible to the sum of the aggregates in contexts of 
social influence. Mercier, H. and Morin, O. (2019). ‘Majority Rules: How Good are We at Aggregating Convergent 
Opinions?’. Evolutionary Human Sciences, 1. Mercier was one of Sperber’s central collaborators in introducing the 
concept of epistemic vigilance (see Chapter 7).
 118 The importance of the physical setting and a physical calendar as secure bases to facilitate young people’s 
mentalizing has been emphasized by Midgley, N., Ensink, K. and Lindqvist, K. (2017). Mentalization- based 
Treatment for Children: A Time- limited Approach, New York: American Psychological Association.
 119 The Family School (Anna Freud) (2014). Application for Free School status. Accessed at: https:// assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 439138/ Wave_ 4_ - _ The_ 
Family_ School.pdf.
 120 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre: ‘64 per cent of pupils who have attended the school since it opened 
have been successfully reintegrated into mainstream school within the school’s own target of four terms. Of the 
pupils who have returned to mainstream schools since the school opened, 95 per cent have succeeded in retaining 
their school places.’
 121 Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2019/ 11/ double- award- win- for- our- new- home- 
the- kantor- centre- of- excellence/ .
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work . . . The community of Pears Family School seeks to operate as a mentalizing training 
ground for children and families.’122
Another partial exception to the underdevelopment of the concept of collective mentalizing 
capacity has been the work of Asen and Fonagy, considering the applicability of mentalization- 
based family therapy. In two papers from 2017 on family violence, they argued that ‘the family 
consulting room can be a unique environment where the collective mentalizing capacity of the 
family, with the support of the therapist’s own reflective capacities, can be mobilized to identify 
the thoughts and feelings that might have triggered a problematic interaction’.123 Implicit in their 
account is a distinction between individual mentalizing and collective mentalizing capacity. 
The former is defined as an ‘imaginative mental activity that entails perceiving and interpreting 
human behavior in terms of intentional mental states’.124 The latter is left undefined, but appears 
from the way the term is used to be a property of the family system that permits the identification 
and reflection on thoughts and feelings of and between its members. The individual mentalizing 
skills of family members support the collective mentalizing capacity. But even when these skills 
fail, the collective mentalizing capacity may have an independent contribution to offer.
By the same token, individual mentalizing skills may have reduced effect, or could even 
backfire, depending on the state of the family’s collective mentalizing capacity. Asen and 
Fonagy did not explicitly theorize collective non- mentalizing processes operating at the 
level of the family system, and distinct from the non- mentalizing of individuals in the family. 
However, they took steps towards such an account. They stated that ‘a system— be that a 
family or other social group— that is characterized by blindness to the mental states of self 
and others will tend to create systems of social influence where coercion and humiliation 
play a key role’.125 They discussed ‘escalating nonmentalizing interchanges’, in which the 
interactions of individuals in the family seem to become more than the sum of their parts in 
facilitating pretend mode, psychic equivalence, or teleological mode.126 They also describe 
the way that violence within the family system can be stabilized or destabilized by use of ex-
ternalization of the alien self by a member or members of the family. Yet, at the level of clin-
ical technique, their approach is quite firmly oriented by a focus on helping family members 
understand their own minds and those of others. There is little attention at the level of tech-
nique, beyond encouraging individual mentalizing, to facilitation of collective mentalizing 
capacity, or reduction of collective non- mentalizing processes. Despite clear apparent rele-
vance, it remains unexamined— for instance, whether the group dynamics that would facili-
tate automatic mentalizing would help or hinder controlled mentalizing, and vice versa.
A third partial exception to the neglect of collective mentalizing capacity is in work 
on group- based MBT, building on the long heritage of attention to group- level processes 
in group psychotherapy.127 Occasionally, Fonagy and colleagues describe the need to 
 122 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre.
 123 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Mentalizing Family Violence Part 2: Techniques and Interventions’. Family 
Process, 56(1):22– 44, p. 29.
 124 Ibid. 6– 21, p. 8.
 125 Ibid. 15.
 126 Ibid. 13. We have not found any point in Fonagy’s writings where he discusses Freud’s Dora case study. 
However, this seems exemplary in showing pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode helping to 
sustain one another within the family system. For a related interpretation of Dora, see Billig, M. (1999). Freudian 
Repression: Conversation Creating the Unconscious, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 127 Winship, G. (2003). ‘The Democratic Origins of the Term “Group Analysis”: Karl Mannheim’s Third 
Way for Psychoanalysis and Social Science’. Group Analysis, 36(1): 37– 51; Roseneil, S. (2019). ‘Broader (than 
Psychoanalysis) and Deeper (than Sociology): The Psychosocial Promise of Group Analysis’. Psychoanalysis, 
Culture & Society, 24: 493– 501.
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foster particular kinds of ‘group culture’ or ‘a secure atmosphere within the treatment mi-
lieu’.128 However, such claims are only ever made in passing. More generally, the collective 
mentalizing capacity of the MBT group has been treated as the sum of individual capabil-
ities.129 It is revealing that in Sigmund Karterud’s manual for group- based MBT he specific-
ally stated that the formation of group culture in contributing to or hindering mentalizing 
is beyond the scope of the manual.130 At points, Karterud referred to Foulke’s concept of 
‘matrix’, the communication network of the group materialized by the history of their inter-
action.131 He emphasized the importance of such collective processes in shaping the poten-
tial for mentalizing. However, he also urged that a distinction between MBT and many other 
forms of group therapy is that in the former the therapist should generally avoid discussion 
of group- level processes, because what matters is the individual’s capacity to consider other 
individual minds and their own. Karterud also perceived a risk that discussion of group- 
level processes had special risks for entry into pretend mode. The MBT therapist may cer-
tainly think about group processes, but the primary way in which they engage with them 
is through ‘stimulating and assisting the group in discussion of group relevant themes’.132 
There is barely mention even of group cohesiveness, which has otherwise been a concern in 
the literature on group therapy.133 Concern with the group matrix has also not spread be-
yond Karterud to other theorists of mentalization.134
The limited explicit concern with group culture, cohesion, and hierarchy by MBT therap-
ists has been criticized by some patients, who feel that sometimes the ‘elephant in the room’ 
is not raised by therapists when this appears to relate to a group- level rather than individual- 
level phenomenon.135 Other patients report their impression that group MBT is asking them 
to mentalize the group, suggesting that this task is felt by some as expected or demanded 
by group MBT, even if this not a goal of the developers of MBT or the therapists delivering 
 128 Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2004). Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorders: Mentalization 
Based Treatment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 176, 263.
 129 Potthoff and Moini- Afchari recommend a ‘binocular’ approach in which mentalization- based interventions 
are combined with attention to group- level processes. In this recommendation, it is assumed that mentalization- 
based group- therapy is concerned solely with individual minds, and offers little relevant to reflection or inter-
vention with group- level processes. Potthoff, P. and Moini- Afchari, U. (2014). ‘Mentalization- Based Treatment in 
Groups— A Paradigm Shift or Old Wine in New Skin?’. Group Analysis, 47(1): 3– 16.
 130 Karterud, S. (2015). Mentalization- Based Group Therapy (MBT- G), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 70.
 131 Foulkes, S. H. (1971). ‘The Group as Matrix of the Individual’s Mental Life’, in Selected Papers: Psychoanalysis 
and Group Analysis, London: Karnac Books, pp. 223– 234. See also Karterud, S., Folmo, E., and Kongerslev, M. T. 
(2019). ‘Personality and the Group Matrix’. Group Analysis, 52(4): 503– 519.
 132 Karterud, S. (2015). Mentalization- Based Group Therapy (MBT- G), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 90.
 133 Hornsey, M. J., Dwyer, L., and Oei, T. P. (2007). ‘Beyond Cohesiveness: Reconceptualizing the Link between 
Group Processes and Outcomes in Group Psychotherapy’. Small Group Research, 38(5): 567– 592.
 134 One exception: there is an extremely passing reference to the matrix concept in Fonagy, P., and Adshead, G. 
(2012). ‘How Mentalisation Changes the Mind’. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 18(5): 353– 362.
 135 Morken, K. T. E., Binder, P. E., Arefjord, N. M., and Karterud, S. W. (2019). ‘Mentalization- Based Treatment 
from the Patients’ Perspective– What Ingredients do they Emphasize?’. Frontiers in Psychology, 10. In a recent 
chapter, Bateman and colleagues have emphasized the importance of ‘active management of process of the group’. 
However, no more detail on what this entails is provided than i) managing the level of group arousal, and ii) ‘inter-
ventions that cultivate and maintain cohesion early in the group treatment’. Bateman, A., Kongerslev, M. and Bo, 
S. (2019). ‘Group Therapy for Adults and Adolescents’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of 
Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp.117– 133, 
pp. 130– 131. However, elsewhere in the same book, Bateman and colleagues observe that ‘group work stimulates 
a hierarchical process within a peer group, which can be harnessed in vivo by the clinicians working with the 
group to explore participants’ sensitivity to hierarchy and authority and the mentalisation distortions that ensue.’ 
Bateman, A., Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Antisocial Personality Disorder in Community and Prison 
Settings’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 335– 349, p. 340.
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it.136 In fact, occasional remarks by Fonagy and colleagues have suggested ambivalence 
about what relationship they wish patients to have with the group. For instance, Fonagy 
and Adshead encourage therapists to ‘engender attachment bonds between members of the 
group, and with the group as a whole’.137 But this is not a recommendation that has recurred 
in subsequent papers.
Mentalizing cultures
In 2019, Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy published a chapter in the Handbook of Mentalising 
in Mental Health Practice specifically focused on social systems. As well as the culmination 
of previous partial attempts to address the topic, the choice to focus a chapter on social 
systems might be placed in the context of two other trends. First, Jurist has observed that 
mentalization theory must surely muster some response to the destruction of communal 
supports and dehumanizing government policies. These throw into relief the extent to which 
environments capable of sustaining mentalization and epistemic trust are dependent on so-
cietal infrastructures and collective processes, and we have seen how these can be broken or 
dismantled.138
Direct attention to social systems in the Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health 
Practice might also be placed in the broader context of increased attention to this topic over 
the past decade from across various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. For 
instance, work in neuroscience has documented that the activation of brain regions asso-
ciated with mentalization, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, temporo- parietal junction, 
and precuneus, do not distinguish individual from group targets. The activation appears to 
be the same for participants reflecting on the potential ‘intentions’ of an individual or an or-
ganization.139 In fact, people can attribute mental states (thoughts and feelings) to a group 
even if they attribute those mental states to none of the group’s individual members, and vice 
versa.140 In 2011, Fonagy praised the growing development of attention to group- level pro-
cesses in organizations and societies within psychoanalytic theory.141 The need for renewed 
attention to group- level processes has similarly been urged in recent years by Twemlow, 
who has explicitly reappraised his work with Fonagy in terms of an intervention to improve 
community- level processes in the schools.142 However, Twemlow drops the mentalizing 
 136 See e.g. Arefjord, N., Morken, K., and Lossius, K. (2019). ‘Comorbid Substance Use Disorder and Personality 
Disorder’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 403– 416: ‘It makes me dizzy sometimes, trying to 
mentalise myself, the group, and my family, it is too much for me . . . [with a smile]’ (p. 414).
 137 Fonagy, P. and Adshead, G. (2012). ‘How mentalisation changes the mind’. Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 
18(5): 353– 362, p. 355. See also Esposito, G., Karterud, S., and Freda, M. F. (2019). ‘Mentalizing Underachievement 
in Group Counseling: Analyzing the Relationship between Members’ Reflective Functioning and Counselors’ 
Interventions’. Psychological Services, Early View: ‘The crucial interventions were exploratory questions on mental 
states addressed to the individual or to the group and defense interpretations.’
 138 Jurist, E. (2018). Minding Emotions: Cultivating Mentalisation in Psychotherapy, New York: Guilford Press.
 139 Jenkins, A. C., Dodell- Feder, D., Saxe, R., and Knobe, J. (2014). ‘The Neural Bases of Directed and 
Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents’. PLoS One, 9(8): e105341. For a parallel in phenomen-
ology, see Salice, A. and Taipale, J. (2015). ‘Group- Directed Empathy: A Phenomenological Account’. Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, 46(2): 163– 184.
 140 Jenkins, A. C., Dodell- Feder, D., Saxe, R., and Knobe, J. (2014). ‘The Neural Bases of Directed and 
Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents’. PLoS One, 9(8): e105341.
 141 Fonagy, P. (2011). Back cover endorsement for E. Hopper and H. Weinberg (eds), The Social Unconscious in 
Persons, Groups and Societies, Volume 1: Mainly Theory, London: Karnac Books.
 142 E.g. Koh, E. and Twemlow, S. W. (2017). ‘Towards a Psychoanalytic Concept of Community (III): A Proposal’. 
International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 14(4): 261– 272, p. 264.
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framework in doing so, presumably following Fonagy’s classical assumption that only indi-
viduals can be the subject or target of mentalizing.
In their 2019 chapter, Asen and colleagues reflected that the long- standing focus on indi-
vidual mentalizing since Fonagy’s work in the late 1980s was itself shaped by cultural values, 
which trained attention on individual responses to challenges. They acknowledged that, in 
their culture, an excessive causal role is attributed to individual agency compared with the 
contribution of contextual and collective factors.143 By contrast, ‘in other cultures, the cen-
tral unit is not the body or “self ” of the individual, but the community and especially the 
family’.144 For individuals to be judged not to be mentalizing because they are concerned 
with the dynamics or cultural memory of communal units rather than individuals would 
seem ethnocentric.145 Asen and colleagues accept that mentalisation- based interventions 
may risk exactly such ethnocentrism to the extent that they treat a patient’s attention to the 
beliefs and affects of collective units as either outright non- mentalizing, or as a distraction 
from the real work of attending to the beliefs and affects of individuals. And to the degree 
that a therapeutic modality is institutionally ethnocentric, it is likely to flounder, or at least 
face serious obstacles, in attempts to generate epistemic trust.146
The same would be true for other communal- level processes, such as social antagon-
isms, wealth inequalities, and structural discrimination. The ‘distributed cognition’ possible 
in friendships, considered earlier in the chapter, and in group problem solving would like-
wise be excluded as a legitimate target of mentalizing.147 As conventionally formulated, if 
patients were to raise such matters during MBT, technically this would be considered not 
 143 In a recent conference presentation, Fonagy has taken this further, reviewing research on the propensity 
to underestimate the importance of social factors. Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘The Future Prospects of Mentalization- 
Based Therapies’, 5th International Congress of Mentalisation Based Treatments, Haarlem, The Netherlands, 22 
November: ‘Our view of the person overemphasizes individual agency.’ Fonagy discussed a paper by Haslam and 
colleagues, which showed that, while social integration and social support are among the most potent predictors of 
life expectancy, participants rated them the least potent from 11 options. Haslam, S. A., McMahon, C., Cruwys, T., 
Haslam, C., Jetten, J., and Steffens, N. K. (2018). ‘Social Cure, what Social Cure? The Propensity to Underestimate 
the Importance of Social Factors for Health’. Social Science & Medicine, 198: 14– 21.
 144 Asen, E., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Social Systems: Beyond the Microcosm of the Individual 
and Family’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice 
(2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 229– 243, p. 233. Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. 
(2019). ‘Supporting the Social Triad. A Commentary on Keeping Culture in Mind: A Systematic Review and Initial 
Conceptualization of Mentalizing from a Cross- Cultural Perspective’, Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 
26(4): e12305 : ‘Coming from an attachment theory background, we have emphasized the individual’s experience 
of being inadequately mentalized as the root cause of an incapacity to trust. This may have been inappropriate 
and was probably the consequence of our own cultural bias.’ Jurist has explicitly argued that the boundaries of 
mentalizing should be large enough to include an individual’s attention to, and reflection on, cultural memory. 
Jurist, E. (2018). Minding Emotions: Cultivating Mentalisation in Psychotherapy, New York: Guilford Press, p. 141.
 145 The argument that the mentalizing or and by collective units needs to be considered to avoid an 
ethnocentric theory has been developed in Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things 
Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed 
at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- series- podcast/ ; Slides. Accessed at: https:// 
www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 02/ Podcast- 2.24.19- compressed.pdf. A par-
allel argument has recently been made by Pereira and Debbané. Drawing on Foucault, they have claimed that 
mentalization- based therapists should not just facilitate mentalization of i) self and ii) other, but also on iii) the 
cultural and institutional context of the therapeutic work itself. Without this sociological reflective functioning, 
they worry that therapists risk becoming insensitive to, or overburdened by, the power- relations that structure the 
therapeutic encounter, and as a result lose track of the basis and qualities of the patient’s mental states. Pereira, J. 
G. and Debbané, M. (2018). ‘An Integrative- Relational Approach in Schizophrenia: From Philosophical Principles 
to Mentalization- Based Practice’, in I. Hipólito, J. Gonçalves, and J. G. Pereira (eds), Schizophrenia and Common 
Sense, New York: Springer, pp. 193– 207.
 146 This latter point is implicit in the 2019 chapter, but was made explicitly by Fonagy in Fonagy, P. and 
Wampold, B. (2016). ‘Psychotherapy Debate with Peter Fonagy and Bruce Wampold at the Nordic Conference on 
Mental Health’. Accessed at: https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=U5fhhAZnduU.
 147 See e.g. Laughlin, P. R. (2011). Group Problem Solving, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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mentalizing, and the therapist would be enjoined to redirect the patient’s attention towards 
the thoughts and feelings of individuals, specifically.148 MBT therapists may even see civic 
disobedience and political activism, perhaps correctly, as sustained by the sense of urgency 
from psychic equivalence. Individual therapists may adapt their practice, but technically the 
modality would suggest redirecting patients away from this kind of thinking. Critics such as 
Parker have criticized Fonagy and colleagues, alleging that MBT is inherently normalizing, 
with ‘patients effectively told how they could or should feel about key events in their lives or 
about their relationships with others.’149 This criticism is certainly too strong. Nonetheless, 
there is a more subtle normativity in MBT. The modality aims to get patients to engage-
ment in mentalizing, but with mentalizing defined in politically and culturally circum-
scribed ways. Asen and colleagues appear to acknowledge this as a problem in recognizing 
that the modality was shaped by cultural values that directed focus to individual responses 
to challenges.
The Asen and colleagues chapter has three ramifications for the fundamental conceptual-
ization of mentalization:
 1. It implies recognition of the potential for shared wishes and plans, for ‘we’ or ‘they’— 
not merely ‘I’— to be the agent of action, to possess thoughts, and to sustain feelings. 
For ‘us’ to establish an institution, buy a flat, or perform an opera is not merely the 
aggregate of our efforts, purchases, or performances, but an irreducibly collective 
undertaking and commitment.150 The ‘irreducibly collective mode of cognition called 
the we- mode’ has been highlighted explicitly by Fonagy in recent workshops and 
conference presentations,151 and experimental support has been offered by Csibra 
and colleagues, who have shown that the results of judgements made on the basis of 
‘we- intentions’ differ from those occurring on the basis of I- intentions’.152 Even in the 
 148 Lyotard would call this a ‘differend’: the patterned and potentially wholly inadvertent subtraction of rele-
vance from particular forms of social suffering, through a practice that promises acknowledgement— but does 
so on the basis of limited terms. Lyotard, J. (1988). The Differend: Phases in Dispute, trans. G. Van den Abbeele, 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press. Our point here is regarding the general logic of MBT as set out 
in written texts, rather than how Fonagy or Bateman would individually practise as clinicians. In fact, there appears 
to be only one instance where Fonagy and colleagues mention patients discussing political views within MBT, and 
the nature of the case makes it difficult to extrapolate: Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based 
Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Many MBT- 
ASPD groups begin with dialogue seemingly in pseudo- philosophical- political mode about how awful the system 
is, how no one can be trusted, how the police are corrupt, and so on. In essence, this is pretend mode. Contrary to 
the usual exhortation about pretend mode (challenge it and do not allow it to become embedded), it is important 
to allow the participants to do this at the beginning of a group to give them a sense of unity’ (p. 383); ‘The aim of 
the group is to encourage participants to identify their current feeling in the group rather than to express bitter-
ness about external organisations, and to increase their recognition of the way context influences their current 
feeling’ (p. 406). See also Aiello, G. and Pariante, C. M. (2013). ‘Citizen, Interrupted: The 2011 English Riots from 
a Psychosocial Perspective’. Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences, 22(1): 75– 79. Here the London riots are inter-
preted as reflecting a lack of mentalizing on the part of the rioters. The authors acknowledge that ‘those arrested 
during the riots mainly came from deprived areas and had the poorest educational backgrounds’ (p. 75), but do not 
apparently regard this as having played a causal role.
 149 Parker, I. (2019). Psychoanalysis, Clinic and Context, London: Routledge, p. 183.
 150 Jankovic, M. and Ludwig, K. (eds), (2017). The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, 
London: Routledge; Salmela, M. and Nagatsu, M. (2017). ‘How Does it Really Feel to Act Together? Shared 
Emotions and the Phenomenology of We- Agency’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(3): 449– 470.
 151 ‘The Future Prospects of Mentalization Based Therapies’, 5th International Congress of Mentalisation Based 
Treatments, Haarlem, The Netherlands, 22 November, discussing Gallotti, M. and Frith, C. D. (2013). ‘Social 
Cognition in the We- Mode’. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17(4): 160– 165. Also Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Trust and 
Interdependence: Lessons from the Study of Human Attachments’. UCL Minds Event, virtual talk, 25 June.
 152 Török, G., Pomiechowska, B., Csibra, G. and Sebanz, N. (2019). ‘Rationality in Joint Action: Maximizing 
Coefficiency in Coordination’. Psychological Science, 30(6): 930– 941 .
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archetypal scene of parental reflective function, ‘we- intentions’ may be relevant: for in-
stance, when a parent displays marked mirroring and ostensive cues relating to same- 
sex gender roles or a collective family culture or project (‘yes, darling, that’s how we do 
it’). Conversely, if ‘we’ or ‘they’ can sustain ‘we- intentions’, then ‘we’ (or ‘they’) can also 
be subject to mentalizing. Asen and colleagues appear to be moving towards the treat-
ment of social or cultural settings as legitimate targets of mentalizing— to the degree 
that these units have collectively held beliefs and feelings.
 2. A second implication is that intentions, thoughts, and feelings can be shaped by the 
qualities and projects of collective units. This might include their distributions of social 
status or material resources, lines of coercion or solidarity, and collectively held values 
or affective atmospheres.153 Consideration of the role of these units in facilitating or 
hindering mentalizing may have earlier been regarded as either non- mentalizing or 
as a distraction from mentalizing. In 2012, Asen and Fonagy had explicitly drawn 
the comparison that ‘whereas systemic practitioners might seek explanations in the 
individual’s context, whether it is their family, social or cultural setting . . . an MBT- F 
therapist may, under certain circumstances, view this as a non- mentalizing stance to 
adopt’.154 The comments by Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy in 2019 suggest a wish to 
clarify the circumstances in which attention to social or cultural settings should not be 
regarded as non- mentalizing. This aligns with Fonagy’s growing conviction that ‘poor 
mental health is not simply in our individual minds. It is part of a social condition.’155
 3. Third, Asen and colleagues appear now to suggest that different collective units, 
including societies and institutions, may differentially facilitate or hinder different 
forms of mentalizing (e.g. of the self or of others) and of non- mentalizing (e.g. pretend 
mode or psychic equivalence). This suggests directions for elaborating the develop-
mental model of mentalization and epistemic trust in the future to take into account 
cultural moderators and mediators. For instance, Aival- Naveh and colleagues have ar-
gued that ‘the suspension of epistemic mistrust may be dependent not only on accurate 
mentalizing and ostensive cueing from an attachment figure, but also on norms and 
social roles, most notably— filial piety and respect’.156
Despite these advances, the 2019 chapter gives the impression of remaining suspended be-
tween two different models of social systems, without thorough integration. For instance, 
 153 See Seyfert, R. (2012). ‘Beyond Personal Feelings and Collective Emotions: Toward a Theory of Social 
Affect’. Theory, Culture & Society, 29(6): 27– 46; Salmela, M. (2012). ‘Shared emotions’. Philosophical Explorations, 
15(1): 33– 46; Anderson, B. (2014). Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions, London: Routledge; 
Mercer, J. (2014). ‘Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity’. International Theory, 6(3): 515– 535; Krueger, 
J. and Szanto, T. (2016). ‘Extended Emotions’. Philosophy Compass, 11(12): 863– 878; Smith, E. R. and Mackie, D. M. 
(2016). ‘Group- Level Emotions’. Current Opinion in Psychology, 11: 15– 19; Collins, S. (2018). ‘ “The Government 
Should be Ashamed”: On the Possibility of Organisations’ Emotional Duties’. Political Studies, 66(4): 813– 829.
 154 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization‐Based Therapeutic Interventions for Families’. Journal of 
Family Therapy, 34(4): 347– 370, p. 351.
 155 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Mental Health is a Care We must Share’. Guardian, 13 October. Accessed at: https:// www.
theguardian.com/ society/ 2019/ oct/ 13/ isolation- not- social- media- cause- teenager- mental- ill- health.
 156 Aival- Naveh, E., Rothschild‐Yakar, L., and Kurman, J. (2019). ‘Keeping Culture in Mind: A Systematic Review 
and Initial Conceptualization of Mentalizing from a Cross‐Cultural Perspective’. Clinical Psychology: Science 
and Practice, 26(4): 25: ‘different aspects of mentalizing may be more important depending upon culture. 
Consequently, it can be expected that different cultures will exhibit different mentalizing profiles . . . we cannot 
simply assume that people across cultures have a similar ability, or need, to perceive internal mental states.’ See 
also Fonagy, P. and Campbell, C. (2019). ‘Supporting the Social Triad. A Commentary on Keeping Culture in 
Mind: A Systematic Review and Initial Conceptualization of Mentalizing from a Cross- Cultural Perspective’. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 26(4): e12305 .
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even on a single page (p. 233), the authors present two different definitions of the term 
‘culture’:
Culture can be defined as a dynamic system of explicit and implicit rules established by 
groups in order to ensure their survival, involving attitudes, values, beliefs, traditions, cus-
toms, norms and behaviours . . . Culture could also be described as a system of knowledge 
shared by a relatively large group of people, passed on from one generation to the next.157
It would appear that the authors have two different objects in mind, though they give them 
both the same name, expressing— apparently without realizing— a wider divergence in social 
scientific practice between two uses of the term ‘culture’.158 A first sense is ‘anthropological 
culture’, taken to mean a collective form of life that shapes the perceptions and intentions 
of its members, with particular priority given to shared myths, presuppositions, and taken- 
for- granted practices. Anthropological culture also encompasses the role of social institu-
tions and forms of self- perception in sustaining these myths, presuppositions, and practices. 
A second sense is ‘cognitive informational culture’, taken to mean the net information held 
by members of a group.159 In the former, the social system is conceived as having a degree of 
autonomy from its members, with group- level dynamics and attributes.160 In the latter, the 
social system is conceived as the sum of the information held by its members.161
To illustrate the difference: when a set of tools or concepts depend upon extensive spe-
cialist knowledge for their use, sustaining epistemic vigilance regarding their appropriate 
application hinders their spread into anthropological culture but not their ascension into 
cognitive informational culture. An example is the Strange Situation as a technical research 
 157 Asen, E., Campbell, C. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Social Systems: Beyond the Microcosm of the Individual and 
Family’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 229– 243, p. 233.
 158 Duncan, J. S. and Duncan, N. G. (2004). ‘Culture Unbound’. Environment and Planning A, 36(3): 391– 403; 
Fornäs, J. (2017). Defending Culture: Conceptual Foundations and Contemporary Debate, London: Palgrave. 
Though not immediately relevant to this discussion, it may be helpful to note that a third sense of ‘culture’ also op-
erates within social scientific discourse, distinct from anthropological culture and cognitive informational culture. 
This is culture as ‘refinement’.
 159 In psychoanalytic terms, anthropological culture can be described as prioritizing rows C (myths) and D 
(preconceptions) on Bion’s grid— elements that do not form discrete and determinate thoughts, and may reside 
as much in the community as within the minds of individuals. Cognitive informational culture can be described 
as prioritizing rows E (conception) and F (concept)— elements that form relatively more refined, individual 
thoughts. Bion, W. R. (1963). Elements of Psychoanalysis, London: Karnac Books. To draw a distinction between 
anthropological culture and cognitive informational culture is not to imply that they are not compatible. For in-
stance, Vygotsky held that anthropological culture organizes the kinds of tasks a child faces and the kinds of cog-
nitive informational tools provided or withheld for responding to those tasks. Luria, A. R. (1979). The Making of 
Mind: A Personal Account of Soviet Psychology, trans. Michael Cole and Sheila Cole, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, p. 44.
 160 This model of culture seems to be presumed when Allison and Campbell write about ‘cultural barriers to 
considering the perspectives of children and young people’. Examples given by the authors include ‘the stigma 
around mental health problems, which challenge the limits of our capacity for understanding and can evoke 
fearful responses, and the systemic tendency for the political process to neglect children because they do not 
have the vote’. Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre, p. 11. Cf. Bonanno, G. A., Romero, S. A., and Klein, S. I. (2015). ‘The 
Temporal Elements of Psychological Resilience: An Integrative Framework for the Study of Individuals, Families, 
and Communities’. Psychological Inquiry, 26(2): 139– 169.
 161 The orientation of Fonagy and colleagues towards this latter definition of culture is certainly influenced by 
Gergely. However, an earlier and background influence may be Winnicott who, after acknowledging that the term 
has multiple meanings, stated that ‘in using the word culture I am thinking of the inherited tradition. I am thinking 
of something that is in the common pool of humanity, into which individuals and groups of people may contribute, 
and from which we may all draw if we have somewhere to put what we find.’ Winnicott, D. W. (1967). ‘The Location 
of Cultural Experience’. The International Journal of Psychonalysis, 48: 368– 372, p. 370.
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tool, constrained in its use by expertise and resource demands. When a set of tools or con-
cepts are circulated in a ‘light’ commodified version that requires little or no specialist know-
ledge, sustaining epistemic credulity regarding their appropriate application hinders their 
use within cognitive informational culture but precisely facilitates their spread within an-
thropological culture. An illustration is the idea of ‘attachment’, which has seen widespread 
take- up, but with poor alignment with how the concept was used in Bowlby’s technical 
writings.162 Another example might be the concept of ‘mentalization’ itself, which can have 
diverging roles in attempts to transfer technical information (cognitive informational cul-
ture) and in the communal processes that operate through shared myths and presupposi-
tions operating within psychological research and practice (anthropological culture).
The two uses of the term ‘culture’ are reflected, and not reconciled, in uses of the concept 
of epistemic trust by Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy in thinking about social systems:
 1. In some cases, the term ‘social system’ is used to refer to anthropological culture and 
explore collective characteristics that facilitate or hinder individuals and groups from 
learning from experience.163 This is clearest in the account by Asen and colleagues of 
the work of Bevington and Fuggle on creating organizational structures facilitative 
of mentalization- based integrative treatment. Indeed, there is friendly criticism of 
Fonagy’s writings in Bevington and Fuggle’s wish for ‘a shift away from the hope or ex-
pectation of creating individual mentalising’ in their chapter of the Handbook.164
 2. In other cases, however, and perhaps predominantly, the term ‘social system’ is used by 
Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy in a way that makes it seem to represent the sum of indi-
vidual qualities that help or hinder learning from experience. This learning might be 
at a group or institutional level or at an individual level, but, with culture interpreted 
as cognitive information held by members of a group, mentalizing remains solely the 
preserve of individuals. Collective mentalizing capacity falls into the background.
The two concepts of culture are not reconciled, and at times produce significant incoherence 
in the chapter. For instance, the authors seem unsure about whether the welfare state i) im-
proves the aggregate epistemic trust and mentalizing of citizens and/ or ii) reduces violence 
through shaping the collective norms, priorities, and concerns of institutions and the wider 
society.165
In contrast to the relatively poor coherence in their discussion of epistemic trust, in their 
2019 chapter, Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy are more explicit than in earlier work about the 
existence of collective- level mentalizing processes. They even argue that it is possible to be 
‘mentalised by relevant social systems’, not just individuals, and that individuals can ‘attempt 
 162 Duschinsky, R. (2020). Cornerstones of Attachment Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 163 See also Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds 
About: Part 2. Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social 
Communication’. Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9: Compromise of the pro-
cesses of social learning ‘is a systemic failure of communication that may characterize a family, the members of a 
social group such as a gang, a social subculture, or indeed an entire culture’.
 164 Bevington, D. and Fuggle, P. (2019). ‘AMBIT: Engaging the Client and Community of Minds’, in Anthony 
Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 211– 228, p. 221.
 165 The same ambiguity is present in Lorenzini, N., Campbell, C. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Mentalisation and its 
Role in Processing Trauma’, in Bernd Huppertz (ed.), Approaches to Psychic Trauma: Theory and Practice, Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 403– 422.
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to mentalise social systems’, not just one another.166 This is an important statement, re-
adjusting the fundamental boundaries of mentalization theory. Teams, groups, organizations, 
societies are now to be treated as able to give and receive recognition; this makes them ‘partial 
persons’ in terms of their capacity to mentalize and be mentalized, on the basis of beliefs and 
affective atmosphere implicated in joint actions, preferences, and duties.167 One case is the 
work of Fonagy and colleagues themselves. Over decades, this research collective have them-
selves been distinctive in their remarkable capacity to incorporate learning from other spe-
cific collectives and research traditions within the contested space of academic knowledge.168
In recent presentations, Fonagy has proposed that this turn to attention to social sys-
tems and communities represents a ‘Copernican revolution’.169 The experience of being 
mentalized by social systems, more than mentalization by individual caregivers, may be the 
primary basis for the potential for epistemic trust, via secure attachment to and identifica-
tion with the community. He has suggested that ‘the infant is responding to the sensitivity of 
a network towards their sense of agency, how much the network is paying attention to them, 
not a single individual. That is what fosters trust.’ As such, ‘we ignore too much the import-
ance of the infant recognizing the specificity of the other as an instance of the general other. 
This particular other is part of the network of “my group of people, my community” to which 
I belong, and represents my identity.’170 A sense of belonging to the community facilitates 
epistemic trust in that community. Fonagy has therefore urged a shift in the study of child 
development to ‘assess the caregiver network’s sensitive responsiveness’, and test the contri-
bution of this collective capacity to the development of epistemic trust, and conversely to the 
development of personality disorders.171 He expressed concern that accounts of mentalizing 
 166 Asen, E., Campbell, C. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Social Systems: Beyond the Microcosm of the Individual and 
Family’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 229– 243, p. 235.
 167 However, it is unclear whether Asen and colleagues regard the capacity for individuals to be ‘mentalised by 
relevant social systems’ as implying some concept of group mind or ‘group experience’; it would depend on what 
was meant, and the kind of social system in question. Cf. Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘The Big Kahuna: Countries with the 
Highest Incidence of BPD’. Accessed at: https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=lcVSMuxApaY: ‘To me, mentalising 
is not something that exists within an individual. Not even something that exists between a mother and a child. 
Not even something that exists between a family. It is something that a community of human beings owns.’
 168 Cf. Wilholt, T. (2016). ‘Collaborative Research, Scientific Communities, and the Social Diffusion of 
Trustworthiness’, in M. S. Brady and M. Fricker (eds), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of 
Collectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 218– 233.
 169 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from 
Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- 
series- podcast; Slides. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 02/ 
Podcast- 2.24.19- compressed.pdf. Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘The Future Prospects of Mentalization Based Therapies’, 5th 
International Congress of Mentalisation Based Treatments, Haarlem, The Netherlands, 22 November.
 170 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from 
Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- 
series- podcast; Slides. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 02/ 
Podcast- 2.24.19- compressed.pdf.
Fonagy cites Weisner: ‘The question that is important for many, if not most, parents and communities is not, “Is 
[this individual] child ‘securely attached?” ’, but rather, ‘How can I ensure that my child knows whom to trust and 
how to share appropriate social connections to others?’ Weisner, T. S. (2015). ‘The Socialization of Trust: Plural 
Caregiving and Diverse Pathways in Human Development across Cultures’, in H. Otto and H. Keller (eds), Different 
Faces of Attachment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 263– 277, p. 263.
 171 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from 
Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- 
series- podcast; Slides. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 02/ 
Podcast- 2.24.19- compressed.pdf. See also Dagan, O. and Sagi‐Schwartz, A. (2018). ‘Early Attachment Network 
with Mother and Father: An Unsettled Issue’. Child Development Perspectives, 12(2): 115– 121. The contribution of 
in- group/ out- group dynamics to mentalizing and epistemic trust had earlier been discussed briefly in Luyten, P. 
and Fonagy, P. (2015). ‘The Neurobiology of Mentalizing’. Personality Disorders, 6: 366– 379.
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and epistemic trust have over- emphasized the importance of family interactions, and under-
estimated the importance of modern sociological processes that isolate families and hinder 
the functioning and integrity of communities, undermining their capacity to show sen-
sitivity to individuals’ emergent sense of personal agency. Rather than treat ‘resilience’ as 
equivalent to epistemic trust (see Chapter 7), Fonagy has now proposed that we ‘conceptu-
alize “resilience” less as a quality held by the child, and more as an outcome of the quality of 
the social network surrounding the child and the child’s capacity to access that network’.172 
In the context of the COVID- 19 lockdown, Fonagy has argued that this situation has espe-
cially highlighted just how limited the nuclear family is, and how important the wider social 
network, for meeting children’s needs.173
In their 2019 chapter, Asen and colleagues develop a framework for thinking about the 
harms of collective non- mentalizing. They give the example of organizations in which ‘psy-
chic equivalence becomes institutional— it characterizes the function of a social system’.174 
The paradigmatic example, for them, is George Orwell’s dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty- 
Four, in which thoughts and feelings are treated as real political threats, and therefore must 
be controlled, with a single viewpoint defended rigidly and even violently. However, Asen 
and colleagues observe that many more familiar social systems— schools, health services, 
political infrastructures— develop related characteristics as psychic equivalence becomes 
institutional.
Similarly, pretend mode and teleological mode can likewise become institutionalized in 
the culture and even the protocols of organizations.175 In pretend mode, especially in the 
form of hypermentalizing, within the institution there may be ‘endless “communication” and 
searching but it is destined to yield no change’. Meanwhile, there may be all kinds of awful be-
haviour contrary to the organization’s stated values, which are not registered due to the dom-
inance of pretend mode.176 In institutionalized teleological mode, only concrete outcomes 
 172 Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Meeting the Mental Health Needs of Looked- After Children and Care Leavers’, in Marc 
Bush (ed.) Addressing Adversity: Prioritising Adversity and Trauma- Informed Care for Children and Young People 
in England, London: Young Minds, pp. 170– 179, p. 176. Accessed at: http:// www.instituteofhealthequity.org/ 
resources- reports/ addressing- adversity- prioritising- adversity- and- trauma- informed- care- for- children- and- 
young- people- in- england.
 173 Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Trust and Interdependence: Lessons from the Study of Human Attachments’. UCL Minds 
Event, virtual talk, 25 June. See also Lassri, D. and Desatnik, A. (2020). ‘Losing and regaining reflective func-
tioning in the times of COVID- 19: Clinical risks and opportunities from a mentalizing approach’. Psychological 
Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 12(S1): S38.
 174 Asen, E., Campbell, C. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Social Systems: Beyond the Microcosm of the Individual and 
Family’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 229– 243, p. 231.
 175 An example is given in passing by Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment 
for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘Intriguingly, the justice 
system has, by and large, adopted the same teleological stance. The logic of “justice being seen to be done” is ac-
ceptable to prisoners and guards in equal measure’ (p. 64). The potential for externalization of the alien self to 
become institutionalized has been a familiar concern in psychodynamic organizational theory, under the rubric 
of projective identification. See e.g. Hinshelwood, R. D. and Chiesa, M. (eds), (2002). Organisations, Anxieties and 
Defences: Towards a Psychoanalytic Social Psychology. New York: Wiley- Blackwell. The series editors were Fonagy 
and Hepworth.
 176 The characteristics of institutionalized pretend mode are not detailed in the 2019 chapter, but appear 
in an earlier conference presentation with substantial overlap in content: Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization 
and Attachment: The Implication for Community Based Therapies’. Paper presented at the Community of 
Communities 10th Annual Forum, March, London. Accessed at: https:// www.slideshare.net/ raffaelebarone/ 
mentalization- and- attachment- the- implication- for- community- based- therapies: ‘Social systems that create fear 
and hyperactivate attachment can destroy thinking capacity and force the system back to pre- mentalistic modes 
of social thinking. Such social systems can be self- reinforcing and therefore highly stable in their instability. They 
undermine the very social mechanism that could alter their character: human collaboration (negotiation and cre-
ativity).’ Institutionalized pretend mode is also described in Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- 
Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press: ‘People 
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matter. For instance, New Public Management in the UK is a system oriented by teleological 
mode, in which the efforts of workers are not to be treated as real or meaningful unless they 
have demonstrable and successful consequences that can be audited and monitored by the 
system.177 This is certainly the institutionalized culture of many contemporary health and 
social care services.178 The institutionalization of teleological mode can also make organ-
izations intensely concerned with perceived threats to their reputation, perceived as having 
catastrophic potential consequences.179
Since the 1990s, Fonagy has from time to time offered his personal impression of a ‘de-
humanisation, the stripping of humanity, that is occurring at all levels of culture’ in social 
systems.180 This reflects major social and economic shifts, as well as the pervasive social ex-
posure associated with new media, which in interaction have contributed to an increased 
recognition of mental illness and likely also a real rise in certain mental health issues among 
young people. Fonagy and colleagues have speculated that the increase in BPD may reflect a 
response to fragmented, dehumanizing social systems in the context of modernity. Fonagy 
has offered the examples of China and Russia as illustrating the societal conditions for the 
production of BPD, the prevalence of which has risen vertiginously in line with social frag-
mentation.181 However, he sees such particular cases as intensified forms of a sociological 
process characteristic of modernity more generally:
experience their thoughts and feelings as having no consequence for others, leading ultimately to the experience of 
an empty and meaningless social existence: this is a social system that is operating in the pretend mode. Selfishness 
and extreme egocentricism then emerge out of the unreality of anything other than one’s own thoughts and feel-
ings’ (p. 451).
 177 New Public Management is comprised of seven doctrines: 1) Hands- on and active management; 2) Explicit 
standards and measures of performance; 3) Emphasis on measuring the quality of outputs; 4) Breaking up state 
services so that they can be placed in competition; 5) Promoting competition between services; 6) Importing tech-
niques for controlling workers from the private sector; 7) Disciplining costs and promotion of cost- effectiveness. 
McLaughlin, K., Osborne, S. P., and Ferlie, E. (eds), (2002). New Public Management: Current Trends and Future 
Prospects, London: Routledge. An early use of mentalization theory to think about the implications of these doc-
trines for an institution’s capacity to acknowledge staff thoughts and feelings was attempted by Siltala, J. (2013). 
‘New Public Management: The Evidence- Based Worst Practice?’. Administration & Society, 45(4): 468– 493.
 178 Bevington, D., Fuggle, P., Cracknell, L. and Fonagy, P. (2017). Adaptive Mentalisation- Based Integrative 
Treatment: A Guide for Teams to Develop Systems of Care, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 179 It should be qualified that the institutionalization of non- mentalizing is not, in itself, a problem. Consider 
the court system: there is extensive pretend mode in all the court ritual, both symbolizing and masking that the 
institution is backed in the final instance by the violence of the state; this helps set the frame for psychic equiva-
lence within which the court is felt as holding authority; the result is the capacity to treat behaviour and evidence in 
teleological mode— for instance, with the payment of damages treated as assuaging personal insult or injury. Each 
of these has its place for the rule of law, but also produces serious and structural obstacles to mentalizing in this 
environment.
 180 E.g. Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Interview with Peter Fonagy’, in S. M. Stein and J. Stein (eds), Psychotherapy in 
Practice: A Life in the Mind, Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, pp. 77– 98: ‘An interest in the human mind is be-
coming less important as part of the professional work of a number of key groups, including doctors . . . This is a 
major danger, a danger in how we handle ourselves as people and how society works. I don’t think it is the doctors’ 
fault, nor is it due to the advancement of science— it is a cultural thing. It is the dehumanization, the stripping of 
humanity, that is occurring at all levels of culture. If you look at television, for example, you will see people being 
portrayed as behaving like machines. The “cops and robbers” kind of stories where people are shot or shoot without 
intention, without desire and without belief. They also die without intention . . . I think this is mirrored in medical 
education, which is allowing itself to focus on technical advantages while de- emphasizing the more human aspects 
of patients . . . I’ve been teaching medical students for seventeen years and I’ve noticed a change . . . I don’t know 
what’s causing it, nor what the main driving force behind it is, but I think it is culture- wide’ (p. 84). See also Fonagy, 
P. (1999). ‘Male Perpetrators of Violence against Women: An Attachment Theory Perspective’. Journal of Applied 
Psychoanalytic Studies, 1(1): 7– 27: ‘Society has relinquished its caretaking function, demolished its institutions for 
supporting emotional development’ (p. 23).
 181 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from 
Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- 
series- podcast. At the same time, the increased use of non- mentalizing prompted by fragmented, dehumanizing 
social systems in turn can reinforce them: ‘Social systems that create fear and hyperactivate attachment can destroy 
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The anomie of modern life— that is, a lack of social connectiveness leading to 
dysregulation— described by Durkheim, and connected by other authors with the condi-
tions that might account for national variations in BPD, can be read as a description of a 
systemic collapse of epistemic trust.182
The comparison with Durkheim is revealing. What is shifting in modernity in general, and 
which is revealed most starkly in China and Russia, is not simply a breakdown of the experi-
ence of the claims and experience of others as dependable, generalizable, or relevant. It is a 
systematic collapse— i.e. a collapse at a systemic level, rather than only something occurring 
for individuals. For Durkheim, the shift away from solidarity based on strong social ties, 
in the context of modernity, does not alter the fact that individuals fundamentally remain 
shaped by their cultural and economic ecology, which channels relatively shared forms of 
moral and social perception and interpretation based on shared practices.183 This cultural 
and economic ecology will facilitate or undermine our experience of the claims and ex-
perience of others as dependable, generalizable, or relevant. For Durkheim, the most im-
portant aspect of this ecology was economic inequality, which hinders the achievement of 
solidarity between individuals.184 In the terms of Fonagy and colleagues, it hinders collective 
mentalizing capacity.185
In countries like the UK, Fonagy has speculated that the availability of mental health 
services and improvements may be mitigating the rise in BPD that would otherwise have 
been expected in the fragmented, dehumanizing social systems that have taken hold in so 
many sectors over recent decades.186 The epidemiology of BPD in part reflects its social con-
struction by infrastructures of psychological classification. However, additionally, Fonagy 
has suggested that its epidemiology to an extent reflects the relative presence of anomie. 
Within societies, for example, Fonagy has proposed that the greater incidence of BPD 
among women may reflect their dehumanization and objectification, in which full subject-
ivity is tacitly ascribed more to men than to women in countless ways even while equality 
has ostensibly been achieved.187 As one case, Fonagy has drawn attention to the way that, 
thinking capacity and force the system back to pre- mentalistic modes of social thinking. Such social systems can 
be self- reinforcing and therefore highly stable in their instability. They undermine the very social mechanism that 
could alter their character: human collaboration (negotiation and creativity)’ Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization 
and Attachment: The Implication for Community Based Therapies’. Paper presented at the Community of 
Communities 10th Annual Forum, March, London. Accessed at: https:// www.slideshare.net/ raffaelebarone/ 
mentalization- and- attachment- the- implication- for- community- based- therapies.
 182 Fonagy, P., Luyten, P., Allison, E., and Campbell, C. (2017). ‘What We have Changed our Minds About: Part 2. 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Epistemic Trust and the Developmental Significance of Social Communication’. 
Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation, 4(1): 9. For instance, in the case of parents: ‘the rela-
tive social isolation in which modern parents engage in caregiving makes it much harder to access another trusted 
person/ mind to help think about stressful situations in order to regulate affect and regain balanced mentalizing’, 
Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable Development, 
London: Anna Freud Centre.
 183 Rawls, A. W. (2012). ‘Durkheim’s Theory of Modernity: Self- Regulating Practices as Constitutive Orders of 
Social and Moral Facts’. Journal of Classical Sociology, 12(3– 4): 479– 512.
 184 Durkheim, E. (1984 [1893]). The Division of Labour in Society, trans. W. D. Halls, Book 3. London: Macmillan.
 185 For an interpretation of solidarity in terms of mentalizing, see Luyten, P., Nijssens, L., Fonagy, P., and Mayes, 
L. C. (2017). ‘Parental Reflective Functioning: Theory, Research, and Clinical Applications’. The Psychoanalytic 
Study of The Child, 70(1): 174– 199, p. 179.
 186 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn 
from Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ 
gap- call- in- series- podcast.
 187 Fonagy, P. (1999). ‘Epistemological and Methodological Background’, in Fonagy, P. (ed.), An Open Door 
Review of Outcome and Process Studies in Psychoanalysis, London: International Psychoanalytic Association, pp. 8– 
85, p. 50. See also Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
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despite discourses of gender equality, in practice ‘we have made mothers inappropriately 
and uniquely responsible’ for children and child care.188 In a recent newspaper article, he has 
highlighted that there is greater pressure on women students in higher education as they do 
exams and think about job market prospects, because expectations of success and equality 
are mismatched with an unequal economic and social reality.189
In 2015, Fonagy and Allison characterized mentalization theory as aligned with liber-
ation politics, proposing that it ‘overlaps almost completely with queer theory’ in seeking 
and defending ‘the singular truth of the individual’s experience’ against ‘publicly accepted 
forms of knowledge’.190 To claim almost complete overlap with queer theory was unpersua-
sive, because at the time Fonagy and colleagues had no account of publicly accepted forms 
of knowledge,191 or of the formation of gender identities.192 With the 2019 chapter by Asen, 
Campbell, and Fonagy, earlier remarks about the potential harms caused by social systems 
are integrated with the theory of mentalizing in the conceptualization of non- mentalizing 
modes ‘becoming institutional’. This opens intruiging possibilities for thinking about forms 
of oppression like sexism and homophobia in terms of problems in collective mentalizing 
capacity, and the specific roles of pretend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode. 
First, however, Fonagy and colleagues will need to develop a much more robust account of 
dominance, oppression, and social consecration to make sense of:
 • who is regarded as having the right to offer ostensive cues;
 • who is attributed real and socially pertinent mental states;
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre: ‘racial discrimination is a powerful predictor of general psychopath-
ology (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999), with the most powerful associations observed for depression 
and anxiety (Banks, Kohn- Wood, & Spencer, 2006; English, Lambert, Evans, & Zonderman, 2014) and conduct 
problems . . . Being at the receiving end of essentialist homogenizing beliefs creates generic vulnerability through 
disrupting effective communication and the potential of adaptation and adjustment through learning. Within this 
framework, prejudices of all kinds, but particularly prejudice based on ethnic divisions, can generate psychological 
problems by disrupting the natural flow of information within social networks.’
 188 Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Peter Fonagy: Combating a Mental Health Crisis’. Accessed at: https:// www.goldmansachs.
com/ insights/ talks- at- gs/ peter- fonagy.html.
 189 Fonagy, P. cited in Thomson, A. and Sylvester, R. (2020). ‘Panic and Anxiety after Education is Plunged into 
Limbo’. The Times, 31 March.
 190 Fonagy, P. and Allison, E. (2015). ‘A Scientific Theory of Homosexuality for Psychoanalysis’, in A. Lemma 
and P. E. Lynch (eds), Sexualities: Contemporary Psychoanalytic Perspectives, Hove, UK: Routledge, pp. 125– 137, 
p. 130– 131.
 191 The claim to almost complete overlap with queer theory was also unpersuasive given the lack of sustained 
social criticism by Fonagy and colleagues. One step towards making this claim more real has been that the Anna 
Freud Centre joined London Pride in 2019. Fonagy gave a statement that: ‘It is profoundly wrong that people 
we know and love fear rejection from their friends and families, from their colleagues and workplaces, feel vul-
nerable to abuse and fear violence simply because of their sexual identity. Being accepted is a human need. It 
is not a privilege to have that need met, but a basic right, one from which all other opportunities flow. When 
we can all assert our individuality and flourish, and when we have the respect we need to feel proud of who we 
are, we will have a fairer society. It’s in recognition of this aspiration that the Anna Freud Centre is marching 
in celebration and solidarity with Pride.’ Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2019/ 07/ 
anna- freud- centre- staff- students- and- champions- march- to- mark- london- pride/ . The Centre issued guidance 
from one of their Young Champions on how mental health services can better serve as safe spaces for people 
who identify as LGBTQ+: accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ blogs/ 2019/ 07/ how- mental- health- 
services- can- present- themselves- as- safe- spaces- for- people- who- identify- within- the- lgbtqplus- community/ . 
Recently, the Centre have also responded critically to the judicial review of the Gender Identity Development 
Service, advocating greater acknowledgement of the capacity of trans and gender- questioning young people to 
self- determination. https:// www.annafreud.org/ insights/ news/ 2020/ 10/ statement- from- the- anna- freud- centre- 
on- the- gender- clinic- judicial- review// .
 192 Straker, G. and Winship, J. (2011). ‘The Dangers of the Universal: A Critique of Fonagy and Target’s Theory 
of Sexual Enjoyment’. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 12(4): 288– 302.
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 • whose signals are subject to epistemic vigilance;
 • the costs or punishments associated with deviating from socially established conven-
tions for ostension, for the recognition of mental states, and for the enactment of epi-
stemic vigilance.193
Such an account has precisely been one of the major achievements of queer theory, and has 
been fundamentally absent in the work of Fonagy and colleagues. It is not false to regard 
queer theory as pitching the singular truth of the individual’s experience against publicly 
accepted forms of knowledge; this is one important element.194 More important to queer 
theory, however, is the role of publicly accepted forms of knowledge and practice in organ-
izing and situating who is considered to have experience and the psychological and epi-
stemic standing of that experience. To take an example, Ahmed has examined the gendered 
relations of power that can construct epistemic vigilance enacted by women as a distraction, 
enforcing epistemic trust and framing the women themselves as ‘spoilsports’ or ‘killjoys’.195
An important obstacle for Fonagy and colleagues over the years in conceptualizing dom-
inance, oppression, and social consecration has been that the scene that has served as their 
lens on mentalization, and more recently on epistemic trust, has been the caregiver– infant 
relationship. Not that they have ignored that this relationship may be abusive; far from it. 
But the scene of recognition or misrecognition is of simple wishes and needs. Though an 
infant is dependent on the power of the caregiver, Fonagy and colleagues do not consider 
this scene as one in which there is any contest for dominance, any interest or manipulation 
on the part of the caregiver, and no necessity for the caregiver to justify his or her authority. 
At least by 12 months, these features are present, albeit perhaps not necessarily salient in 
child– caregiver interactions; it would have been quite different if Fonagy and colleagues had 
narrated the scene of parental reflective function with the child as a true preschooler. It was 
always a peculiar mismatch that in expositions of their theory in the 1990s and early 2000s by 
Fonagy and colleagues, the ages 2– 3 were given priority for the development of mentalizing, 
but in accounts of parental reflective function the child seemed to have the characteristics 
of an infant, displaying simple intentions, but not battling to jump into the pond, wanting 
to wear their sibling’s clothes, or refusing to put down the attractively packaged product 
grabbed from the aisle in the supermarket.196 A scene of parental reflective function without 
conflict, deception, or cultural mediation has been retained over subsequent decades, even 
as the prioritization of preschool for the development of mentalizing has been abandoned by 
Fonagy and colleagues, and even as their focus has shifted from marked mirroring to osten-
sive cues and the development of epistemic trust.
 193 Sedgwick, E. K. (2008). Epistemology of the Closet, Berkeley, California: University of California Press; Butler, 
J. (2005). Giving an Account of Oneself, New York: Fordham University Press; Berlant, L. (ed.) (2019). Reading 
Sedgwick, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
 194 Huffer, L. (2012). ‘Foucault and Sedgwick: The Repressive Hypothesis Revisited’. Foucault Studies, 14: 20– 40.
 195 Ahmed, S. (2010). The Promise of Happiness, Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Ahmed, S. (2017). Living 
a Feminist Life, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
 196 The problem is actually acknowledged by Bateman and colleagues in a paper from 2007, though not sub-
sequently rectified. The scene of thinking about parental reflective function remained infancy: Bateman, A. W., 
Ryle, A., Fonagy, P., and Kerr, I. B. (2007). ‘Psychotherapy for Borderline Personality Disorder: Mentalization 
Based Therapy and Cognitive Analytic Therapy Compared’. International Review of Psychiatry, 19(1): 51– 62: ‘the 
problem with the concept of contingent and marked mirroring is that it appears to offer a one- sided and reduc-
tive account of the maternal– infant interaction . . . The mentalizing perspective is a dynamic developmental view 
where the respective capacities of child and parent, and therefore the nature of their contribution to interactions, 
change as the child matures. While the mentalizing approach considers that contingent mirroring may be the key 
contribution of the parent in the first year of life, this gives way to more complex interaction’ (p. 55).
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Queer theorists would ask: what has been the implication of the scenes in which Fonagy 
and colleagues predominantly imagine mentalizing taking place? These scenes are, above 
all, dyadic: the analytic clinic and parental reflective functioning. They would point to a cer-
tain epistemic bias in the image of what counts as mentalizing, because the way it has been 
imagined has tended to filter out the collective conditions, social antagonisms, and prac-
tical workaday phenomena beyond the dyad that might otherwise be recognized as facili-
tating or obstructing mentalization. One example, for instance, is the neglect of Fonagy 
and colleagues of the role of habit in facilitating or obstructing mentalizing.197 Another 
is their neglect of social oppression. It is notable that a quality of the four key ideas that 
Fonagy and colleagues drew from Gergely— marked mirroring, teleological mode, ostensive 
cues, epistemic trust is that each offers a way of considering the relationship between indi-
vidual theory of mind and embeddedness in sociality. This is part of what makes them such 
powerful concepts and heuristics. However, each concept simultaneously limits the scope of 
acknowledgement of sociality. So, for instance, marked mirroring is irreducibly dyadic and 
social, but the dyad is removed from cultural context, adversities, and the pragmatic chal-
lenges of everyday life.198 Fonagy and colleagues know, of course, that these ideas are prag-
matic simplifications. However, the problem has been that, in incorporating them, Fonagy 
and colleagues tended over the decades to lose track of what has been lost.199 For instance, 
in characterizing epistemic trust in terms of an individual open to learning from other indi-
viduals or from society, Fonagy and colleagues bracket the way that cognitive informational 
culture is invested by relations of power and exclusion, which influence what is supported to 
become knowledge. As black feminist epistemologists such as Hill Collins and Dotson have 
argued, the tools and skills that sustain cognitive informational culture are differentially ac-
cessible and, when accessed, differentially suited for use by dominant groups.200 The capacity 
to recognize oneself as a learner, or for others to recognize us as someone from whom they 
could learn, are likewise structured by intersecting forms of authority and prestige, invisi-
bility, and denigration, which apply to both individuals and communities. As is the capacity 
to recognize mental states in others and in oneself. These processes are missed as, following 
 197 The role of habit in facilitating or hindering awareness of thoughts and feelings has been a classic concern 
of phenomenology since Husserl, and has continued in the work of queer theorists developing the phenomeno-
logical tradition e.g. Ahmed, S. (2006). Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others, Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press.
 198 An aligned criticism has been offered by Køster, A. (2017). ‘Mentalization, Embodiment, and 
Narrative: Critical Comments on the Social Ontology of Mentalization Theory’. Theory & Psychology, 27(4): 458– 
476: ‘in spite of a strong interactive focus, it remains fundamentally rooted in a Cartesian ontology, overlooking 
embodied, expressive, enactive and sociocultural dimensions of social cognition’ (p. 460); ‘Bernhard Waldenfels 
(2015) distinction between “frontal” vs. “lateral” variants of sociality. Whereas frontal sociality refers the type 
of “face- to- face interaction” which completely dominates the framework of MT, lateral sociality designates the 
equally prominent dimension that we find ourselves “side- by- side” in a shared relation to a cultural world of prac-
tices, norms and objects etc. which are saturated with social reference and meaning. Whereas the early attachment 
context might supply the child with a basic understanding of the rhythm and structure of this lateral dimension, it 
hardly seems persuasive to claim that these forms of social understanding exclusively or even primarily owe their 
ontogenesis to the early infant/ caretaker interaction. Rather, these norms are learned from actual engagement in 
these social practices in their proper contexts’ (p. 467).
 199 Similar concerns have been raised by Shaw, C., Lo, C., Lanceley, A., Hales, S., and Rodin, G. (2019). ‘The 
Assessment of Mentalization: Measures for the Patient, the Therapist and the Interaction’. Journal of Contemporary 
Psychotherapy, 50(4). It may be noted that the concepts were also incorporated by Fonagy and colleagues into the 
developmental model quite early, on the basis of one or two empirical studies generally conducted by Gergely— that 
is to say, before much is known about factors that might clarify the roles of context and culture. That said, marked 
mirroring and teleological mode were introduced 20 years ago now, but moderators have still barely been considered.
 200 Dotson, K. (2014). ‘Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression’. Social Epistemology, 28(2): 115– 138; Dotson, 
K. (2017). ‘Theorizing Jane Crow, Theorizing Unknowability’. Social Epistemology, 31(5): 417– 430; Hill Collins, P. 
(2019). Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, Chapter 4.
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Gergely, Fonagy and colleagues give ‘cognitive informational culture’ precedence over ‘an-
thropological culture’ in their thinking about learning.
With anthropological culture more in view, queer theory draws from Althusser and 
Foucault in imagining a different scene of recognition and misrecognition to that of Fonagy 
and colleagues. Here, the encounter is not between child and caregiver but between indi-
vidual and institution, or representative of that institution.201 This fundamentally alters the 
stakes of questions about ostensive cues, the recognition of mental states, and the deploy-
ment of epistemic vigilance.202 Even the scene of marked mirroring and ostensive cues in 
early childhood appears in a different light, because the way in which the caregiver comes 
to offer acknowledgement of the child’s mental states, intention, and individuality is already 
contingent on forms of symbolic and material stratification, and a wider economic and cul-
tural ecology. So, for instance, a caregiver’s recognition of the child’s playful exploration (see 
Chapter 5) will already be embedded within gendered systems of power, shaping what the 
child comes to recognize as their own curiosity and excitement, and the manner in which 
they feel they can dare to venture out into the world and learn from experience.203 As we saw 
in Chapter 6, for Fonagy and colleagues the self is partly imaginary, a confabulation weaving 
together diverse sources of information. This already offers an important qualification to 
any idea of ‘reflective’ function as simple, transparent knowledge. Yet, a further complexity 
left aside by Fonagy and colleagues, at least until recently, is the way that self- representation 
is always already saturated by a wider economic and cultural ecology (‘the symbolic’ in 
Lacanian terms), which not only prompts and informs the self- representation but also the 
integration of its elements, including the identification of intentions excluded from the 
self- representation to form part of the ‘alien self ’.204 Seemingly moving in this direction, in 
 201 Althusser, L. (1971). ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in Lenin and Philosophy, trans. Ben 
Brewster, New York: Monthly Review Press; Foucault, M. (1982). ‘The Subject and Power’. Critical Inquiry, 
8(4): 777– 795. Curiously, Winnicott has moments when he makes links between the parent– child scene and the 
wider scene of cultural subjectivation. However, in these cases, society is always mediated by the mother. His 
accounts are also almost always positive, with these two elements acting in potential concert: ‘The mother’s con-
fidence in her husband or in the support that she will get, if she calls out, from local society, perhaps from the 
policeman, makes it possible for the child to explore crudely destructive activities which relate to movement in 
general, and also more specifically destruction that has to do with the fantasy that accumulated round the hate. In 
this way (because of environmental security, mother supported by father, etc.) the child becomes able to do a very 
complex thing, that is to say, integrate all his destructive impulses in with the loving ones’: Winnicott, D. W. ([1967] 
1986). ‘Delinquency as a Sign of Hope’, in Clare Winnicott, Ray Shepherd, and Madeleine Davis (eds), Home is 
Where We Start From: Essays by a Psychoanalyst, New York: Norton, pp. 90– 100, p. 94.
 202 What is ‘shown’ to the infant in ostension— for instance, the caregiver’s desire for the child to pay attention 
to particular information— is already embedded in forms of symbolic and material stratification, and a wider eco-
nomic and cultural ecology. Marcia Cavell has criticized Fonagy directly on these grounds. Cavell, M. (2006). 
Becoming a Subject: Reflections in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 69. Likewise, 
see Straker, G. and Winship, J. (2011). ‘The Dangers of the Universal: A Critique of Fonagy and Target’s Theory 
of Sexual Enjoyment’. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 12(4): 288– 302. For relevant work in queer and feminist 
theory, see e.g. Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender. London: Routledge; Benjamin, J. (2005). ‘What Mothers and 
Babies Need: The Maternal Third and its Presence in Clinical Work’, in S. Brown (ed.), What do Mothers Want? 
New York: Analytic Press, pp. 37– 54. Object relations theory has been an important influence on the attention 
of queer theorists to infancy. However, attention to this site has also helped contest the classical liberal character-
ization, at least since Locke, of child– caregiver relationships as somehow outside of the forms of oppression that 
structure wider society.
 203 Young, I. M. (2005). On Female Body Experience: ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
 204 Lacan, J. (1977). Écrits: A Selection, London: Tavistock; Gasché, R. (1986). The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and 
the Philosophy of Reflection, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. That these were complexities knowingly 
left aside is shown by the fact that, in their 2003 book, Fonagy and Hepworth offer a summary precisely of Lacan’s 
critique of psychoanalysts who over- focus on the imaginary aspects of the mirror stage at the expense of the sym-
bolic. Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2003). Psychoanalytic Theories: Perspectives from Developmental Psychopathology, 
London: Whurr Publications, p. 17.
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conference presentations in 2019, Fonagy has argued that the ‘infant recognises the specific 
other as an instance of the generic other characteristic of the community’, acknowledging the 
cultural situatedness of recognition within the child– caregiver dyad.205
A published consideration of recognition and misrecognition, not by the parent but by 
collective units, has also been offered recently by Fonagy and colleagues in thinking about 
the role of distorted intentions and/ or mental states for individuals seeking to cope with 
social institutions that discount their needs, identities, and experiences. In the Handbook 
of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Fonagy, Campbell, and Allison characterized ‘dis-
torted social cognition’ as entirely ‘necessary for people to be able to live with the vivid human 
capacity for social imagination and function in an inherently socially imperfect world’.206 
Non- mentalizing modes might be used more by individuals with significant histories of ad-
versity and oppression, as part of their adaptation to this adversity (see Chapter 7). However, 
Fonagy and colleagues contend, we all engage in distorted social cognition to the degree 
that we must learn to cope with a society and institutions ‘in which the minds of individuals 
are either discounted altogether or systematically described as “culpable” or “undeserving”. 
To varying degrees, we have each experienced distortions and damage to the imaginative 
capacity that underpins both mentalization and ethical vision as part of becoming people 
able ‘to tolerate the social system well enough to navigate it’. The institutionalization of non- 
mentalizing modes hinders our ‘capacity for both critique and creativity’.207
This account of the role of institutionalized non- mentalizing in mediating structural 
oppression and personal indifference is distinctive, and represents a potential advance in 
thinking about dehumanizing institutional arrangements. An example can be seen in the 
attention Fonagy has given to the ways in which collective non- mentalizing capacity may 
be facilitated by the affordances of new media technologies. Fonagy has characterized new 
media as a double- edged sword: currently contributing to social and psychological pres-
sures on young people, but with significant potential to facilitate mentalization, self- care, 
and the strengthening of relationships with others.208 He has argued against a techno-
logical determinist argument in which the pervasiveness and the image- focused aspects of 
new media are necessarily contrary to mentalization. Instead, he has proposed that social 
 205 Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘The Future Prospects of Mentalization Based Therapies’, 5th International Congress of 
Mentalisation Based Treatments, Haarlem, The Netherlands, 22 November; Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Why is it So Hard 
to Learn to Do Things Differently? On Not Being Able to Learn from Experience’. GAP Call- In Series Podcast. 
Accessed at: https:// www.borderlinepersonalitydisorder.org/ gap- call- in- series- podcast.
 206 Fonagy, P., Campbell, C. and Allison, E. (2019). ‘Therapeutic Models’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy 
(eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, pp. 169– 180, p. 178. It is interesting that the term ‘social cognition’ is used here. As noted in Chapter 3, 
mentalization was introduced to characterize three of the four elements that Dunn had ascribed to social cogni-
tion. These were understanding of the i) origin, ii) location, and iii) functioning of mental states. Dunn had also 
considered children’s iv) understanding of social and cultural conventions. In referring to ‘social cognition’ here, 
there is tacit acknowledgement that distorted understanding of social and cultural conventions is also operational. 
In the Introduction to the Handbook (p. 4), Fonagy and Bateman indeed reiterate that mentalization is not coex-
tensive with social cognition, but rather ‘is the aspect of social cognition that enables individuals to make sense of 
the behaviour of themselves and others’, without reference to social and cultural conventions.
 207 Ibid.
 208 Wallwark, E. (2016). ‘Thousands of Children Start School ‘Not Ready for the Classroom’, Parents’ 
Smartphone Habits to Blame’. Huffington Post, 09/ 05/ 2016. Accessed at: http:// www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ entry/ 
children- not- school- ready_ uk_ 57308969e4b0ade291a2342e: ‘Professor Peter Fonagy, chief executive of the Anna 
Freud Centre agreed that smart phones don’t necessarily have to be a barrier to communication. “To the extent 
that smart phones stand in the way of that natural process they are indeed a problem,” he said. “However, what is 
stopping parents from using smart phones to have a conversation with children about how school went, what they 
have learnt, and for children [to] write about their reactions to new experiences? It may be perfectly possible to 
use smart phones to promote social relationships even though the tendency is for it to replace rather than enhance 
parent child interactions.”
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media is good for circulating ostensive cues without the substance of recognition, and 
for stimuli for rapid, implicit rather than careful, explicit mentalizing.209 To date, their 
predominant effect has been to reduce sustained consideration of thoughts and feelings. 
However, he regards this as an effect of their embeddedness within social practices not 
built to promote mentalizing, rather than an inevitable effect of the technology itself.210 He 
has given the example of his daughter, who was bullied at school, but who could use her 
phone to reach out to her parents rather than feeling left alone in the institutional context 
of the school.211
However, Fonagy and colleagues are yet to distinguish the social conditions that facili-
tate different forms of non- mentalizing— what would seem to be the greatest potential of a 
social systems interpretation of their theory.212 Furthermore, their hold on a social systems 
perspective remains precarious still. For instance, in the Handbook of Mentalising in Mental 
Health Practice chapter by Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy on social systems, the authors iden-
tify four characteristics of ‘a social system with a capacity for effective mentalising’.213 The 
foremost characteristic of social systems with a capacity for effective mentalizing is that the 
system needs to be capable of retaining different perspectives rather than being ‘stuck in 
one point of view’. Second, the system ‘must be able to permit modifications of convention, 
at least on a temporary basis’. Though justification is not given, it would seem that this is re-
garded as facilitating the other characteristics of a social system with capacity for effective 
mentalizing. Third, a social system needs to have means of identifying and responding to the 
experiences and goals of its members, rather than assuming sufficient knowledge of these in 
 209 Duschinsky, R., Collver, J., and Carel, H. (2019). ‘“Trust Comes from a Sense of Feeling One’s Self Understood 
by Another Mind”: An Interview with Peter Fonagy’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 224– 227.
 210 E.g. Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Peter Fonagy: Combating a Mental Health Crisis’. Accessed at: https:// www.
goldmansachs.com/ insights/ talks- at- gs/ peter- fonagy.html: ‘With social media, and as kids have drawn back into 
their bedrooms and are using smartphones and are using a range of digital devices, what we have found is that they 
become less happy. Social media is not a replacement for social contact with real human beings. It is particularly 
when kids compare themselves ‘upwardly’, with models that are better. So for example body image, particularly 
among young women, is negatively related to screen time with Facebook and Instagram where there are photo-
graphs. Whereas looking just at text, your body image is unaffected.’
 211 Interview with Peter Fonagy, cited in Rampton, M. (2019). ‘So your Kid Wants a Phone— Now What?’, 
Huffington Post, 18 October, https:// www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ entry/ what- age- give- child- a- phone_ uk_ 
5da6e5d0e4b062bdcb1b3f29: ‘ “It’s the function of a phone that really matters, far more than the physical reality of 
having one,” he says. “It’s what a kid uses it for.” We can’t ignore the advantages of children having them. It’s great 
to be able to keep in touch with family and friends, says Fonagy, who stresses that phones aren’t inherently a bad 
thing. “After age nine or ten your main social network is other children, and using a phone to maintain that net-
work seems, to me, good,” he says.’ He gives the example of when his daughter was bullied at school and was able, 
while sitting on her own and deeply upset, to reach out to her parents to share her distress.
 212 In both editions of the Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice, Fonagy and colleagues highlight 
the potential relevance of their theory to conceptualizing war. However, in doing so, they do not advance much 
beyond Bion, who argued that one of the central objectives in warfare or other forms of sustained violence is to 
stop the other side thinking, and that lack of thinking helps perpetuate futile violence. Bion, W. R. (1940). ‘The War 
of Nerves’, in Miller, E. (ed.), The Neuroses in War, London: Macmillan, pp. 180– 200. Differentiating the modes 
of non- mentalizing, this claim could be further specified to identify the role of pretend mode, psychic equiva-
lence, and teleological mode (and externalization of the alien self) in offering false certainties or uncertainties, 
and blocking inquisitive stance about the minds of the enemy, allies, or one’s own forces. This line of thought may 
also help pursue a distinction, neglected in the work of Fonagy and colleagues, between mindless violence and 
mentalized violence— for instance, some forms of civil insurrection.
 213 These characteristics were already presented by Fonagy in conference presentations from 2012, and in 
Bateman and Fonagy 2016; they appear to reflect an older position less well integrated with recent thinking. 
Fonagy, P. (2012). ‘Mentalization and Attachment: The Implication for Community Based Therapies’. Paper 
presented at the Community of Communities 10th Annual Forum, March, London. Accessed at: https:// www.
slideshare.net/ raffaelebarone/ mentalization- and- attachment- the- implication- for- community- based- therapies; 
Bateman, A. W. and Fonagy, P. (2016). Mentalization- Based Treatment for Personality Disorders: A Practical Guide 
(2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 449– 450.
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advance. Finally, ‘the social system needs to emphasize the importance of individual “owner-
ship” of, and responsibility for, specific behaviours and actions, rather than explaining indi-
vidual behaviours or actions as the result of some external force.’214
Yet there is a false opposition here. Why should awareness of causes of individual be-
haviour beyond the individual entail a denial or negation of individual responsibility? 
Would Asen and colleagues really treat the actions that the characters in Nineteen Eighty- 
Four are brought to as chosen, and as reflecting individual ownership and responsibility? 
As we read the book, especially the closing chapters, one of Orwell’s main concerns is with 
the way that feelings of personal responsibility can diverge terribly from the actual condi-
tions for meaningful enactment of responsibility. As we saw in Chapter 6, Fonagy’s position 
has been increasingly qualified in recent years to balance two claims: where supports can 
make the illusion of personal agency somewhat meaningful and self- reinforcing, it can be 
a very helpful illusion because it becomes a kind of reality; where supports are unavailable 
to make the illusion of personal agency meaningful and self- reinforcing, the feeling of re-
sponsibility is persecutory and unhelpful. To take an illustration: if ‘we have made mothers 
inappropriately and uniquely responsible’ for children and child care,215 the inappropriate-
ness stems in part from the fact that the apparent uniqueness of this responsibility is part 
of a wider system of sexism, and in the fact that the unique responsibility is an illusion that 
masks the necessary contribution of external supports or lack of supports for the activities 
of caregiving.216
The term ‘responsible’ needs to be considered carefully. Vincent, a philosopher, offers 
helpful distinctions, asking us to consider ‘the text of a notice that hangs in Café Doerak, 
my favourite bar in the Dutch city of Delft, “The management of this establishment is not re-
sponsible” ’. Vincent points out that:
This notice is terribly ambiguous, and one might imagine two people engaged in a frus-
trating argument about it, simply because each understands it differently, though neither 
realizes that this is so. But the text of this notice could be helpfully re- written . . .
CAPACITY: The management of this establishment are not (yet) psychologically mature.
VIRTUE: The management of this establishment are not dependable and might be reckless.
ROLE: The management of this establishment have no responsibilities towards its clients.
 214 Asen, E., Campbell, C. and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Social Systems: Beyond the Microcosm of the Individual and 
Family’, in Anthony Bateman and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd 
edn), Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, pp. 229– 243, pp. 234– 235. By way of comparison, only 
the first and third of these characteristics are identified in the account of mentalizing organizations offered by Di 
Stefano, G., Piacentino, B., and Ruvolo, G. (2017). ‘Mentalizing in Organizations: A Psychodynamic Model for an 
Understanding of Well- Being and Suffering in the Work Contexts’. World Futures, 73(4– 5): 216– 223. Di Stefano 
and colleagues identify some elements missing from the account of Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy. These include 
the role of the organization in regulating arousal, in treating thoughts and feelings as intelligible and of com-
munal interest, and in offering an environment in which uncertainty and ambiguity can be tolerated. See also Koh, 
E. and Twemlow, S. W. (2018). ‘Towards a Psychoanalytic Concept of Community (IV): The Well‐Functioning 
Community’. International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 15(1): 5– 15.
 215 Fonagy, P. (2018). ‘Peter Fonagy: Combating a Mental Health Crisis’. Accessed at: https:// www.goldmansachs.
com/ insights/ talks- at- gs/ peter- fonagy.html.
 216 Fonagy, P. and Target, M. (2002). ‘Fathers in Modern Psychoanalysis and in Society: The Role of Father 
and Child Development’, in J. Trowell and A. Etchegoyen (eds), The Importance of Fathers: A Psychoanalytic Re- 
Evaluation, New York: Brunner- Routledge, Taylor & Francis, pp. 45– 66; Fonagy, P. and Higgitt, A. (2007). ‘The 
Early Social and Emotional Determinants of Inequalities in Health’, in G. Baruch, P. Fonagy, and D. Robins 
(eds), Reaching the Hard to Reach: Evidence- Based Funding Priorities for Intervention and Research, Chichester, 
UK: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 3– 34. See also Duschinsky, R., Greco, M., and Solomon, J. (2015). ‘The Politics of 
Attachment: Lines of Flight with Bowlby, Deleuze and Guattari’. Theory, Culture & Society, 32(7– 8): 173– 195.
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CAUSAL: The management didn’t causally contribute to losses suffered on these premises.
OUTCOME: The management can’t be blamed for whatever happens on these premises.
LIABILITY: The management won’t pay for any losses suffered on these premises.217
As has often occurred in Fonagy’s use of the term ‘responsibility’ since the 1990s, Asen and 
colleagues seem to have conflated some of these meanings. They appear to have assumed 
that attention to the causal role of system- level factors is incompatible with an individual’s 
sense of intentionality in their moral role, and thus with mentalizing.218 As a result, the au-
thors slip back into a stance in which attention to the beliefs and atmosphere of collective 
units as causal for individual behaviour is treated not simply as ‘not mentalizing’ but as non- 
mentalizing, destructive of individual mentalizing capacity.
Naturally, there may be situations in which collective mentalizing capacity and individual 
mentalizing operate at the expense of one another. But attention to the beliefs and atmos-
phere of collective units as causal for individual behaviour should not in itself be regarded 
as opposed to an individual’s sense of intentionality. Jurist, among others, has identified this 
as, inadvertently, an ethnocentric, moralizing, and politically neoliberal stance.219 It does not 
sit comfortably with the trend towards greater acknowledgement— and critique— by Fonagy 
and colleagues of the properties of the social system in shaping human capacities, including 
the capacity for mentalization and the viability of feelings of responsibility (see Chapter 6). 
For instance, elsewhere in recent work, Fonagy and colleagues have highlighted evidence 
that ‘the prevalence of BPD can be relatively well predicted from the ratio of the average in-
come of the richest 20% to that of the poorest 20% of the population. Hence, a general lack of 
social concern for equality may be directly related to the prevalence of BPD.’220 Such findings 
have led Allison and Campbell to argue that mental health difficulties in our society ‘are a 
collective responsibility and ought to be a collective concern’.221
Fonagy has recently argued against discourses of ‘responsibility’ in a society where young 
people are frequently made to feel powerless and encounter institutions and environments 
 217 Vincent, S. (2011). ‘ “A Structured Taxonomy of Responsibility Concepts” ’, in N. Vincent, I. van de Poel, 
and J. van den Hoven (eds), Moral Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism, New York: Springer, pp. 15– 
35, p. 26.
 218 E.g. Fonagy, P., Target, M., Steele, M., Steele, H., Leigh, T., Levinson, A., et al. (1997). ‘Morality, Disruptive 
Behavior, Borderline Personality Disorder, Crime, and their Relationships to Security of Attachment’, in L. 
Atkinson and K. J. Zucker (eds), Attachment and Psychopathology, New York: Guilford Press, pp. 223– 274, pp. 
256– 257. Examining uses of the term ‘responsibility’ in Fonagy’s work, it would seem that the problem was initi-
ated by his use of the term in the 1990s to encompass the Kleinian problematic of guilt and reparation, in which 
accepting responsibility initiates the depressive position, acceptance of truth, and the basis for moral life with 
others. However, in Klein, this is responsibility for imagined attacks on the mother, rather than actions in reality. 
On this basis, taking inappropriate responsibility for faults that lie, in part, in environmental causes was regarded 
by Winnicott as no less pathological than the abdication of responsibility and the derogation of the environment. 
Winnicott, D. W. (1986). ‘Berlin Walls’, in C. Winnicott, R. Shepherd, and M. Davis (eds.), Home is Where We Start 
From, New York: W. W. Norton, pp. 221– 227, p. 223.
 219 Jurist, E. (2018). Minding Emotions: Cultivating Mentalisation in Psychotherapy, New York: Guilford Press. 
Jurist encourages mentalization theory to become more ‘cautious about using the term “emotion regulation”. 
Emotion regulation has not emerged in a vacuum; it has come to the fore in a specific place and time, which val-
orises individual responsibility and is sceptical of communitarianism. Personally, I am wary of the moralising dis-
courses that preach self- discipline, which can be associated with neoliberalism, and which obscure how dependent 
we are on others’ (p. 48).
 220 Luyten, P., Campbell, C., and Fonagy, P. (2019). ‘Borderline Personality Disorder, Complex Trauma, and 
Problems with Self and Identity: A Social‐Communicative Approach’. Journal of Personality, 88(1): 88– 105.
 221 Allison, E. and Campbell, C. (2019). Transforming Child Mental Health: Principles of Sustainable 
Development, London: Anna Freud Centre. See also Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘The Big Kahuna: Countries with the 
Highest Incidence of BPD’. Accessed at: https:// www.youtube.com/ watch?v=lcVSMuxApaY.
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with inadequate support for enacting meaningful agency. Speaking to the Youth Select 
Committee:
I feel very strongly that, very differently from my own childhood, young people nowadays 
carry a far greater responsibility than I had to carry, in terms of my life course. My life 
course was far more set out and determined, and I didn’t feel personally responsible for 
it. I actually had far more authority over my life than young people do these days. That 
combination of having to take responsibility without authority makes young people very 
vulnerable.222
Nonetheless, where supports can make the illusion of personal agency into a kind of reality, 
it can still be regarded as very helpful. “Acknowledgement that ‘I am a person and I have 
agency’ ” is a perspective that supports the coherence and consistency of thoughts and feel-
ings by supporting mentalizing and the capacity to make good use of social relationships.223
Behind the issue of responsibility in Asen, Campbell, and Fonagy’s account of mentalizing 
culture lies ongoing ambiguities in the conceptualization of intention. This concept has 
an underpinning role across the work of Fonagy and colleagues. In part, it is linked to the 
contributions of Gergely. Intention is critical in distinguishing mentalization from teleo-
logical mode; and as the other object, besides mental states, that can be taken as the target 
of marked mirroring and ostensive cues. Beyond this, though, Fonagy and Allison have 
reconceptualized the psychoanalytic unconscious in terms of intentions externalized from 
the self- representation. However, there is an ambiguity to the term, contributing here to con-
ceptual and normative problems with how Fonagy and colleagues in turn conceptualize re-
sponsibility. It is logical that mentalizing social systems would help people consider how 
behaviour and experience can be accounted for in terms of thoughts and feelings implicated 
in motivations and intentions. That is part of what mentalizing means. However, it is not 
logical that acceptance of individual responsibility excludes acknowledgement of external 
causal factors.224 This seems to depend on an essentialized notion of intention as individual 
will, relatively impervious to circumstances. It also runs contrary to statements made by 
 222 Youth Select Committee (2017). ‘Oral Evidence Taken before the Youth Select Committee on Friday 7 July. 
Accessed at: http:// www.byc.org.uk/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 10/ Youth- Select- Comittee- 07.07.17- morning.pdf. 
See also Chivers, T. (2016). ‘12 Things you Probably Didn’t Know about Happiness’. Accessed at: https:// www.
buzzfeed.com/ tomchivers/ 12- scientific- facts- about- happiness, citing an interview with Fonagy: ‘the combination 
of responsibility and the absence of agency is a particularly toxic phenomenon’.
 223 Asen, E. and Fonagy, P. (2017). ‘Mentalizing Family Violence Part 1: Conceptual Framework’. Family Process, 
56(1): 6– 21: ‘It would seem that the need for each individual to be recognized as a person in their own right is so 
powerful because, among other things, being recognized in this way is a precondition for the opening up of epi-
stemic trust. To make knowledge resonate— to imbue it with epistemic trust— we need to feel that it is relevant to 
us, and this is linked to an acknowledgement that “I am a person and I have agency” ’ (p. 16).
 224 Even Dennett, whose reification of intentionality was taken up by Fonagy and colleagues, acknowledges that 
it is a logical error: ‘The intentional stance towards human beings, which is a precondition of any ascriptions of re-
sponsibility, may coexist with mechanistic explanations.’ Dennett, D. (1981). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on 
Mind and Psychology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 253. In a recent interview, Fonagy argues that mentalization 
allows one to act with ‘agency’ rather than to be a ‘victim’, at the mercy of what is evoked in us by our environment. 
BBC Radio 4 (2020). ‘Peter Fonagy on a Revolution in Mental Health Care’. The Life Scientific Podcast, 28 January. 
Accessed at: https:// www.bbc.co.uk/ programmes/ m000dpj2. It is wholly persuasive that difficulties in conceiving 
of and reconsidering the thoughts and feelings of others increase the likelihood that a person will feel that the 
actions of others are intended at their expense, contributing to a sense of being a victim. Yet, the opposition be-
tween mentalizing/ agency and victimhood also seems to assume some of its appeal on the basis of wider cultural 
narratives that situate rationality, agency, and responsibility as opposed to weakness, victimhood, and influence by 
the environment. See e.g. Stringer, R. (2014). Knowing Victims: Feminism, Agency and Victim Politics in Neoliberal 
Times, London: Routledge; Johnstone, M. A. (2020). ‘Plato on the Enslavement of Reason’. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 50(3): 382– 394.
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Fonagy and colleagues elsewhere, on occasions when intention is considered more carefully, 
that state that one needs ‘to feel responsible for and in control of one’s own mental life as well 
as behaviour in the world, but also to assess fairly accurately what is outside one’s control. 
Failures in the process of evaluation can lead at one extreme to a belief in one’s own omnipo-
tent responsibility’.225
Given that the concept of ‘intention’ is a key component in accounts of mentalization and 
epistemic trust, it would appear that slippage in use of the concept will be a continued hin-
drance for work to conceptualize the role of culture. On the one hand, when intention is 
treated as equivalent to individual will, this is likely to hinder attempts to make sense of the 
kinds and forms of intention involved in we- intentions, and in the ascription of intention-
ality to collective units. On the other hand, it will hinder attempts to understand the role 
of culture and context in shaping how we come to thoughts and feelings. For instance, re-
ification of the idea of intention will contribute to the continued neglect of proto- thoughts 
and feelings, which play such a key role in shared myths, prohibitions, presuppositions, and 
taken- for- granted practices and artefacts (‘anthropological culture’). Such issues may sus-
tain the difficulties Fonagy and colleagues have had in integrating their concept of the pri-
mary unconscious with the rest of their thinking. Furthermore, given the turn in the most 
recent work of Fonagy and colleagues towards the pursuit of empirical trials of therapeutic 
interventions in the developing world,226 problems in their thinking about cultural differ-
ences may turn out to be particularly consequential.
 225 Fonagy, P., Edgcumbe, R., Target, M. and Miller, J. (1999). Contemporary Psychodynamic Child 
Therapy: Theory and Technique. London: The Anna Freud Centre and University College London, p. 54. See also 
Fonagy, P. (1998). ‘Prevention, the Appropriate Target of Infant Psychotherapy’. Infant Mental Health Journal, 
19(2): 124– 150, p. 137.
 226 For instance, a randomized- control trial of the use of play therapy for children in Ethiopia to accompany an emer-
gency food intervention. Accessed at: https:// www.annafreud.org/ what- we- do/ research- policy/ research- themes/ 
testing- what- treatment- works- best/ emotional- stimulation- in- the- context- of- emergency- food- intervention- 
in- the- treatment- of- malnourished- children- a- randomised- controlled- trial/ . Palmer, R. (2016). Emotional 
Stimulation as an Addition to Therapeutic Food Intervention for Treatment of Young Children with Severe Acute 
Malnutrition in a Low- Income Country. Unpublished doctoral thesis, London, University College London. Fonagy 
and colleagues are also pursuing a trial of group- based psychotherapy in Kenya and Lebanon. Accessed at: https:// 
www.nihr.ac.uk/ news/ research- funding- boost- for- mental- health- in- low- and- middle- income- countries/ 24900.
Conclusions
Constructive appraisal
Throughout this book, we have attempted to offer reflections that have been friendly and 
constructive, looking to understand the underlying coherence of the theory as well as po-
tential limitations. We acknowledge that it can be hard for a paradigm in psychological 
theory and practice to metabolize criticisms, because there is much invested in the current 
state of affairs, including ‘secondary gain’ from the fuzzy use of concepts and their lack of 
operationalization. As discussed in the Introduction, Sandler identified that there can be re-
sistance to efforts to appraise or refine concepts that seem to work well enough for pragmatic 
purposes, and help hold a coalition of interested parties together, even if their use has had 
associated disadvantages:
The fact that they work well may in turn lead to an undue resistance to the progressive in-
tegration and modification of our concepts, so necessary for scientific development. This 
resistance can partly be overcome by the cultivation of a critical attitude towards our ideas, 
by discussion with colleagues, and by honest reading of the literature, but unless we are 
directly confronted with contradictions in our thinking, resistance to change due to sec-
ondary gains may prove too great.1
An aspect of this book that we hope may help circumvent some of this resistance is that we 
have tried, whenever possible, to be constructive and specific with suggestions to accompany 
appraisal. A number of such reflections from across the book can be particularly highlighted, 
without intending to be exhaustive. In Chapter 3, we expressed concern about confusion 
in the use of the concept of disorganized attachment by Fonagy and colleagues. We pro-
posed that processes such as i) fear of attachment figures, ii) dissociation, iii) conflicting 
feelings, iv) difficulties modulating feelings, and v) the absence of help- seeking in times of 
need should be addressed more explicitly, given that they have at times been lost or outright 
mistaken for one another when disorganized attachment has been invoked.2 This may help 
resolve the ambivalence Fonagy has shown (see Chapter 7) regarding whether or not to in-
clude disorganized attachment in his developmental model of mentalizing and epistemic 
trust, and help retain attention to elements that otherwise fluctuate in and out of view, such 
as dissociation.
In Chapter 4, we identified both strengths and weaknesses in the ‘four poles’ model of 
mentalizing (inner/ outer, automatic/ controlled, affective/ cognitive, self/ other), which has 
 1 Sandler, J. (1962). ‘Research in Psycho- Analysis— The Hampstead Index as an Instrument of Psycho- Analytic 
Research’. International Journal of Psycho- Analysis, 43: 287– 291, p. 290.
 2 See also Duschinsky, R. and Solomon, J. (2017). ‘Infant Disorganized Attachment: Clarifying Levels of 
Analysis’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 22(4): 524– 538; Solomon, J., Duschinsky, R., Bakkum, L., and 
Schuengel, C. (2017). ‘Toward an Architecture of Attachment Disorganization: John Bowlby’s Published and 
Unpublished Reflections’. Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 22(4): 539– 560.
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been prominent in the theory and clinical guidance of Fonagy and colleagues since 2009. 
We offered a number of friendly suggestions of matters that might be addressed in future. 
First, the account of affective versus cognitive mentalizing is troubled by a lack of clarity 
regarding whether this refers to the object of mentalizing (e.g. mentalizing one’s thoughts 
or feelings) or the process of mentalizing (e.g. mentalizing using one’s thoughts or feel-
ings). Second, the conditions that facilitate high- quality automatic mentalizing are left un-
addressed. Third, ‘automatic’ mentalizing and ‘outer’ mentalizing are generally treated as 
non- mentalizing, leading to conceptual and terminological muddle between mentalizing 
and non- mentalizing. The treatment of automatic mentalizing as non- mentalizing also 
leads to the excluded middle of slow, semi- intentional ‘feeling out’, as in therapy. Fourth, 
even after a decade, no attempt has been made to operationalize the model. Perhaps in 
part this reflects difficulties with the constructs, but equally in turn the lack of attempts at 
operationalization has insulated the four poles model from scrutiny, empirical validation, 
or refinement.
The four poles model was introduced in 2009 to respond to commentators such as Jeremy 
Holmes, who had identified that the term ‘mentalizing’ was serving as something of a catch- 
all, impeding communication between and among researchers and clinicians, and hindering 
scientific discussion. In Chapter 4, we identified 28 different uses of the term ‘mentalizing’ 
over time by Fonagy and colleagues. In part, this represented the evolution of theory over 
time; in part, it represented a desire to encompass different processes within a single um-
brella; in part, it expressed a degree of haziness in the theoretical conceptualization. Our 
reflections go beyond identification of these problems. On the basis of a comprehensive ana-
lysis of every usage of the term across the writings of Fonagy and colleagues, we synthesized 
a new definition of mentalizing:
The capacity to conceive of and make available for reconsideration the thoughts and feel-
ings implicated in motivations and intentions in order to account for and explain the ob-
servable social behaviour and present and past perceptual experience of oneself and others.
This definition makes it easier to distinguish between full and specific forms of mentalizing, 
articulate the relationship between mentalizing and non- mentalizing, and specify the rela-
tionship between mentalization and mental states. It situates more exactly within one frame-
work the dimensions that Fonagy and colleagues had described using the ‘four poles’, while 
resolving some of the difficulties with that account.
In Chapter 5, our new definition of mentalizing was used to address questions in the 
account of non- mentalizing offered by Fonagy and colleagues. The researchers had claimed 
that non- mentalizing represented a hijacking of mentalizing capacities, but without ex-
plaining how or why non- mentalizing deploys the very elements that comprise mentalizing. 
Our definition allowed us to address this question and specify more precisely what is being 
hijacked in non- mentalizing.
Pretend mode was characterized as using the capacity to conceive of thoughts and feelings 
implicated in motivations or intentions.
Hypermentalizing was characterized as a form of pretend mode using the capacity 
to conceive of thoughts and feelings implicated in motivations or intentions in order to 
account for and explain the observable social behaviour of others.
Psychic equivalence was characterized as using the capacity to account for and explain 
thoughts and feelings and observable social behaviour in terms of immediate experience.
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Teleological mode was characterized as using the capacity to account for and explain 
observable social behaviour as implicated in the motivations or intentions of others and of 
oneself.
In articulating how non- mentalizing constitutes elements of mentalizing, this account helps 
specify when and how mentalization- based therapy (MBT) may contribute to harm to pa-
tients by entrenching non- mentalizing. An example, discussed in Chapter 8, is when MBT 
refines knowledge of the feelings of others, but where this is then used by the individual as 
a resource for relational aggression. A further advantage to our account of non- mentalising 
here is that it makes sense of an ambiguity in the work of Fonagy and colleagues: whether 
mentalizing is merely the absence of non- mentalizing, and vice versa. Our definition helps 
us resolve this question, because it highlights the centrality for mentalisation of the genera-
tive doubt that underpins inquisitive stance.
Chapter 6 drew together the threads of discussions of the ‘self ’ across the writings of Fonagy 
and colleagues. Readers of the work of these researchers have generally been segmented, each 
audience having access to only a ‘part object’. Fonagy and colleagues have also used the concept 
in different ways across these contexts. While perhaps inevitable for the sake of communica-
tion, there has been a price to pay for the theory— for instance, in a lack of clarity about how 
‘mental states’ occur, and whether mentalizing one’s own mental states is the same as or dif-
ferent from mentalizing others’ mental states. Bringing together discussions of the self from 
across the writings of Fonagy and colleagues helped clarify the extent to which, for these re-
searchers, the ‘self ’ is a confabulation, as well as the role of two distinct kinds of unconscious 
processes in producing the content of this confabulation. We also raised the question about 
the status of ‘externalization of the alien self ’, which at times shuttles between a description of 
experience and an explanation of experience. Certain versions of the concept would appear to 
represent a candidate for another form of non- mentalizing, a question Fonagy and colleagues 
may wish to address. However, we also note that the concept of ‘externalization of the alien self ’, 
so prominent in their work in the 2000s, appears to have dropped out of favour in recent years, 
without explanation and while formally remaining on the books as part of the paradigm.
Chapter 7 identified that Fonagy and colleagues have increasingly sought to emphasize 
that non- mentalizing is an adaptive response to adversity, drawing ideas from attachment 
theory. However, this claim has not been supported by explanation of what is meant by 
adaptation. Using an unpublished interrogation of the concept of adaptation by Ainsworth, 
one of the founders of attachment theory, we identified three different meanings to the 
term: species- level natural selection, individual responsiveness to the environment, and 
individual thriving. Natural selection may have facilitated the development of mentalizing 
and forms of non- mentalizing as a repertoire of responses available to humans. And both 
mentalizing and non- mentalizing may— or may not— reflect responsiveness to contextual 
cues. As such, non- mentalizing is theorized by Fonagy and colleagues to contribute to 
short- term positive outcomes, especially in harsh environments. In turn, mentalizing is the-
orized to contribute to long- term positive outcomes, especially— or perhaps solely— in non- 
harsh environments. The question of whether contextual adversity moderates the effect of 
mentalizing and non- mentalizing on outcomes is an important one, and should certainly be 
addressed in future research.
Chapter 7 also offers some distinctions we hope will be constructive regarding the con-
cept of epistemic vigilance, which has seen special prominence in the work of Fonagy and 
colleagues in recent years. A significant problem faced by their account is ambiguity between 
two concepts of epistemic vigilance: one in which the communication of others is subject to 
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scrutiny, and another in which the communication of others is outright distrusted. We re-
commended that the term ‘epistemic vigilance’ reverts back to the original usage of Sperber 
and colleagues, who introduced the concept, to mean a suite of cognitive mechanisms that 
help calibrate the credence assigned to the inferred experiences and claim others. This would 
be distinguished from ‘epistemic mistrust’ as a chronic state in which the thoughts (and per-
haps feelings) of others as implicated in their motivations and intentions are not felt to be 
trustworthy, generalizable, or relevant to the self. Epistemic mistrust may be a transitory 
state; however, it can be stabilized by the non- mentalizing modes, and in turn contribute 
to non- mentalizing. The distinction between epistemic vigilance and mistrust is helpful in 
making sense of the claim of Fonagy and colleagues that epistemic vigilance is actually bene-
ficial for mentalizing. Epistemic vigilance, but not epistemic mistrust, can support genera-
tive doubt and the potential for the reconsideration of the experiences of oneself and others, 
though the rigid and inflexible subjection of experiences to epistemic vigilance may con-
tribute to hypermentalizing, rather than mentalization.
Chapter 9 offers reflections and suggestions relating to the account by Fonagy and colleagues 
of wider social systems extending beyond the individual. This is clearly an area of particular 
interest and theoretical development, and we hope that our distinctions can help facilitate future 
thinking and research in this area. One contribution was our efforts to excavate the concept of 
‘collective mentalizing capacity’: the properties of the community that facilitate mentalization. 
In discussions of schools, family therapy, and group therapy, Fonagy and colleagues have offered 
partial acknowledgment of this process, and it is hoped that with attention drawn to collective 
mentalizing capacity the concept may see greater prominence, including further elaboration 
and ideally operationalization. The question of whether groups themselves can mentalize and 
non- mentalize, or only their individual members, has also been left in abeyance, and may be 
worth raising more focally in future because the stakes seem quite high. Relevant to this ques-
tion, in Chapter 9, we identified an unacknowledged hinge in the use of the concept ‘culture’ by 
Fonagy and colleagues, and difficulties this was causing their account of social systems. In a first 
sense, they have been discussing ‘anthropological culture’, meaning a collective form of life that 
shapes the perceptions and intentions of its members, with particular priority given to shared 
myths, prohibitions, presuppositions, and taken- for- granted practices and artefacts. In a second 
sense, they have been discussing ‘cognitive informational culture’, the net information held by 
members of a group. This distinction is important because in focusing on cognitive information 
culture in their work on epistemic trust to date, the researchers have tended to neglect the role 
of anthropological culture, including the operation of oppression. It has also made it difficult for 
them to distinguish the social conditions that facilitate different forms of non- mentalizing, and 
that make individual responsibility feasible rather than a persecutory ideal.
Some remaining questions: mentalizing
One of the most important areas for future trials of MBT will be to examine whether improve-
ments in mentalizing mediate the success of the modality, and how or whether improvement 
is moderated by social systems. Fonagy and colleagues have recently acknowledged this as a 
limitation in the current evidence base, and highlighted the importance of questions about 
working mechanisms.3 As such questions are pursued in future research, it would be good to 
 3 Sharp, C., Shohet, C., Givon, D., Penner, F., Marais, L., and Fonagy, P. (2020). ‘Learning to Mentalize: A 
Mediational Approach for Caregivers and Therapists’. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 27(3): e12334.
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see the potential for iatrogenesis from MBT explicitly explored, ideally based on a means of 
measuring forms of non- mentalizing.
In terms of theory, one of the most important areas for future development will be to ac-
knowledge and address limitations with the four poles model. In particular, the elements that 
appear to have particular value, such as mentalizing self versus mentalizing others, should 
be operationalized and/ or incorporated into existing measures. Ensink’s work adapting the 
reflective functioning scales has been a valuable step in this direction (see Chapter 4).4 The 
account of automatic mentalizing has been widely criticized by commentators, and might be 
revisited. In terms of future work, thinking about ‘poles’ of mentalizing might also address 
the difference between mentalizing a determinate mental state versus mentalizing inchoate 
or conflicted mental states. This might pick up on a difference relevant to clinical efforts to 
help patients enrich their mentalizing capacities. It may also help counter a tendency in the 
theorizing of Fonagy and colleagues to treat mental states as relatively determinate rather 
than conflicted or inchoate, though certainly they acknowledge that conflicted and inchoate 
mental states exist. In part as a result of this tendency, there are outstanding questions about 
the role of proto- thoughts and proto- feelings.5 It is not clear that facilitation of the capacity 
to conceive of the determinate mental states of others or oneself will have similar correl-
ates to the capacity to conceive of the inchoate mental states of others or oneself. Clinical 
 efforts to help the former capacity, when this is at the expense of the latter, may inadvertently 
 contribute to teleological mode rather than mentalizing.
Another area where future work may be fruitful is in relation to anxiety. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, Fonagy and Target found that anxiety was a positive prognostic factor for chil-
dren receiving therapy at the Anna Freud Centre. Yet there has been minimal subsequent 
attention to anxiety, despite the fact that it was a core concept for the Anna Freudian trad-
ition of psychoanalysis inherited by Fonagy, such as in the work of Sandler.6 Even though dy-
namic interpersonal therapy is ostensibly an adaptation of MBT for people with depression 
or depression and anxiety, there is no sustained published discussion of how the treatment is 
presumed to address anxiety. Indeed, Fonagy appears to recommend cognitive- behavioural 
 4 Ensink, K. (2004). Assessing Theory of Mind, Affective Understanding and Reflective Functioning in Primary 
School‐Aged Children. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, London: University College London; Ensink, K., 
Normandin, L., Target, M., Fonagy, P., Sabourin, S., and Berthelot, N. (2015). ‘Mentalization in Children and 
Mothers in the Context of Trauma: An Initial Study of the Validity of the Child Reflective Functioning Scale’. 
British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 33(2): 203– 217; Bizzi, F., Ensink, K., Borelli, J. L., Mora, S. C., and 
Cavanna, D. (2019). ‘Attachment and Reflective Functioning in Children with Somatic Symptom Disorders and 
Disruptive Behavior Disorders’. European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 28(5): 705– 717. A parallel distinction has 
been made in scaling the Parent Development Interview for mentalization by Suchman, N. E., DeCoste, C., Leigh, 
D., and Borelli, J. (2010). ‘Reflective Functioning in Mothers with Drug Use Disorders: Implications for Dyadic 
Interactions with Infants and Toddlers’. Attachment & Human Development, 12: 567– 585.
 5 Thinking on embodied mentalizing has offered one way that questions about proto- thoughts and feelings are 
starting to be explored, though this has not seen much attention since Shai, D. and Fonagy, P. (2014). ‘Beyond 
Words: Parental Embodied Mentalizing and the Parent Infant Dance’, in M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver (eds), 
Mechanisms of Social Connections: From Brain to Group, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 
pp. 185– 203. Another resource here may be Winnicott’s concept of ‘aliveness’. See Goldman, D. (2013). ‘Vital 
Sparks and the Form of Things Unknown’. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 33(1): 3– 20.
 6 E.g. Freud, A. (1977). ‘Fears, Anxieties, and Phobic Phenomena’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 
32(1): 85– 90; Sandler, A. M. (1977). ‘Beyond Eight- Month Anxiety’. The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 
58: 195– 207; Sandler, A. and Freud, A. (1982). ‘Discussions in the Hampstead Index on “The Ego and the 
Mechanisms of Defence”: VI. Orientation of the Processes of Defence According to the Source of Anxiety’. Bulletin 
of the Anna Freud Centre, 5(1): 5– 35. See also ‘The problem of anxiety is a nodal point at which the most various 
and important questions converge, a riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on our whole 
mental existence.’ Freud, S. ([1916– 1917] 2001). Introductory Lectures on Psycho- Analysis (standard edition), 
London: Hogarth Press, 15– 16, p. 393.
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therapy rather than a mentalization- based approach for children with anxiety.7 One reason 
for the relative lack of concern with anxiety for Fonagy and colleagues and other scholars 
working on mentalizing is that it does not align with their assumption that mental states are 
intentional (see Chapter 4). This assumption works well enough for some feelings like fear 
and disgust. But anxiety— and some other affects— can be free- floating, corresponding to a 
general sense of threat rather than a specific object. In general terms, anxiety can be concep-
tualized as the perception of present or future threat (general or specific), plus uncertainty 
(especially when extensive or poorly modulated), plus difficulty modulating uncertainty, in 
the absence of perceived help. The theory offered by Fonagy and colleagues is relevant to each 
of these elements. To sketch some illustrative directions for thinking about mentalization 
and anxiety: as we saw in Chapter 4, mentalization helps modulate threat appraisal and may 
help sustain access to help from others, whereas non- mentalizing reduces the modulation of 
uncertainty. In turn, high levels of anxiety hinders mentalizing. By contrast, reflection of the 
opacity of one’s own or others’ minds, or reflection on one’s own or others’ destructive feel-
ings, may contribute to both anxiety and successful mentalizing. Drawing on the reflections 
in Chapter 5, it may be supposed that the modes of non- mentalizing contribute to relatively 
distinct and identifiable forms of anxiety:
 • Pretend mode anxiety may be persecutory, because it is not tied down by actual states of 
affairs and the ordinary limitations of their ramifications.8
 • Psychic equivalence anxiety may centre around the sense of crushing reality without 
alternatives or openings.
 • Teleological mode anxiety may be seen as a sense of panicked urgency, in the desire to 
concretely resolve perceived problems and meet standards.
Further theory and research on the relationship between anxiety and mentalization may 
help contribute to further advancement of the paradigm, and to its clinical efficacy in plan-
ning and delivering treatment.
Some remaining questions: non- mentalizing
The most important issue facing the account of non- mentalizing, and perhaps the most sig-
nificant limitation of the paradigm as a whole, is the lack of operationalization of pretend 
mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode. In our view, this has profoundly hindered 
the validation and advancement of these ideas over time. The attempt by another research 
group to operationalize the modes of non- mentalizing appears not to have been registered 
by Fonagy and colleagues.9 Whereas the modes of non- mentalizing have been central to the 
theorizing and advice on clinical technique offered by Fonagy, in fact this has all occurred 
without specific supporting evidence— and places the theory and clinical guidance subject 
 7 Fonagy, P. (2016). ‘Guest Post: It’s Important to Recognise When Childhood Anxiety is Becoming a 
Problem.’ Accessed at: https:// www.mumsnet.com/ Talk/ guest_ posts/ 2710877- Guest- post- Its- important- to- 
 recognise- when- childhood- anxiety- is- becoming- a- problem.
 8 See e.g. Craib, I. (1994). The Importance of Disappointment, Bristol: Psychology Press.
 9 Hausberg, M. C., Schulz, H., Piegler, T., Happach, C. G., Klöpper, M., Brütt, A. L., . . . and Andreas, S. (2012). 
‘Is a Self- Rated Instrument Appropriate to Assess Mentalization in Patients with Mental Disorders? Development 
and first validation of the Mentalization Questionnaire (MZQ)’. Psychotherapy Research, 22(6): 699– 709. See also 
Gagliardini, G. and Colli, A. (2019). ‘Assessing Mentalization: Development and Preliminary Validation of the 
Modes of Mentalization Scale’. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 36(3): 249– 258.
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to the criticisms Fonagy levelled at psychoanalytic theory in the 1990s. If we compare the 
account of non- mentalizing to the six changes to psychoanalytic practice recommended 
by Fonagy as the basis for scientific credibility (see Chapter 2), this raises the following 
concerns:
 • We do not actually know empirically that the three modes of non- mentalizing are nega-
tively associated with mentalizing, or how strongly.
 • We do not know that the reduction in non- mentalizing is associated with reduced 
symptoms or greater quality of life.
 • We do not know whether MBT reduces all three modes of non- mentalizing. We do not 
know what components of MBT are effective for what forms of non- mentalizing.
A further set of questions for future work on non- mentalizing will be to consolidate an evolu-
tionary perspective, attentive to mechanisms at individual and population levels. One way to 
do this would be to ask Tinbergen’s four questions of each of the modes of non- mentalizing:10 
How did it develop in the individual? What causes it? What is its function? How did it evolve 
in the species? Fonagy and colleagues have certainly addressed function and development. 
The account of the evolutionary basis of the modes of non- mentalizing is currently a sketch 
and warrants further attention. Cross- species comparison may help specify the role of rep-
resentational and non- representational processes more sharply, alongside the phylogenetic 
building blocks of the non- mentalizing modes. However, perhaps most importantly, the 
proximal cause of non- mentalizing would benefit from exploration, hypothesis generation 
and empirical scrutiny. For instance, subsequent inquiry may consider forms of pleasure/ 
enjoyment attending the modes of non- mentalizing, and help them to become reinforcing. 
It may be that non- mentalizing can feel invigorating, vital, or a relief in certain localized 
ways that help prompt this state of mind.11 An obstacle that has repeatedly obscured effective 
examination of the cause of non- mentalizing has been the concept of ‘trauma’ as used by 
Fonagy and colleagues. Both recognition of the need for better specification and some of the 
ongoing problems with the concept of trauma in the work of Fonagy and colleagues can be 
seen in their recent chapter in the second edition of the Handbook of Mentalising in Mental 
Health Practice.12 These include: 1) an overencompassing (and unoperationalizable) defin-
ition of trauma as ‘experiences that go beyond the average expectable environment’;13 2) a 
characterization of the most important traumas as occurring, and healed, primarily by at-
tachment relationships, without a specification of what an attachment relationship is; 3) the 
claim that ‘aversity becomes traumatic only when it is compounded by the individual’s sense 
that his or her mind is alone’,14 a proposal that certainly contains insight, but has aspects of 
 10 Tinbergen, N. (1963). ‘On Aims and Methods of Ethology’. Zeitschrift Tierpsychology, 20: 410– 433.
 11 Cf. Bollas, C. (1996). ‘Borderline Desire’. International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 5(1): 5– 10. ‘The borderline 
personality unconsciously seeks emotional turbulence because this complex of affect is the shape of the object of 
desire. Whether these people were intrinsically disturbed as infants, or, whether the early object world was itself 
disturbing, they knew the maternal object as disruptive effect. This effect then became the shape of the object, so, 
in seeking turbulence they are in fact constituting the primary object. As painful and disturbing an event as this is, 
it is nonetheless desired and finding themselves in states of distress is unconsciously gratifying. This person culti-
vates “borderline objects” which evoke turbulent frames of mind’ (p. 6).
 12 Luyten, P., Malcorps, S., Fonagy, P., and Ensink, K. (2019). ‘Mentalising and Trauma’, in Anthony Bateman 
and Peter Fonagy (eds), Handbook of Mentalising in Mental Health Practice (2nd edn), Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, pp. 79– 102.
 13 Ibid. 82.
 14 Ibid. 86.
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a soundbite. It seems to assume that reframing of one’s experience in discussion with others 
is the sole means by which adversity does not become traumatic. This claim is difficult to 
evaluate given that the term ‘trauma’ is used so generally, and given that the account of ‘with 
one’s mind’ seems to slide about between metaphor, phenomenological description, and 
causal mechanism.
Questions remain also regarding the status of ‘alienation of the alien self ’. Has the 
concept dropped out of the theory? Or is it in fact a fourth mode of non- mentalizing? At 
present, links between this concept and theoretical developments of the 2000s and 2010s 
(e.g. epistemic trust, the p- factor) remain poor. This is despite the strong potential for 
relevant connections— for instance, between the alien self and epistemic credulity. If it 
is decided that alienation of the alien self is to be rehabilitated as a live element of the 
theory, a question that could be valuable to pursue is whether there are forms of alien 
self that contribute positively to mentalizing under certain conditions. For instance, it 
might be considered that the ambitions for ourselves to which we aspire form a kind of 
‘alien self ’, which may contribute to rumination but which may also, or instead, con-
tribute to efforts to achieve a life commensurate with our hopes and values.15 If the 
‘alien self ’ is reinvigorated as a concern, another question might be whether alien selves 
with the same correlates and clinical meanings are created through sustained use of pre-
tend mode, psychic equivalence, and teleological mode. There are hints in the work of 
Fonagy and colleagues that the different forms of non- mentalizing populate different 
kinds of innerscape, but this has not been considered explicitly. For instance, Fónagy 
and Fonagy’s account of primary and secondary meanings (see Chapter 2) may suggest 
that teleological mode focuses on primary meanings at the expense of secondary mean-
ings, and the intentional at the expense of the non- intentional, and so loses the richness 
and nuance these provide.
Finally, an exciting set of questions is opened up by the emerging ideas of Fonagy and col-
leagues regarding collective non- mentalizing. Among other things, their account of system-
atically distorted public communication undermining the deliberative basis of democratic 
societies can be regarded as an incipient political theory.16 This would be attended by an 
incipient theory of the psychosocial mechanisms of dehumanization. For instance, the pol-
itical objectification of humans may be analysed in terms of how propaganda is sustained by 
pretend mode, how the emotive construction of threats is sustained by psychic equivalence, 
and how the replacement of the intentions of individuals with reifications of their labour or 
political ‘will’ is sustained by teleological mode.
Finally, as we saw in Chapter 9, Fonagy and colleagues identify a major shift in their cur-
rent thinking on the basis of attention to the wider social system. We perceive great potential 
benefits of a ‘distributed model’ of mentalizing— and epistemic trust— rather than treating 
these as capacities lodged solely in the heads of individuals. This would help facilitate atten-
tion to the conditions that support mentalizing capacity and forms of epistemic trust. For 
instance, attention to the material conditions of mentalizing could open opportunities for 
dialogue and collaborative research with researchers in architecture, urban planning, and 
geography.
 15 Cf. Blos, P. (1974). ‘The Genealogy of the Ego Ideal’. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 29(1): 43– 88.
 16 See Habermas, J. (1970). ‘On Systematically Distorted Communication’. Inquiry, 13(1– 4): 205– 218.
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Some remaining questions: epistemic trust
Mentalizing and non- mentalizing has been a long- standing concern for Fonagy and col-
leagues, and the outstanding questions above arise in reflection on an established research 
programme and clinical modality. By contrast, their work on epistemic trust is more recent 
and emergent. We hope that future work will include efforts to operationalize epistemic trust, 
epistemic mistrust, epistemic vigilance, epistemic hypervigilance, and epistemic credulity. 
However, there are some theoretical questions that may have precedence. This includes the 
question of the object of ‘trust’. Their account tends to imply that trust is in the thoughts of 
others. It remains ambiguous whether they think it is possible to have epistemic trust or mis-
trust in the feelings of others. The capacity for epistemic trust or mistrust in the thoughts or 
feelings of oneself would also benefit from further attention, because this has barely been ac-
knowledged but would seem to be of the utmost importance for linking the idea of epistemic 
trust to the capacity to reconceive thoughts and feelings as part of mentalizing.
It would be good to see attention to the relationship between epistemic mistrust and the 
forms of non- mentalizing. An obstacle to date has been the rather limited diet of examples of 
epistemic trust and mistrust used by Fonagy and colleagues, which focus on parent– infant 
and therapist– client interactions. Both these forms of interaction have quite specific power 
dynamics that are unrepresentative of most adult interactions, and which contribute to un-
usual configurations of trust and mistrust. One consequence, discussed in Chapter 9, is that 
the role of power dynamics in epistemic trust and mistrust can be left out of frame by Fonagy 
and colleagues. This has left significant open questions about how the epistemic mistrust of 
others, including in collective forms through epistemic oppression, can contribute to forms 
of non- mentalizing. This could help advance the interest Fonagy and colleagues have dem-
onstrated in identifying the societal conditions that contribute to the prevalence of border-
line personality disorder. Their current emphasis on the role of ‘fragmented, dehumanizing 
social systems’ across society runs some risk of aligning with Fonagy’s pessimism about 
social change. By contrast, attention to the ways that epistemic mistrust contributes to in-
stitutionalized forms of non- mentalizing may offer a more specific, testable, and optimistic 
locus for concern.17
Core strengths of the theory
Having described some particular reflections across the chapters of the book which we hope 
will be constructive for the paradigm, and identified some outstanding questions for future 
theory and research, we would like to close by highlighting what we see as core propulsive 
strengths of the theory of mentalization and epistemic trust. In closing the present book, we 
wish to draw attention to five features of the paradigm that we see as contributing especially 
to its tremendous strengths.
First, as documented in Chapter 2, Fonagy and colleagues have assembled a remarkable 
institutional and theoretical edifice, permitting the movement of knowledge across different 
domains. Perhaps most remarkably, their paradigm has helped sustain bi- directional transfer 
 17 This would align with advances in sociological theory. The concept of general societal fragmentation, which 
Fonagy and colleagues take from Durkheim, is generally regarded by sociologists today as limited; more specific 
causes tend to be identified in the rules, norms and routines that organise institutionalised practices. Baert, P. and 
Da Silva, F. C. (2010). Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, Cambridge: Polity, Chapter 1.
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of knowledge between psychoanalysis and health services research and policy. Fonagy and 
colleagues have been unusually reflexive in their work, repeatedly sensing earlier than peers 
which way the winds are blowing in sociological pressures faced by psychological research 
and practice. As well as helping defend against threats and make use of opportunities rep-
resented by these pressures, this reflexivity has also helped their work in other ways— for 
instance, in helping them tailor their message to different constituencies.
Second, as Chapter 3 identified, their theory is intrinsically and insistently developmental.18 
This has contributed to the acuity of research, such as the Anna Freud longitudinal study (see 
Chapter 2) and the pre- natal use of the Adult Attachment Interview (see Chapter 3). It has 
helped the theory incorporate insights from the developmental psychopathology movement, 
such as the p- factor and the idea of symptom networks (see Chapter 7). The developmental per-
spective has also underpinned adaptations of MBT to support children and adolescents, and 
parents and other caregivers (Chapter 8). Without a doubt, the theory of mentalization has con-
tributed to a great deal of important empirical work with relevance across a range of disciplines.
Third, MBT offers a clinical modality with impressive transferability between settings 
and evidence of efficacy for many populations. Early indications suggest that the modality 
has adapted very fluently to remote delivery during the COVID- 19 pandemic. Some elem-
ents of MBT are relatively generic, and the training burden for practitioners is comparatively 
light. However, MBT also offers compelling and distinctive clinical guidance— for instance, 
in the proposal that therapists pursue ‘contrary moves’ to help expand patients’ repertoire 
of mentalizing (Chapter 8). Likewise, there is a great deal of clinical acuity in the account of 
the modes of non- mentalizing. The distinction between hypermentalizing and mentalizing 
is important in its commitment to the therapeutic value of accurate integration objectively 
perceived with subjectively conceived reality. For all that they have not been operationalized 
and so remain scientifically underdeveloped, the forms of non- mentalizing are perspica-
cious characterizations of ways in which information may be filtered, obstructing genera-
tive doubt. They represent a distinctive contribution, irreducible to either existing cognitive 
models or psychoanalytic concepts of defence.
Fourth, the ideas of Fonagy and colleagues have an underpinning architecture, reflected 
in the 18 key concepts explored in this book. The writings of Fonagy and colleagues are care-
fully crafted to be accessible to specific audiences, and their clarity can give the impression 
that they need only be read once to be fully understood. This has misled some critics, par-
ticularly from within psychoanalysis, who misapprehend Fonagy and colleagues as a sim-
plified and superficial version of familiar psychoanalytic notions. Yet, when the works of 
Fonagy and colleagues are looked at in the round, an underpinning architecture comes into 
focus, and reveals the huge questions pursued by the researchers and, ultimately, the depth of 
their response. So for instance a measure such as the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire 
may appear to be a simple set of items to a psychoanalytic critic, but in fact possesses in-
genious and theoretically- innovative aspects in the conceptualization of certainty, uncer-
tainty, and mental health. In one of his papers, Derrida asks, ‘What is it in a “great” work, 
let’s say of Plato, Shakespeare, Hugo, Mallarmé, James, Joyce, Kafka, Heidegger, Benjamin, 
Blanchot, Celan, that resists erosion? What is it that, far from being exhausted in amnesia, 
increases its reserve to the very extent to which one draws from it, as if expenditure aug-
mented the capital?’19 In the case of Fonagy and colleagues, a strength of their work is its 
 18 See Sroufe, L. A. (2009). ‘The Concept of Development in Developmental Psychopathology’. Child 
Development Perspectives, 3(3): 178– 183.
 19 Derrida, J. (1989). ‘Biodegradables’. Critical Inquiry, 15: 812– 873.
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underpinning architecture, which allows clinical, theoretical, and research activities to 
cross- fertilize and sustain one another. For instance, ideas from attachment theory about 
adaptation have been drawn upon to qualify the potential pathologization of patients associ-
ated with diagnosis and deficit models; and empirical findings from developmental psycho-
pathology (e.g. symptom networks) have been used to qualify limitations with attachment 
theory.
Fifth, something frankly quite distinctive about the work of Fonagy and colleagues has 
been their openness to development and refinement of their theory, through the incorpor-
ation of ideas from different communities. Theory, research, and clinical practice have been 
conducted in a way that, whenever possible, maintains ‘inquisitive stance’: acknowledging 
the potential for influence, surprise, change, and learning with and from others. Key mo-
ments include:
 • The integration of ideas from within psychoanalysis: the Anna Freudian and Kleinian 
traditions of psychoanalysis, as well as the work of Winnicott (Chapters 1, 2 and 6).
 • The integration of ideas from within cognitive science: work by researchers on social 
cognition (Chapter 3) and Gergely and Csibra’s natural pedagogy theory (Chapter 7).
 • The integration of ideas from within developmental science: the tradition of empirical 
attachment research in the 1990s (Chapter 3), and subsequent advances in develop-
mental psychopathology and evolutionary approaches to behaviour (Chapter 7).
 • A significant transition seems to be presently underway in growing concern with cul-
ture and the wider social system (Chapter 9).
It is our hope that the reflections offered in the present book may contribute to greater 
understanding of the work of Fonagy and colleagues. We also hope they will prove useful for 
further refinements of the paradigm.
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